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2ABSTRACT
Most studies in the Third World conclude that the magnitude of 
poverty and Equality amongst the majority of the rural population has 
increased. This is particularly emphasised for Bangladesh. But scholars 
differ in explaining the causes of this depressing trend. One group 
would attribute it to the natural/demographic factors; while others 
insist that inequality and poverty are manifestations of certain socio­
economic processes which cause the peasantry to disintegrate. The two 
divergent views strikingly resemble the famous debate on differentiation 
of the peasantry which took place in Russia in the late 19th and early 
20th century between the Populists and Marxists.
The present study makes an attempt to apply the principal 
hypotheses of that debate in the context of two villages in 
Bangladesh. Data generated through a prolonged, indepth survey into 
demographic and socio-economic aspects of households of these two 
villages have been used to test the hypotheses.
The major findings of the study are as follows :
i) The hypothesis that it is family size which 
determines the relative wealth of any household 
does not always hold good, 
ii) The 'social mobility' schema or the lack of 
class differential hypothesis does not always 
appear to be true, 
iii) Clearly a pattern of differentiation between 
owners and non-owners of material elements of 
production, including land, has emerged in 
rural Bangladesh, 
iv) The speed of this differentiation is higher 
in a village which has acquired some 'Green 
Revolution1 technology, 
v) The old relations of production and exchange 
are changing along with the differentiation 
and a process of dispossession of the poor 
and enlargement of the rich holdings are 
gaining momentum. However, this 'proletarianisation' 
is, as yet, 'partial'.
3'vi) The state has been actively negotiating 
on behalf of capital to subsume labour. 
The rich peasantry has clearly benefited 
from state intervention with respect to 
the peasantry. This has only accentuated 
the process of differentiation of the 
peasantry.
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Bangladesh t Basic Features
1. Location and Area :
Located in the tropical zone with longitudinal 
bounds at 20.3*+°N and 26.38°N and latitudinal 
bounds at 88.01°E and 92.*+l°E.
Total land area is 1*0,998 km^ (55,598 square 
miles) including rivers (the river areas 
encompass 9,065 km /3 ,50Q square miles).
Largely a deltaic plain formed by the outlet of 
the Ganges (Padma) and Brahmaputra (Jamuna) Rivers 
into the Bay of Bengal (see Map at page -15).
2. Climate
Tropical Monsoon with heavy rains in May-September,
Annual Rainfal : 1.*f to 5 metres.
Temperature : 22°c - 28°c.
3- Population ;
Total Population : Around 90 million (1981)
Rate of Growth : 2.59%
Density : 1,566 persons per square mile.
Labour force as % of total population : 35*2% 
Agricultural labour force as % of total labour 
force : 55**+% (197*+ Census figures).
Rural Population : 91*22%
Urban Population : 8.78%
*+. Structure of G.D.P;
(1979-8o estimates)
Sector % Share
Agriculture 55*26
Manufacture 8.39
Trade, transport 25.00
and other services
Construction, Power, 11.35
Gas, Housing etc.
Total : 100.00
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5- Per Capita Income/Land :
G.D.P Per Capita (1977) : US$ 91 
Land Per Capita n .3^  acre.
6 . Currency :
1 taka - 100 poisha
1 US ^  ss about 20 taka (as of February 1982)
7. Measures :
1 maund = ^0 seers - around 37 kilos = 1/27 ton. 
1 bigha = J acre = 0 .1 3 hectares.
8 . Administrative Divisions (as of March 1981) :
a) Divisions : k
b) Districts 1 21
c) Sub-divisions : 71
d) Thanas : 7^5
e) Unions : ,^365
f) Mouzas i 60,316
g) V illage :
i) Less than 50 households
ii) 50 or more households
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The last few decades have witnessed a rapid increase in the 
magnitude of poverty and inequality amongst the vast majority of 
the rural population in Bangladesh (ILO, 1977* 137; Alamgir, 1978: 
11-18; Stepanek, 1979s 189; GOBD, 1980: 1-15; Osmani and Rahman,
1981: 22-53).
Scholars differ widely in explaining the ever increasing poverty 
and asset inequality in rural Bangladesh. One group would attribute 
it to natural/demographic factors as exemplified in their notion of 
of a predominant 'peasant mode of production' (Abdullah, Hossain and 
Nations, 1976; Abdullah, 1978; Khan and Latif, 197*0* They were mainly 
inspired to reach such a categorisation of the Bangladesh economy by 
two findings from some macro-level surveys (GOP, 1962; Bose, 1973;
BBS, 1977):
i) The absence of a substantial class of landlords and holders,
ii) The low level of the average size of holding.
From these findings the above scholars concluded that the rural 
economy of Bangladesh is best described as a 'peasant economy' based 
on small family farms operated primarily with family labour 
(Abdullah, Hossain and Nations, 1976: 210). Abdullah later elaborated 
this concept of a 'peasant mode of production' in these terms:
The primary form of surplus-appropriation is direct 
appropriation by the direct producers, assoicated 
into 'collective workers' through the mediation of 
the kinship, in the form of domestic groups (augmented 
at need through the creation of putative kin relations). 
Access to the main means of production, and hence re­
production of the unit of material appropriation, is 
basically controlled by kinship relations. The 'law of 
motion* of the mode depend mainly on natural/demographic 
factors.(Abdullah, 1978: 361)
19
Abdullah et al argues that inequality in the peasantry is a 
temporary phenomenon and is, therefore, "tolerable, domination 
veiled, and the stratification obscured by kinship and quasi-kinship 
formations in which dominance is legitimised through extra-economic 
personalised sanctions" (Abdullah et al, 1976: 217).
It is this network of personalised relations which reproducer 
the system of 'peasant economy' in the absence of known types of 
markets for land and labour (where normally "the blind laws of supply 
and demand work out their inexorable and impersonal logic"). In the 
'peasant economy' the labour and land exchanges are embedded in more 
'diffuse social relations' (Abdullah et al, 1976:216-217).
And once one accepts the above assertions, inequality amongst 
the peasantry becomes structurally insignificant. The peasantry then
becomes "a social entity of comparatively low 'classness'........ "
(Abdullah et_ aJL, 1976: 217). In the presence of such a class harmony, 
rural development becomes merely a technical and cultural operation —  
the formation of farmer groups large enough to match the lumpy 
investment; and the problems of methods, since 'peasants' were auto­
nomous, self-sufficiept family farming units (Hart, 1971).
1
The Comilla. model of rural development, which started in the 
1960s' was essentially based on the above notions of 'harmonious', 
'homogeneous' peasantry. The presence of 'surplus' peasants and the 
'domination' of the co-operatives by them do not negate the above 
notion of the peasantry. Their existence is explained largely in 
terms of "traditionally strong lineages which have managed to dominate 
the co-operatives, new irrigation opportunities, fertilizer distribu­
tion etc. through their political connections with government 
officials.." (Wood, 1978: 1).
The Comilla co-operative model consists of a two-tier structure:
(i) the village based primary co-operatives called the KSS ('Krishi 
Samabava Samiti' or Agricultural co-operative Association) and
(ii) their federation at the thana level called the ACF (Agricultural 
Co-operatives' Federation). Akhter Hamid Khan, an ex-Civil Servant, 
conceived and led the programme during the 1960s, the first decade of 
its development.
20
There is the related notion that these elites do not constitue 
a class, since the division of the holding between sons ensures a process 
of "cyclical mobility" or indeed "cyclical kulakisra" (Bertocci, 1972), 
Thus, to Bertocci, rural stratification appears flexible and fluid as 
the elites circulate over time and space (Bertocci, 1976: XVII).
This notion of homogeneity of the peasantry in Bangladesh has 
led policy makers to replicate the Comilla Co-operative model 
throughout the country in the name of Intregrated Rural Development 
Programme (IRDP) in the early 1970s (Khan, 1979) and the latter-day 
comprehensive rural development in the late 1970s and early 
1980s (GOBD, 1980: XVII).
In recent years, international organisations and aid giving
agencies have been showing concern about the rural development strategy
(McNamara, 1982). They too, subscribe to the views that nothing
should be done to disturb the ’class harmony' which exists in the
rural areas of the third world countries. While giving support to
the view that in the absence of much socio-economic differences,
population control policy can help mitigate the problems of poverty
and inequality, these organisations advocate the preservation of
2
homogeneity and equality in the rural areas. Since Bangladesh is 
mainly an aid dependent country, the rural development policies 
advocated by these donor agencies do find reflection in its policies.
20ECD, an important aid giving organisation emphasises the maintenance
of homogeneity amongst the peasantry in these words:
  giving priority to the poorest people, however, does not
mean they have to be isolated and regarded as a clearly difined 
and homogenous group that can be reached as such. In fact, poor 
people differ among themselves in age, sex, religion, caste.etc.
In addition, their relationships with the rich vary according to 
many different factors; history, geography, and socio-economic 
and cultural context. Rural Development policy should endeavour 
to reach them through the basic group to which they belong:rural 
family, village or group<£villages. The basic units rather than 
individual persons should be agents and beneficiaries of Rural 
Development policy. The more fortunate members of the units 
should not be excluded from Rural Development policy as is 
recommended by some specialists (OECD, 1978: 82).
21
At the other end of the spectrum, there is a group of scholars 
who insist that inequality and poverty are the signs of the gradual
■5
differentiation ofagrarian classes (Jahangir, 1979; Alamgir, 1978; 
Siddiqui, 1980b; Arens and Beurden, 1977; Haque, 1978; Rahman, 1979 etc). 
According to this group of scholars, the 'peasant1 has experienced a 
fundamental revolution in his structural role in Bangladesh society: 
i.e. the social division of labour in rural Bangladesh has undergone 
a qualitative change. The peasantry has undergone certain processes 
causing them to be fragmented. As a result, there has been created 
a structural role for the ’peasant' in the over all social division 
of labour.
The two contrasting views on the peasantry in Bangladesh have 
striking similarities with the famous debate on the differentiation 
of the peasantry that took place in Russia in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century. The debate played a crucial role in 
shaping the theoretical understanding of social forces in Russia on 
the eve of the Revolution (Lenin, 1977a; Cox, 1979; Shanin, 1972; 
Harrison, 1972, 1975, 1977; Solomon, 1977; Patnaik, 1979;
Kitching 1982 etc.). Though this lively debate was suddenly pushed 
into the background during the collectivisation programme of Stalin, 
its significance, has, nevertheless, not diminished. Its influence 
is still very strong in present-day thinking on development. 
Historically, there developed a fierce debate between two schools 
of thought - the Populist and the Marxist which "proceeded unabated, 
rapidly increasing in sophistication, to reach a new and final height 
in the official 1926 debate conducted by the Soviet Agricultural 
Academy" (Shanin, 198O: 88-89).
^Differentiation denotes (a) the processes of becoming separate 
distinct, specialized; the acquisition of specialized forms out 
of generalized or homogeneous ones; and (b) that which results 
from such a process (Gould and Kolb, 196 ;^ 198-199)•
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The legacy of the PopuliBt school of thought was borne by 
Chayanov, the director of the Academy and his other colleagues.
This school of thought denied the significance of the social division 
of labour and found the peasantry as a more or less homogeneous entity, 
which showed extreme stability and viability over a long period of 
time. The inequalities which existed were a reflection of demographic 
processes associated with the generational cycle of peasant households 
(or family farms) (Chayanov, 1966: 66-69).
According to Chayanov, the difference within the peasant economy 
are purely temporary phenomenon; if sufficient time is allowed to pass, 
one would get a picture of 'complete static calm1 in the relative sense 
of the term. Family size, being the adjusting variable, brings back 
this stability.
In sharp condradiction to the above 1 demographic/non-social * 
ideas of differentiation of the peasantry, Marxist, especially Lenin, 
viewed the Russian peasantry as highly differentiated and fragmented 
into conflicting classes emanating from the development of commodity 
production and hence the social division of labour (Lenin, 1977a:37-192)• 
Making use of the empirical investigation into the Russain peasantry 
(available in the form of Zemstvo statistics) Lenin proved that the 
old patriarchal peasantry was undergoing utter dissolution and that 
new types of rural inhabitants (i.e. the rural bourgeoisie and rural 
proletariat) were being created as the end product of the processes 
of differentiation. Kritsman and his followers made valuable metho­
dological contributions to this debate in the post-Revolution period 
and carried forward the ideas of Lenin by applying them empirically 
(see Solomon, 1977 for details).
In the specific context of Bangladesh none of the studies 
cited earlier has made explict use of the conceptual tool called 
differentiation of peasantry. Neither was any attempt made to apply 
the concepts empirically through rigorous field work exercises.
Arens and Beurden (1977), Siddiqui (1980b) and Jahangor (1979) 
made some good efforts to this end through extensive field works.
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However, except for Jahangir, they did not address explicitly the 
issue of differentiation. Jahangir's study, for its part, has failed 
to draw its conceptual hyptheses from the debate on differentiation 
and most of his findings look, at times, exaggerated and superficial.
In view of these research gaps the present study atteraps to 
operationalise the concepts of differentiation that we have highlighted 
and test the hypotheses propounded by both the Chayanovian and Leninist 
schools of thought. To that end, we focus primarily on two villages of 
Bangladesh where I have done extensive fieldwork. I plan to proceed 
in the following way.*
Chapter II elaborates upon the Russian debate on differentiation 
i.e. between the two schools of thought - the Chayanovian and the 
Leninist. We will focus here not only on the theoretical but also on 
the methodoligical innovations which both schools made in the course 
of their intellectual exercises.
Chapter III considers the applicability of the debate in the 
context of Bangladesh, Here we also consider some of the similar 
attempts made by others in the context of other third world countries. 
We also bring out certain hypotheses to be tested empirically in the 
specific context of rural Bangladesh.
Chapter IV, mainly based on macro-level data, provides a broad 
overview of the agrarian structure and the concomitant inequality in 
rural Bangladesh since the 19^ 0s. This chapter forms the macro back­
ground for the micro-level investigations that follow.
In Chapter V, I put to the test the Chayanovian and related 
hypotheses on the demographic differentiation of the peasantry. I 
first test the hypotheses drawn from Chayanov in the context of 
two villages in which I collected data and then I examine the 
typotheses put forward by Shanin on the cyclical mobility by cons­
tructing mobility matrices with the help of data collected during 
my field study. Here I put to use the new methodology of collecting 
historical data through memory recall.
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Chapter VI tests the Leninist hypotheses on concentration of 
landownership/control and the consequent inequalities in rural 
Bangladesh*
Chapter VII examines the differences in the material elements 
of production other than land.
Chapter VIII, IX, and X attempt to explain the underlying 
factors that cause differentiation of the peasantry in Leninist 
lines.
Chapter VIII examines the social relations of production mainly 
centring around land-man relations, tenural arrangements, transfer of 
land, commercilization and impact of new technology.
Chapter IX examines the labour exploitation as an element of 
differentiation. Here I examine the extent of rural proletarianisation, 
focussing on the growth of hired labourers and class-in-itself changes.
Chapter X focusses on the state and the peasantry. In this 
chapter I bring out the role of the state as a vehicle of creating 
differences in the asset-ownership mechanism in rural Bangladesh.
Chapter XI concludes the thesis.
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CHAPTER II
}
THE RUSSIAN HIFEBRENTIATION DEBATE
It is inconceivable to have any substantive discussion of 
differentiation of the peasantry in any country without considering the 
issues raised in the Russian debate on this in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. The debate had its roots in the exchanges 
between Populists and Marxists during the later part of the nineteenth 
century. It followed from two divergent political views which came 
into conflict on the general question of the destiny of capitalism in 
Russia.
1. THE POPULIST VIEW
A majority of Russian intellectuals believing'in the Populist cause 
came from the disciplines of philosophy, theology, art and literature 
and raised a variety of moral and social considerations rather than 
economic ones. We, however, will primarily concentrate here on the 
thoughts of the economists of the time. We will, infact,state the 
Populist position depending mainly on two major economic theorists 
of Russian populism in the 1880s and 1890s, V.P. Vorontsov and W. 
Danielson (Kitching, 1982: 37“39)* They, unlike their predecessors, 
Herzen and Chemyshevsky (Venturi, 1966: 147-67), conceded that 
capitalism.had commenced in Russia, but argued that the nature of 
that "capitalist development was artificial in the face of an 
insignificant home market and, therefore, had no future there.
While elaborating the Idea, these two scholars argued that capitalist 
industrialization in Russia had occurred under the auspices of the 
state and under strong control of the" banks. Moreover it was 
dependent on advanced technology imported from the west. These three 
factors compelled the industrial plants to be large-scale and 
capital intensive, employing very few workers. Simultaneously, the 
industrialization tended to be more and more capital intensive to 
raise output per worker. Danielson, especially, held that this 
implied an ever Increasing volume of output and proportionately fewer 
number of workers. As a result the share of wages in total income 
would fall. Ever expanding, capitalist industrialization was
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destroying the indigenous handicraft activities of the peasants.
i
In addition, the crushing taxation imposed on the peasantry to pay 
for the industrialization was ruining all but a few. It was bound 
to encounter an early and impassable blockage in the destruction of 
the home market (Valicki, 1969* 115-26; Kitching, 1982: 37~38). £n 
the absence of an adequate home market and at the same time Russia 
being a late comer in capitalist development and in a weaker position 
as an exporter, capitalism had no potential in Russia. They thought 
that Russia had her future in the peasantry and indigeneous small- 
scale industrial activities less destructive to the peasantry.
-j
In otherwords, they believed that the mir (or the obschina ) was 
still a vital and flourishing institution. Extolling the virtues of 
'peoples* production' in the obschinas, the Populists argued that 
it would be possible to build upon this already existing foundation 
an institutional framework( through 'changes in state policy to include 
cheap credit for artisans and other non-agricultural producers, lower 
taxes and rents for the peasantry, and free agricultural advice to 
the peasants to enable them to increase their productivity' as 
advocated by Vorontsov, see Eitching,-|982 : 38) to make a direct 
transition to a kind of agrarian socialism without passing through a 
horrifying stage of capitalism. The basic assumption behind all 
these pupulist assertions was a homogeneous, self-sufficient peasantry.
1
The Obshchina was, prior to the abolition of Serfdom in Russia 
(in "1861), the unit responsible to the landlord for peasant, 
rent payments and/or for the organization of peasant work on 
the lord's land. These responsibilities were exercised by a 
council of elders. This council was known as the mir, and it 
acted in the name of Obshchina for most purposes. As a result, 
the two terms appear in most literature interchangeably 
(Katching, 1982: 35)- mir exercised the power of allocation
and redivision of land tilled by peasant households for their 
subsistence. These powers were supposed broadly to keep 
landholdings in accord with family needs. After the 
abolition of Serfdom in 1861 by Tsar. Alexender II the Obschinas 
retained the collective obligations to ensure the payment 
of rent for land tilled by peasants which remained in the 
lord's possession. Populists were attracred by this 
communal spirit of the mir.
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Populists also showed anti-'urfcanism and suspicion of money and credit 
(Kitching*ibid: 39) *
2. THE MARXIST VIEW: M I N
These Populist views of the 1880s and 1890s were fiercely opposed 
by Russian radicals and Marxists. Plekhanov and Lenin, the two 
noted Marxists, argued that Capitalism could not be avoided and was 
advancing rapidly aided by the very state to which Vorontsov was 
appealing to alter the whole process. As a part of this, they said, 
the unity of the village was a myth. The rich and the poor peasants 
were already divided by their class interests. Lenin®s classic,
The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1899) was designed to 
refute Vorontsov's and Danielson's (appearing as Mr V.V. and 
Mr I - in Lenin's text) arguments concerning the necessary collapse 
of the home market (Lenin, 1977a). Lenin argued, instead, the 
very ruin of peasant handicrafts and the growth of impoverishment in 
the peasantry extended the home market. According to Lenin, 
capitalism was already the dominant tendency in the Russian country­
side as well as in the towns. Russian peasants, argued Lenin, had 
already found themselves in commodity production and it was 
incorrect to think any longer of the peasantry as a homogeneous 
entity.
Lenin, after carefully examining the contemporary 'Zemstvo Statistics', 
demonstrated that there existed an unequal distribution of 
resources which automatically produced a stratified peasantry. He 
also predicted that under the competitive market system, economic 
advantages and disadvantages would develop cumulatively and that the 
peasantry would be eventually polarised into two distinct groups of 
unequal size. The peasantry would then be seen to be characterised 
by all the major contradictions of a developing commodity economy 
(Lenin, 1977a: 175) viz:
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(i) Competition;.
I
(ii)
i
the struggle for economic independence;
(iii) grabbing of land (purchasable and rentable);
(iv) Concentration of production in the hands of a minority;
(v ) the forcing of the majority into the ranks of the proletariat;
(vi) the exploitation of the proletariat by a minority through the
medium of merchant's capital;
(vii) the hiring of farm labourers.
The sum total of all these contradictions among the peasantry, 
according to Lenin, is the differentiation of the peasantry.
'Depeasantisating' is almost synonymous with this term. Lenin 
further emphasised that this process of disintegration of the 
peasantry and the emergence of property inequality was not sufficient 
to' he termed differentiation. Differentiation signified much more.
It ousted the old peasantry and brought in new types of inhabitants - 
the rural bourgeoisie (chiefly petty bourgeoisie and the rural 
proletariat - one class being commodity producers and the other class 
turning into agricultural wage workers) .
"While Lenin was theorising the concept of differentiation of the 
peasantry (mainly the small producers) he had in mind Chapter 47 of 
Marx's Capital III on Genesis of Capitalist Ground Rent. In this chapter 
Marx identified three types of rents - labour rent, rent-in-kind, and money- 
-rent. In Marx's wordsi
Labour rent arises in a system where the direct producers 
using instruments of labour (plough, cattle etc) which 
actually or legally belong to him, cultivates soil 
actually owned by him during part of the week, and works 
during the remaining days upon the estate of the feudal 
lord without any compensation from the feudal lord ........
(Marx, Das Kapital, Vol III, J23 as quoted in Lenin,
1977a: 177).
Rent-in-kind originates when the direct producer produces the 
entire product on land which he himself exploits, and gives up to the 
landowner the whole of the surplus product-in-kind. The producer here 
becomes more independent and is enabled to acquire by his labour a 
certain surplus over and above the amount of produce that satisfies his 
indispensable needs.
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In Marx's view:
........ this fbrm will give rise to greater differences in
the economic position of the individual direct producers. At least 
the possibility for such a differentiation exists, and the possi­
bility for the direct producer to have in turn acquired the means 
to exploit other labourers directly (Marx, Das Kapital, Vol III,
329 as quoted in Lenis, 1977a: 178).
Therefore, a possibility of differentiation is there in the 
rent-in-kind system. This possibility or the 'germs1 (as Lenin would 
call it) can develop only under the next form of rent, money-rent, which 
represents a mere change in the form of rent-in-kind.
In the case of money-rent, the direct producer gives up in favour 
of the owner of the land not produce, but the price of this produce in 
terms of money. Here too, the direct producer remains the traditional 
possessor of the land. Money-rent, however, presupposes a considerable 
development of commerce, urban industry, commodity production in 
general, and thereby of money circulation. The relationship between 
the peasant and the landowner then becomes purely a cash contract-based 
one. This results in the expropriation of the old peasantry on the one 
hand, and in peasant buying out his land and his liberty, on the other.
The transformation of rent-in-kind into money-rent is furthermore not only 
inevitably accompanied, but is even anticipated, by the formation of a 
class of propertyless day-labourers, who hire themselves out for money. 
During their genesis, when this new class appears but sporadically, a 
custom necessarily develops among the more prosperous peasants, subject to 
rent payments of exploiting agricultural wage labourers for their own 
account. According to Marx :
... In this way they gradually acquire the capability of 
accumulating a certain amount of wealth and themselves 
becoming transformed into future capitalists. The old 
self-employed possessors of land themselves thus give rise 
to a nursery school for capitalist tenants, whose 
development is conditioned by the general development of 
capitalist production beyond the bounds of the 
countryside (Marx, Das Kapital, Vol.Ill as quoted in 
Lenin, 1977a: 179)
It is important, therefore, to note that for Lenin 
differentiation of the peasantry and the process of capitalist development 
are identical. Differentiation of the peasantry, which develops at the 
expense of the "middle” peasantry, creates two new types of rural
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inhabitants - the rural bourgeoisie and the rural workers. The middle
i
peasantry (emphasis mine) is thus not representative of the so-called 
'community spirit* but is distinguished by the least development of 
commodity production. The middle peasants, in most cases, cannot make 
both ends meet and hence resort to loans, which are to be repaid by 
labour services. Any pressure on the economy, like a crop failure 
creates a few more proletarians out of these middle peasants. Only 
a lucky few go up to the rank of capitalists. Thus a process, 
specifically characteristic of a capitalist economy, takes place; the 
middle members are swept away and the extremes are reinforced. This is 
the process of "depeasantising", i.e. differentiation.
Using 'Zemstvo Statistics' and the 'Horse Census', Lenin grouped 
the peasantry into different categories and demonstrated empirically that 
the process of differentiation was in motion in the Russian countryside.
But he was careful to stress that the speed of differentiation was 
often halted: for example, because of the presence of usurious capital, 
or labour service.
On the other hand, the speed was accelerated by migration of the 
labouring class and the simultaneous development of the industrial sector. 
Lenin used two broad indices in order to demonstrate the differentiation 
of households in rural Russia: the amount of sown area and the number of 
horses. Later many of Lenin's followers made several attempts to 
improve the methodology of studying differentiation of the peasantry. . 
Khryaschcheva (1911) and Baskin (191~3) were two of the leading agrarian 
Marxists who tried to improve Lenin's indices of differentiation. 
Khryaschcheva supplemented Lenin's indices of 'sown area' and 'horses 
owned' with three other indices: i.e. family labour, cows owned and land
owned (Shanin, 1980: 90)- Baskin in 1913 introduced wage labour usage, 
non-agricultural income and enterprise ownership in addition to land 
sown as indices to classify the peasantry. The Marxists argued that 
Stolypin's reforms of 1906 and 1910 invested ownership of the land in the 
head of the cultivating household and severed connections with the 
Obschchina and abolished the powers of land redivision and allocation 
. of m i r . In addition the tax burden was transferred from the mir to 
the individual household heads (Gerschenkorn, 19&2: 134; Kitching, 1982: 40)* 
The reforms were designed to encourage more enterprising peasants to buy
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the lands of their neighbours and become large-scale commercial farmers. 
At the same time, less successful peasant farmers were forced to join 
the ranks of the rapidly growing industrial proletariat or become 
labourers on the land of the more successful peasants. Despite 
all these signs of a ever-increasing pace of capitalism, the Russian 
Populists continued to minimize the significance of this development.
In the wake of the Stolypin reforms, they continued to argue that except 
in a few untypical and highly commercialized areas near towns and cities 
Obshchinas remained untouched by these changes as the peasants did not 
take advantage of these legally available opportunities.
The debate continued right up to 1917* The 1917-21 Revolution and 
Civil War led to considerable levelling within the Russian villages and 
the middle peasantry, instead of being swept away (as predicted by 
Lenin), showed some resistance.
So the debate continued well after the Revolution. Though set in 
a different context, the followers of both schools of thought continued 
to argue with increasing theoretical and empirical sophistication.
3. TEE ORGANISATION - PRODUCTION SCHOOL
Encouraged by the resistance shown by the middle peasantry, a
group of rural researchers emerged in the Russian academic field who
began to carry ’forward the ideas of the Populists in a different guise -
2
which became known as Neo-populists^ This group which came to be
Neo-populism is distinguished from populism in that it is not a purely 
anti-capitalist doctrine, but rather opposes all forms of large-scale 
industrialisation including socialism. In the specific Russian context, 
Neo-populists put forward, for the first time the coherent economic 
argument that small-scale peasant production might have certain advantages 
over large-scale capital intensive agriculture (Kitching, 1982: 41-42). 
They thought reliance on the slow improvement of peasant agriculture was 
actually far more efficient, in certain circumstances ,than large 
capitalist or state farms.
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identified as the Organisation - Production Scholars (led by Chayanov) 
claimed that their work on the internal structure of the family farm and 
its viability as an entity was the most important item of rural 
inquiry.
Their defence of the peasantry has to be located in the specific
historical context of Russia. After the Revolution, Russia had become
a country of individual peasant holdings, and during the HEP period
the mai n concern of the Bolshevik regime was how to improve the productivity
of these holdings. In addition, they were anxious to secure food supply
to the cities. The nine years (1914-23) of war and civil war caused
Russian industry to collapse completely. This meant there were no
consumer goods for which the peasant could exchange their grain. The
HEP sought to restore the grain supply by allowing a free market and
simultaneously trying to expand the production of the consumer goods
which the peasant wanted. However, this policy faced fierce critisism
from within the ruling communist party. Trotsky played a leading role
amongst these critics. They argued that this policy would strenghten
the hands of the rich peasants or Kulaks who provided most of the marketed
surplus of grain. They proposed that peasant agriculture would have
to be collectivised and then mechanised. Simultaneously, priority should
be given to the producers goods rather than consumer goods. This would
ensure industrial growth in the long run to provide modern inputs
(fertilizer, tractors) to develop agriculture and ensuring rising food
3supply to the cities.
In this situation Chayanov’s book (1926) represented a defence of 
the peasantry and opposition to the above views. In addition he continued 
to represent many of the populist views in more sophisticated forms.
 ^E. Preobrazhensky’s The Hew Economics (1926) was the theoretical 
statement of the views of the critics of HEP.
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According to Daniel Thorner;
"Chayanov synthesized the theoretical ideas of his predecessors 
and developed them along original lines" (Thomer in the introduction 
of Chayanov, 1966: XII),
While Chayanov was emerging as an important defender of the 
homogeneous peasantry, a group of Agrarian Marxists led hy Kritsman 
(1925) felt strongly that the most urgent task for research in post­
revolution Russia was the study of the social and economic stratification 
of the peasantry (Solomon, 1977; Shanin, 1980; Cox, 1979)* Thus the 
debate continued throughout the 1920s. Although it initially centred 
around the academic spheres in a good spirit, later it became a tool for 
political rivalry and had an unhappily abrupt ending.
We will here present the contrasting views on the Russian peasantry
in the 1920s in two stages: first the views and methods of investigation
of the peasantry of the Agrarian Marxists^ and secondly, the ideas of 
5
Chayanov in detail.
4
We will examine the methodological developments of Kritsman and his 
associates in detail in Chapter III with a view to bring out certain 
testable empirical methods for classifying the peasantry in a present- 
day Third World country. We will make attempt to apply these indices 
later in our empirical chapters.
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Since, Chayanov Is correctly put forward by-Thorner as the representative 
of the school of thought opposed to Lenin, we will concentrate on his 
ideas to focus on the other side of the debate. In the words of 
Thorner:
In fact, Chayanov1s whole approach - his selection 
of the pure family farm as the typical Russian unit, his 
insistence on the survival power of such family farms, 
and his treatment of rural differentiation in terms of 
demographic cycles rather than class antagonisms - 
was diametrically opposed to that of Lenin. (Thorner, 
in the Introduction of Chayanov, 1966: XXI)
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4- KRITSMAN AND HIS-FELLOW AGRARIAN MARXISTS ON THE
DIFFERENTIATION OF THE PEASANTRY:
The Agrarian Marxists, in the 1920s, involved themselves in 
enunciating and improving a theory in the Marxist tradition and made 
valuable contributions towards developing an appropriate methodology to 
study the problems which they considered crucial at that time. Kritsman 
and his fellow Agrarian Marxists faced a peculiar situation arising out 
of inverse leasing in the post-Revolution and Civil War Russia. For 
example, in the new context, a rich peasant was increasingly hired in, 
together with his implements and horses, by his poor n e i g h b o u r s ,  in 
the new circumstances of NEP, Kritsman and his associates, therefore, 
concluded that the emerging pattern of differentiation could not be 
explained with the help of the older indices (Gox, 1979* 2-4). He 
argued that stratification by ’sown area1 (originally suggested by 
Lenin) was inadequate as the peasantry was being differentiated by the 
ownership of scarce animals rather than land sown (which had levelled 
off). The ownership of these scarce animals reflected, in post-Revolution 
Russia, the extent of dependence of farms. They thus advocated 
collecting data on direct class indices such as the hire and sale of 
labour power, the rent and lease of land and the hire and lease of 
stock and working animals.
Kritsman and others noticed that farms entered into different 
types of relationships depending on the extent of possession of the above 
factors. Kritsman argued that it should be possible to discover the 
predominant balance of relations engaged in by a particular farm and 
subsequently use this to characterise the class nature of that farm. In 
Kritsman1 s own categorizations ( Cox, 1977* 3) in 1925 J
(i) a farm whose relations were predominantly expropriating 
was termed 1enterpreneurial;
The discussion on Kritsman and other Agrarian Marxists draws 
heavily from the well-organised paper by Cox (1979)* Occasionally, 
we have also consulted Shanin (1980) and Solomon (1979)*
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(ii) a farm whose relations were predominantly exploited 
was termed dependent1 and
(iii) a farm whose relations were more or less in balance between 
exploiting and exploited tendency was considered to be an 
1 independent' farm.
"While Kritsman was conceptualising these relations and developing 
the Agrarian Marxist methodology, Eemchinov (a statistician working in 
the TJrals region and not a member of Moscow-based Kritsman group) was 
inspired by Kritsman1 s work and made an attempt to operationalise his 
ideas (Solomon, 19775 95—975 Shanin, 1980s 92-93> Oox 4)* Nemchinov's 
schema can be summarised as follows:
 C_hart 2-1______
* _ Use of Means of Production by Farm Type
Conditions 
1 and Means 
of Production
On Own Fhrm
I On Other's Farm 
> Own Means 
production
iu Other's j T Own
1. Land Entrepreneurial Independent Dependent
2. Basic capital
(cattle stock,
farm buildings) Dependent Independent Entrepreneurial
5- Variable capital
(seed, fodders
fertilizer) Dependent Independent • Entrepeneurial
4. Labour Power Entrepreneurial Independent Dependent
Source: Cox, 1979s 4’ Solomon, 1977s 96
36
The chart 2*1 though describing essentially qualitative
relations, could also he given a quantitative character by setting
7monetary values on all the means of production. The results obtained
after setting the monetary valuations could be used to categorize farms
according to their overall predominant tendencies. Nemchinov used the
following groupings (Cox, 1979s 4)*
. C h art  2 2
Farm C ategor iza t ion
1. Dependent: (a) More than 50% dependent in their relations
with other farms;
(b) 15”50% dependent;
2. Independent: (a) 2 .5-15% dependent;
(b) up to 2.5% dependent or up to 2.9% enterpreneurial
( c ) 2. 19% entrrpreneurial;
3. Entrepreneurial: More than 15% entrepreneurial.
7 The valuation of the means of production was actually not a simple 
matter • it involved several points of discretion. Thus land in excess 
of the "consumption norm" was to be valued at the level of local 
rent; both basic capital and circulating capital had to be valued 
to include amortization and labour had to, be valued to include different 
types of work, agricultural and crafts, at the going average market 
wage rate, (see Solomon, 1977s 247)*
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Using these groupings Nemchinov set the "basic pattern for the
i
methodology to be employed by Agrarian Marxists for the remainder of
1920s. Nemchinov claimed that his approach was much more
sensitive to the social relationships among the peasantry and maintained
that his method was not all-inclusive and could be supplemented by
grouping peasant farms according- to their economic strength
(i.e. according to their income)(Solomon, 1977* 97)*
Kritsman welcomed Nemchinov*s ideas, though he made some 
critical comments about his detail. He also made a few modifications. 
Kritsman argued that Nemchinov had viewed labour and the means of 
production separately. This had misled Nemchinov to assert that a 
peasant*s labour on his own farm was an indicator of his independence.
The peasant could be termed as independent, emphasised Kritsman, only 
if he laboured with his own means of production (Solomon, 1977= 99)*
Kritsman also found certain limitations in the method of 
calculation used by Nemchinov in working out the balance of tendencies 
within a farm. He advocated two rules of calculation instead (Cox, 1979s 4)
(i) For farms hiring labour and leasing out stock the ratio
should be calculated of the household*s own labour to all 
labour employed on their farms and the ratio of their own means 
of production employed on their own farms to the total value
of their own means of production wherever it was employed.
(ii) For farms selling labour power and hiring stock or animals 
the ratio should be calculated of their own labour on their 
own farms to their total labour power wherever it was 
employed, and the ratio of their own means of production on 
their own farms to all means of production employed on 
their own farms.
In the first case the calculation revealed the extent to which the
farm was tending toward capitalism while in the second case it was the
extent to which they were tending towards proletarianisation.
38
Kritsman claimed, that this kind of calculation would reflect a 
truer approximation of rural relations. Kritsman’s two rules later 
became the core of the Agrarian Marxist’s methodology for the study of 
the differentiation of the peasantry. A number of studies developed 
centring around this methodological principle in the later 1920s (for 
example, Anisimov, Vermenichev and Naumov on 'Production Characteristics 
of Peasant Farms of Different Social Groups' in 1927; Vermenichev,
Gaister and Raevich on '710 Farmsteads in the Samara Countryside' in 
1927; Gaister on 'Stratification of Soviet Countryside' again in 
1927 etc,)(See Solomon, 1977- 100-110 for details).
(The Agrarian Marxist School developed these rural studies with the 
utmost care partly to oppose the claims, the Organisation - Production 
School led by Chayanov was making on the resistance of the independent 
middle peasantry and consequently the viability of the family farm 
economy. So we may now turn our attention to the views of Chayanov and 
his school.
1
5. THE ORGANISATION - PRODUCTION SCHOOL ON DIFFERENTIATION;
Contrary to the Marxist approach, the Organisation-Production 
School led by Chayanov viewed the differentiation of the peasantry 
primarily as a demographic phenomenon. To them, it was more a measure 
of relative family size and composition than of differential economic 
success. Farm size being the most important indicator of a peasant's 
wealth, it was argued that farm size tended to follow a cycle coincident 
with the peasant family life cycle, increasing as family members 
matured' into workers and declining as the family aged and 
disintegrated with the formation of new families (Millar, 1970* 220)
Chayanov draws this conclusion from a number of fundamental 
concepts eg. family labour farm, the single labour income and the 
labour-consumer balance. By family labour farm, Chayanov conceives it 
as a particular form of economic unit in Russia. It is a production 
and consumption unit which makes its living from the land, sometimes with 
supplementary non-agricultural income (e.g. the seasonal non-agricultural 
work i.e, crafts and trade) by utilising its own family labour (with 
no hired labour) (Chayanov, 1966: 272-73)* For such a unit, labour
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is not a variable cost' but a fixed cost* The agricultural 
activities in which such farms are involved are first and foremost 
the source of subsistance and not of profit (as in the case of a 
capitalist farm). For such peasant families, there will be a customary 
or socially accepted minimum level of subsistence. A peasant family 
depends mainly on its own family labour and the land to achieve this 
minimum level of subsistence (Kitching, 1982: 48).
Since the family labour farm is the basic unit of production, 
there is a concomitant family labour product which is the only possible 
category of income for a peasant or artisan family labour unit, for 
there is no, way of decomposing it analytically or objectively. Since 
there is no social phenomenon of wages, the social phenomenon of net profit 
is also absent. Thus it is impossible to apply the capitalist profit 
calculation (Chayanov, 1 $66: 5)* Chayanov refers to this family labour 
product as a ’single labour income1 (Chayanov, 19&6: 41) •
A peasant family will work for as long and as hard as is required to 
earn its labour product or labour income needed to obtain the minimum 
subsistence. But having once attained it, their labour input will begin 
to drop sharply. This is because the work on the land with only primitive 
technology is a physically laborious and tiring job (Chayanov terms it 
’drudgery') and peasants will not continue doing it a moment longer 
than they have to. But conversely they will continue doing it for as 
long as they have to, even if the marginal return for thier labour is 
actually negative. In other words, the peasant does not respond to 
diminishing marginal returns for labour in the way that the capitalist 
does.
The extent of effort made by each family is adjusted to the pressure 
of the consumption demands made by the members of that family (Littlejohn, 
1977i 120). This equilibrium . is called'the labour consumer balance'.
The intensity of this pressure has been defined by Chayanov as a 
function of family composition. Thus the 'labour/consumer balance' is 
not only determined by the 'drudgery' but also the size and composition 
of the family, in particular by the proportion of its members able to 
work (called the 'consumer-worker' ratio).
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When a family is composed of few adults and a lot of small
i
children, its 1 lahour/consumer balance* is adverse. In that case, it 
has a large number of dependents whose consumption needs cannot be 
'balanced by their capacity to produce. So the amount of drudgery 
required from the working adults in the family is likely to be large.
When, however, the children grow up and can contribute much more to the 
production of the food and other essentials they consume, then the labour- 
consumer balance improves and at a stage becomes positive. The amount 
of drudgery from the adult members of the family required to obtain 
the total family subsistence is likely to fall.
But children grow up, marry and split up to set up their own 
family farms. So both the amount of labour input required for the 
subsistence of aging parents left on their own and their capacity to 
undertake 'drudgery* fall. And with it falls the farm income. Meanwhile, 
on the new farms created by the splitting of the family, the 
demographic cycle - and with it the cycle of peasant family income 
rising - is starting again (Kitching 1982: 49-50).
Based on the above arguments, the Chayanovian School attributes 
the differences in the economic productivity of farms, resource distribution 
and many other such differences to the forces of demography 
(mainly the family size). Hence the' name of their theory: demographic 
differentiation (Soloman, 1977* 117)- This theory underlines that the 
demographic cycle ensures that no peasant family can obtain a 
permanent position of superiority over others, though it might do so 
temporarily. The observed variations or inequality in farm size 
at a point in time can be explained largely by variations in the 
family size. That means, there is effectively very little or no 
inequality of landholding among different farms.
Chayanov* s primary emphasis on the family size rather than on 
farm size stems from the assumption that sown area is not a given 
constant for the individual farm, because all farms can and do mobilize 
land at short notice through the short-term rented land market
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(Harrison, 1975s 399)* Therefore -sown area cannot be a
j
determinant. So family size and family growth are the independent 
variables: as the family grows, the farm takes in more land 
through short-term rent. The family labour force can exploit the increased 
sown area through increased capital investment and increased capital 
productivity. That means, one can see families in different stages 
of the life cycle and in the various strata.
To support his propositions on the biologically determined 
differentiation Chayanov cites two sets of correlation (Chayanov,
1966: 61-64). One set relates to sown area per holding (as the dependent 
variable) to family size (as the independent variable) and the second 
relates gross agricultural income (as a proxy for sown area) to family 
size. The first exercise indicates that larger farms tend to have 
larger families. In the second, Chayanov finds a high degree of 
correlation between the family size and the measure of agricultural 
activity. He then reproduces Provokich1s findings on the co-relation 
co-efficient for farm agricultural income and family size. In this case, 
the relationship-is linear and the co-relation co-efficients are 
stated to be O .64 and 0.61 between gross agricultural income and 
number of workers, and gross agricultural income and number of 
consumers respectively (Chayanov, 1966: 64)
The above explanation, as Chayanov points out, is based on 
static data collected at a point in time. Next he goes for a dynamic 
explanation of his theory of demographic differentiation. He takes 
the help of repeated statistical censuses carried out in a technical 
manner which allowed a genetic link to be established between the farms 
from which they came and which had been statistically described 
decades ago. Taking the sown area as a measure of peasant wealth and the 
volume of economic activity, Chayanov shows a clearly expressed 
dependence between development of a peasant family and the size of area 
sown by it (Kerblay, 1971J 157). He supports his proof with regional 
statistics of the evolution of peasant holdings and families from 
1882 to 1911. He argues the case from the other way round:
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When we study the dynamics of these farms with 
the view that family size is entirely determined 
by its economic situation we might expect that 
farms Sowing small areas will in the course of fifteen 
years continue to sow the same small areas and that 
farms well endowed will as before sow large areas and 
retain a large family. The works of Chernenko v, 
Khryashcheva, Vikhlyaev, Kushchenko and others, however, 
tell us something completely different. This may be seen 
from table (1-10), which is analogous to all the others, 
comparing the 1882 and 1911 censuses for Surazh Yezd, 
Chernigov Gubernia. (Chayanov, 1966: 67).
Chayanov1s Table 1-10 is as follows:
1911 Sown Area by 1982 Sown Area Groups (%)
Desyatinas 
Sown in 1882
Desyatinas Sown in 1911
.Total
0-3 3.6 6 -9 9~12 >12
0 -3 28.2 47.0 20.0 2 .4 2.4 100
3-6 21 .8 47.5 24.4 8.2 2.4 100
6-9 16.2 37 .0 26.8 11.3 2.4 100
9-12 9.6 35 .8 26.1 12.4 16.1 100
>12 3-5 30 .5 28.5 15 .6 2 1 .9 100
Source: Chayanov, 1966: 67
While explaining the table, Chayanov argues that just as cross- 
sectional variations in farm size are determined by variations in 
family size, the changes in the distribution of holdings by area over 
time are also determined by changes in family size.
We see that a considerable part of the farms that sowed small 
areas gradually acquired a labour force as family age and size increased 
and by expanding their sown area passed into the higher groups, thus also 
expanding the volume of their activity. Conversely, former large farms
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passed into lower groups corresponding to small families created 
after division (Chayanov, 1966: 67).
From this, Chayanov concludes that the demographic processes 
of growth and family distribution mainly determine the distribution of 
farms by size of sown area and numbers of livestock, and not the other 
way round. This is, in a nutshell, the basic structure of 
Chayanov's theory of demographic differentiation (emphasis mine).
As one can find from his table (1-10), Chayanov identifies two 
different currents in the peasantry. The class with small sown area 
shows great growing power, and almost three quarters of its farms pass 
into higher sown area classes. From the same table, on the other hand, 
he identifies classes with large sown area (in 1882) as declining and 
breaking down in the later period. Thus in the case where the young, 
undivided farms with small sown area mainly participate, consumption 
needs are rising, expanidng the volume of its farms under pressure of 
family growth. The ocher is declining, largely due to the division of 
old, complex families.
As a result of the inter-relationship between these two 
counterposed social currents, peasant farm composition is established 
at any particular moment and gives a distribution by sown area classes. 
If both currents are mutually balanced, then despite the fact that 
individual farms will pass in great numbers from class to class, the 
numerical relationship will remain unchanged. If a~ whole sale comparison 
of the two censuses, separated by a long time interval, is made, one 
gets a picture of 'complete static calm' . Even though they are 
formed by completely different farms the classes as such remain the 
same. Their absolute positions may differ but their heterogeneity or 
peasant farm differentiation will be of the same degree relative to the 
time of the initial registration. That is how Chayanov establishes 
his mechanism of movement in the peasantry's social composition.
He calls this process 'demographic differentiation' - thus stressing 
that the chief cause of differences in farm size is the demographic
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processes of family growth as its age increases and not social factor 
causing peasant farms to become either capitalist or proletarian as 
argued by the Agrarian Marxists.
Thus Chayanov disagreed with Lenin over the painful 
decomposition of the Russian peasantry into a rural petty borgeoisie 
and a rural proletariat. In contrast he found in the peasantry the 
capacity to reproduce itself.
The Organisation-Production School was not only busy formulating
theoretical ideas, but also continuously carried out sophisticated
0
empirical research to support their theoretical convictions. Whenever 
an opportunity came, they used their well organised empirical findings 
to confirm and extend the propositions of the theory of non-capitalist 
economics (i.e. peasant economics) and reasserting their claim that 
the family farm was a viable economic unit in the new circumstances.
The school’s research on farm budgets was definitely their major
achievement. Chelintsev, Makarov and many others (Solomon, 197 7 : 61-117)
generated statistical information which rarely provided the kind of data
on the basis of which It could be asserted that socio-economic factors
dominated the rural society. They, very often, found the viability and
9
dominance of the small family farm as the trend in rural Russia.
Harrison says: "Chayanov and his colleagues were almost 
the only people working on these problems, gathering data, 
analysing and publishing them, who involved themselves both 
on the theoretical side and in the organisational problems 
of the co-operative ............."(Harrison, 1975: 4-14)*
9
The Chayanovian -School believed that the small family farm had at least 
two decisive advantages over the large capitalist farm. Firstly, it had 
a secured source of labour i.e. family labour and did not need to buy 
labour at a higher price. Secondly, since its chief motive of production 
was to meet subsistence needs anyhow, so it was invariably willing to 
pay more for land and equipment than its capitalist rival, and consequently 
would beat its competitor in the race to acquire these means of 
cultivation (Solomon, 1977* 121).
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As we have noted earlier many of Chayanovian views were 
challenged by the Agrarian Marxists led by Kritsman. In the late 
1920s the debate became quite untenable because of political accusations 
and counter accusations by each group of intellectuals. Moreover, the 
crisis of grain supply, planned industrialization and enforced 
collectivisation left no room for scholary arguments in the prevailing 
atmosphere. A congress of Agrarian Marxists was hastily summoned 
in 1929j not to debate issues, but to condemn enemies. This was done 
quite successfully as Shanin points out (Shanin, 1972: 61). Then 
the flood of collectivization and the great purge swept away the 
differentiation debate and, with it, its main participants.
The debate that ended abruptly in the late 1920s in Russia continues
even today in the context of the Third World. The views expressed by
the Russian populists and Neopopulists in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth -century can be seen to be reflected (though not always
in exactly the same forms) in the present day development thinking in
10Third World countries with substantial peasant populations. Since 
the translation of Chayanov1 s book in English in 1966 by Daniel Thorner 
et al the interest in peasant studies has increased tremendously 
(Harrison, 1975: 590-91)* Many of the present studies of the Third 
World attempt to analyse the problems of peasant agriculture in 
essentially Chayanovian terms. The poorest peasants, they suggest, are 
mainly using family labour and very simple technologies to produce 
for their own subsistence, plus a small surplus which they sell for cash. 
Many of them, while giving primacy to agriculture and rural development
I
(Kitching 1982: 72) argue in terms of 1 small is beautiful1, flow 
classness1 and 1 peasant co-operation1 - as was stressed in the 
pre-Revolution Russia. Implicit^ they refer to the peasantry as 
Countryfolk1 or a single rural class united by convergent anti-urban
10
Kitching has specifically pointed out that the ideas and development 
strategies promoted by scholars like Shanin, Lipton, Schumachan and 
policy makers like President Julius Nyrere of Tanzania and world bodies 
like IL0, World Bank have historical links with the populist and 
neopopulist ideas (Kitching, 1982: Chapter 4)*
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interests (Lipton, 1977* 23, 86, 112, 117 etc.) and thus portraying it 
as more or less homogeneous. Arguing in the same line, they assert 
that demographic pressures and not socio-economic differences constitute 
the main problem.
Of those who have been profoundly influenced by these 
Chayanovian ideas, Shanin has emerged as the most prominent. Shanin 
in exactly the same way as Chayanov, argues that the differences amongst 
peasant households are purely temporary and that there is constant 
'multi-directional mobility' among different groups of peasants, no 
olass will, therefore, crystallise to cause class differentiation within 
the peasantry (Shanin, 1972: 13-14)* We will discuss Shanin's ideas 
in more detail in the next chapter.
But the Chayanovian ideas as in the past, do not go unchallenged 
in the present. For example, Harrison (1975) and Utsa Patnaik (1979) 
are two notable scholars who have mounted a challenge. Infact,
Harrison has subjected Chayanov to the closest scrutiny. Harrison 
has not only opposed the Chayanovian views on the demographic differentiation 
but has recalculated and reanalysed the data for Starobelsls: district 
(on which Chayanov depended so much in formulating his theory) in order 
to question the.empirical validity of Chayanov's assertions. Patnaik 
reemphasised some of Harrison's findings in order to find the internal 
inconsistency of Chayanovian theory of demographic differentiation. Both 
Harrison and Patnaik raise doubts about the adjusting power of the 
dependency ratio which explains the homogeneity in the peasantry.
Harrison rearranged data on family size, sown area, income and 
expenditure of 101 peasant farms of Starobelsk district in 1910 
(see Harrison, 1975* tables 2, 3, and 4) a*id reached the conclusion that:
Family dependency was a relatively insignificant (emphasis 
mine) factor in economic inequality, and that farm 
size and family income per head are related together 
and with other factors in much more important ways 
(Harrison, 1975* 400)•
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Elsewhere, Harrison ^ Harrison ,71972 as quoted by Patnaik, 1979- 382) 
presented his recalculated data on the district of Starobelsk and 
it has been found that for the same period (which Chayanov was referring 
to,1882 to 1911) family size less than trebled while the size of farm 
increased over a thousand fold. In other words, landholding per worker 
was over a hundred times higher on the largest farms compared to 
the smallest. Moreover, as Harrison asserted, Starobelslc was located 
in one of the most backward and commercially underdevloped province of 
Kharkov (Harrison, 1972). And if Harrison found an inequality of this 
magnitude in such a district, one can argue that Chayanov’s own data 
suggest a highly differentiated peasantry in Russia during the early 
20th century. Surely, the peasant household of a desyatina of land 
per capita will be in a qualitatively different position compared 
to the peasant household with four and a half desyatinas of land per 
capita.
So correlation alone does not imply a undifferentiated peasantry.
One must look for the changes in the comparative positions of the correlated 
elements.
Patnaik argues along the same lines. Her agruments on correlation 
exercises may be summarized as follows:
(1 ) The finding that there is a close correlation between the
large farms and the larger families, is not something typical 
for Russia alone but is also characteristic of all economies 
with a substantial peasantry. As the Indian Farm Management 
Studies suggest one can observe a correlation between family 
size and farm size even in India. But as Harrison showed in 
the Russian context, it is not correlation but the relative 
size of the change that each element undergoes that is more 
important.
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(2) Simple correlation does not imply that variations in farm size 
- are caused by changes in family size. But Chayanov seems to have 
taken positive correlation between the- two as a proof of that 
causation.^
One may argue equally strongly from the other way round. It may 
be stressed that at is variations in farm size, more specifically 
in per capita landholding, which causes the variations in family 
size. The argument may be further elaborated by saying that the 
smallest holdings which have very small amounts of land per 
worker are struggling to make ends meet and are semi-proletarian 
in nature, as ninety per cent of those impoverished households hire 
out labour( See Harrison , 1972: tables ^.1,^.2 and 1975:table 6).
Owing to the low level of consumption on such holdings infant 
mortality is higher,adult life expection is lower and they end up 
with small families. Harrison takes this point a step further 
(Harrison, 1975: 401-^ 102). He questions how the poor peasant families 
can expand their reproducible assets over the family cycle when they 
start the cycle from a disadvantageous position? He starts his argument 
by taking the case of a younger nuclear family. He assumes it to be 
a poor family. When this family has children its consumption needs 
will go up. And increased consumer demand will immediately conflict 
with the increased investment required to bring family resources 
into balance with .family requirements in the future.And this crisis, 
though universal, will be more severe for the poorer families. So it 
is hard to see internal accumulation as a source of complementary 
factors for the growth of smaller farms. And in that sense the 
Chayanovian idea of life cycle seems not to operate.
11Chayanov also supports this by arguing that sown area is not a 
given constant for the individual farm (as it can be varied by 
resorting to rental market) but family size and family, growth 
are the independent variables (as the family grows, the farm takes 
in more land from the rental market and family labour force can 
exploit the increased sown area subsequently) (Harrison, 1975: 599).
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At the other extreme are the largest holdings which are mainly 
rich peasants in class terms, for they have high per capita land 
endowment, over 75 percent of them hire in labour, and over and 
above they have sufficient per capita consumption, and can afford 
to raise larger families. Thus larger farms have greater economic 
strength. Thus the Chayanovian assertions of family size as the 
independent variable does not appear to be tenable.
Chayanov1s second statistical exercise also appears to be inconsis­
tent. This statistical exercise brings dynamic information into the 
Chayanovian scenario of so-called 'demographic differentiation*.
According to Chayanov, households should acquire more land and move 
up into higher sown area groups as their family size expands, while some 
households with grown up children would tend to subdivide and move 
into lower sown-area groups. The table (1 -10 ) cited by Chayanov (1966 .*67) 
apparently supports this hypothesis. But the fact remains that the 
exercise was done with the data relating to commune area alone. This 
is not a typical phenomenon and one cannot generalize a hypthesis based 
on this highly specific situation. The criterion on which the 
'repartitional commune area* or allotment area was periodically 
distributed by the 'mir* (.co-operative) among peasants in those areas 
where the practice still prevailed was precisely the egalitarian one of 
the family size.
At the turn of the century, only about 42% (Patnaik, 1979: 185) 
of the area operated- by peasants was in fact 'repartitional communal 
area' and the percentage was decreasing consistently. The decreasing 
importance of the allotment area was a result of the extensive 
purchase and leasing in of landlord's land, which was concentrated 
in the hands of the rich peasants. Moreover, the allotment area 
itself was the object of leasing, and here again the leased in 
allotment area was in the hands of the rich peasants (see Lenin,
1977a: 104). As the purchased and rented land was concentrated with 
minority rich peasants, the over-all distribution of land in use was 
highly concentrated despite the relative equality of allotment 
component.
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But it seems that Chayanov ignored this fact. He based his 
whole argument on the total operated area which by definition 
(by "force of law") varied according to family, size. Patnaik 
accuses Chayanov of not only ignoring a large component of the 
operated area (which did not fit into his theory) but also criticises 
him for ignoring the fact that equal distribution was 
institutionally maintained. Thus this could not be taken as proof of 
an autonomous demographic differentiation mechanism.
Chayanov daimed that ’communal repartition1 was the agrarian 
regime for Russia during that period. Patnaik disagrees with 
Chayanov on this point as well. She argues that the communally held 
land of the (increasingly weakening) "mir" existed side by side with 
private property, purchase and sale for a full three decades or more 
before Chayanov wrote; and that the communally-held land was itself 
the object of mortgage and leasing. Also, after the 1906 Decree of 
Stolypin, people could Withdraw their land from the communal 
arrangements. Further, far from adjusting farm size to family size 
(as Chayanov would expect) the purchase and renting of land by 
peasants served to worsen considerably the distribution of per 
capita landholding.
So both Harrison and Patnaik find that the empirical evidence on 
which Chayanov based his theory of ‘demographic differentiation1 was 
not always reliable. They, -and a few others, even question Chayanov1 s 
conceptual categories and theoretical premises.
Chayanov uses ‘family farm1 or ‘family labour farm1 as the 
basic conceptual category in his theory. This as we have seen earlier 
is an agricultural production unit in which a certain area of land 
(held through commune, owned or rented) and means of production are 
possessed by the family which does not hire any outside labour and 
works the land with family labour alone for the sole purpose of 
satisfying consumption needs. Chayanov argues that no class other than 
that constituted by the family farms, exists within the peasantry:
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the latter is conceived of as a more or less perfectly homogeneous
entity. His vision of the peasantry is that of a completely
undifferentiated one. They never enter into any kind of relationship
either internally or externally. In his general essay fon the Theory
of Non-Capitalist Economic Systems* Chayanov goes on to construct
the * peasant economy* - which is made up of innumerable such
economically viable family labour farms (see Chayanov, 1966). To take
the family as a basic analytical' unit is to encompass the conceptional
dissolution of internal social relations - the domination of some
family members by others on lines of age and sex.; The unitary conception
of the family economy means that one abstracts from the national
economy and analyses the family farm as an enterprise unaffected by
12 1wage category, wage labour and family markets. Only by abstracting 
the family unit from both internal and external social relations was it 
possible to generate the notion that * peasant economy* resulted not 
from exploitation (of some by others) but from * self-exploitation* of 
family as a whole. Harrison has made a useful critique of this notion 
of the *peasant economy* (Harrison, 1977h: 530).
Littlejohn goes a step further and finds the notion of 
demographic differentiations as against social differentiation a 
little absurd:
The absurdity of treating demographic differentiation 
as an alternative to social (i.e. class) differentiation 
can be seen if. one supposes that family labour- farms 
were to become the sole form of agriculatural production 
(either in the Soviet Union or, if there were no political, 
obstacles, in the world as a whole). In that case, the
12
But Kubanon argued that the family farm was npt a harmonious unit 
composed of individuals striving for a common cause in Eussia during 
the period about which Chayanov was writing. Friction was inherent in 
both the economic and social relations within a farming family 
(Soloman, 1977; 130-131)•
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rising population and a f-Jn.ite land area, the point 
would ultimately be reached where it was technically 
impossible to establish new farms for new families, 
since the land area would be too small to sustain 
them on the basis of the established conditions of 
production. In such an ultimate case, demographic 
differentiation would by itself lead to the creation 
of a class of landless peasants. In the absence of 
capitalism, they would not become landless -wage 
labourers, but it is difficult to see how Chayanov 
could avoid calling this social differentiation .
(Littlejohn, 1977: footnote 17 p. 15^ -155)
But not all of the critics have treated Chayanove so ruthlessly.While 
critising the basic premises of Chayanov1s theory of the peasant 
economy, many of the critics did not fail to acknowledge the 
contribution of Chayanov in the peasant studies. Millar is one such 
critic:
Whatever may be the case regarding the design of an 
alternative theoretical explanation of Chayanov1 s 
data, it is obvious that his careful and detailed 
description of the Russian peasant economy is 
important in its own right and that it has significant 
implications for a number of subjects of contemporary 
interest. (Millar, 1970: 228)
Even Harrison did not hesitate to acknowledge the contribution 
made by Chayanov in the peasant studies (1975s 414; 1970: 355)*
Hunt*s (1979) treatment of Chayanov is even more sympathetic and she 
makes a,good attempt to test his theory in the African context. We 
.will examine her work more in the next chapter.-
6. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
■ r
Erom our discussion so far, we can now sum up the main 
contrasting points that emerged, from the debate on differentiation of . 
the peasantry:
1. Ehe Leninist School of thought did not recognise a homogeneous 
rural society. In terms of all economic, social and political 
Indicators rural•society essentially revealed inequality and 
conflict of interests. By contrast, the Neo-populist or Chayanovian
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school assumed an .undifferentiated peasant society where inequality
3
was normally absent; or when inequality was present, as being due 
to temporary demographic factors.
2. The Leninist school presupposed the existence of capitalist
production relations and also a commodity production system. It 
also assumed the presence of wage labourers. Chayanov, on the contrary, 
assumed that the economic unit was a farmer who was neither a 
capitalist nor a labourer and who did not produce to sell and/or 
to earn profit. The chief motive of production was self-consumption 
or subsistence. He presupposed a family labour farm (or peasant) 
economy.
J. The Leninist school asserted that as time passed the rich would 
become richer and the poor poorer. Furthermore, with the passage 
of time, the middle group of the peasantry would disintegrate and 
would join either of the two groups. The Chayanovian school argued 
that generally ^ich1 (by definition big) families would disintegrate 
and turn into- poor (and by definition small) families; while the 
•poor* families would turn into 1 rich1 over time. Thus they had a 
cyclical mobility schema in their mind.
4. The Leninist school argued that large-scale capitalist farms were 
more viable than small-scale family farms. The Chayanovian school 
argued that small-scale family farms were more viable and stable than 
large-scale capitalist farms. - - _
5- The Leninist school argued that a small farmer with surplus labour 
in relation to his land and capital was forced to hire himself out 
as a wage labourer and in this way turned into a semi-proletarian.
The Chayanovian school assumed that land and other inputs could be 
easily leased or bought by the small farmers in order to match his 
surplus labour. So a small farmer was generally not forced to sell
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labour. ^ j
6. The Leninist school assumed that the development of capitalism in 
the non-agricultural sector attracted the surplus labour from 
the agricultural sector. The Chayanovian school assumed on the 
other hand, the complete absence or insignificant presence of the non- 
agricultural sector. The Chayanovian economy was primarily 
dependent on family labour activities.
13
Lenin believed that the poor peasant might survive for a certain 
period not because of his superiority over large-scale farming but 
because of over—work and under consumption. Actually often the 
standard of living of the poor peasant was worse than that of the 
pure rural-proletariat (Lenin, 1975* Vol 5: 194-205)
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, ' CHAPTER III 
APPLICABILITY OF THE D1EEERENTIATION DEBATE
In the last chapter, we have examined, in detail the contrasting 
views on the differentiation of the peasantry in Russia from an historical 
perspective. In the course of considering the debate, we have also 
mentioned in brief the attempts made by a number of contemporary scholars 
to add their ideas on the issue and to operationalize the concepts 
of both schools (Leninist and Chayanovian) with the aim of applying 
them in the specific context of present-day Third World countries.
Here in this chapter, we will first make a critical review of this work 
and then identify the major hypotheses that emerge from it >„ We will 
then modify the original hypotheses of Lenin and Chayanov in the light 
of these new studies. The hypotheses will then be formulated in 
testable form and later tested in the context of the Bangladesh peasantry. 
We will primarily depend on the data collected in two villages of 
Bangladesh during our recent field work.
Let us first look into the methodological developments of the 
Chayanovian school and those of the Leninist school. In the first 
case, besides Chayanov, we will specifically examine the work of 
Thorner (1968),. Shanin (1972, 1980)and Hunt (1979) in some detail to work 
out testable hypotheses on demographic differentiation. In the second 
case, besides Lenin, we will look into the work of Mao Tse Tung (19&7) > 
TJtsa Patnaik (1976* 1979)> Byres (1981) etc. in order to arrive at the 
testable hypotheses on social differentiation of the peasantry. In 
both cases, we will bear in mind the exciting exchanges that took place 
between the Agrarian Marxists and the Neo-populist in post-Revolution 
Russia.
A: THE METHODOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE CHAYANOVIAN SCHOOL OF THOUGHT:
An THORNER1 S REDEFINITION;
Besides publishing Chayanov1 s The Theory of Peasant Economy in 
1966 In collaboration with other scholars Daniel Thorner himself made an
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attempt to redefine the Chayanovian category of peasant family farm
j
to make it applicable in a contemporary Third World economy 
(Thorner, 19 8^: 508). Thorner thought complete absence of wage labour
. (as stressed by Chayanov) was too much an abstraction in the context of 
contemporary Third World peasantry. He, therefore, extended the 
Chayanovian definition to include peasant households which do hire in 
outside labour provided the extent of such hiring is less than the 
number of days worked by family workers.
But this fundamental abstraction also implies several modifications 
in the over-all analytical framework of Chayanov. However, it seems 
that Thorner and many of his followers did not pay enough heed to these 
Implications. Thus new meanings have been superimposed on the old 
conclusions. He tries to replace the Chayanovian category of 
'peasant economy1 with 'society predominantly peasant' in nature.
While the former is an abstract analytical category (used to mean a 
complete economic system) the latter is an empirical descriptive term.
As such there has arisen an analytical inconsistency. The five macro 
features in term of production, population, area etc, as proposed by 
Thorner, appear too naive and simplistic to add any methodological 
rigour to the Chayanovian school of thought.
A2: SHANirS MOBILITY SCHEMA:
Shanin's work (1972, 1980) provides valuable additions to the 
methodological developments of the Chayanovian school. His Awkward Class 
(Shanin, 1972) ably demonstrates how profoundly he has been influenced 
by Chayanov. In a recent paper (Hobsbawm et al: 1980) he once again 
reveals his standing vis-a-vis this debate. In this paper shanin makes 
an attempt to compare the empirical work on differentiation in Hussia 
of the 1920s and India of the 1970s hoping to operationalize the concepts 
relating to the measurement of capitalism. He portrays the methodological 
developments that took place in Russia of the 1920s but fails when he 
discuss the work on contemporary Indian peasantry. He takes up only 
one piece of work - that of Utsa Patnaik (1978) where an attempt has 
been made to find-a criterion (called the E-criterion) whereby one can 
differentiate the peasantry in order to make his comparison. As is
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well known, a lively debate has taken place on the Indian mode of production, 
(see for example, Sau, 1973, 1976; Rudra, 1970, Patnaik, 1972, 1976; 
Chattapadhya, 1972; Banajj, 1972 and a host of others) and if one wants 
to compare the Indian researches with those of the Russia, one must 
have a thorough grasp over these works. It is because of this lack of 
rigour that Byres finds it:
.....  to be a hopelessly unbalanced comparison - indeed,
not a comparison at all, for it consists of consideration, 
itself inadquate, of a single article by Utsa Patnaik, 
against which are juxtaposed the ideas of an army of 
Russians. (Byres, 1980: 1J10)
Moreover, Shanin1 s comments on Patnaik1 s work at times misses 
the target. Shanin makes the following comments on Patnaik:
(i) There is a multiplicity of indices rather than a single 
labour exploitation criterion.
(ii) Patnaik discards the activities of moneylenders and traders.
(iii) Patnaik uses existing data, collected wtihout any concern with 
peasant differentiation and exploitation.
Byres in his review article, discards most of Shanin1 s accusations 
against Patnaik and concludes, "the critique of Patnaik is not a valid 
one" (Byre, -198,0; 1311). This is because Patnaik was explicitly clear 
about these limitations and she is aware of the role of the usurious 
capital in the differentiation of the peasantry (which she ably 
demonstrated in her earlier work, 1972). And there is no rational basis 
for claiming that Marxist ideas are always to be tested with the help 
of data collected with Marxist questions in mind.
In the Russian context Shanin provides a useful review of the 
1920s debate, but ignores Lenin’s classic 1Levelopment of Capitalism 
in Russia* on differentiation. Lastly, Shanin makes a few suggestions 
for operationalizing the catefories used by the Russian scholars to 
understand the rural society of a developing country.
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The main thrust of his. argument is as follows:
)
"To study a process one must establish the 
methodology directly relevant to change 
i.e. to overcome both the inherent static bias of 
the ordinary census and the in-built descriptive 
narrowness of monographic studies” (Shanin in 
Hobsbawm et al, 1980: 103)
He then provides his final suggestion that .dynamic study and 
budget study can offer a methodological tool to operationalize these 
concepts and may be used on massive empirical data.
There is one interesting aspect to such a suggestion. Shanin 
himself has used these dynamic studies and budget studies 
(Shanin; 1972) and has formulated his famous concept of cyclical 
mobility finding some historic link with the work of Chayanov.
In his own words:
"Chayanov seems to have retained the essence of 
his views about the crucial influence of 
’biological1 factors, on the Russian peasant 
economy of this period and, more important, for 
us here, (emphasis mine), fully restated in 
his later studies initial explanation of peasant 
socio-economic mobility" (Shanin, 1972 MO 7)
Shanin also discovers that budget studies empirically validated the 
general theory of Chayanov1 s peasant economy and mobility (Shanin, 1972: 
105). Shanin, although quite subtle, ultimately goes all the way to 
prove that class differentiation did not really exist in Russia during 
the period about which the Chayanovian school was talking. A brief look 
into his mobility schema at once reveals that Shanin*s ideas are deeply 
rooted in the Neo-populist ideas of the Chayanovian era of Russia.
So one must take his suggestions for concentrating on budget Studies 
and dynamic Studies in order to understand differentiation of the 
peasantry in the contemporary Third World with a pinch of salt.
This is because there is an inherent bias in such studies towards 
’levelling off* of differences. Let us first briefly examine 
Shanin1s ideas before we make further comments.
59
Shanin* s (1972) Awkward Glass touches upon two important problems
j
- i.e. the problem of collectivisation and the problem of the 
relationship between communists and the peasants, and this forms the 
background for his mobility thesis. Shanin*s thesis is that the 
communists of the USSR during this period committed three grave 
mistakes! i.e. they:
(i) over estimated the class differences in the countryside;
(ii) failed to take into account the peculiar cohesiveness of
a general peasant culture associated with the long tradition 
of the repartitional commune system .
(iii) failed to recognize the high incidence of multidirectional 
and cyclical mobility which effectively prevented class 
crystalization in the countryside, since relative stability 
of the membership of different classes is a prerequisite for 
the development of class consciousness and class conflict.
As a result of these mistakes the communists at last had to resort 
to forced collectivization, which, according to Shanin could have been 
avoided.
Then he p re s e n ts  his famous dynamic mobility study of the Ryssian 
peasantry. Here Shanin examines the dynamic studies carried out by 
U. Chernenkov, G. Kushchenko, (also mentioned in Chayanov's works) and
all such works carried out in Russia during the last decade of the
19th and first two decades of the 20th centuries. The evidence gathered
in these decades of dynamic studies proved that:
A complex multidirectional mobility, involving both 
centripetal and centrifugal tendencies simultaneously 
operating among peasant households, is, therefore, at 
work and underlies the gross differentiation process 
in peasant society (Shanin, 1972: 74)
The anti-Lenin hypothesis of centripetal mobility was the key premise 
of all of Shanin’s later arguments. Thus Shanin carefully tries to 
■ substantiate this tendency by discovering certain stable casual
forces working behind such a process. According to Shanin those
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casual forces were:
(i) By partitioning the M g  farms were moving downward. This 
enhanced the process of equalization or levelling.
(ii) The disappearance or migration of the small farmers was 
relatively greater. Thus it produced a false picture of 
equality.
(iii) Sometimes small farmers merged together and moved upward.
This also enhanced the levelling mechanism.
(iv) Redivision of the land administered by the peasant commune
on the Basis of an egalitarian principle of family size also 
enhanced the levelling mechanism.
(v) The natural growth of the young peasant family put the
pressure of increased consumption needs on the male workers
of the family. The degree of self—exploitation and the
pooling in of further factors of production is made in
response to such pressures. Thus the young and poor families
experience upward mobility. At a certain stage consumers
turn into workers and the c/w ratio decreases and thereby
also decreases the drive for economic expansion. Moreover
partitioning of such matured families causes a downward
mobility again, thus this biological life cycle also naturally
1
enhances the centripetal mobility.
But side by side there works the economic mechanism of 
centrifugal mobility as well.
According to Shanin these two opposing trends ultimately result
in cyclical mobility. (i i )Centripetal mobility
( i ) Centrifugal mobility
WEALTH
TIM E
WEALTH
TIME
1 One should note the striking similarities between these and the
Chayanovian arguments on demographic differentiation (see Chapter 2)
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( i i I ) Multidirectional ( iv > Cyclical mobility
m obility
WEALTH
TIME
WEALTH
t i m e
One can clearly observe from the above diagrams that a 
cyclical mobility model may really conceal the class differences that 
exist in a peasantry. By contrast, it puts more emphasis on the 
non-socio-economic factors (such as partition, inheritance, population 
growth, migration, merger, extinction etc) which diffuse on class
antogonism. After carefully examining the work of Shanin, Littlejohn
argues:
it is clear that he (Shanin) is only able to treat the
peasantry as one class" (Littlejohn, 1973* 119)
A?: HUNT'S APPLICATION:
Liana Hunt makes a most useful attempt to apply some of the key 
ideas of Chayanov in the context of the African peasantry (Hunt, 1979)* 
Although she primarily deals with the *Chayanovian model of peasant 
household resource allocation* in the specific context of Mbere in 
Eastern Kenya, she has also examined the applicability of Chayanov* s 
theory of demographic differentiation. She has done this by 
correlating farm size and family size, consumer-worker ratio (she 
calls it 1 producdr-consumer ratio*) and output per worker per hour, the 
*producor-worker ratio* and per capita income etc. Given the 
abundance of land and near natural economy of Eastern Kenya with little 
or no wage labour, she has, in most cases, obtained a positive 
correspondence between Chayanovian hypotheses and her findings.
But in some cases the results varied widely.
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It is unlikely 1jhat we will get a similar correspondence 
in the context of Bangladesh villages (where land is very scarce and 
most of the poor households depend on wage earning), nevertheless,
Hunt's methods of data collection and their application may be quite 
useful. We will use her work extensively while working out the 
testable hypotheses for Bangladesh.
33: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LENINIST METHODS OF BIFFERENTIATION:
B1: MAO’S ’HOW TO DIEEERENTIATE CLASSES' (EDO)s
Mao Tse Tung, while making a contribution towards developing 
the Marxist concept of differentiation of the peasantry in the sepcific 
context of China in the 1920s wrote his famous article, f,How to 
Differentiate Classes" in 1926 (Mao, 19^ 7)* The Chinese Communist Party 
used his categorizations extensively while formulating and implementing 
the Land Reform programmes (Hinton, 19&4)* ^ao distinguishes more than 
two types of inhabitants (bourgeoisie and proletariat) in rural China 
of the 1930s and. finds intermediate links between these classes. In 
fact, Lenin himself revised his 'two classes1 thesis (as propounded in 
DCR) on differentiation and Mao seems to have been inspired by that line 
of argument.
2
Lenin argued that the net results of differentiation have to be 
placed in the context of the intermediate links and the starting 
point of the process is the emergence of property inequality, In 
1920, Lenin presented his famous Preliminary Draft Thesis (PDT) on 
the Agrarian Question (Lenin, 1920) and elaborated the intermediate 
links through characterization of the peasantry, not only for the 
specific circumstances of Russia but also for the whole of Europe. 
In PDT Lenin talks about the following classes In the context of 
European capitalist countries:
(i) Eirst, the agricultural' proletariats or wage-labourers (by the 
year, season or day) who obtain their livelihood by working 
on hire basis at capitalist agricultural enterprises.
cont'd
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Mao distinguishes five-broad classes in rural China:
;
(i) The Landlord; A landlord is a person who owns, land, does 
not engage in labour himself or does so only to a very small extent, 
and lives by exploiting the peasants. The collection of land rent is 
his main form of exploitation.
(ii) The Rich Peasant: The rich peasant as a rule owns land.
But some rich peasants own only part of their land and rent the remainder.
Others ....... rent all their land. His main form of exploitation is
the hiring of labour ........ A person who owns a fair amount of good
land, farms some of it himself without hiring labour, but exploits other 
peasants by means of land rent, interest or in other ways, shall also be 
treated as rich peasant.
(iii) The Middle Peasant: Many middle peasants own land. Some
own part of their land and rent the rest. Others........ rent all
their land. A middle peasant derives his income wholly or mainly from 
his own labour. As a rule he does not exploit others and in many cases
he himself is exploited by others........... Some middle peasants
(the well-to-do middle peasants) do practice exploitation to small extent, 
but this is not their regular or their main source of income.
footnote cont'd...
(ii) Second, the semi-proletariats or peasants who till tiny plots
* of land, i.e. those~who obtain their livelihood partly as
wage-labourers and partly by working on their own or
rented plots of land, which provide their families only with 
a part of their means of subsistence.
(iii) Third, the small peasantry i.e. the small-scale tillers who,
— either as owners or tenants, hold small plots of land, which 
enable them to satisfy the needs of their families and their 
farms, and do not hire outside labour.
(iv) In the economic sense, one should understand by 'middle peasants' 
those small farms who either as owners or tenants hold plots 
of land that are small but under capitalism, sufficient to 
provide them with a meagre subsistence for the family and the 
bare minimum needed to maintain the farm. It can also produce
cont'd
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(iv) [The Poor Peasant: Among the poor peasants some own part
of their land...... others own no land at all hut only a few odd
farm implements. As a rule poor peasants have to rent the land they 
work on and are subjected to exploitation, having to pay land rent and 
interest on loans and to hire themselves out to some extent. In 
general, a middle peasant does not need to sell his labour power 
while the poor peasant has to sell part of his labour power.
(v) [The Worker: The worker (including the farm labour) as 
a rule owns no land or farm implements, though some do own a very small 
amount of land and very few farm implements. Workers make their 
living wholly or mainly by selling their labour power.
B2: PATNAIK1 S E-CRITERION;
Patnaik notes one interesting point of difference between 
Lenin1 s PDT and Mao*s KDG formulations:
In the first, labour hiring is taken as the only 
main index for differentiating classes within the 
peasantry, and it is specified that the holding may be 
either owned or tenanted. In the second, however, along with 
labour hiring, rent exploitation (and indeed also loan 
interest) is explicity included in differentiating classes.
We believe that the reason for difference is the following: 
in the context of the European capitalist countries to which 
his PDT refers, rent exploitation by landlords, still 
remained as a feudal hangover, affected all sections 
of the peasantry and therefore was not germane to the 
question of differentiation within the peasantry. This 
was a result of developing capitalist relations, i.e. 
of labour hiring alone. In the Chinese context, however, 
extraction of rent and loan interest (besides labour 
hiring) by richer sections of the peasantry itself 
from poorer ones, was of some importance, and hence, had to 
be explicitly considered. (Patnaik, 197&: A-88)
footnote cont!d...
a certain surplus which may in good years at least be converted in 
capital.
(v) The big peasants are capitalist entrepreneurs in agriculture, who 
as a rule employ several hired labourers and are connected with 
the peasantry' only in their low cultural level, habits of life 
and the manual labour they themselves perform on their farm.
cont1d
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Keeping in mind, the differences, Patnaik (1976: A-85), 
makes an attempt to define the differentiation and later 
operationalize the concept in terms of her labour sexploitation 
criterion (E-Criterion) with a view to using it in the specific 
historical context of a Third World country (like India). 
Patnaik says:
By 1Economic differentiation1 we refer to the fact that 
there is no single homogeneous type of holding with 
respect to the way production activity is organised, which 
may be taken as a Representative* type. On the 
contrary, the very fact of concentration .of means of 
production implies that there must be qualitatively 
distinct types of holdings which differ in the way 
their production activity is organised. A minority 
of households have so much resources relative to family 
size that they cannot cultivate with family labour 
alone but must rely primarily on the labour of others.
At the other pole a large proportion of households - 
which may be the majority, have so little resources 
relative to the working capacity and consumption needs 
of the family that they must rely primarily on 
working for others in some form or another.
Furthermore,' these different types of holdings enter into 
relation with each other in the production process 
through labour hiring and land leasing.
The Marxist position is that economic classes 
are to be looked at in terms of the above two related 
criteria: possession of the means of production, and the 
exploitation of labour.(Patnaik, 1976: A-83)
Patnaik herself uses the labour exploitation 
(or E-vriterion) for classifying peasants in terms 
exploitation ratio. The labour exploitation ratio 
following formula:
E =  X/y
footnote cont'd...
(vi) The big landowners, who, in capitalist countries - directly 
- or through their tenant farmers - systematically exploit 
wage-labour and the neighbouring small (and, not infrequently, 
part of the middle) peasantry, do not themselves engage in 
manual labour, and-are in the main descended from feudal 
lords.
criterion
of ,a labour
is calculated by the
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where x is defined as net total use of outside and
j
y is the family labour days expended in cultivation on the 
operational holding. The term x may be further elaborated as 
follows:
x = Net labour days hired in /^Labour hired in (a^  ) - 
labour hired out (a2 / 7
-i Net labour days appropriated through rent /labour 
days taken through rent (b^  ) - labour days given 
through rent
That means: x= a + b
= (a, - a2) + (b1 - b2)
b^  and b^  may be operationalised as follows:
b^  = r_j (total labour days on land leased out)
b^ - 3?2 labour days on leased in land)
Nhere r^  = rental share to owner of land leased out.
r^ = rental share to owner of land leased in.
Patnaik then uses her E-criterion to classify the peasantry.
She, however, distinguishes two types of exploitation. For some 
landowners and cultivators x will be positive and very high. They are 
mainly enjoying other's labour. Some will have the ’a1 component 
predominant, and they are the capitalist type of labour exploiter.
While some others will show the predominance of the 1 b1 component which 
implies the landlord type of labour exploiter.
Another group of peasants will show a high negative value of the 
x component implying that they are either agricultural labour 
(if 'a1 predominates) or petty tenants (if ’b* predominates).
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For a middle category or primarily self-employed cultivators
j
x will "be relatively small in absolute value or it might be zero.
That is either these cultivators will not be involved in exploitation 
at all, or they will be involved either way to a very minor extent.
Her schema may be presented as follows:
SCHEMA - I
Economic class Empirical Defining 
characteristic Remarks
1 . Landlord E — » OC X Positive and very high,
7 zero
2. Rich peasant E \  + 1 X Positive and high
7 positive, x ^  y
3• Middle peasant +1 y  e y  - 1 divisible into
i) Upper Middle +1> E^ 0 X positive but small
7 positive, x ^ y
ii) Lower Middle +1 E - 1 X zero or negative but small
7 positive,|x | <^ |y|
4• Poor peasant E 7 -  1 X negative and high
7 positive, Iy|
5 . Full time labourer E ---)~C>C X negative and very high
7 zero
Source: Patnaik,1 A-85.
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The empirical characterisation of Patnaik1 s schema is as 
}
follows:
SCHEMA - II
Empirical Characteristics Remarks
1. Landlord; i
(a) Capitalist b Labour hiring greater than rent.
(b) Feudual Labour hiring at most as high as rent.
2. Rich peasants: \
(a) Proto-bourgeois a \  b Labour hiring greater than rent.
(b) Proto-feudual a ^ b Labour hiring at most as high as rent.
5- Poor peasant:
(a) Agricultural labourer 
operating land. Hiring out greater than rent payment.
(b) Petty tenant Hiring out at most as 
payment.
high as rent
4- Pull time labourer b -  o Hiring out only form, no rent payment.
Source: Patnaik 1976: A-87
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While operationalizing the concepts, Patnaik is aware of the 
limitations of the Indian case, where the extent of development of 
capitalism is quite small compared to the European case about 
which Lenin was talking in his PDT. Patnaik is also aware of the 
Chinese Case, where the extent of capitalism was even smaller 
compared to contemporary India. She also generates some ideas about 
the possible cases of inconsistency that may arise while applying 
the concept. A widow who applies no family labour and hires in some 
labour may be classed as a landlord, although by any criterion she is 
very poor. Again, when there is a high degree of mechanisation, a 
capitalist, may attract the categorization of 'middle peasant1. And, 
where will one put money lenders in the spectrum of Patnaik's class 
differentiation? It also fails to take account of the technical part 
of production. Patnaik, however, has an argument. In her own words, 
her criterion:
does not give an exhaustive coverage of all agrarian 
relations but only those arising directly in the 
production process; and the rationale for this is 
that other relations such as those between the trader 
and the money lender on the one hand and different 
classes within the peasantry, are themselves conditional 
upon the existence of class differentiation arising 
out of the production process. (Patnaik, 1976, A-90)
However, there are a number of problems with the direct method 
of differentiating the peasantry. It is very difficult to collect 
accurate data, especially on the labour hired in/out for a whole year _ 
through the conventional methods of data collection. One has to take 
into account the everyday movement of not only the family labourers 
hour by hour, but also the hired in labourers. The ^ regular character 
of labour hiring, existence of a number of hiring arrangements, lack 
of book-keeping at the households level present severe constraints on 
collection of data on labour exploitation. If someone is determined, he 
can concentrate only on a handful of households and collect this 
information. Even in that ca ,se one has to visit households every day. 
Even if one were to take pains to collect labour exploitation information 
# with such rigour, one will only come out with a partial class analysis. 
This is because Patnaik's E-criterion has concerned itself only with the
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agricultural aspect o^* the status of the household. But an 
agricultural household may have more than one occupations.
In that case Patnaik's E—criterion fails -to take account of labour 
exploitations in those non-agricultural occupations. It is only 
applicable in case where agriculture is the only occupation of the 
household concerned (Adnan et al, 1977s 30* Also, Patnaik assumes 
the same productivity for hired and family labour. But in reality this 
does not always hold good. It will be wise, therefore, to combine 
this method of differentiation with other methods in order to make a 
comprehensive class analysis. Lenin himself, in his work, has left 
enough indication regarding the multidimensional approach of differentiation. 
Moreover, Patnaik, has so far talked about economic differentiation 
only. But economic differentiation is not the last word in the Marxist 
way of looking into the concept of differentiation. Byres takes up 
this point and goes further (Byres, 1981).
BJ: BYRE'S EXPOSITION OF CLASS-IN-ITSELF AMD CLASS-FOR-ITSELF;
According to Byre^ economic differentiation creates the ground 
for social differentiation which entails how class-in-itself changes 
into class-for-itself (Byres, 1981: 4-24) •
In Byres' words:
The notion of class-in-itself, which has been said to 
embody the hard core of class [~~tfestegard and Resler, 
1976: 2-5J7, concentrates one's attention upon the 
structural formation. These involve men and women 
with a common relationship to the means of production, 
a common means of surplus product, and a common 
relationship, therefore, to one another; these 
relationships giving rise to an objectively given, 
common set of economic interests vis-a-vis other 
classes (other interests). Class-for-itself, on the 
other hand, entails a perception of these interests, 
and a willingness and a capacity to pursue them through 
organise^ collective activity (class action), and it 
directs the analysis towards ideas, institutional . forms, 
behaviour and the possibility of struggle. The crucial 
mediating element between class-in-itself and class- 
for-itself is class consciousness, which transforms the 
former into the latter, though never in a mechanical 
way,(Byres, 1981s 407)
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Hence a comprehensive discussion on differentiation of the 
peasantry should take into account this process of transformation 
of one into the other - their ramifications, how far they are likely 
to go, their manifestations in a concrete situation (Byres,19 82 J 408). 
There are, no doubt, a number of difficulties in making an attempt 
of that nature. Only those engaged in concrete political practice 
are placed in a unique position to comprehend such processes. An 
academic can only make rough approximation of the reality which is 
undergoing change. Nevertheless, an analysis of this kind is 
necessary if a full understanding of the processes of change is 
sought.
We have so far discussed in detail the attempts made by different
scholars to operationalize the concepts relating to differentiation
of the peasantry and their limitations. Now we are in a position to
identify some hypotheses from both Chayanovian and Leninist ideas
(including the later methodological developments on them) with a view
to testing them empirically for Bangladesh. We will use the data
3
collected on two villages during our fieldwork for this purpose .
We will first work out the Chayanovian hypotheses followed 
by Leninist ones.
TESTABLE HYPOTHESES:
A: CHAYANOVIAN HYPOTHESES;
We have primarily depended on Chayanov1 s‘ pwii work (1966), the 
works of Shanin (1972, 1980), Harrison (1975) and Hunt (1979) 1 in 
formulating Chayanovian hypotheses on demographic differentiation.
Hypothesis 1: Peasant households do not employ wage-labour.
Hunt modifies this hypothesis by framing it as 'dominance of the non­
wage family economic unit' (Hunt: 19795 276) in the African context. 
This may also be applicable to Bangladesh.
The criteria of selection of the villages, methods and limitations 
of data collection have been discussed in Appendix A.
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2. One of the key elements of Chayanovian theory is the independence
of consumption and production decisions. So, the motive behind
production organisation by an individual family unit is not 
profit-maximisation but establishing and maintenance of the 
labour-consumer (or subsistence) balance. Hunt redefines it by 
saying 'it is impossible to calculate profit according to 
capitalist formula* (Hunt, 1979* 276) as there is no wage system.
3. Land is in flexible supply to all households (through rent and/or
communal repartition) (Hunt, 1979s 248).
The three hypotheses formulated so far will give a general idea
of the peasant economy as analysed by Chayanov.
Once the general nature of the economy is established, we will
move to the specific hypotheses relating to demographic differentiation.
4- For each household family size influences the size of the cultivated
area (i.e. operated area) (Hunt, 1979: 276). The direction of the 
causality is from family size to farm size. More specifically, 
the amount of sown area (in Bangladesh case, operated area) shall 
directly vary with the size of the family. Couching in 
Chayanovian terminology, the correlation between the operated 
area and consumer-worker (c/w) ratio shall be positive.
5. For each household the c/w ratio influences the hours worked per
adult. In other words with increase in c/w ratio , hours worked
per adult also increases.
6. Hypothesis 5 raay also be re-emphasised in the following way:
With the increase in c/w ratio, output/acre also increases 
(as with the increase in the number of consumers the workers 
available in a family work harder i.e. their self-exploitation 
increases).
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7- Similarly, with the increase in c/w ratio, output/worker shall
i
also increase.
8. For each household the c/w ratio determines the value of total 
output per capita. In other words with the increase in c/w 
ratio, agricultural income per capita shall also increase.
9- The family life cycle influences the relative wealth of a family. 
Thus, a nuclear family grows in size over time faces disadvantages 
initially. But as the children grow up and help the parents in 
agricultural activities the position improves. So the years of 
existence of a family (we call it the age of family) shall have 
some relationship with the c/w ratio at any point in time.
Families in existence for smaller number of years shall tend to have 
higher c/w ratio and families in existence for greater number shall 
tend to have lower c/w ratio (but up to a point, after which c/w ratio 
tends to decline as growp up children will leave the parents and 
set up their own families). The latter part of the hypothesis will 
explain the dynamic argument of Chayanov on differentiation.
10. Shanin, while extending the Chayanovian views on differentiation, 
hypothesises a peasantry in complete fluidity. Rich families are 
becoming poor over time by partitioning and other demographic 
processes and poor families are becoming rich as their family sizes 
increases. In other words, in accordance with Shanin1s hypothesis, 
a group of peasants cannot stay long enough in the same position of 
the social ladder to consolidate as a class entity. The population 
pressure, law of inheritance, migration, partition etc. always 
divide a household and its duration in the same position is always 
under attack.
To test Shanin1s hypothesis a kind of mobility matrix showing 
land ownership or control for different periods for the peasant 
households may have to be constructed.
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B: LENINIST HYPOTHESES ON CLASS DIITERENTIATION
;
Leninist hypotheses on the differentiation of the peasantry
may he formulated as followsi
1. That the control over the means of production at a point in time 
is distributed very u n e q u a l l y
2. That the concentration in the ownership of means of production 
(especially land) would have been getting worse over time.
3. Concomitantly with the differences and concentration of material 
elements of production, one shall observe differences in 
techniques of production, income and expenditure pattern, food 
intake and standard of living, extent of market participation and 
any other aspects connected with such differences.
4* Differences in the distribution of material elements of production 
shall have roots in social relations -of production and exchanges - 
particularly in the over time tenural arrangements, usurious 
capital, market relations etc.
5* The Leninist view requires that the extent of labour exploitation 
and impoverishment shall increase as the pace of differentiation 
increases.. So. one would expect the following:
(i) Resumption of operated land by the rich farmers from tenants,
(ii) Dispossession of the small and marginal farmers,
(iii) Growth of wage labour, especially worker ’novice1.
(iv) Movement from 'bonded' to 'free' labour.
(v) Development of class consciousness.
(vi) Erom class-in-itself to class-for-itself changes.
6. The state shall get increasingly involved in displaceing the
poorer peasantry and helping the processes of concentration in the 
hands of a few. This will be an extension of the Leninist analysis 
of the differentiation.
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CHAPTER IV
j
AGRARIAN STRUCTURE AND INEQUALITY IN BANGLADESH: 
A MACRO OVERVIEW
This chapter is primarily based on macro-level published statistics.
It examines the gradual evolution of agrarian relations in rural 
Bangladesh since the 1940s with a particular emphasis on the situation of 
ever increasing poverty and inequality.
1. THE BENGAL PEASANTRY DURING THE LAST BAYS OF THE BRITISH RULE:
A close examination of the available statistics suggests that during 
the British period the peasantry in Bengal -was differentiated and that 
there was a significant presence of surplus Muslim raiyats, although their 
proportions varied from region to region. Bue to the presence of a
1
'surplus* group of raiyats in secure tenancy, and a host of middlemen 
in between the Zamindars and actual tillers, there always existed extra
pressures on the working peasantry and a number of avenues were open for
exploitation of the peasantry: in particular through money lending, 
trading and rack-renting interests. All these affected the stability 
of the agrarian peasantry and caused the peasantry to disintegrate. Thus 
by 1958 the Floud Commission bore witness to a highly disintegrated and 
unequal peasantry in Bengal. The Commission considered five acres of land 
as the minimum size of an economic holding (GOB, 1940:86) and a substantial 
number of people were by then found to be below the subsistance level. A 
sample survey of 19 j 599 households organised by the commission in 1930 found 
that about i|tK74*6%) of the total households in rural Bengal had holdings 
below the subsistence level (i.e. 5 acres) and only 2 5*4% more than 
5 acres of land, (GOB, 1940: Vol II , Appendix IX, Table VIII b).
Going into further detail, it was found that as high as 45*8% of the 
households had less than 2 acres of land and only 7*7% of households had
holdings which were more than 10 acres of land.
The Land Revenue Commission (henceforth, the Ploud Commission) reports
as many as 50 sub-infeudatory interests on land in some cases
(see the Report of the Land Revenue Commission: Bengal, 1940, Vol I: 57)*
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Compared to the overall distribution noted above, regional distributions 
were much more striking. Table 4*1 below brings out the regional variations 
quite clearly.
TABLE 4.1
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF LANDHOLDING BY DISTRICTS: BENGAL 1958-59
Name of districts
% of families
More than 
2 acres
More than 
10 acres
Average acres per 
family
1. Bakerganj (Barisal) 61 .8 1 .2 2.17
2 . Bogra 34-5 7-1 4.28
3- Chittagong 60.3 4-3 2.45
4- Dhaka 62.4 3-5 2.13
5. Dinajpur 24.2 15.0 6.38
6. Faridpur 81 .5 0.6 1 .63 1
7- Jessore 28.5 13.6 4-78
8, Khulna 55-6 7.6 4-78
9. Mymensingh (including 
Tangail and Jamalpur) 34.1 6.5 3.86
10. Noakhali 65.3 2.8 2.41
11. Pabna 64.I 2.4 2.39
12. Raj shahi 31 .8 14.6 5.52
13. Rangpnr 24.6 11.2 6 .67
14. Tippera (Comilla) 63.9 2.9 2.22
TOTAL 45-8 7.7 4.02
Source: Report of the Land Revenue Commission (Sir Francis Floud, Chairman),
Vol.II, Table VIIl(c), Bengal Government Press, Alipore, 1940*
7 7
We can note th^ followings from Table 4*1 s
1. Districts in the North and West (Dinajpur, Rangpur, Jessore,
Rajshahi) fall significantly below the 'less than 2 acres* 
average (percentages ranging from 24*4 ‘to 31 *8). They rise 
significantly above the 'more than 10 acres' average (percentages 
ranging from 11.2 to 15 • 0) .
2. Districts in the East and South (Dhaka, Tippera, Chittagong,
Mymensingh, Barisal, Khulna) fall even more significantly below
the 'less than 2 acres' average (percentages varying from 34-1 £>3*9)
and their rise above the 10 acres mark is not always significant 
(percentages varying from 1.2 to 7*6)*
The Commission also noticed wide regional variations in the incidence 
of landless labourers and share-croppers. The Commission found that the 
total percentage of families living mainly either as share-croppers or 
agricultural labourers in 1938~39 was 31%*
The districts which exceeded the average were in order of magnitude: 
Khulna (53%)> Pabna (41%) > Earidpur (39%)? Dinajpur (37%)> Rajshahi (36%) 
and Rangpur (32%). All of these districts are located on the Western 
side of the North-South river complex (Brahmaputra - Jamuna - Ganges - 
Padna - Meghna) and the majority of them (5 out of 7) are in 'the 
Rajshahi Division in Northern Bengal. If we consider the Eloud 
Commission data on a regional basis, ~we find that the landless population 
(including sharecroppers) ranged between 32-41% in the North Western 
region of Bengal to 5*9% in Comilla and 13*4% in Chittagong in the 
East. These figures lend support to the proposition that there was a 
loose correlation between areas of low landholding size and areas with 
a smaller proportion of landless families.
The districts in Northern Bengal had not only the greater proportions 
of sharecroppers and landless agricultural labourers, but the classes of 
raiyats and tenants were also more differentiated (as we have seen in 
Table 4* 1) • The Commission's findings thus lend support to the 
proposition that 'surplus' Muslim peasants did exist before and during
7 8
2
the emergence of Pakistan. The presence of rich Muslim .jotedars in
Northern Bengal in the early forties was also supported by Bell (1942)*
Bell, while writing the settlement Report on Dinajpur noted three-tier
agrarian relations in the rural areas. According to Bell, rural Bengal
3
exhibited three distinct classes:
(i) Class I - land owners (Zamindars, Talnqdars, Patnidars etc) 
and rich farmers (Jotedars, Gantidars, Haoladars etc);
(ii) Class II - self sufficient peasants (Raiyats) and
(iii) Class III - Sharecroppers (Bargadars) and agricultural labourers
(Krishans)
The explanation for this regional variation in the extent of 
differentiation among the raiyat classes in the forties was 
attributed by Wood (1978) to the historical specificity of the 
'border' districts. Wood says:
The districts were more exposed to the Communal tension 
which developed as a prelude to the Muslim League's 
Campaign for a separate Islamic State. Where the 
Zamindars and Tenure holders were largely Hindu, the 
communal factor restrained the excesses of Zamindar's 
oppression over the Muslim tenants (e.g. -illegal 
charges in addition to statutory rent). Thus 
retaining more surplus at the level of raiyat for 
accumulation and consolidation of holdings .
(Wood: 1978: 6)
3
In the words of Bell:
The Agricultural population of the district is 
scattered over the plains of the district in small 
villages, and in every village is to be found 
representatives of three distinct classes. The 
first of these are the landlords. Though the 
landlord or even his 'Gomosta1 may not be present 
in every village, yet the land upon which the 
industry of the village is expanded belongs either 
to an individual landlord or landlords or. to a 
group of relations who constitute a body of joint
cont1d
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The differentiated picture of rural Bengal has also "been confirmed 
by Ishaque's plot to plot survey (1944~45) of 5*284 random households 
in rural Bengal. The survey results have been recalculated by 
Abdullah (1976) and Abdullah*s tables have been recompiled by 
Hossain (1981). Hossain (ibid) while reorganising Ishaque’s 
(ishaque: 1946) data concludes that there were only 15 • 1PA of the 
rural households who owned more than 5-° acres of land (compared to 
25.4% in 1958 as per Floud Commission Report) and they owned more than 
60% of the total land. Not only that they share cropped out more than 
a third of their land, and so their share of cultivated land was not as 
high as the owned land. They supplied about 78% of total share 
cropped out land. Sharecroppers on the other hand were mainly the poor. 
Table 4*2 gives futher details:
footnote cont’d -
proprietors. Next to them are the pettty farmers 
or cultivators who constitute the largest of the 
three classes, these men rent from the landlords 
small parcels of land over which they usually 
acquired rights of occupancy. The third and last 
class is made up of such landless persons, who 
work as labourers in the fields of their more 
fortunate neighbours, and such artisans as~ the 
carpenter, the blacksmith and the potter, who 
assist agriculture by making or repairing agricultural 
tools or supplying the domestic wants of the 
population. To this class also belong the village 
servants who perform the menial offices of the 
village. Although the persons in this last category 
follow a variety of occupations, the whole class 
is relatively small, because there are few villages 
so large as to demand the services of more than one 
carpenter or potter and the number of landless classes 
in most villages is absolutely small.( Bell, 19 2^:80)
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Another study by the Indian Statistical Institute (194^ ) 
based on a sample survey of 80,000 households, also revealed the 
unequal agrarian structure prevailing in Bengal during the forties.
It found that in rural Bengal only 11.5 P©** cent of the total 
households owned 5 acres or more (see Mukherjee, 1957b:footnote 1, P.47)* 
When compared to the findings of the Report of the Land Revenue 
Commission of 1958? "the findings of both Ishaque's survey and Indian 
Statistical survey point to changes in landholding in rural Bengal 
leading to its concentration in the hands of a few wealthy people.
Based on these surveys and his own field studies in six 
villages of Bengal (Mukherjee, 1957a)> Mukherjee, like Bell, identifies 
three recognisable classes of the peasantry in Bengal during the last 
part of British rule in India^ (Mukherjee, 1957a)* They were:
1. Class I - composed of the landed gentry, viz, the landholders
and supervisory farmers i.e. of the sub infeudatory landlords and the 
prosperous non-cultivating or supervisory farmers. They formed 
the top most group in the villages.
^ The three classes have been formed‘out of the following occupational 
groups (Mukherjee, 1957b: l)i
1. Landholders are either the subinfehfiatory landlords created by the 
permanent settlement of 1795 ox those landowning persons who do not work 
on their land but let out the holdings for sharecropping for which
they receive at least a half share of the crop. In Bengal they are 
known as Zamindars or Jotedars ,
2. Supervisory farmers are those who live by having their land cultivated 
by hired labourers. They are generally distinguished from the ordinary 
cultivators by a qualifying prefix of being rich, viz. dhani chasi or 
grihastha.
cont1d
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2. Class II - was ^omposed mainly of the self-sufficient peasantry, ‘viz. 
the cultivators; "but artisans and traders were also included in this 
class. They too, like most of the cultivators, maintained a 
somewhat self-sufficient existence, partly based on land.
5. Class III - was composed of the remaining occupational groups, viz. 
the sharecroppers, agricultural labourers, service holders, and 
others, which were the people who depended on working for others 
or in case of a few of them,on the charity of the wealthier people.
footnote cont'd.
5..Cultivators are the self-sufficient peasants who possess tenancy 
rights over their holdings and cultivate them for themselves.
4- Sharecroppers or bargadars are those who live mainly by tilling 
others' land on a share-cropping basis. They usually possess a 
pair of oxen, a plough, and seeds for production, and are thus 
differentiated from the agricultural labourers,some of whom may be 
paid by crops instead of cash wages. There is also an important 
distinction between the two groups in as much as that while the actual 
earnings of - the share-croppers will depend on the total crop produced 
on the land, the wages of the agricultural labourers (either in cash 
or in kind) are fixed beforehand.
5. Agricultural labourers or Kisans are those who are paid in wages 
for their work in agricultural production.
6. Artisans are the rural craftsmen, like weavers, carpenters, potters, 
blacksmiths, etc, most of whom own their means of production and 
produce for themselves by their own labour.
7» Traders are generally the petty shopkeepers, maintaining a grocery
store or stationery shop in the village or peddlers.
8. Service holders are in the main menial employees of the local government
or public organisations or of individual households such as sweeper, 
messenger, watchmen, domestic servant etc.
cont'd
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Class I formed the landed gentry and thrived on the concentration 
of land and use of others' labour. According to a survey of the 
Indian Statistical Institute (194&)» this class formed only 4% of the 
rural households in Bengal but owned 11% of the total land.
Class II composed of mainly self-sufficient and self-cultivating 
peasants with proprietory rights on land (plus more or less self- 
sufficient and self-working artisans and traders) formed 42% of the 
total households and owned 68% of the total land (see 194& survey).
Class III had very little or no land of their own. They were 
the propertyless class mainly dependent on Class I for their living.
Mukherjee (1957b) says that the Bengal rural economy during 
British rule was dependent on two sets of production relations: one 
between classes I and III as owner and non-owner of the means of production 
(mainly land) and user and supplier of labour Respectively; and the 
other constituted by class II as owner of the means of production and 
user of own labour. Mukherjee argues th&t class II was predominant and, 
in fact, the single form of production relations in rural Bengal in 
pre-British days and , while the introduction of the Permanent Settlement 
in 1793 ( which brought the concept of private property in land) facilitated 
the emergence of classes I and III ( for details, see Mukherjee,1957b;14-40).
footnote cont'd.
9. Others, as a whole, group the rest of the households pursuing 
some ill-defined lowly occupations or living on the 
charity of other members of society.
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In Class I and- Class III relationships, Mukherjee noted the 
predominance of a landholder and sharecropper relationship rather 
than between a supervisory farmer and an agricultural labour.
There were, according to Mukherjee (l957b:50) iwo reasons for such 
a relationship:
(i) Such a relationship secured their employment throughout the year; 
while, because of extreme overcrowding in agriculture, if they 
remained as agricultural labourers, they might not have been able 
to secure regular employment.
(ii) As a sharecropper the peasant still remained a grihasfcha or
husbandman and was socially ranked more or less at the level of 
a raiyat (Class II peasants) and not as Kisans or agricultural 
labourers - a group socially placed lower than the former.
This new relation of production in agriculture was 
primarily determined by the demands of the property-owning privileged 
class in rural society and the gradual transformation of the agrarian 
economy from the closed door subsitence one to a market oriented 
open economy. The relationship also allowed constant exploitation of 
the landless and near—landless population by the landed gentry and this 
further aggravated the situation. This helped concentration of land 
and hence the agricultural income in the hands of Class I. And the 
cumulative effect of the operation of these factors caused poverty 
amongst the owners'of uneconomic holdings-and led to further inequality 
and concentration of land in the hands of Class I. Consequently, 
sharecropping and cultivation by hired labour grew at the expense of 
self-cultivation without any improvements in the technique of production.
However, during the last days of British rule, the agrarian 
structure based on the Zamindari system came under tremendous pressure 
from all sides. Gradually the arbitrary power of Zamindars and their 
subinfeudatory agents (Clsss i) began to be limited in the face 
of increasing socio-political pressure created by the division 
of holdings due to inheritance and population growth, increasing 
power of the urban professional classes as agents of British 
imperial policy, awakening of the peasantry as exemplified in the
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Tebhaga Movement aijicL other peasant movements. Communal discontent also 
worried Hindu Zamindars (the majority of whom were in Northern 
Bengal) about their future stakes in estates (Abdullah, 1976s 79-80). 
The pressures to abolish the exploitative Zamindari system were 
well reflected in the Floud Commission Report. The Commission 
recommended the abolition of the Zamindari system in Bengal and its 
replacement by a settlement directly between the state and the 
cultivators(Ploud Commission Report, 1940* 41“46). The system 
virtually collapsed during the turbulent years preceding the partition 
of India in 1947* After partition, practically all of the large 
Hindu Zamindars and rich raiyats left the territory now designed as 
Bangladesh for India. The departure of Hindi Zamindars and raiyats 
created enough1 illegal1 opportunities for the remaining rich Muslim 
peasants to expropriate the land vacated by the Hindu raiyats as well as 
landlords. As a result, there is every reason to believe that the 
regional variations in differentiation we noted earlier increased after 
1947 and certainly after 1950 when the Zamindari system was 
formally abolished (Wood, 1978* 6-7)* To legalize the defacto 
expropriation of land by Muslim jotedars and rich peasants (the power 
base of the then Muslim League Government in power) the East Bengal 
Legislative Assembly passed the East Bengal State Acquision
5
Tebhaga Movement evolved around the demand to enhance the 
bargadar1 s share from the existing half of the produce to two thirds 
in the forties. The movement was organised by Bengal Kishan Sobha, 
a frontal organisation of the Communist Party of India (CPl), 
following the second world war. In 19 districts bargadars involved 
themselves into action and forcibly implemented their demands 
(Sen, Suril, Agrarian struggle in Bengal 1946-47« People’s publishing 
House, New Delhi, 1972). Simultaneously in Mymensingh, Sobha 
organised the peasants against 1Tonko1, a system under which they had 
to pay fixed and exhorbitant rent in kind to the landlords irrespective 
of the quality of produce obtained (TJmar, 1975* 252-264). Nankor 
movement in Sylhet was also noted by Umar (ibid).
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and Tenancy Act (EBSATA) on February 16, 1950, after about two 
and a half years of deliberations and amendments of the bill proposed 
immediately after partition. Two and a half years time was long 
enough to give a signal to the rich landholders to organise their 
papers with the connivance of the revenue officials so that they could 
evade the ensurfig Act. Moreover as we shall see the implementation 
processes of the Act were not sufficient to ensure redistribution 
of land. Infact, at the end of the day concentration of land in the 
villages remained as before and in some cases it increased.
2. THE ACT OF 1950 AND ITS IMPACT ON THE! AGRARIAN STRUCTURE:
The Act of 1950 had the following provisions (Mahmud, 1959s 3~4) •
(i) All rent receiving interests in all lands stood acquired so that 
actual tillers of the land became direct tenants under the 
government. All raiyats (to be called 1 maliks1 henceforth) were 
to have permanent, heritable and transferable rights to use their 
land in any way they liked.
(ii) Subletting of land in future was forbidden. However, cultivation 
under barga (share-cropping) was not to be treated as subletting 
but as equivalent to cultivation through wage labour.
(iii) All cultivable lands in excess of 100 bighas (55-5 acres) per 
family or 10 bighas per member of the family, whichever was 
larger, plus homestead land up to a maximum of 10 bighas, were to 
be acquired by the government. This ceiling would be relaxable in 
cases of tea, coffee, sugarcane and rubber plantations, carsia 
leaves, gardens, orchards and large scale appliances and large 
scale diary farming. The excess land thus acquired would be 
settled with bonafide cultivators holding less than 3 acres 
of land.
(iv) All hats (periodic market places), bazars (daily market places) 
and fisheries would be acquired by the state irrespective of 
their present ownership.
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(v) The rent receiving interests of estates belonging to
> /
religious institutions ('waqful-lillah' and * waq ful-airlad* in 
case of Muslims and 1debottor1 in case of Hindus) were not to 
be exempted from state acquisitions. In case of religious 
property meant for private (i.e. waqful-aulad) welfare the ceiling 
on retainable land would be 375 bighas whereas for those devoted 
entirely to public welfare (i.e. waqful-lillah) no ceiling would 
apply.
(vi) For acquisition of rent receiving interests, compensation was 
payable on a graduated scale ranging from 10 times the net 
annual income in case of persons with net income of Tk. 500 or 
less per annum to 2 times the net annual income in case of 
persons with net income of Tk. 1 lakh (one hundred thousand) 
or more. In case of 'public' religious property, the 
compensation would be a perpetual annuity equal to the annual 
net income. Hut in case of 'private' religious property 
compensation would be at the same rate as that for secular 
property. •
(vii) For acquisition of "excess" lands, compensation was payable 
at the rate of 5 times the net annual profit from the land.
Again, in case of 'public' religious property, the compensation 
would be a perpetual annuity equal to the net annual income.
For 'private' religious property, compensation rates would 
follow those for secular property.
(viii) Compensation could be paid either in cash or in bonds or both.
The bonds would be non~negotiab 1 e and payable in not more 
than 40 annual instalments and would carry 3% interest.
(ix) Maximum rent would not exceed 1/lOth of the annual gross produce 
of the land. Fixed kind-rent, irrespective of production, as 
existing in Mymensingh, and known as 'tohk' was to be abolished.
In effect, It meant that kind rent was not to exceed 50^ of "the produce.
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(x) The 'bonded labour1 system known as 1 Nankar1 in Sylhet was to 
be abolished. Under this system, in lieu of‘ using land, the 
'Nankar' had to provide 'corvee' to his landlord.
(xi) If not less than 2/jrd of the villagers holding /3^d of the
village cultivable land applied, the collector could consolidate 
all the holdings of the village.
(xii) No holding could be sub-divided to the extent that the rent 
of any portion would be less than Tk. 1.0.
(xiii) Transfer of land would be restricted to only 'bonafide' cultivators.
Certain amendments were made to these from time to time.. The 
following are a few of them (Abdullah, 197&: 81-82):
(1) The amount of retainable khas land was raised from 100 to 375 
bighas by the East Pakistan Ordinance No. XV of 1961 . Some land had 
then to be restored to previous owners.
(2) In 19&4» bhe exemption of the ceiling (now 375 bighas) was 
extended to co-operative societies, "provided the ownership of the 
land is transferred unconditionally to the society by the individual 
members" (Eabir, 1972; 62).
In fine, the Act had two broad objectives. First, the elimination 
of rent-receiving interests previously enjoyed by the intermediaries 
and illegal exactions, and second, the redistribution of excess land. 
Apparently, the Act was supposed to have a great impact on the 
traditional agrarian structure. But in reality, it did not change it 
in any significant way. More specifically, the way in which the land 
used to be owned and operated, remained the same even after the 
enactment of the Act. Thus, we note the following:
(i) Abwabs or illegal exactions were not 1 reduced and the tenants
were hardly any more secure than they were under the old system.
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In the old system, Abdullah, argues:
..-a commercially minded landed class may have- 
resorted to large-scale eviction, but no such 
class existed in Bengal, and evictions were 
rare. Sale of land for arrears was more common 
but, so that procedure is,if anything,more expeditious 
now, so that the tenants may well have cause to 
feel less rather than more secure. In the past, 
when the Zamindar failed to collect enough rent 
to pay the revenue due to the state, it was the 
estate that was put up for sale . (Abdullah, 1976: 86)
Moreover, the lower level government functionaries 
(e.g. the tahsilders) were no less oppressive than the naibs and 
gomastas of the old Zamindars. Except for a slight increase in the 
rent collection of the Government (most of which went to meet the 
expenses of the ’revenue administration), the impact of the Act of 
1950 was insignificant. The intermediaries between the state and 
the cultivators were not effectively removed, but were merely 
substituted by another category, perhaps more powerful, which 
possessed government backing.
(ii) The redistributive effect was also not very significant. The 
ceiling was too high relative to the average size of holding.
In fact, according to one source, there were 529 families 
with more than 375 bighas (Hussain Report, 19^ 3* 62).
According to a different source, the number was 439 and the 
total amount of excess Khas land acquired was only 164 
thousand acres (Abdullah, 1976: 83). This was less than 1 
per -cent of the net cropped area of 1947/48. If -the acquired 
land had been redistributed among all the landless labourers 
(male and females over 12 years of age and as estimated in 
1961 census), they would have received on average only 0.06 
acres per head, or 0.3 acres per landless family. Moreover, 
all the acquired land was not cultivable either 
(Abdullah, 1976 estimates that only 40% was cultivable).
The implementation processes were also fraught with inefficiency 
and corruption. Hie criteria of categorisation used in the Act were 
not properly conceived and hence there was delay in implementation.
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The system of salami (earnest money paid along with applications 
for acquired land) made it slower still. There was strong pressure 
from the rural rich to maintain the status quo and there was 
active collaboration between the rural rich and the administration. 
They were opposed to any reform and they were powerful enough to 
subvert any attempt to reorganise the agrarian structure.
(Siddiqui 1980a).
So one can argue that the 1950 Act hardly had any favourable 
impact on the condition of. the poorer peasantry. On the contrary, 
the power and wealth of the rural rich improved. Inequality 
worsened further. A reflection of this will be seen in the 
following sub-sections.
3. The Present Agrarian Structure:
The present agrarian structure is, in fact, the creation of 
the EBSATA of 195°.' Macro level information on the land-ownership 
pattern is not always available on a consistent basis. Nevertheless, 
we will present the land/man relations for Bangladesh covering the 
last two decades in chronological order, from whatever macro data 
that are available.
3a. The Agrarian Structure of the Sixties:
We have two important Government sources for land information 
for the sixties - 1960 Census of Agriculture (G.O.P., 1962) and the 
Master Survey of Agriculture (7th Bound, 1968). The Agricultural 
Census of 19&0 found that in 19^ 0, 61 per cent of all farms were 
owner operated; another 37 per cent were owner-cum-tenant operated 
and only 2 per cent were purely tenant operated. Boughly similar 
figures were also reported in the Master Survey (7th Bound, G.O.E.P., 
1968). Table 4*3 gives further details.
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TABLE 4 .3
i
LAM) TENURE PATTERN Iff THE 1960S
Tenure Categories
percentage of farms Average size of 
farms (acres
1960 ■ 1968 1960 1968
Owner farms 61 66 3*1 2.7
Owner-cum-tenant farms 37 30 4*3 4.0
Tenant farms 2 4 2.4 3-0
1
All farms 100 100 3*5 3*2
Sources: (i) G.O.P., 1962 ( i960 Census )
(ii) G.O.B.P., 1968 ( Master Survey )
The average size of landholding has been, historically, 
very small. According to the 1960 Census, the average size of farm was 
only 3*5 acres; the average size of the pure—tenant farm was smallest 
(2 .4 acres) and that of the owner-cum-tenant farm was largest (4 *3) 
acres. The 1968 Master Survey, however, indicated that the average size 
of farm had fallen to 3*2 acres; the average size of owner-operated 
farm being the smallest (2 .7 acres) while that of the owner-cum-tenant 
farm was the largest (4 acres).
The distribution of farms according to operational holdings was 
skewed even in the 1960s. Table 4*4* below reveals this inequality 
quite sharply.
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, ' TABLE 4.4
DISTRIBUTION OP FARMS ACCORDING TO OPERATIONAL PATTERN IN 196QS
FARM SIZE 
(in acres)
percentage of farms percentage of 
farms (acres)
1960 1968 1960 1968
0 - 2 . 5 51 57 , 16 21
2.5 - 7*5 38 34 45 48
7.5 - 12*5 7 6 19 15
12.5 and above 4 ' 3 20 16
Source: i960 - (i) G-.O.P., 1962
(ii) G.O.E.P., 1968
One can see from the above table that a large proportion of 
farm households were very small holders. The 1960 census reveals that 
51 per cent of farm households had less than 2-5 acres and operated about 
16 per cent~of the total operated area. On the other, hand, only about 
11 per cent of households with about 39 per cent of operated area 
controlled more than 7*5 acres on the average. Similar findings were 
also reported in the 1968 Master Survey. Neither the i960 nor the 
1968 source gives information on the ownership pattern.
We have, in this section, presented some data on the landholding 
pattern in Bangladesh during the 1960s. The widespread existence of 
small holdings during the 1960s should not obscure the presence of 
regional variations in land control and social structure. The same 
sources, when examined region by region portray a differential picture. 
Tables 4*5 ^nd 4*6 gives us a brief view of regional variations.
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Tables 4*5 and 4*6 present data on gross areas, the 
divisions (comprising a number of districts) which broadly 
correspond to the different ecological zones of Bengal Delta,
Table 4*5 compares the data on landownerBhip of each division as 
percentage categories of the whole of Bangladesh (East Pakistan 
in the sixties). The table focusses a striking contrast between ,
North Bengal with other zones in terms of land tenural arrangements. Thus, 
in 19^ 0, North Bengal was the home of 51% of pure tenant farms 
(no ownership) in Bangladesh'^ % of the share-croppers were in 
Rajshahi commanding over 37% of the total sharecropped area. The 
corresponding figures for Dhaka division were only 24% and 18%. But 
the % of landless labourers in Dhaka division was much higher (30%) than 
that of Rajshahi division (2 5%)* Since pressure on land in the Central 
region was higher, more people had to sell -labour for their living.
As we shall see, this tendency of alienation of more people from land 
increased much faster in the -later period, in particular to this part 
of the country. The .inflow of modem inputs like fertilizer, irrigation, 
credit only accentuated this process.
Table 4*6 gives us similar trends. As we move from the north­
west to south-east, we observe that the size of holdings for all farms 
shifts from larger to smaller proportions. The number of owner farms 
also varies from 51% in North Bengal (Rajshahi) to 74% in South 
East (Chittagong). Correspondingly, the incidence of tenancy 
(including sharecropping) is higher. in North Bengal.
One may argue that-these differences, in a region where the average 
size of the holding is so small do not bear much significance-r But 
there can be inequalities even;when all the land holdings- are relatively 
small. As we have seen earlier, despite the mean size being very small, 
the disparities of landownership in this part of the world have been 
historically well marked and the processes of concentration have been 
getting further strengthened.
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3b, Agrarian Structure In The 1970s;
)
We have available for the 1970s two representative surveys, 
the Land Occupancy Survey of 1977 and of 1978 (B.B.S., 1977 & 1978) 
which give national level data on land-man relation. The Land 
Occupancy Surveyofl 978 seems to he more reliable than that of 1977 - 
The 1978 survey estimates the amount, of land at 20.8 million acres 
compared to 19*4 million acres by 1977 survey. The former is 
closer to the net cropped area (jannuzi et al, 1977 & 1980).
We have also, the Agriculture Census 1977 to provide 
necessary information on the contemporary agrarian structure. But 
an accurate picture of the landownership pattern in Bangladesh is 
hard to get as most people hesitate to give this sensitive 
information. So it is very likely that the survey findings under­
estimate the extent of inequality in the distribution of land 
ownership. The 1978 survey gives us the latest information on the 
land ownership pattern in Bangladesh. The following table 
summarizes the information obtained in the survey.
6 .The agricultural census 1977» however, appears to contain 
serious bias. For instance, it seems to present the picture 
that the number of farm households have hardly increased since 
i960 and the average farm size has. not changed (and remained
at 3*5 acres). These findings indeed, ignore the fact that 
there has been a significant increase in the size of the
population and the fragmentation of holdings through inheritance law. 
( ee also Osmani and Rahman, 1981: 23 for further reservations).
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TABLE 4 .7
)
DISTRIBUTION OF LANDOWNERSHIP IN 1978
Land ownership 
groups (in acres)
Number of
households
(thousands)
% of house­
holds
% of
population
% of 
land 
owned
No land except 
homestead 5462 28.8 23.4
Up to 1.0 (excluding 
landless) 5681 50.6 27.7
8.3
1.01 - 2 .0 1850 15.2 15.3 12.8
2.01 - 5 .0 1045 8.7 9.6 12.5
5.01 - 4-0 621 5.2 6 .4 10 .5
4.01 - 5-0 371 3.1 4-0 7.9
5.01 - 7-0 427 3-5 5.1 12 .0
7.01 - 10.0 273 2.3 3*4 10.9
10.01 - 15 .0 181 1.5 2 .6 10.4
Over 15-0 139 1 .2 2 .2 15.1
ALL GROUPS: 12051 ~ 100.0 10070 100.0
Source: Jannuzi and Peach, 1980: Appendix Tables E-I & E-IV ,
As we can see feom table 4»7> about 29 per cent of rural 
families were landless^ (having at best homestead land), and if we 
include in this figure, the families who owned up to 0 .5 acres, the 
total comes to about 0^ Per cent, who are functionally landless.
 ^ The Land Occupancy Survey of 1977 puts the figure at 53 Per cent. 
We feel that the 1978 survey findings are closer to reality.
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At the other extreme, 2,7 per cent of rural families owning more 
than 10 acres control nearly one fourth of the total land. 
Households owning more than 5*0 acres constitute the top 8.5 
per cent of the rural households. They own nearly half of the 
total land, although they constitute only 15 per cent of the 
population.
Although there is considerable inequality in the distribution 
of land ownership, the pattern of distribution of operational 
holdings may be slightly more egalitarian. But one should not 
overemphasise this since it might lead to an exaggeration of the 
role of small and medium farmers (Hossain, 1981 : 25). The average 
farm size, according to the 1977 census (G.O.B.D., 1981) is 3*51 
acres. It seems there was little or no change in farm size over 
the two decades. This appears slightly misleading as noted in 
footnote 6 of this chapter. The operation of the Land Occupancy 
Surveys give average sizes of operational holdings as 2.3 and 2.1 
acres in 1977 and 1978 respectively, which appear more plausible.
The Agricultural Census of 1977 seems to have favoured the 
view that the growing inequality in the ownership of land has been 
balanced by the tenural arrangements ( sharecropping, fixed-renting). 
The distribution of operated holdings has been more egalitarian 
according to the census. Even so, the 1977 census reported that 
marginal farms (up to 1.0 acres) constituting 1 5*9% of the total, 
operated only 2,7% of the farm areas as against 3 2.7% of farm 
areas being operated by large farms (7-51 acres and above) 
constituting about 9*4% of total farms.
Let us now look at the tenurial pattern in the 1970s-
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The following table shows us the tenur. al pattern:
TABLE 4.8 .
TEmJR..Ah PATTERN HT THE SEVENTIES
Tenure Categories
% of holdings % of area Average size 
farms (acres)
of
1977 1978 1977 1978 1977 1978
Owners 61 .2 64 .5 54-0 58 .0 2 .0 1.9
Owner-cum-tenant s 52.0 28.1 41 • 6 58.0 3.0 2.9
Pure Tenants 6 .8 7.4 4 .4 4 .0 1.5 1 .2
Source: Land Occupancy Surveys, 1977 and 1978
One can note from the above table that farm size for the pure 
tenant is the smallest (1 .2 acres) and that of the owner-cum-tenants 
is the largest (2 .4 acres).
Erom our discussion so far, we may identify the following trends:
1. The distribution of land (both on the ownership and operational basis) 
became more unegual in the late seventies compared to the late sixties. 
Osmani and Rahman (1981: 24) estimated the fractile groups and Gini 
Co-efficients for the sixties and seventies and their findings support the 
above hypothesis. These are reproduced in Table 4*9*
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TABLE 4 .9
i
EXTENT OF INEQUALITIES IN LAM) DISTRIBUTION IN BANGLADESH 
IN THE 1960S AND 1970S
© r  F r a c -t il e  G rG ew ps ( i'M/CJ)
Rractile groups 1960 1968 1977 1978
1. Bottom 60 per cent 25 24 11 9
2. Middle JO per cent 39 40 40 59
3. Top 10 per cent 36 56 50 52
Gini Co-efficient -of Landholding:
a) Operational 0.49 O .48 - -
b) Ownership — — O .63 0 .6 6
Source: Osmani and Rahman, 1981: 24» table 9*
Notes: (a) The figures for the shares in i960 and 1968 refer to 
operational holdings, whereas those of 1977 a^ d 1978 
refer to ownership. Operational holdings include rented 
in land from others. Since the tenants have no permanent 
-right over the rented in land and can he ejected at will 
(Ahmed and Timmons, 195^ * 58) operational holdings do not 
represent the true picture of control over the most 
important asset in the villages (i.e. land). In that sense 
the data of the sixties are not strictly comparable with 
those of the seventies. But one can get at least some 
trends. However, one must be aware of the myth of 
1 egalitarianism1 in the distribution of operational 
holdings.
cont’d
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The extend bf pure tenancy increased over these two decades 
at the cost of the owner-cum-tenants. This means that some of 
the small owners and owner-cum-tenants sold off their land and 
hecame pure tenant s. They probably leased in part or all of the 
land they had sold off, which explains the simultaneous increase 
in the volume of rented in land. The process has in fact 
accentuated income inequality rather than moderated it (as claimed 
by some, say,for example, Hossain 1981).
4* TMEQ.IJA1.ITY ARP POVERTY;
The unequal agrarian structure that has evolved over time 
has been at the root of processes which intensify income 
inequality and poverty. As we have already noticed, landlessness 
has increased sharply (Adnan et al, 1978; 120, 1974? BBS, 1979) 
on the one hand while there has been a growing concentration of 
assets, and particularly land, in the rural areas on the other.
The table 4*18 gives us an indication of the trends.
footnote cont'd.
(b) Ginio co-efficients have been calculated ffom the
formula: G = 1 + l/n - (2/nM ) bj + +.........
Where G = Ginio co-efficient 
M = the mean of the characteristics (here landholding size), 
n = number of observations (here households) and
\^>/ y2^ .... ^yn-
Thus the highest landholding size is y^  and it has
multiple I. The second highest landholding size is
designated as and its multiple is 2. The smallest number
is .01 in case of operational and effective holdings 
and 'O’ in case of ownership holdings. (see Sen,
1972: 31).
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TABLE 4 .1 0
j
GINI CO-EEFICIENTS OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN 
BANGLADESH: 196V6A to 1976/77
1963/64 1966/67 1968/69 1973/74 1978/77
RTJRAL 0.34 0.32 0.27 O .38 0.44
NATIONAL O .36 0.34 0 .29 O .36 0.45
Source: Osmani and Rahman, 1981: Table 3* P 11.
As shown in the table, although inequality declined towards 
the end of the sixties it went up in the seventies. By 1978/77* 
inequality in the rural areas and in the country as a whole was 
higher than-in 1983/8 4.
With the growth in inequality, the poverty situation has also 
been worsening over time. There is no standard set of criteria for 
measuring the poverty situation in Bangladesh. Different sources 
use different criteria to estimate the poverty line, (i) The 
Planning Commission (SFYP, 1980: 1-15) defines a minimum calorie intake 
of -2122 cal as the poverty line. On the basis of this criterion,
8 4.8^  of the Bangladesh population is below the poverty line 
(the proportion being 8 6.7% for rural areas). The Planning Commission 
takes 1805 cal as the minimum requirement for defining the extreme 
poverty line. On this basis, it estimates 53*8% of the Bangladesh 
population ties below the poverty line.
(ii) The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, the main source 
of national statistics, uses different criteria to define poverty 
line (BBS, 1981: 71 )• According to this source, the value of the
1 03
minirrvum consumption basket to satisfy per capita per day 
calorie requirements (2130 k cal for urban and 2150 k cal for 
rural areas) and the average value, of non-food items such as 
clothing, fuel, foot-wear, medical care, transport, housing etc. 
were calculated and these -values in turn give the poverty level 
income. Two poverty level incomes have been estimated for the 
year 1976-77 by the Bureau. The first is based on a combination 
of both food and non-food items and the second is based on food 
items alone. The estimated poverty level per capita annual income based 
on the first method (i.e. food + non-food requirement at constant 
prices of 1973-74) is Tk. 1053 for rural and Tk. 1030 for urban 
areas in 1976-77. The poverty level income based on the second 
method (i.e. taking only the food items) has been estimated 
to be Tk. 879 for rural areas and Tk. 744 for urban areas for the 
same year. The population of households below these poverty 
level incomes was then obtained as follows:
TABLE 4.11
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH PER 
CAPITA INCOME BELOW POVERTY LINE
Area
1973 - 74 1976 - 77*
a b a b
Rural 78 56 81 69
Urban 76 43 70 36
Source: BBS, 1981s Table 1.1, P 73
Notes: (a) Estimates based on the value of food and non-food 
consumption items.
(b) Estimates based on the value of food items only.
* 1976-77 estimates are based on 1973“74 prices. Definitions 
of rural and urban areas are as in 1974 population census.
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(iii) A.R^ Khan in another estimate finds the degree of 
rural poverty as given in table 4.12.
TABLE 4.12
INCIDENCE OF RURAL POVERTY IN BANGLADESH:
1963/64-1515
Tear Absolutely Poor* Extremely Poor**
households (in %) households
1963/64 51*7 9*8
1975 (first quarter] 70*3 50*5
Source: A.R. Khan, 1976
Note: *Per capita monthly income of Tk. 25*61 corresponding
to'per capita Calorie intake by the family of 1955 
k cals, i.e. 90^ ‘ttie recommended intake.
**Per capita monthly income of Tk. 17*02 corresponding 
to per capita intake by the family of 1720 k cals 
i.e. 8($j of the recommended intake.
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The Nutrition Surveys of Bangladesh indicate a similar 
;
trend of poverty. An average Bangladeshi, according to these 
surveys, not only experienced a nutritional deterioration "between 
1962/63 and 1975/76, but also a reduction in consumption of 
fish, meat and pulses (the source of meagre amount of protein intake). 
Thus while the per capita food intake declined from 835*0 grams 
to 807.0 grams per day between 1962/63 and 1975/76 (the percentage 
change being - 2.6), the per capita consumption of pulse, fish and 
meat oils and fat declined from 28.0 grams, 30*5 grams, and 6.2 
grams to 23 .8 grams, 26.1 grams and 3*2 grams respectively. The 
percentages of decline were — 1 5-0, - 3^ *2 and - 40*4 respectively. 
Table 4.13 below shows clearly the steady decline in the 
overall nutrient intake over the two decades.
TABLE 4.15
PER CAPITA CALORIE CONSUMPTION IN THE RURAL 
AREAS 0E BANGLADESH: 1962-64 TO 1976-77
Period
v . ...."
Pood intake in 
grams
Nutrient intake
Calorie (kcal) Protein (gram)
1962-64 841 2251 57*5
1973-74 729 1885 50.2
1975-76 806 2094 58.6
1976-77 624 1707 41.4
Sources: 1962-64, Nutrition survey of East Pakistan (Ministry of Health, 1966)
1975-76, Nutrition survey of rural Bangladesh (University of
Bhaka, 1977)
1975-74 & 1976-77, Household expenditure survey.
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Table 4 .15,shows us the extent of the poverty situation 
on an average basis. The situation is not the same for all 
groups. If we examine the food and-nutrient intake for different 
groups of the rural household we get a differentiated picture.
Table 4.14 indicates how pervasive is the inequality 
situation in rural Bangladesh. As is seen in the table, the 
position of the landless group is slightly better than the near 
landless groups (i.e. 0 .01-0 .49 acre group).
TABLE 4.14 
FOOD AMD NUTRIENT INTAKE BY GROUPS 11975
Household groups 
(in acres)
Food intake 
(grams/person/per day)
Nutrient Intake
Calorie 
(K cal)
Protein
(m)
0 694 1925 52.9
0.01 - 0 .4 9 685 1924 52.6
0 .5 0 - 0.99 745 2035 57-7
1.00 - 2 .9 9 785 2193 62.5
5 .00 and above 843 2375 67.6
_
Source: 1975-76 Nutrition survey of Bangladesh,
BBS, 1981: 77-
The Bangladesh Bureau of statistics (1981) estimated 2248 k 
cals as the minimum requirement for a person. According to its 
calculation (based on the Food Nutritional Survey of Bangladesh, 1975-76) 
as many as 59 per cent of households had Calorie intake less than 
the above requirement. Table 4*15 gives the details.
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, * TABLE 4*15
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS MEETING- DIEEBRENT PROPORTION OF 
CALORIE REQUIREMENT t 1975-76
Percent of requirement Percent of household
Less than 50 9
50 - 59 6
60 — 69 8
70 - 79 12
80 - 89 11
90 - 99 13
100 and over 41
Source: BBS, 1981: 80
The poverty situation prevailing in rural Bangladesh as 
reflected in the above paragraphs is also supported when one looks 
into the trend of real wages, especially the rural real wages 
situation in Bangladesh.
5- TREND IN REAL WAGES:
To establish the trends in real wages, the choice of a price 
index is crucial. Although BBS publishes cost of living indices 
for major districts and the upper and lower income groups, none of 
these indices presents national averages or goes back far enough to 
determine long term trends. To determine trends in average national 
wage level, two composite indices - one for rural and the other for 
urban areas - have been constructed by adjusting the cost-of-living 
index for Government employees in Dhaka with the average weights 
calculated from the 1973“74 Household Expenditure Survey. We present 
the trend for national as well as urban and rural cost of living 
indices in table 4*18.
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TABLE 4.16
BANGLADESH: COST OF LIVING INDICES (GENERAL)
(1955/56 - 100)
Year Cost of living - indices
National Rural Urban
1959/60 127.62 127.54 125.89
1969/70 177.96 177.75 176.80
1972/73 328.10 328.08 322.22
1973/74 461.99 462.22 451.28
1975/76 600.15 679.30 676.23
1976/77 667.34 665.84 670.48
1977/78 772.61 770.94 776.04
1978/79 842.00 840.00 850.00
1979/80 979.00 976.00 984.00
Source: World Bank (1981, Vol. II, Annex V table 2).
Note : Average weights have been calculated from 
1973-74 Household Expenditure Survey.
Weights were given as follows: " •
I t e m s
W e i g h t s
National I Rural Urban
Food 74.2 74.7 67.9
Fuel & lighting 8.0 8.1 7.3
Housing 5.2 4.8 9.4
Clothing 5.3 5.3 5.6
Miscellaneous 7.3 7.10 9.8
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Since our major emphasis has been upon understanding
i
the peasantry, we will discuss here only the trends in real wages 
for the rural areas.
RURAL WAGES;
Agricultural wages, when deflated by the rural cost of 
living index or simply by the price of rice, 6how a downward trend 
in real terms. Although 1969/70 was a recoid year for agricultural 
production, real wages of agricultural labour were nearly 18% lower 
than in 1963/64 (WB, 1981, Annex V,P. 1). Agricultural production 
declined between 1969/70 and 1974/75* with real agricultural wages 
declining further.' In 1975/76, agricultural production exceeded the 
levels achieved -in 1969/70, and since then has increased substantially. 
Real wages of agricultural labour in 1979/80 were, however, 23% below 
the 1969/70 level. After a continuous decline in real wages between 
1963/64 and 1985/76, real wages of agricultural workers improved 
slightly in 1976/77 after the good harvest of 1975/76. But this 
improvement was not similar in all regions. In Kushtia,
Faridpur, Tangail, Rajshahi, Comilla and Khulna, accounting for 27% 
of total foodgrain production, one could see some improvement in real 
wages between 1975/76 and 1979/80. But the national average real 
wage of agricultural labour has continued to stagnate around the 
1975/76 level. The table 4*17 indicates the trend:
TABLE 4.17
TREND IN REAL AGRICULTURAL WAGES 
(1969-70 - 1U0j
YEAR i Agricultural wage Index
1972-73 6 6 .5
1973-74 63 .2
1974-75 60.7
1975-76 76.6
1976-77 75-6
1977-78 74-3
1978-79 81 .0
Source: GOBD, Planning Commission, SEYP, 1980: 1-15
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Real wages^in two other major activities of rural Bangladesh, 
fisheries and the handloom industry also declined between 
1963/64 and 1975/76. After 1975/76, we notice some increase in 
the real wages of these two activities, even through real wages in 
1979-80 were still 11-16% below the 1969/70 level (World Bank 
1981, Annex V, Table 3)*
The above trends can primarily be explained by the fact that 
the labour force has been growing faster than employment 
opportunities. The rural labour force is estimated to have increased 
by 14% between 1963/64 and 1969/70 by another 16% between 
1973/74 '1979/80, while food production increased by 12% and
13% respectively in these periods. The total cropped area 
increased by only 1 .7% during 1963/64 to 1969/70 and by 2% during 
1973/74 to 1979/80. Studies of the impact of technical change 
on employment suggest that the entire package of new seeds, fertilizer, 
irrigation technology increases employment at a rate which is about 
one-third to one-half that of the increase in crop production 
(WB, 1981, Annex V, P, 2). This implies that the aggregate demand for 
agricultural labour increased by only some 1 .5% a year over the last 
10-12 years, whereas, the rural labour force expanded by at least 
2.2% a year. If one compares the decline in real wages of agricultural 
labour vis-a-vis industrial labour, one finds that the figures 
continued to decline during 1963/64 to 1969/70, improved slightly 
during the period 1969/70 to 1975/76 but again declined during 
1975/76 to 1977/78 in relation to other sectors (World Band, 1981,
Annex V, Table. 6).
Summary:
From our discussions, we can see that on the one hand the 
agrarian structure is becoming more inegalitarian while the condition 
of the poorer section, particularly the landless and the landpoor 
peasantry, has been deteriorating consistently. Different poverty 
and inequality indicators calculated from the government supplied 
data confirm these trends. These macro trends, as we will see, have 
been shaping the phenomenon of differentiation of the peasantry and 
they, too, are being shaped simultaneously by it.
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FIELDWORK FINDINGS : PART-A
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENTIATION
In this part of our fieldwork findings 
we will see how far the notion of 
demographic differentiation of the peasantry 
is applicable in rural Bangladesh. We 
will first test the hypotheses propounded 
by Chayanov in the context of Russia and 
this will be followed by testing Shaninfs 
mobility schema.
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CHAPTER Vj --------
TESTING THE CHAYANOVIAN HYPOTHESES
Except for Hunt*s study (1979) we did not know many others which 
have tried to apply the Chayanovian model empirically in the context of 
a thrid world peasantry. Examples are even rarer in the South Asian 
context. In this chapter we will primarily depend on the information 
gathered during our field work in two Bangladesh villages in order to 
test the Chayanovian hypothesis we formulated in the last chapter.
HYPOTHESIS I:
The basic requirement for an economy to be Chayanovian is the 
complete absence of wage labour. In more modified form, one can 
hypothesise that there shall be the dominance of non-wage family economic 
units.
We do not have enough macro-level data for Bangladesh by which 
we might prove or disprove this primary notion of Chayanovian economy.
But we have a number of micro studies.
It is true that as yet the family labour component dominates in 
the total supply of labour. But one cannot argue that there is a 
complete absence of wage labour and the dominance of the non-wage family 
unit. As many of the micro studies, including our one, reveal the 
extent of pure cultivators (employing no wage labour) is indeed prery 
insignificant. In fact, the proportion of wage labour has been growing 
steadily. In 1974 ihe national census of Bangladesh reported that as 
much as one quarter of the total agricultural population depended on wage 
employment. The Directorate of Agriculture (Extension and Management) 
in a country-wide survey conducted in 1977 found the proportion to be 30% 
(BARC, 1978 s iv). The proportion has increased over the last few years 
and some regions have shown a significantly higher capability of absorbing 
wage labourers. Especially in those districts where modern technologies 
have some inroads, the proportion of wage labour vis-a-vis family 
labour has increased quite sharply. The World Bank, in a recent study,
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finds that "There are the landless and the near landless households,
j
comprising nearly one-half of all rural households, who must depend on 
wage employment for their livelihood" (World Bank, 1981: Vol II,
Annex IV, P.16).
We can also present the results of a number of micro studies 
which establish the high incidence of wage labour. Table 5-1 
summarizes the results.
TABLE 5*1
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF WAGE LABOUR AND FAMILY LABOUR 
IN BANGLADESH AGRICULTURAL ' SECTOR
Area of survey Period of
% of total labour supplied by
(Districts) survey
Family
workers
Permanently
hired
workers
Casually
hired
workers
Total
hired
workers
1. Mymen singh 1973-74 59*2 12.3 28.5 4 0 .8
2. Dina j pur 1973-74 6 9 .4 15 .0 15 .6 30.6
3- Comilla - 1974-75 56.1 6.5 37.5 44*0
4 . Dhaka (Dacca) 1978-79 56.7 - 43.3 43*3
5. Chittagong 1978-79 77.6 - 22.4 22.4
6. Bari sal 1979-80 71.4 — 28.6 28.6
Sources: (i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Centre for Scoial Studies, Dhaka University, 1980 
Hossain, M, 1981; BDS, 1977: Vol, VI, No. 3 
Khan, A.R., 1981 
Rahman, M, 1978
One can see from the above results that in some districts (say 
for example, Comilla or Dhaka in the Eastern Bangladesh), the proportion
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of wage labour is more -than 40%* The proportion of wage labour is, by­
comparison on the lower side in Northern Bangladesh where the productive 
forces have not developed so well.
In another study conducted in two areas of Dinajpur and Comilla, 
Rahman found that about one-third of the households earned their 
livelihood'mainly from wage employment (Rahman, 1979: 74)* He identified 
19% and 13% of households in Dinajpur and Comilla as pure cultivators 
(who neither hire in nor hire out agricultural labour). From the income 
earning point of view as well, Rahman noticed about 9*4% of the total 
earnings of the area came from agricultural wage labourers.
In our study areas, also, we noticed quite a high proportion of 
households engaged in agricultural wage earning. In village-I, about 
40% of households were dependent on agricultural wage earning (35% 
had agricultural wage earning as the principal occupation) in 1980-81 and 
in village -2, 29% of households were agricultural wage earning households 
(21% had agricultural wage earning as the principal occupation).
The percentage of pure cultivator households were -1 3% and 20% 
in village-I and village-2 respectively during our study period. The 
percentage would be even smaller if we excluded the potential landless 
labourers (i.e. those households who owned less than 1 -50 acres of land 
in village-I and 2.5 acres in village-2) from the total number of house­
holds. In fact, our survey results reveal that more than 90% of the 
cultivating households in both -the villages employed casual labourers.
The percentage of households employing casual labour is almost 100% in the 
higher land-owning groups.
Rahman recorded as high as 97% of farms employing casual labour 
in 1974-75 in the relatively developed region of Comilla district.
The following table gives us the relative weights of family labour and 
hired labour for our study village-I, for which information was collected 
most intensively.
11 5
CM
in
I—I
I
a2hzI—
s
03 H* O’ CO O O
w m  - CO 03 in 03 rH ID 03 in ID nni O a a a a a • • « a a
in m (—1 X) CO O CO r- O 00 CO
O’ o\° CM CM CM CM CO p»> ["' O’
tn m 00 03 IO CO in 0 CO in ID O’
td o a a a a * * • a a
in in 1—1 O’ p ID 03 O’ O in CO
co o\o CM CM CM CM CM CM CO n LO CO
m m ID m O O 1—1
id o O O O in ID a a ■ • ain a a H1 CO O rH CM
CM oV> O’ 1—1 CO 1—1 rH CM CM rH
in M-H 1—1 O CO ID 00 00 f" O’ O’ Otd n a • • a a a a a a a
in CO 00 1—1 O’ 03 CM I-1 03 1-1 O
■—I o\P r" r- [■"• ID in in in CM CM CD
in —^V s- -V —^k ,—■, —^s O ^^
ft >1 _ _ in in 1—E CM 0 O’ U niH 3 td 0 CM in o’ 03 O’ O O* iH
<3 Q  ^3  in o’ in O' IO O  •to •rH •CM •1—1 •ID •O  O* 1-1 a+* rQ C m  •CO •00 p> O  in 03 O r-~ 03 03 CO ID CO O’ 0 *CO COO 1  -r3 Jj CO 03 cm p -03 O in to CO O’CO rH co i—1ID rH CM O ID IDEh r—| CM 1—1 1—1CO iH O’ rH CM CM in o’CM O’O’ n in <—1CM rH
■ '— ' ' '—' '—' —' —^■” ■—■CO ^
,— V ,— v ^^ ,—^ —* Q in ^ S-—s
1—1 rH p~ •—1 O’ in O O ID in
id lo 03 1—1 00 O  00 tn in to P CO •ID •iH •n  •03 rH
4-1 o’ 03 •p* •^  a O  *p  .ID CO CO CO 03 n O  p- CM •
O r-~ CM ro iH O CO 03 CO CM in co CO 03 CM in 03 iH CO 03
Eh — - iH co rH CO p CM rH 1 1 1—1ro co O’ CO n  P’
— '— — ' ' 1—l ’— ■
£d
O  —
PQ CQ
3  >1 1— 1 ,—„ ,—^ ,— , ._„ CO p> CO .— .
M  td id 1—1 r-~ m P- Q in CM p- CO O’Tj p ro in 03 rH CO O  0 * O  CM 00 O co •ID •ID • 0  •03 CO
I2; s U3 — 03 •p- .00 ■CO .ID • O  «H 03 CM n  1—1 co ID aH id p- CM co 03 lO cm p p  o’ cm 03 O’to ID O’ P' CO 03
U '— ■ ■— ■ CM rH CO in 1—l i—1 (H CM CM co in rH n
M  C —' '—' —" 1—I '
s  S
4J
ft<D -—. ^^
r\ —^x ^^ a* _v ,— ID in a^—N
g CN CN p in CM 1—I OO rH _  0
O O O  co in cm in p O  ^ O  r- LO •in •O  00
M in •p  •Q *in •03 •CO CO CO 03 ID a0 rH O' CM 1—1 CO 00 H co in 03 0 O’ CO 03 03
pq — - '— ' in in 1— 1rH CM CO rH— ■ '— ' ’
in
> 1 ,— . ,— .
>i M m in i— 1 p* ,— »
H  H  3 rtj H O tn in in H r" in t> in 03(d -H c) g -— ■* 03 in CO P" O  r- 03 03 co •O ’ • in •in •in •CO O’
-ft §  X 5 3 LO ■ 10 •O1 •10 •rH CO O  rH 03 CO p- CM to LO 03 *
O 3 n3 s CM 1—!03 CO 00 m 03 03 O  ID ■—1 CM O’ rH CO LO CO CM CM rH
Eh 4-t H CM 1—1CM P' CM 00 CM -H CO CM iH CM 1—1 1—1H  CM ID CO—^■* 1— 1 '— "
mo •
* Pd <N O r~ co CM ■yr 03 in Qo • rH r- ro CO 1—1 rH O
s  in CM
Q W
O 4 in. O O 0 O O O 0 Or
■H P in in in in O in « gJ3 ft • a a a 0 + p
in ^ u r-4 CM CO in P' 1—1 1 kft Q4 cd d Hi ? rH 4i rH r—1 rH rH
1
rH 8
G S P P| O LO in in in O in 1—1
a a a a * • a 0 1—1
m <5 rH CM CO m H <
PQ
S
11 6
Table 5*2 shows the pervasiveness of hired labour in the 
rural economy of Bangladesh. For the last three groups, the proportion 
of wage labour surpasses total family labour. The proportion of hiring 
in of permanent labour increases as we move to the higher land-owning 
groups. The proportions of income from agricultural wage labour were 
also quite substantial, 8.8% in village~I and 9*9% in village-2.
So neither the Chayanovian original hypothesis of complete 
absence of wage labour nor Diana Hunt's modified hypothesis of dominance 
of non-wage family unit do really hold good in the context of Bangladesh.
HYPOTHESIS 2;
Once we nullified hypothesis I, hypothesis 2 becomes questionable 
immediately. 0u£ intimate discussions with the peasants about their 
production decisions revealed that rural households were indeed profit 
conscious and cost minimisers. Chayanov asserted that since the labour 
cost could not be inputed, the profit could not be calculated( as a 
capitalist entrepreneur would). But we found most rural households were 
guided by a rational comparison of differential gain and cost 
attributable to any of their production decisions. The rural households, 
although they did not have proper accounting procedures, did have in mind 
a traditional way of judging the profitability of any production decision. 
Thus in village-I, at least one-fifth of the total operated land was 
devoted to the -cultivation of Jute in the sixties. But as the price of 
jute relative to rice fell steadily, the farmers changed their production 
decisions and by the early eighties not even of the total operated land 
was found under jute cultivation. Jute, the most important exportable 
item for Bangladesh had falling demand in the international market and 
a farmer easily read that signal. The same thing happened when modern 
agricultural techniques, including the high-yielding seeds, began to 
spread in rural Bangladesh. After an initial hesitation, the farmers 
in general accepted the merits of irrigation, chemical fertilizer and 
other components of B;YV technology. There were as many as seventeen 
power pumps in watering the paddy fields of village-I. The absence 
of irrigation technology in village-2 had nothing to do with the 
'peasant motive1 . The households in village-2 lacked capital and state
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connection to bring :jn' tube-wells to their villages. Many of its 
adjoining villages had installed irrigation pumps and benefited from 
the high yielding technology.
The general attitude of the poor peasantry is also changing 
pretty fast and they do not see themselves as'pure cultivators1 only.
They may opt for the occupation of wage labourer if the opportunity 
arises.
Even part of the middle peasantry in both the villages was found 
to be involved in the modem techniques of production and employing 
a substantial proportion of wage labourers. They did not produce only 
to consume. They very often think in terms of profit maximisation and 
become involved in commerce and trade activities.
The other part of the middle peasantry was seen to strive very 
hard to stick to their original position at least, if not better it.
But economic forces are pulling them down and they are facing all the 
pressures of a disintegrating peasantry.
So our field investigation does not support Chayanovian hypothesis
no* 2
HYPOTHESIS 5.
Hypothesis 5 expects land to be in flexible supply to all 
households. If there be any short fall in any household, It can 
compensate that by renting in more land fiom others.
But as we have observed, most households in our study villages 
were starving for land. Both per household and per capita operated land 
has been declining consistently. As we shall see in Chapter 8, the 
rich households have been taking back their rented out land from the 
poorer peasantry and forcing them to join the ranks of wage labourers.
Table 5-3 points to the shrinking land-man ratios since 1951 in both 
our study villages.
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TABLE 5.5
SHRINKING OPERATED LAID PER HOUSEHOLD/PER CAPITA
Name of the 
village
Operated land per hh 
(acres)
Operated land per capita 
(acres
1951 1972 1981 1951 1972 1981
Village-I 3.33 2 .56 2 .09 .81 .51 .35
Village-2 4-77 3.40 2.52 1 .10 .73 • 45
Table 5*3 portrays the pressure on land via growing population in 
both of our study villages. The per capita figures reveal an accute 
situation. Chayanov also hypothesised that occassional short-fall in 
the sown area would be matched by seasonal recourse to crafts and trade 
activities. But the opportunity for going into trade and crafts, with no 
capital in hand and in the face of stiff competition from manufacturing, 
is also very limited. In a situation like this, the only option left for 
them Is to join the already overcrowded wage labour market.
In any case, our field investigation in two villages once more 
convinced us that the flexible supply of land in rural Bangladesh was 
a myth.
We have, then, begun to suggest that, on a basis of our evidence 
concerning the incidence of wage labour, rural Bangladesh is not a 
Chayanovian universe. We may now proceed to a more detailed testing 
of the Chayanovian hypotheses.
HYPOTHESIS 4:
Hypotheis 4 envisages a positive correlation between family size 
and sown area. In the specific context of Bangladesh we can take 
operated land (which takes care of mechanisims of land adjustment like
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renting^ -in, renting^out, mortgaging etc) as a proxy for what was sown 
area in rural Russia. As Chayanov insisted, we have taken family size 
as the independent variable while constructing the following table, which 
predicts a direct relationship between family size and operated land.
TABLE 5.4
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY SIZE AND OPERATED IAND: 1980-81
FAMILY VILLAGE - 1 - VILLAGE - 2
5
i
SIZE
GROUPS
No. of 
renters per 
household
.Amount of 
operated 
land 
(acres)
Amount of 
operated 
land per 
Capita 
(acres)
No. of 
neuters per 
household
Amount of 
operated 
land per 
household 
(acres)
....
Amount of ) 
operated : 
land per ' 
Capi ta ! 
(acres)
1 - 2.5 1.96 .56 .23 1.92 .69 .36
3 - 4.5 4.02 1.98 .42 3.78 1.75 .46
5 - 6.5 5.54 1.50 .32 5.44 1.65 ■ 34
7 - 8.5 7.25 7.92 1.72 7.30 6.91 .82
9 + 10.76 6.43 .97 10.50 6.73 .66
Note: All children less than ten years have been taken as half of adult ccnsurrer.
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Table 5-4 does not give us a very consistent relationship. But 
in the majority of the cases (three out of five) we get positive 
correlations between family size and average operated land per household 
and per capita. However, in two cases we notice a sudden breakdown 
in that relationship.
To be more specific, let us look into the relationship between 
c/w ratios (as defined in appendix A) and landholding size. The c/w 
ratio gives us the proxy for changing family size. While estimating land 
holding size we have taken not only operated land, but also owned and 
effectively controlled (net operated land left after making various 
rental adjustments). We first look into the relationship between the 
c/w ratio and operated land. Table 5*5 gives us that relationship.
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TABLE 5.5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN C/W AND OPERATED LAND
c/w
RATIO
GROUPS
VILLAGE - 1 VILLAGE - 2
No. of 
Household
Amount of 
operated 
land per 
household 
(acre)
No. of 
Household
Amount of 
operated 
land per 
household 
(acre)
1.00 - 1.50 17 1.11 2 0.59
1.51 - 2.00 34 1.38 11 1.63
2.01 - 2.50 41 1.64 12 3.27
2.51 - 3.00 42 2.28 22 1.70
3.01 - 3.00 20 2.67 7 2.28
3.51 - 4.00 . 12 2.80 15 2.44
4.01 - 4.50 14 2.68 7 2.01
4.51 - 5.00 5 1.10 2 13.33
5.01 + 15 3.61 23 3.78
All groups 200 2.09 101* 2.52
Note: C/W ratio = All members (adjusted for children by
dividing' them by 2 )
All male workers (10 - 64 years) - 
male students
20 households who immigrated after 1972 from another 
district have been excluded while computing the C/W 
ratio for village 2.
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As evidenced from Table 5*5 as the c/w ratio increases,average
i
operated land per household increases consistently except in one case in 
village-I. But the relationship is not that consistent in village -2.
The ratio between the lowest and the highest c/w ratio is roughly 
1.5 in both the villages. But the ratio between the corresponding 
operated land associated with the lowest and the highest c/w ratio groups 
are 1.5 for village -I and 1.6 for village-2. That means that the c/w 
ratio and operated land size did not vary at the same rate.
Corresponding to the c/w ratio 4 .51-5*00, the average operated land per 
household was recorded as 1.10 acres in village-1. But the preceding 
groups1 operated land size was 2.84 acres .
For village 2, the relationship between the two variables is 
indeed erratic. While the c/w ratio varies consistently from 1.00 
to 5.00 and above, the operated landholding sizes vary fiom group to 
group in different degree. In one case, the operated land jumps up 
to 15*55 acres only to fall again to 3*78 acres in the next step.
We get similar types of relationships in cases of owned and 
effective landholding sizes. Table 5*6 gives the detail.
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TABLE 5.6
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN C/W AND QWNED/EFEECTIVE LANDS
C/W
RATIO
VILLAGE - 1 VILLAGE - 2
Amount of 
owned
cultivatable
land
(acres)
Amount of 
effective 
land 
(acres)
Amount of 
owned
cultivatable
land
(acres)
Amount of 
effective 
land 
(acres)
1.00 - 1.50 .95 1.02 0.59 0.59
1.51 - 2.00 1.33 1.36 1.13 1.42
2.01 - 2.50 1.36 1.51 3.23 3.29
2.51 - 3.00 2.13 2.22 1.53 1.60
3.01 - 3.50 2.39 2.53 1.86 2.15
3.51 - 4.00 2.93 2.85 2.37 2.41
4.01 - 4.50 2.04 2.83 1.65 1.94
4.51 - 5.00 2.52 1.79 10.03 10.33
5.01 + 3.71 3.62 3.73 3.78
All groups 2.00 2.04 2.41 2.50
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The nature of the correspondence between c/w ratio and landholding 
size (of different categories i.e. owned, operated and effective) is 
better demonstrated in the attached graphs (5i and 5ii).
Both in the tables and the graphs, Chayanovian hypothesis No.4 
appears to be almost totally true in the case of village I and partially 
true in village 2. However, the relationship as predicted in the tables 
and graphs does not tell us anything about the direction of casuality. 
Chayanov always insisted that it is family size (hence the c/w ratio) 
which influences the landholding sizes. But this does not emerge 
clearly from the above discussion.
We can get almost an identical result if we change the columns 
and make landholding size the independent variables. Table 5*7 gives 
us the relationships between operated land groups and c/w ratios, while 
table 5*8 gives us the relationships between landholding groups and 
c/w ratios.
TABLE 5.7
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATED LAND AND C/w RATIO
OPERATED IAND 
GROUPS (IN ACRES)
C/W RATIO
VILLAGE - 1 VILLAGE - 2
1. 0 2.77 3.19
2. . Ol — . 50 2.30 2.67
3. .51 - 1.50 2.75 2.63
4. 1.51 - 2.50 2.61 3.29
5. 2.51 - 3.50 2.59 3.42
6. 3.51 - 5.00 2.83 3.84
7. 5.01 - 7.50 2.77 3.54
8. 7.51 -10.00 2.80 2.42
9. 10.01 + 3.92 4.51
All groups 2.81 3.27
1 25
Table 5-7 indicates that there is no consistent relationship 
between operated land and c/w ratio. This is true for both the 
villages, though the fluctuation is wider in case of village-2. In 
both villages, while the size of the operated land groups increase 
consistently, the size of the c/w ratio does not increase 
accordingly. We notice ups and downs in the value of c/w ratio in most 
cases.
The same thing is true in the relationship between c/w ratios 
and land owning groups. Table 5*8 gives us that picture.
TABLE 5.8
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN LANBOWNING GROUPS AM) c/W RATIOS
Landowning 
Groups 
(in acres)
c/w Ratios
Village 1 Village 2
1 . 0 2 .76 2 .90
2 . .0 1 -.5 0 2 .58 2 .88
5. .51-1.50 2.55 2 .50
4 . 1.51-2.50 2.55 4 .2 2
5. 2.51-5.50 5.11 5.47
6. 5.51-5 .00 2 .72 5.45
7. 5.01-7.50 2.71 5-75
8 . 7.51-10.00 2.94 5-00
9 . 1 0.01+ 5.92 4 .56
ALL GROUPS 2.81 5.56
1 2b
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As we can see^  from table 5*8* there is no consistent 
relationship between the c/w ratios and land owning groups. In village-.| , 
the c/w ratio for group I (with no land) is 2 . 7 while that for 
group 7 (owning 5-01 —7-50 acres of land) is 2.71* The latter is 
less than the former. Similarly for village-2, the c/w ratio first 
decreases and then suddenly jumps to 4*22. There after it moves 
erratically.
Graph 5iii demonstrates the relationship between operated 
land and c/w ratio and graph 5iv between owned land and c/w ratio for 
both villages.
Since we get almost similar pattern of relationship between c/w 
ratio (independent variable) and landholding size (dependent variable) 
and between landholding size (independent variable) and c/w ratio, 
we cannotcategorically say that family size influences the economic 
position of rural households in Bangladesh villages. In our 
participant observation as well we noticed that most of the large 
holdings had larger family size. The per capita consumption level 
for larger holdings (as we will see in chapter vii) was also higher than 
that of the smaller holdings. The smaller households had smaller family 
size as the infant mortality rate was found to be very high. Also the 
adult life expectation was lower for them. We would tend to agree with 
Patnaik (1979* 581) &s regards the direction of causality i.e. from 
landholding size to the family size and not the other way round.
HYPOTHESIS: 5
Our field investigation, next did not fully support Chayanovian 
hypothesis Ho.5* We closely watched the labour utilization pattern of 
twenty pure cultivator households (ten from each village). Here, too, 
we did not get any consistent relationship. The c/w ratio did not 
always vary directly with the hours put in by the family concerned.
Thus in village 1, household Ho .G34 headed by Shahidullah had only one 
worker. But he had four family members. The consumer-worker ratio of this 
household was 3* He had 2.5 acres of operated land. He worked very hard 
and on an average he used to work nine hours in the field daily during the
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peak season. In the off season he does not have much work to do. He 
workB on an average 4 hours daily in the field and other household 
activities during tlie off peak season.
On the other hand, the c/w ratio of household numberGI 63, headed 
by Ibrahim Ali is 3*5« But Ibrahim Ali owns only 1 acre of land. 
Hypothesis 5 demands that he should work more than Shahidullah whose 
c/w ratio is less than his family. Hut in reality he could not get in 
more cultivated land through the rental market. He could finish his 
farm work by putting in only 6 hours daily. He very much warns to 
put in more labour. But he had insufficient land to make that possible. 
Consequently, he had to be satisfied with less production and less 
consumption. After talking to him closely we observed that he was under 
tremendous economic pressure. His vanity as a self-cultivating farmer 
prevented him from joining the labour market as a wage labourer when he 
finished his own farm work. But as the consumption pressure was building 
up, it would be quite difficult for him to refrain from doing so for long.
In some cases households with higher c/w ratios were found to put 
in more hours of. labour on an average than others. But here again the 
deciding factor was not family size but the landholding size. Most of 
these larger families had larger holdings as well. Since they did not 
employ hired labourers they had to put in more hours of their own labour 
to cultivating the family holdings.
HYPOTHESIS 6 1
This hypothesis has been particularly designed for a situation where 
there is land scarcity. In such a situation the Chayanovian effect comes 
via labour intensification on a particular piece of land. Chayanov, of 
course, specified a land abundant situation.
To test this hypothesis in the context of Bangladesh villages, we 
may see the variation of the c/w ratio and paddy output (as this is the 
most common crop in Bangladesh, occupying about 87% of the total crop 
area - BBS, 1977) per acre.
Table 5*9 gives us the relationship between the c/w ratio and output 
per acre and per worker.
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Table 5*9 does not reveal a consistent relationship between the 
. } 
c/w ratio and output per acre or output per worker. In both the
villages, while the c/w ratio increases consistently, we observe an
inconsistent change in the other two variables. The irregular
relationship that we notice in this case does not support our Chayanovian
hypothesis No.6,
We also get a disaggregated view when we rearrange the table 
by making land size the independent variable. Table 5*10 gives 
us that view.
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One does note from table 5 .10 that the paddy output per acre
. 1
and c/w ratio do not always vary in the same direction. Thus, for 
village I, we see that the c/w ratio increases from 2.30 (group 2) 
to 2.75 (group ), the corresponding output per acre also increases from 
19.8 maunds to 26.0 maunds. But the trend does not continue. From 
group if we go ahead to, say group 6, we find that the c/w ratio 
increases to 2.83 from 2.75* but that output per acre drops to 23 .8  
maunds contrary to the hypothesis. In village 2, output per acre 
oscillates within the range of 18 to 22.5 maunds, while the c/w 
ratios vary almost two fold, from 2 .63 to 4*51 • The direction of the 
variation of output per acre and c/w ratio for village-2 is also not 
the same.
Again, if we look at output per worker, we also find a highly 
disaggregated and inconsistent trend. For example, in village 1, 
corresponding to c/w ratio 2 .3 0 (group 2), output per worker is 6.1 
maunds. But for the same village, in group 8, while the c/w ratio 
increases to 2.80 (a change of +21%), corresponding output per worker 
has increased to-14 2.6 maunds (a change of +2237%)* Again if we compare 
the two ratios between group 3 and group 8, we see that while output 
per worker has changed by +328%, the c/w ratio has changed only +2%. 
Village*-2 presents us with even more Inconsistent relationships.
The foregoing implies that given the socio-economic constraints 
in a Bangladesh village, an increase in the number of consumers alone 
- does not lead to higher output per acre or per worker-r Chayanov no- 
•where takes account of the existence of such constraints.
HYPOTHESIS 8;
Hypothesis 8 says that value of output (or agricultural income) 
will vary positively with the consumption of the family.
In the context of Bangladesh villages, we first calculated the 
c/w ratio for each family. We then calculated the agricultural income 
of each of these families. While calculating agricultural income, we 
have computed values of all crops produced poultry, livestock, and 
other ancilliary incomes deriving from other activities related to land 
and agriculture (see Appendix b ). We then distributed c/w ratios at a 
certain frequency interval and computed the average agricultural income per 
family and per capita. The results are presented in table 5.11.
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Table 5-1  ^does-not reveal a consistently positive correlation.
In village-I with the consistent rise in c/w ratios, agricultural 
income both per household and per capita, does not always vary in 
the same direction. Thus while per household and per capita agricultural 
income for group 2 are tk 6683.78 and tk 1215*23 respectively, the 
figures for group 3 ( a higher c/w ratio group) drop to tk 6405.OO and 
tk 1085*59 respectively. Average agricultural incomes then rise 
consistently but only to fall again to tk 8556.00 per household and 
tk 1711*20 per capita in group 8 . We notice a steep rise in group 
9 again. The changes are equally uneven in case of village-2.
Even if we replace the c/w ratio by operated landholding size 
as the independent variable, we do not notice a consistent relationship 
between the c/w ratio and agricultural income either. This is clear from 
table 5*1 2.
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Here we have presented three variables in order. As we can 
observe, there is no consistent relationship between the c/w ratio and 
agricultural income. While the c/w ratio varies irregularly, we 
observe a consistent rise in agricultural income except in one case 
(i.e. the case of group i). This is true in both the villages.
One can, however, note a positive correlation between landsize and the 
agricultural income. Excepting group 1, agricultural income (both 
per household and per capita) and operated landholding size vary in the 
same direction. This finding, in fact, supports Patnaik*s notion that it is 
land size and not family size which determines the relative economic 
position of a family (Patnaik, 1979 = 3^ 1)-
HYPOTHESIS 9: THE LIFE CYCLE ANALYSIS I
This hypothesis has two aspects - (a) the static aspect and 
(b) the dynamic aspect. The static part of the hypothesis postulates that 
families in existence for a smaller number of years(i.e. the age of the 
family) shall vary positively with the c/w ratio at any point in time.
The dynamic part of the hypothesis, on the other hand, takes into account 
the growth of the family, ageing of the children, the splitting of the 
family etc. The former may be tested by cross-sectional data and the 
latter by time series data.
(a) Static Analysis;
We computed c/w ratios and the age of the family for all the 
households we investigated. Our average and disaggregated findings are 
as follows:
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Tables 5*'?5 5*14 representing villages 1 and 2 respectively
do not reveal consistent correlations between c/w ratios and years 
of existence of the households. Thus while the average age of a household 
for the group with c/w ratio 1.00-1 .50 is 17*76 years, the same for the 
group with higher c/w ratio (5*01-5*50) is 15*45 years in village-I.
In more disaggregated form; we notice, in the same village, at least 
six households in group 1 (a/w ratio ranging between 1 .00-1.500) who 
have been in existence for at least 1$) years, one of them for more than 
40 years. In group 1, we notice only one third of the total household 
of this group who have been in existence for less than nine years. These 
are the families who support the Chayanovian notion of a small c/w 
ratio. But the remaining two third indeed negate the hypothesis. 
Similarly, in the group with the highest c/w ratio (i.e. 5*10+) we 
find quite a number of households of a relatively younger age. We find 
similar inconsistent results in the case of village—2.
So far, as our cross-sectional data reveal, we really do not get 
consistent and positive correlations between c/w ratios and other 
economic variables. The relationship is very often uneven.
(b) Dynamic Analysis:
The dynamic aspects of the Chayanovian hypothesis assumes that 
the c/w ratio increases up to a point of time and then starts falling 
as some of the children join the workforce. The land size adjusts itself 
to these variations of the c/w ratio. But this trend again breaks down 
when the family splits up as adult members form their own households.
With respect to our study villages, we have assumed that a couple 
have their first issue after two years of marriage and a child normally 
starts doing household work at about 10-12 years of age .
1. See Cain, M.T. (1577)
14 3
The hypothesis can be broken down in order to test it
j
in the context of Bangladesh villages!
(i) If households are distributed according to their years of
existence (i.e. the years since their inception) at a certain 
frequency interval and in each case corresponding c/w ratios are 
computed and their percentage changes observed, one will notice:
(a) the c/w ratio shall change in a positive direction up to 
the 10-12 years group;
(b) The amount of positive change shall be relatively higher in 
successive groups as one moves from the'O* years group to 
the 10-12 year group.
(c) After reaching the 10-12 years group, the c/w ratio shall start 
to decline and as age matures the magnitude of the negative 
change shall be higher in the successive groups.
The underlying assumption is that when the age of the household 
is less than 12 years, there are more consumers than workers. But 
after about 12 years of existence, a household may expect to have a 
son of ten years old joining the workforce. The other assumption 
behind the hypothesis is that a peasant household positively adjusts its 
land, labour, output, income equations with the growth of the c/w ratio 
(i.-e. the dependency burden).
The best way to test the hypothesis outlined above is to identify 
the nuclear households (with no children) at the time of inception.
One can then select those nuclear households which have been in existence 
for at least 31 .years and have gone through different changes of c/w 
ratios and landholding sizes. In the case of these households as well, 
one should observe a positive relation initially (i.e. the c/w ratio 
rises as the household matures and simultaneously its landholding will 
also increase).. But at later dates, after at least 12 years of existence, 
the c/w ratio should start falling and so should land per household fall 
(as land will be parcelled out to the disintegrated new families).
1 44
To test these .dynamic hypotheses in the context of one
f
study villages, let us examine 5*15 and 5*16. The tables have been 
consturcted by taking age of the households as the independent variable. 
C/W ratios and land have been taken as dependent variables.
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We observe from tables 5*15 ar^  that:
Part 'a* of Chayanov’s dynamic hypothesis holds good for both 
villages. C/W ratios change in positive direction in both villages 
up to the 10-12 years of age of the households.
Part fbf of the hypothesis, however, is hot always supported by 
our data. This part of the hypothesis demands that the magnitude of 
the positive change shall always increase Successively. In village -1, 
as can be seen from table 5»15> the magnitude of the change fluctuates 
widely. Thus recently created households belonging to 0-3 years age 
group witnessed a positive change of 12.97% in their average c/w ratio.
The next group of households (belonging to J\ . - 6  years of age) also witnessed 
a positive change in c/w ratio by +28.7%. So far part *bT has been 
supported. But in the group after (i.e. 7-9 years) we notice a drop in 
the magnitude of the positive change. This time it is+17-0^.
Therefore, we notice a highly irregular pattern of change. In village-2, 
part *b* of the hypothesis appears stronger than in village-1. Here 
the c/w ratio always changes in a positive direction and the magnitude 
of the positive change increases continuously in most cases except in one 
or two cases. Of course, an exception lihe that causes a breakdown 
in the chain of whole arguement.
Part fc» of the hypothesis postulates that after crossing the 
10-12 years range (around which time the first child, if he is a son, 
becomes* about 10 years old and begins to participate in agricultural work)f 
the c/w ratio shall begin to decline steadily. The percentage of the 
decrease in c/w ratio shall be greater in absolute term successively.
But we get no support for this part of the hypothesis from our data.
As we can see in table 5-*15 and 5•'16, the c/w ratios for all age groups 
of households have increased successively and the percentage change in 
c/w ratio has never been negative for any group. In fact, in village-2, 
the c/w ratio for groups following the cut-off group (i.e. 10-12 years) 
has never fallen below 2 .6 4, the original c/w ratio of the households 
in 10-12 years group at the inception.
14 8
The Chayanovian dynamic hypothesis also suggests that landholding 
size shall positively adjust to the variations of c/w ratios. But as 
tables 5*15 suggest, c/w ratios and landholding size per
household do not always vary in the same direction, between two 
points of reference i.e. the time of inception and 1981. Village—I, 
while c/w ratios change in positive direction between the two times 
for all age groups of households, average landholding does not change in 
a positive way. Owned cultivable land per household changes in the 
positive direction in five cases (groups: 2, 4» 7» 10 and 11). In the 
case of operated land and effective land, we observe at least three cases 
of negative change. For effective land size, the change is positive in 
seven cases. So we observe the variations in the percentage change for 
all categories of land quite unevenly. For village 2, we get a similar 
picture. The land does not really adjust to the changing c/w ratios.
So far we have discussed the relationship between the c/w 
ratio and land sizes for all households. But strictly speaking, the 
Chayanovian dynamic hypothesis is suited to those households which 
start their families without any extra consumer (i.e. as nuclear 
families with c/w ratio of 2).
We have conducted a similar exercise for all those households who 
reported as nuclear families at the time of their inception.
Table 5*17 gives the details.
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Prom the nuclear household table (5*17) we find the 
following trends:
(i) Both for village-1 and village-2, the o/w ratio changes in a 
positive direction for all households. For village-1, the % change 
does not always increase successively. We see some fall as well.
For village 2, the percentage change increases successively for all 
groups. But for the Chayanovian peasantry, we would expect the c/w 
ratio to rise first successively and then fall continuously till it 
reaches the number 2. The percentage change in landholding (all 
varieties) does not always follow the direction of the change in 
c/w ratio. Vhile we did not notice any change in the value of c/w 
in a negative direction, we came across a number of negative changes 
in the landholding sizes.
The nucelar families, examined for two periods (i.e. between 
inception and 1981) > also do not give any concrete indication of 
Chayanovian characteristics.
To bring further dynamic aspects into our analysis, we may 
single out those nuclear households which became independent 
households at least 31 years ago. We do this to notice a three-point 
comparison of the c/w ratio and corresponding land position of these 
households (i.e. between 1951 > 1972 and 1981).
We have collected information for the years 1951 (approximately) 
1972 and 1981 for all these nuclear households. We have fifteen such 
households in village—1 and 3 in village-2.
The comparative information for the three cut-off periods is 
presented in table 5*18.
TABLE 5.18
DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AVERAGE C/W AND LANDSIZE FOR NUCLEAR HOUSHIOIDS:
INCEPTION TO 1981
VILLAGE
NUMBER ITEMS INCEPTION 1951 1972 1981
Village-1 1. Average age 
of the HU 
(in years)
0 9.33 30.33 43.21
2. C/W ratio 
% change in 2
2
(16.00)
2.32
(46.55)
3.40
(9.11)
3.71
3. CWned culti­
vable land 
(in acres)
% change in 3
3.20
(8.12)
3.46
(2.89)
3.56
(7.58)
3.29
4. Operated land 
(in acres)
% change in 4
3.23
(2.16)
3.30
(1.21)
3.34
(-6.88)
3.11
5. Effective land 
% change in 5
3.22
(3.41)
3.33
(4.50)
3.48
(-8.33)
3. 19
Vlllage-2 1. Average age 
of the HH 
(in years)
0 9 30 40
2.C/W ratio
% change in 2
1.82
(37.36) .
2.50
(76.J30)
4.42
(-13.34)
3.83
3. O^ned culti­
vable land 
% change in 3
1.82
(-54.94)
.82
(267.01)
3.01
(0.66)
3.03
4. Operated land 
(in acre)
% change in 4
1.66
(32.53)
2.20
(20.90)
2.66
(21.80)
3.24
5. Effective land 
% change in 5
1.66
(20.48)
2.00
(41.00)
2. 82
(15.60)
3.26
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If we follow table 5*18 cloBely, we do not get'proof of the 
Chayanovian assertions made in the context of 1 demographic differentiation! 
For village -1, the average c/w ratio and the corresponding land size of 
these particular 15 nuclear families (again on an average 9*33* 30.53 
and 43-21 years old at the three cut-off points of 1951, 1972 and 1981) 
for three periods have been arranged side by side. The consumer-worker 
ratio on average has been continuously rising although the magnitude 
of the percentage change between two subsequent cut off points is not 
always similar. The c/w ratio has changed by 16% from inception to 1951» 
by 46-55% between 1951 and- 1972 and by 9 *11% between 1972-1981 . If 
Chayanov were correct, the c/w ratio would have fallen subsequently.
Anyway the c/w ratio of 1972 could never be greater than that of 1951- 
But in village—1, for all age groups, the c/w ratio in 1972 was greater 
than that of 1951, a clear violation of the Chayanovian rule.
In village-2, also, the c/w ratio did not change as the 
Chayanovian hypothesis would demand.
Again, when we look at the percentage change in the land distribution 
(all categories), it does not tally with the corresponding change in 
the c/w ratio. Let us examine the pattern of change in operated land 
(which almost resembles Russian sown area) for both villages. In 
village -1, whereas the c/w ratio changes by 16%, operated land changes 
by only about 2% between the inception period and 1981 . Between 
1951 and. 1972, the former changes by about 46%, but the latter changes 
only by 1%7 -Between 1972 and 1981, the former changes by "about 9%> 
the latter changes by about -?%• In village-2, also, we do not observe 
much consistency in the percentage change in the two variables.
CASE STUDIES:
Besides these average findings, we also looked very carefully 
into the structural changes of a few households. We present these 
findings in the following case studies;
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Case S-hudy 1 i
j
Sadar Ali, son of the late Nizam All Mondal was 45 in 1981 •
He became the head of the household (No. G—99) in 1956. He was newly 
married and had no children at the time of inception of his household.
He started his household with 3-5 acres of land (owned) which he 
inherited from his father. His father had 20 acres of land in 1951 
when he and his three other brothers were living in the joint family.
By 1972, he had two children aged 8 and 6. His first child died when 
he was one. By giving half equivalent to each child, we found the 
c/w ratio of this household as 3 in 1972. When the second son grew 
up in the mid-seventies his c/w ratio fell to 1-75* By 1981, Sadar Ali's 
daughter has been married. But by now he had another son. So his 
c/w ratio did not change. But his land size did not change in the 
same direction as the c/w ratio. Although his c/w ratio increased by 
50% in 1972, his total landholding in fact declined to 3 acres. Again 
although his c/w ratio remained steady at 1.75 throughout the late seventies 
his land size has been squeezed to 1.00. He lost more than an acre 
of his cultivable land during the famine of 1974 as village-1 was hit 
very hard by this famine. He lost the rest of his land in the later 
years as he became heavily indebted.
Case Study II
Hazrat Ali Fakir became the head of his household (G-28) in 1952.
His c/w ratio was 2 at that time. He owned 12 acres of land in 1952.
His c/w ratio rose steadily during the fifties and sixties. He had 
no sons. But by 1972 he had 4 daughters, two of whom were more than 
12 years of age. So his c/w ratio was 5 in 1972. Since he had no 
supporting hands, he had to depend on himself. And consumption pressure 
forced him to sell off some of his land. By 1972 he had about 6 acres 
of land. The pressure continued and he had 3 more children by 1981.
But two of his daughters have already been married. So his c/w ratio 
became 6*5- But his land size has declined to 1.75atreeHence in this 
particular household, we did not see the increase in land simultaneously 
with the increase in c/w ratio.
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Case I I I  } *
In village 2 we witnessed a similar story. Bhaben Mali 
inherited 3 acres of land when he first became household head in 19^5*
But as he had children, he lost most of his land to face the 
consumption and other economic pressure. So by 1981, although his 
c/w ratio has increased to 3-5, his land ownership has fallen to 
1.33 acres.
The major findings of these case studies are presented in the following 
diagrams.
Hence from the above discussions based on our fieldwork, we 
can safely conclude that except for one or two sporadic cases, the 
Chayanovian hypotheses of demographic differentiation do not really correspond 
to the realities of rural Bangladesh. We have examined the hypothesis 
with both static and dynamic data, and nowhere have we found a broad 
indication of the Chayanovian scenerio of demographic differentiation 
determined by purely biological factors rather than socio-economic 
realities. We have examined in detail the correlation exercises 
between the c/w ratio and land size, agricultural output, agricultural 
income, age of the family over time, and we have not observed a 
trend consistent with the criteria of a Chayanovian peasantry.
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CASE : I
SADAR A L I________
H H NO * G - 9 9 
I N C E P T I O N  S I 9 5 6
C/W RATIO LAND
19 5 6
I 6 YEARS
N/
I 9 7 1
9 YEARS
3*5
6 6*6 6 %
1 »7 t
/CO0)
i /»>
( L a n d  f i gures  in acres  )
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. c  A s E : 2
H A Z R A T  A L I  F A K I R
H  H  N O
I N C E P T I O N  I 9 5 2
C / W  R A T I O L A  N D
9 5 2.
Y E A R S
9 7 2
Y E A R S
19 8 1
( L a n d  f i gur e s  in a c r e s  )
1 57
CASE • 3
H H NO H - ? I
i n c e p t i o n IP 6 5
C/W RATIO LAN D
I 9 6 5
N /
I 9 72
YEARS
YEARS
1 • c _ 19 81 \ I- 33J  * i> \  /
( Land f igures are in acres )
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HYPOTHESIS 10: ; *
This Chayanovian hypothesis has been formulated, by 
Shanin in terms of his mobility schema. His ideas on family life 
cycle in a way reemphasise Chayanov1 s demographic differentiation. 
According to this hypothesis no peasant household, however rich, can 
remain rich for a long time and exhibits its class entity as 
demographic pressures shall pull it down to a poorer position.
To test this mobility hypothesis of Shanin, we have constructed 
a mobility matrix for each of our study villages, based on the time 
series data on owned land distribution. Since we have land information 
for 195*1, 1972 and 1981, we could construct a number of mobility 
matrices using different terminal years.
Let us first look at the mobility matrix for each of our study 
villages using 1951 and 1981 as the two terminal years. Table 5*19 
shows us the mobility of households from one group to the other between 
1951 and 1981 in village-1 . Table 5*20 shows the same for village 2. -
As can be seen from the tables, we have taken slightly different 
land group sizes while categorizing rural households in terms of their 
economic position. Notes below each table clarify the idea.
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TABLE 5 .1 9
LAND MOBILITY MATRIX FOR VILLAGE - 1: 1951-1981
HOUSEHOLD
CATEGORIES
(1951)
HOUSEHOLD CATEGORIES (1981)
LLHH PH H MHH RHH
TOTAL
u u m
Pm
A / [ m
H m
75.8
(27.0
(6172
(36.5)
26.5
15.4
[26761
(19.5)
45.0
(38.7) (42.3 27.4)
14.5 22.6
(17.0)
(4074
(35.6)
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(34.6) (63.6)
TOTAL (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Hotes: All figures incidate percentages. The figures in
parenthesis are the elements of a column matrix 
indicating percentage distribution of land for 1981. 
Figures in squares are the elements of a rcm matrix 
indicating percentage distribution of land for 1951.
Landless Households (LLHH) OaTL 0 - .50 acres of land in village-1
Poor Households (PHH) cwn .51-2.50 acres of land in village-1
Middle Households (MHH) cmn 2.51-5.00 acres of land in village—1
Rich Households (RHH) cwn 5.01 + acres of land in village—1
16 0
TABLE 5 . 2 0
LAND MOBILITY MATRIX FOR VILLAGE - 2: 1951-1981
HOUSEHOLD
CATEGORIES
(1951)
HOUSEHOLD CATEGORIES (1981)
TOTAL
LLHH PHH MHH RHH
LLHH 
pH H 
/V\HH
r h h
TOTAL (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
(6.2)(20.0,
|46V5l
(27.0,(46.7) (6.6)
4.0
(10.0) (40.0(3172) (1275)
(205
(53.4) (8775)
3.5
24.060.0
33.3
18.0
12.0
66.7
50.0
(100.0)
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Notes: All figures indicate percentages. The figures in
parentheses are the elements of a column matrix 
indicating percentage distribution of land for 1981. 
Figures in squares are,the elembents of a raw matrix 
indicating percentage distribution of land for 1951.
Landless House holds (LLHH)cwn 0 - .50 acres of land in village-2 
Poor Households (PHH)own .51 - 3.50 acres of land in village-2 
Middle Households (MHH) own 3.51 - 7.50 acres of land in village-2 
Rich Households (RHH) own 7.51 + acres of land in village-2
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Table 5-19 tepls us the following:
(i) Of all the LLHHs of 1951 * 75*8% have remained in the same group 
even in 1981 * The rest climbed up the ladder to settle in higher 
groups.
(ii) Of all the PHHs of 1951* 26.3% have remained in the same group 
in 1981, 61 .2% went down to the LLHH group and the rest went 
up to the upper groups.
(iii) Of all the MHHs of 1951* only 18.4% have remained in the same
group in 1981. 10% climbed up to the richer groups and the rest
fell down the ladder.
(iv) Of all the EHHs 22.6% have remained in the same group in 1981.
The others fell down the ladder.
Excepting the LHH group, Shanin is apparently correct in 
hypothesising a 'fluid situation in rural Bangladesh,
But if we present the data from the column matrix, we get a 
significantly different picture. Thus reading from the column matrix, 
we observe that:
(i) The EHHs show a considerable ability to stay in their original 
position. Thus of all the EHHs of 1981, 6 3 .6% had a similar 
landownership background even in 1951. Only about 36.4% came 
from lower groups.
(ii) Of all the MHHs, 42.3% came from the same group.
(iii) The majority of the poor and landless households came from the
rich and middle groups of the peasantry. About 17% of I/LHHs 
of 1981 came from EHHs in 1951 .
16 2
Ve also get a similar trend in village-2. Thus table 5*20 reveals
i
that:
(i) Of all the LLHHs of 1951* 66.7% have remained in the same group 
in 1981.
(ii) Of all the PHHs of 1951* 46.5% have remained PHH even in 1981.
5 0.0% have fallen down and the rest went up the ladder.
(iii) Of all the MHHs of 1951* only about 24*0% have remained in the
same group in'1981. The rest of them have disintegrated.
Only 4% went up. The remaining 72% became impoverished.
(iv) Of all the EHHS of 1951* 18.0% have remained in the same group 
and the rest fell down the ladder.
But if we turn to the column matrix we get a different 
picture. It reveals that:
(i) Of all the EHHs of 1981, 87-5% had a similar landownership
background in 1951* Only about 12.5% of today's rich households 
came from MHH group.
(ii) Of all the MHHs of 1981, 48% came from the same group of 1951*
Only 6.6% of today's MHH came from poor households of 1951* The
rest came from EHH groups.
(iii) Of all the PEHs of 1981, 27% came from the same category of
peasantry of 1951 • 6,2% of todays PHH came from LLHH category.
The rest came from the richer groups.
(iv) Of the LLHHs of 1981, 20% came from the same group of 1951*
Thus If we combine the findings from row and column matrix, we 
can safely conclude that although a good proportion of the richer 
households have become poorer over the span of three decades (1951-1981), 
the majority of today's EHHs came from a richer background in both the 
villages. Similarly almost two-third of the LLHHs of 1951 have remained
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TABLE 5 . 2 1
LAND MOBILITY MATRIX FOR VILLAGE - 1: 1951-1972
HOUSEHOLD CATEGORIES 1972
HOUSEHOLD
CATEGORIES LLHH PHH MHH RHH
(1951)
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0
TOTAL (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
LLHH
PHH
MHH
RHH
( 4.3%)(39.7:
(12.3%) ( 8.7%)(34.5%) (31.4!
677%]
(48.9% (17.4%)(19.0%)• (30.0%)
|29.7%
(38.8%)
137 75% 
(34.3%) (73.9%)
40.0%
4.0%12.0%44.0%
18.3!
11.5%
40.0!
35.0!
8S3
26.5%6.3
NOTES: As ±n table 5.19
16 4
TABLE 5 . 2 2
LAND MOBILITY MATRIX FOR VILLAGE - 1: 1972-1981
HOUSEHOLD CATEGORIES 1981
HOUSEHOLD TOTAL
CATEGORIES
(1972) LLHH PHH MHH RHH
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
TOTAL (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
NOTES: As in table 5.19
LLHH
PHH
MHH
RHH
(14.3%)(60.4%
(4.4%)(51.4%
(30.0%)(9.9%) (57.6
70.812.5
83.1 16.9
8.4
42.816.3 30.6
1.5
(2.5%) (4.3%) (7.7%) (73.9%)
16 5
j
TABLE 5 . 2 3
IAND MOBILITY MATRIX FOR VILLAGE - 2: 1951-1972
HOUSEHOLD CATEGORIES 1972
HOUSEHOLD TOTAL
CATEGORIES
(1951) LLHH PHH MHH RHH
LLHH
PHH
MHH
RHH
43.8% (3.7%)
(43.8%) (37.0% (5.0%)
40.0
(25.9%) 50.0% 9.1%)
23.1
(12.4%) (33.4%) (45.0%)
25. 6j 
(90.9%)
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
TOTAL (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
NOTES: As in table 5.20
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TABLE 5 . 2 4
LAND MOBILITY MATRIX FOR VILLAGE - 2: 1972-1981
HOUSEHOLD
CATEGORIES
(1972) LLHH
HOUSEHOLD CATEGORIES 1981
PHH MHH RHH
TOTAL
LLHH
PHH
MHH
RHH
168.7 ] 
(36.8%,
(76.7%)'(50.0%) (18.7%)
(10.6%)
( 3.3%) ( 6.3%) (100.0%)
5.5
60.0
72.2
25.0
27.8
9.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
TOTAL (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Notes: As in. table 5.20
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landless to this day. This means that for the two extreme groups the 
staying power is quite high and the intervening period is long 
enough to allow them to consolidate as stable groups with similar 
economic and other interests. As for the middle groups, we notice a 
perpetual disintegration. Thus in both villages we find the middle 
group in mobility in either direction. But the proportion of 
dispossession is much greater than that of enhancement. We have 
also constructed other mobility matrices for both the villages 
for the years 1951 and 1972 and also 1972 and 1981-
Mobility matrices shown in tables 5*21-5.24 also confirm that the 
majority of the EHHs and LIiHHs have shown extreme ability to stay 
in their own groups for a long period. In one case, as shown in table 
6.23, 10C$> of today1 s rich households came from EHHs of 1951 .
Thus examining the mobility matrices which we have constructed, 
we cannot say that Shanin*s anti-class formation hypothesis is supported 
by the empirical information we have on the Bangladesh peasantry.
Our participant 'observation also lends support to this conclusion.
16 8
SUMMARY OP MAJOR FINDINGS: 'T1’——— 1 ■» ■
Our fieldwork findings do not support the Chayanovian view 
of demographic differentiation. The Chayanovian economy requires 
complete absence of wage labour.
(i) We noted as high as 40% of households in village-1 and 
29% in village-2 earning a agricultural wage.
(ii) Only 19% of households in village-1 and 20% in village^2 
can be termed as pure 1 cultivators', depending primarily on their own 
labour.
(iii) More than 90% of households in both villages employed casual 
labour. The incidence of employing hired labour has been increasing 
amongst rich households.
(iv) We found most peasant households highly profit conscious 
and cost minimis'ers. They make rational production decisions In the 
face of changing product prices.
(v) Flexible land supply is a myth in Bangladesh. Operated 
land size has been constantly shrinking as rich peasants have taken 
back some of the rented out land from the tenants. The acute per capita 
operated land figures amongst poor and middle peasants negate the 
Chayanovian notion of speedy land adjustments through the rental system.
(vi) We did not get any consistent correlation between family
size and landholding size as expected by the Chayanovian view.
(vii) Nor did we get any consistent correlation between the
consumer-worker ratio and output/agricultural income.
(viii) .Intensity of worker was not always noted to vary with family 
size. In most cases hours put by a family labour varied with the 
landholding sizes.
1 6 9
(dbc) We also noted that an increase in the number of
i
consumers alone does not lead to higher output per acre or per 
worker. In other words, the direction of casuality is not from 
family size to land size but indeed vice-versa.
(x) Our field data also do not support the life cycle 
hypothesis of Chayanov, which assumes that the c/w ratio increases 
first and then starts falling as some of the children join the work 
force.
(xi) The modem version of Chayanovian ideas in terms of 
a ‘homogeneous peasantry1, as formulated by Shanin in the shape of his 
mobility schema, was also not found to work in our study villages.
We did not note a fluid peasantry. In fact, most of the present day 
rich households had a rich background.
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f i e l d w o r k  f i n d i n g s  : p a r t  -  r
THE L E N I N I S T '  C L A S S  D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N
As hypothesised in Chapter "the Leninist school of thought 
on the differentiation of the peasantry approaches the issue from 
two main angles. These are (i) what has been happening with respect 
to possession of the means of production and other related 
characteristics; and (ii) what has been happening with respect to the 
labour processes.
We plan to proceed in four steps to test the Leninist hypothesis 
on differentiation in the case of the Bangladesh peasantry, using 
micro level data collected from our study villages:
(a) In Chapter VI we will examine the extent of differences in 
the distribution of land. The focus of the analysis will be on the 
changing patterns of concentration of land over time plus the pattern 
of dispossession. The analysis will cover, in most cases, a period 
of thirty years (1951-81).
(b) Chapter VII will include an examination of (i) ownership 
patterns of all other elements of production (except land) Qg. , 
draught and other animals, farm implements and accessories. Whenever 
possible, information on quantitative differences in the ownership of 
these elements will be complemented with qualitative findings: for 
example, the health and value of the draught animals, the length of the 
iron share used in the wooden ploughs etc.
(ii) The farming techniques, cropping intensities, use of modem 
inputs, level of agricultural production and pattern of income 
distribution, which immediately follow from the above differential 
possession.
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iii) Differences in the standard of living amongst different 
groups of the peasantry. Items included are : housing, 
other household assets, level and pattern of expenditure, 
the extent and nature of food in take etc.
c) In chapter VIII we will make an attempt to explain these 
differences, focussing primarily upon the changing patterns 
of production relations involving men from different strata 
of the peasantry.
d) In chapter IX we will consider the hypotheses related to 
the nature of the labour processes and especially the extent 
of labour exploitations as an explanatory variable with 
respect to differentiation.
In addition to these well-known Leninist hypothesis, we will 
also examine the state as an important complementary variable to 
explain differences in the material elements of production in 
Chapter X. Starting with a short review of the theoretical works on 
the state, particularly those focussing on contemporary third world 
states, we proceed to a discussion of the differential impacts of the 
development strategy pursued by the Bangladesh state over the last 
decade, especially since its birth in 1971* Here we will single out 
a few important governmental policies which normally have been observed 
to have a direct bearing on the peasantry. We will examine the extent 
of involvement of the respondents from our study villages with these 
policies and the nature of the benefits that have accured to different 
groups of the peasantry depending on their positions in the overall 
power matrix. We will simultaneously complement our discussion on the 
state and peasantry with a number of relevant case studies.
1 7 2
CHAPTER VI
CONCENTRATION OF IANBOWNERSHIP/CONSOL
We have collected micro level information on various categories 
of land (i.e. owned, operated and effectively controlled) with respect 
to nine groups of the peasantry in the two villages we studied. The 
groups are empirical categories and may he pooled into a small number 
of groups or classes if required. The data relates to three different 
time periods: the early 1950s, the early 1970s and the early 1980s.
We will present the information chronologically i.e. for the 1950s, 
the 1970s and the 1980s. We have already noted the general trends 
in Chapter XV while presenting an overview of the agrarian structure. 
Here in this chapter we will see if our micro findings conform to 
those macro generalisations.
1. TEE CHANGING LANDHOLDING PATTERN; 1951-81
In the early 1950s, everything was in a flux in the then 
East Pakistan (today's Bangladesh). Following Partition in 1947 
and the creation of Pakistan, there was a great deal of emigration 
of rich Hindu families (most of them being former Zajrrindars,
Talukrla.-rs and Jotedars) out of our study areas to India. Also a 
few Muslim families from Assam and other eastern districts of India 
migrated into those villages. Around that time there were frequent 
communal riots, land grabbing by rich raiyats and transfer of many 
assets. Shortly after Partition came the East Bengal State 
Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950 (henceforth EBSATA) in the light 
of the recommendations of the Floud Commission (Floud, 1948).
Village 1 was not affected significantly in terms of the 
distribution of ownership rights of land by this Act. There were no 
resident Zamindars or their agents in this village. The raiyats just 
became maliks - a change of status which did not alter in effect the 
distribution of landholdings. In a few cases, the rich Muslim raiyats
17 3
gained some land fi?om their Hindu counterparts who decided to leave 
the village to settle in India. The price paid for this land was, 
indeed, very nominal, as always is the case with this type of distress 
sale.
But drastic changes were observed in village 2. . Ther were two 
small Zamindars in this village enjoying titles to at least three 
hundred acres of land (not necessarily within the boundary of village 2) 
in the Pre ~EBSATA period. They lost their control over the Zaminfla-ri 
lands and became ordinary landowners. Their raiyats. who actually 
cultivated the lands earlier, became the maliks (i.e. land owners).
Significant changes were noted in the landholding pattern in both 
villages in the 1960s and 1970* The general trends which we observed 
in Chapter XV at the macro level, could also be confirmed by our 
micro investigations. The concentration of land in the hands of a few 
was seen to have increased over time in both villages, though the 
magnitude of that concentration varied from village to village.
The mid 1960s saw the beginning of 'Green Revolution' in 
rural Bangladesh. But none of our study villages seems to have been 
affected by that early dose of 'Green Revolution' .
The war of liberation in the early 1970s brought many changes 
in rural Bangladesh. The new government announced a new land reform 
bill. More modem agricultural inputs such as pumps, fertilizer, 
insecticides, seeds etc. were made“available to the cultivators.
Village 1 seems to have benefited more from the later dose of 'green 
revolution' and consequently has undergone the tremendous stress and 
strain of income inequalities that usually follow such an inflow of 
modern inputs (Byres, 1972; 1981; Griffin, 1974-j 51-59) • Village 2 
witnessed very little of this inflow. Simultaneously, population 
has increased quite fast in both villages during the last thirty 
years and the impact of this demographic explosion can be seen in the 
declining per capita share of land.
We draw these conclusions from the data we collected during 
our field works. Tables 6.1a and 6.1b give us an average picture 
of changing pattern of land-man relations over the period
1951-1981 *
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We notice from tables 6.1A and 6.1B a steady increase in
i
the number of households and population in both villages with a 
simultaneous decline in average land owned per household and per 
capita.
(i) There were 138 households in village 1 in 1951* This 
increased to 173 in 1972 and to 200 in 1981 . That means the percentage 
change in the increase of households between 1951-1972 was +25.36 
(the annual change being +1.20%). The change between 1972-1981 
was +1 5.60% (the annual change being +1.73)*
Similarly in village 2, the annual change in the number of 
households between 1951-1972 was +2.80% and that between 1972-81 
was +5.48%. This means that the speed of disintegration of the 
household was much greater in the 1970s than that of the 1950s and 
1960s.
(ii) Population increased even faster in both villages. The 
rate of growth of population was higher in the seventies than the 
previous period. The growth was more dramatic in village 2 
(+8.12% annually). Following the war of liberation in 1971 and the 
consequent vast dislocation in the socio-economic structures, there was 
a net immigration of 21 families into village 2 from the district of 
Faridpur. They were landless destitutes and as such we get an 
1 immlserised1 picture of land-man ratios in village 2 in the early 
1980s.
(iii) The decline in per household and per capita land owned was 
worse in the 1970b than the previous period in both villages. The 
per household land owned declined to almost half between 1951-81. 
Whereas the annual declined between 1951-72 for village 1 was (-)1.68% 
that between 1972-81 was (-)2.0C%. The corresponding rates for 
village 2 were (-)1.70% and (-)2»99% respectively.
(iv) The decline in the per capita figures was even more drastic. 
Though the period between 1972-81 was almost half of that between 
1951-72; the % of decline in per capita landownership size in the 1970s 
was almost equal to the % decline in the 1950s and the 1960s together 
in both the villages. Whereas as the annual growth of decline in
1 7 7
per capita figure for village 1 between 1951-1972 was (-)2.28%, 
that between 1972-81 was (-)4 *50%* The corresponding figures 
for village 2 were (-)1.92% and (-)4*11%.
Thus we can see an average picture which has been deteriorating 
secularly. However, this average picture can be quite misleading.
Hot all households lost their economic strength. In fact, a section 
of them gained more economic strength by acquiring more land through 
buying,mortagaging and renting in more operated land. When we 
distribute the households into 9 empirical categories we find 
a highly differential picture.
Tables 6.2A and 6.2B gives us that heterogeneous picture.
VT
LI
AG
L 
I:
 
LA
ND
 
MA
N 
KD
LA
TI
CN
S 
BY 
I/^
JD
O
W
NE
RS
III
P 
GR
OU
PS
: 
19
51
-1
98
1
1 7 8
g
rH
cOG\rH
O
o
CO1—1 COCO VOm 00in 04vo * O'00
1.
63 r-m
cu
Q
a
6 ffi cn
| | g
19
72 O
\o
o
0404 a\CO­ ''Tm O'O'
1.
32
1.
38 CO00
rH
nj
in
H  
LO 
CH 
—H
o o
04m COin o- O'OH inOl
•H
00
-H 2.
77
00*1
19
81 o
a\
pH
1.
01 Jco0
01 2.
95
1
4.
49
6.
42
1 ! 9
.0
0
15
.7
7
2.
18
§ 04 o o-04 rrO mO roO mOl oVO O-VO inm VDVO
S it: cn 3
<—i 04 ro ■^r VO CO in
•H
(VI
C  C  73
4.
22
8.
18
4.
12c  “  S  
^  -=i 19
51 o ■— CO cs\ 
*—
00
01 5.
7" in
•3*
p—i
j 
19
81 °  s
13
.3
9
(3
.0
6)
37
.5
2
(8
.
59
)
67
.0
0
(1
5.
33
)
35
.4
2
(8
.
11
)
62
.9
7
(1
4.
41)
1
44
.9
6
(1
0.
29
)
1 
81
.0
0 
(1
8.
54
)
VD 
VO 10 
VD * 
i rH 
h* rvi 
oh — 43
6.
93
(9
9.
99
)
p
Sc
6
o
197
2 
1
°  S
12
.4
9
(2
.
71
)
— Ol
04 • 
in
O'04 75
.4
4
(1
6.
38
)
54
.3
3 
: 
(
11
.8
4) VO
m04 « 
* VO
VD •—1 
O' ^
*3"
Ol O  
OJ .
• cVO rH 60
.7
0
(1
3.
18
)
10
7.
50
(2
3.
35
)
46
0.
36
(9
9.
98
)
§  ^
2 §  
|  2
l—)
in
cr»i—i
°  2 2.
20 (.
38
)
12
.0
8
(2
.
12
)
49
.9
3
(8
.7
7)
45
.1
6
(7
.9
4)
11
3.
87
(2
0.
00
)
75
.0
2
(1
3.
18
)
81
.8
2
(1
4.
38
)
18
9.
00
(3
3.
21
)
56
9.
08
(9
9.
99
)
i
19
81 50 (4
.2
3)
TT
»—1 in 
C  04 
m 20
2
( 1
7.
07
) 
j
20
1
(1
6.
99
)
98 (8
.2
8)
10
8 
! 
(9
.
13
)
72 (6
.0
9)
93 (7
.
86
) o
■ OH 
CO • 
m  'T
11
83
(9
9.
99
)
i 19 
72 34 (3
.
89
)
19
6
[2
2 .
45
)
119
 
! 
[1
3 .
63
)
19
0
[2
1.
76
) (s
n
i
:
001 98
[1
1.
22
)
35 (4
.0
1)
O  
- ^  * 
in 57 (6
.5
4)
87
3 
(9
9.
99
) 
j
i 5
53
c,
s 19
51 27 (4
.7
7]
55 (9
.7
2)
37 (6
.5
3)
86
(1
5.
19
)
! 
61
 
■ 
(1
0.
78
)
11
7
(2
0.
67
) o
VO
8 id
> 
55
 
(9
.7
2) iH
^  °  CO •
OH 
OH 
VD ’ 
V0
in
T86
I
8 04 ♦ 
•H VO 70
(3
5.
00
)
37
(1
8.
50
)
33
(1
6.
50
)
12 (3
.0
0) 84
pH O'
7
(3
.5
0)
9
(4
.5
0)
6
(3
.0
0)
(00
*001
)
o
o
z
S
c/3
S
19
72
<N
VO
CO • 45
(2
6.
01
)
26 
' 
(1
5.
03
)
37
(2
1.
39
)
18
(1
0.
40
)
18
(1
0.
40
)
7
(4
.0
5)
7
(4
.0
5)
7
(4
,0
5)
17
3
(1
00
.0
0)
§
f-i
in 
cn ■—t
O
ohTT • 04 15
(1
0.
86
)
1 
14
 
(1
0.
14
)
26 
| 
(1
8.
84
)
16
(1
1.
59
)
27
(1
9.
57
)
13 (9
.
42
)
10 (7
.2
5) (Nm •
OH 13
8
(9
9.
99
)
ft.
g S | I 1111m ♦H Ol ro TJ* m VD O'* CO a\ i
IA
ND
-M
AN
 
RE
LA
TI
ON
S 
BY 
LA
ND
CW
NB
RS
HI
P 
GR
OU
PS
: 
19
51
-1
98
1
1 7 9
u a  a. <
o
o o c
O O
n O n  o
Oo o
f
No
te
: 
Fi
gu
re
s 
in 
th
e 
br
ac
ke
ts
 
sh
ew
 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s.
 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
fi
gu
re
s 
do 
no
t 
al
wa
ys
 
ad
d 
up 
to 
10
0.
00
 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 
ro
un
di
ng
 
of
f 
er
ro
r.
1 8 0
Tables 6.2A and. 6.2B show a wide range of changes that have 
been proceeding in both villages since the early 1950s.
The proportion of households in the landless and the land- 
poor groups Bwelled whereas that in the land-rich groups in fact 
ebbed over the last three decades:
(i) The proportion of households owning less than -50 acres 
of land (including the landless ones) increased sharply from about 
14% in 1951 to about 3 1% in 1972 and finally to 41% in 1901*
-j
The corresponding figures for village 2 are 12%, 16% and 41%.
(ii) The burden of supporting additional mouths by the marginal 
households also increased steadily during this time. Thus the above 
two groups together constituted about 14% of the population of 
village 1 in 1951 • The proportion increased to 26% in 1972 and to 
30% in 1981 • The corresponding population figures for village 2 are 
7%, 13% and 32%.
(iii) But the total land owned by this poorest section of the 
peasantry did not increase at the same pace. In village 1 they owned
0.38% of the total land in 1951* This increased to 2.37% in 1972 and 
3.06% in 1981. The corresponding figures for village 2 are 0.37%>
.34% and 1 .90%- And most of this land was in fact homestead land.
The decline in their economic position becomes clearer when we consider 
the per household and per capita figures. The per capita figure 
declined more drastically than the per household figure. The extent 
of this decline was greater in the period 1972-81 than in 1951-72.
It is true that the per capita figures declined for almost all groups, 
but the magnitude of the dispossession was certainly much higher in 
the landpoor groups. This is true for both the villages.
1. The figure for 1981 looks vastly exaggerated because of the 
families who migrated into village 2 in the early 1970s.
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(iv) By contrast, we notice a significant decline in the 
proportion of households but not in the proportion of land owned.
In fact, there is a sharp increase in their share in the seventies.
Thus, we see that groups 8 and 9 together constituted about 16% of 
households of village 1 and owned about 47% of land in 1951. By 1972, 
though the proportion of households in these two groups declined by 
half their share of land declined by only 11%. By 1981, they 
constituted only 7*50% of total households and owned more than 48% 
of total land. Similarly in village 2, groups 8 and 9 together 
comprised about 29% of households in 1951* This proportion declined 
drastically to about 10% in 1972 and to about 7% in 1981. Although 
their proportion of total households shrank, their share of owned 
land did not decrease proportionately. These two groups together 
owned about 65% of land in 1951 • Their share dropped to 42% in 1972 
and again increased to 49% in 1981.
The per household figures increased in both the villages. However, 
there has been some decline in the per capita land due to overall 
increase ±n the population. But on the whole we notice positive 
indices cf economic strength in these land-rich groups.
(v) In the middle groups, say groups 5j 6 and 7» there has been 
significant decline in the proportion of households and also the share 
of the land. These are the households which have been under tremendous 
pressure to disintegrate and in most cases the disintegrated households 
fell down the scale.
2.In a way the distribution of land was less skewed in the early 
1950s than in the 1940s. Mukherjee noted that 14% of households 
in the interior village owned less than one acres, 49% between 
1 and 5 acres, 20% between 5 and 10 acres and 21% owned more than 
10 acres in 1942 (Mukherjee 1957a: 84). It may be mentioned that 
according to our findings the proportion of households owning 
more than 10 acres of land was 17*65%.
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It is claimed ^by some scholars that although there exists 
considerable inequality in the distribution of owned land, land 
is generally cultivated in small and medium size family based 
holdings (see for example, Hossain, M, 1981: 24)- They argue that 
the majority of small landowners rent in land fhom others to cultivate 
a larger size of holding than their ownership of cultivable land 
would permit. Similarly, many large landowners are Baid to rent 
out a part of their holdings to others and cultivate a holding smaller 
in size than the actual size of their ownership. Also, there are
many landowners, especially the poorer ones, who rent out their
entire holding and engage in non-farming activities. Because of this 
pattern of land transfer through the rental market, Hossain argues 
that the distribution of operated land is much less unequal than 
the distribution of owned land (Hossain 1981: 24).
But our data do not entirely support the above suggestion. In 
fact, even after the effective adjustments of rental shares, the 
distribution of land remains highly unequal in both villages. To 
test this hypothesis, we have taken nine land owning groups as the 
basic reference groups and then distributed various types of land 
(owned cultivated, operated and effective) among these groups.
We first examine the command over these different categories of land
by each of those nine groups in village 1. Tables 6 .3, 6 .4 and 6 .5
give the details.
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- (l) Table 6 .3-is almost similar to table 6.2A, only
i
the extent of inequality is slightly greater. The share of the 
poorer groups (say the first 2 groups) in table 6 .3 is much less 
than that shown in table 6.2A. This may be because of the homestead 
land, which we excluded while computing owned cultivable land. The 
situation has worsened for the poorer groups in the last decade.
As for the richer groups (say groups 8 and 9) there was an initial 
decline in over all share in the period between 1951-72 (of course, 
the number of households also declined in these groups) and the share 
has increased in the 1970s.
(2) As shown in Table 6 .4 , the situation is quite different 
when we consider command over operated land. No doubt the distribution 
is less skewed than that shown in table 6 .3, but the inequality is still 
high enough to cause concern. What is more disturbing is that the 
proportion of operated land has been swelling in the richer groups and 
falling in the poorer groups. The same thing is true fob per capita 
figures. Thus except in group 1 (where the percentage of operated
land has, in fact, increased over time), most of the other poorer groups 
(say groups 2 and 3 4) lost some of their operated land in the
1970s. The richer groups have been resuming some of their land from 
the tenants to cultivate it with the help of hired labourers under 
their own supervision. In the 1950s and the early 1960s more people 
preferred to rent out part of their operated land as they found it 
more profitable to do so. So the share of poorer groups in total 
operated'land was higher in the period 1951-72v And the share of 
land-rich groups was lower. But the situation lias changed 
significantly in the 1970s as cultivation with hired labour has become 
more profitable following the inflow of modem inputs like seeds, 
fertilizer and, most important of all, irrigation pumps in this 
village since the late 1960s. Consequent upon this there-has been 
some eviction of sharecroppers.
(3) The picture is more or less the same when we compile the 
distribution of effective land (i.e. the net operated land left after 
making the necessary rental share adjustments) amdngst nine land­
owning groups. Table 6 .5 reveals that, on average, both per capita 
and per household effective land has declined over time. Compared
187
to the average figures, we notice significant differences between the
j
poorer and the richer landowning groups.
As for the percentage command over effective land by different 
groups, we find wide differences between groups in all the cut 
off periods. As with operated land, the poorer groups appeared 
to have gained some land in the 1950s and- the 1960s, but they have 
been loosing their effective control over the land as some of the 
rich farmers began to repossess the land and also the rental share 
deteriorated for the remaining tenants in recent years.
How the command over different categories of land by 
different groups of the peasantry varied in village 2 can be seen 
from tables 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8.
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(i) Table 6.£ 'shows a pattern of inequality similar to 
that depicted in the case of owned land in table 6.2B, though the 
concentration is worse in the case of owned cultivable land. Thus 
while the richest group (group 9) had command over about 48%» 57% 
and 40% of total owned land in 1951» 1972 and 1931 respectively, the 
same group commanded 49%» 58% and 41% own cultivable land in those years.
(ii) As for operated land, the situation in village 2 was 
slightly different to that in village 1. Irrigation and other modem 
inputs have not yet made sufficient inroads in village 2. A substantial 
proportion of rich households still rent out part of their land to 
the poorer and middle peasants. Compared to owned cultivable land, 
the share of operated land accuring to the richer groups is indeed 
smaller. The opposite is the case for the poorer peasantry.
Immediately after the abolition of the Zam-i ndari system, the richer 
groups, mostly .iotedars, repossessed their rented-out land from poor 
tenants and hence we notice a very high share of operated land in 
the richer groups in the early fifties. But as the dust finally 
settled and the land reform Act of 1950 was effectively neutralised, 
they once again began to rent out land to poorer peasants. So 
their share in operated land dropped in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. But in the 1970s, they appear to have increased their share 
somewhat, which indicates repossession of some of their rented out 
land from tenants. There appears to be a slight increase in the 
share of operated land in the poorer groups. But compared to the 
expansion in the number of households in this section of the 
peasantry (say groups 1 and 2) the increase in their share in operated 
land is negligible. This is reflected in the declining amount of 
per household and per capita operated land in the poorer groups.
(iii) We find a equally differential picture with respect of 
command over effective land. As can be seen in table 6.8, it is 
somewhat less skewed than owned cultivable land distribution and more 
skewed than operated land distribution. In any case, village 2, 
under the increasing pressure of population, and being deprived of 
the modern inputs of production, has been experiencing increasing 
’immiserization* in the landholding sizes both in average and 
group terms. But in relative terms, the inequality situation
19 2
between the poorer and richer groups in fact, worsened over the
i
three decades. However, the degree of difference has not been as 
pronounced as in village 1 .
One may, however, argue that UBing landowning groups alone as 
one's basic reference groups precludes one from saying anything 
conclusively about the existence of inequalities. The tenancy system 
operating in Bangladesh over a long period, one may argue, must have 
had some moderating impact on inequality. To test this hypothesis, 
we have taken each of the remaining categories of land (i.e. owned 
cultivable, operated and effective) as the basic reference groups 
and then compiled individual distributions for each category. While 
doing so, we note some changes in distribution, especially with respect 
to operated land. But the changes were not so significant as to 
negate the broad trends of inequalities which we have observed in 
earlier tables. Tables 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11 summarize the findings 
in village 1 .
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The preceding tables also reveal the differences emerging 
when we change the basic reference land groups.
(i) When we distribute owned cultivable land among the 
new reference groups (see table 6.9) we find the distribution as 
unequal as before. Taking groups 1 and 2 together, we find that 
although their proportion in the total households increased quite 
dramatically (from about 15% in 1951 to 31% in 1972 and 41% in 1981), 
their share in the total owned cultivable land did not increase at 
the same rate. In fact, in the later decade, their share declined.
But for the richest two groups, while their proportion in the total 
households remained more or less at the same level (around 7% )their 
share in the total owned cultivable land increased from about 59% 
in 1951 to 42% in 1981* The seventies saw the higher rate of increase 
in these two groups than in 1950s and the 1960s. -
(ii) The percentage of the landless households rose quite 
sharply when we compiled the distribution using operated land groups 
as the reference groups. The percentage change accelerated in the 
1970s.
By contrast, the proportion of the richest two groups in the
total households did not vary significantly (around 6^ ). But their
command over operated land enhanced quite significantly (from 25Jjfc in
1951 to 56% in 1981). Although there were 138, 173 and. 200 households
in 1951 j 1972 and 1981 respectively, there were actually 123, 155 and 
3
149 farms in those years. Thus, although the number of farms increased 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the trend has been reversed in the 1970s.
The number of farms, in fact, declined even though the total number 
of households increased in the 1970s. This means that most of the 
households with a small amount of land have been renting out that land 
and joining the labour market as wage labourers. Another reason for 
the squeeze in the number of farms is the resumption of rented out 
land by the rich households in the 1970s.
(iii) The inequality situation was even worse with respect to 
the distribution of effective land, then was the case with operated land.
1 __________________
5 households who had }oacre of operated land.
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Using effective land groups as the reference group, we
j
see in table 6.11 that the effective control over land by the land- 
rich groups improved in the 1970s compared to the earlier 
two decades. There was also a slight improvement in the share of 
effective land by the land poor groups, but the proportion of the 
households in these groups increased at a higher pace to offset than 
gain. In fact, the distribution of effective land in village 1 
is, without doubt, unequal.
Using similar reference groups, we present three separate 
distributions of land in village 2 in order to capture the nature 
of inequalities there;too.Tables 6.12, 6.13 6.14 represent three
distributions of land compiled for three cut off periods of 195*i» 
1972 and 1981.
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We get a similar picture of inequalities in village 2 from 
tables 6.12, 6 .1 3 and 6 .1 4 •
(i) As is indicated by table 6.12, although the proportion 
of households in the poorest stratum^ (including groups 1, 2 and 3) 
increased considerably (from about 29% in 1951 to about 38% in 1972 
and about 59% in 1981), the corresponding share of owned cultivable 
land were only 3%» 5% and 9% for this section of the peasantry.
Two sets of figures do not really correspond in proportional terms.
So the share of owned cultivable land per household and per capita 
must have dropped dramatically in recent years. But for the richest 
group (owning more than 10.01 acres of cultivable land) while the 
proportion in total households declined so abruptly (from 1 7*65% 
in 1951 to 7*40% in 1972 and to 4 *98% in 1981), the corresponding 
shares in the total owned cultivable land did not vary that much 
(from 48*84% in 1951 to 37*95% in 1972 and to 40*70% in 1981). That 
means the average per household figures must have been much higher 
during the later period (i.e. 1970s). The inequality situation 
has thus further worsened.
(ii) We have used operated land groups as the reference groups 
in table 6.13 for village 2. The distribution, though slightly 
more equitable than in the others, is skewed enough to cause concern. 
Although the proportion of households increased significantly in'the 
poorest stratum (from 29% to 54% in between 1951 and 1981), their 
share in the operated land remained almost the same (5*99% in 1951 
compared to 6 .65% in 1981).
By contrast, in the richest stratum whereas the proportion of 
households actually dropped from 11.78% in 1951 to only 4*1^ in 
1981, their share in the total operated land improved (from 29*16% 
in 1951 to 34*52% in 1981). This suggests that the richer households 
have been resuming some of their erst while rented out land from tenants.
^ Note that we have included group 3 in the poorest group as the 
productivity of land in village 2 is lower than that in village 1. 
This calls for group re-adjustments.
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This is also supported by the fact that the number of farms has 
not been increasing at the same rate in recent years as earlier.
There were 47 farms in 1951. The number increased to 70 in 1972 
and to 87 in 1981.
So our fieldwork findings indicate quite clearly that the - 
inequality situation has been worsening over time and commitantly 
the concentration of land in the hands of a few households has been 
gaining momentum. We now turn to an estimate to the extent of 
that concentration.
7.2. CONCENTRATION OP LAUD:
We have pursued two empirical exercises to estimate the extent 
of concentration of land:
(1) We calculated the concentration ratios (more precisely
Gini co-efficients, see Sen, 1972: 31) fcr 1951, 1972 and 1981
using the following formula.
G = 1 +1/n - (%2iyi) (^ + 2y2 +*. • ■ n yn) -
Where n = number of observations (here number of household)
y , y2,-...yn = the characteristics (i.e. landholding size),
where v  \ y
M u the mean of the characteristics (i.e. average landholding size)
(2) We computed the relative '.shares in different categories 
of land of two polar groups of the households:
(a) the bottom 6C% of the households and
(b) the top 10% of the households.
Groups (a) and (b) roughly correspond to the poor and prosperous 
peasantry. We then compared these relative shares graphically.
Using data on land for 1951» 1972 and 1981 we have calculated 
concentration ratios for both the villages. They are given in 
Table 6 .15•
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TABLE 6.15 
CCNCENTRATICN RATIOS: 1951-1981
LAND CATEGORIES
CONCENTRATICN RATIOS
VILLAGE - 1 VILLAGE - 2
1951 1972 1981 1951 . 1972 1981
1. Owned land .51 .58 .66 .49 .56 .70
2. Owned cultivable .50 .59 .68 .48 57 .71
land
3. Operated land .47 .53 .68 .43 -55 .68
4. Effective land .44 .54 .68 .46 *58 .68
CHANGES IN CONCENTRATION RATIOS
. VILLAGE - 1 VILLAGE - 2
1951-1972 1972-1981 ■ 1951-1972 ,1972-1981
1. Owned land .07 08 .07 .14
2. Owned cultivable .09 09 .09 .14 1
land |
3. Operated land .06 05 .12 ■13 1
4. Effective land .10 ;14'* .12 .10 j
ANNUAL % CHANGE IN CONCENTRATION RATI 05
VILLAGE - 1 VILLAGE - 2
1951-1972 1972-1981 1951-1972 1972-1981
1. Owned land + .65 +1 .53 +.68 +2.77 I
2 Owned cultivable +.85 +1 .69 + .89 +2.34
land
3. Operated land +.60 +1.04 +1.32 +2.62
4. Effective land +1.08 +2 .80 +1.24
i
41.91 j
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Table 6.15 reveals that concentration has been increasing 
consistently since the early 1950s and that the rate of increase 
has been greater in the 1970s. It also reveals that the extent 
of concentration was greater in village 2 - a typical feature of 
a North Bengal village.
(i) In village 1, the concentration ratio for owned land 
increased by an amount of .07 between 1951 and 1972 and by an amount 
of .08 between 1972 and 1981. The annual percentage changes for 
those two periods were + .6 5 and +1.55 respectively.
In village 2, the corresponding increases for owned land 
were .07 and .14- The annual % changes were +.68 and +2.77*
(ii) The increase in the concentration of operated land was 
relatively small in the 1950s and 1960s in village 1 (and not in 
village 2). But the change has been quite significant in the 1970s 
in both the villages. This confirms our earlier suggestion that 
the rich peasantry was repossessing some of their rented out land 
from the poor tenants to operate under their own supervision with 
the help of hired labourers.
(iii) The trend in the concentration of effective land also 
supports the above hypothesis. In fact, in village 1, the
concentration has been the higher' in both the periods compared to
the other categories of land. Concentration of effective land in 
village 2, is also quite high but not the highest. This suggests 
that some sort of land adjustments do still take place in village 2.
The pattern of concentration which we have noted can also
be demonstrated with the help of the Lorenz Curve. Graphs 
6(i) and 6(ii) represent two Lorenz Curves for villages 1 and 2 .
We have drawn these Lorenz Curves only for owned land distribution 
of the three reference periods - 1951? 1972 and 1981. Here 
households have been taken as proxy for population and the land 
as proxy for income.
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As we can see from graphs 6(i) and 6(ii), the slope 
;
of the Lorenz Curve has increased consistently over time in both 
villages. The graphs also show greater inequality in the 1970s 
as the Lorenz Curve for 1981 has moved further from the diagonal 
in both villages.
That inequality has been increasing can also be confirmed 
by computing the relative shares of land (all categories) of two 
polar groups of the households (i.e. (a) the bottom 60% and
(b) the top 1($
Table 6.16 shows the changes, in the relative shares of those 
two polar groups for village 1. Table 6 „ 17 shows the same thing 
for village 2.
2 08
TABLE 6.16
VIIlACS I: RELATIVE SHARES OF DIFFERED CATEGORIES OF LAND BY
A) BOTTOM 60% AND B) TOP 10% OF THE HOUSEHOLDS: 
1951-1981
Share of bottan 60% of HH Share of top 10% of HH
Land Categories:
1951 1972 1981 1951 1972 1981
1. Cwncd land 24.35 18.81 12.00 34.81 41.25 47.85
2. Owned cultivable 
land
24.48 18.34 9.93 33.91 41.03 50.28
3. Operated land 29.57 25.54 14.71 28.37 32.87 45.70
4. Effective land 27.93 22.44 13.08 31.32 36.92 47.99
5. Hemes tead land 23.31 23.79 34.51 41.80 43.87 21.42
PERCENTAGE CHANGES
*
1951-72 1972-81 1951-72 1972-81
1. CWied land -5.54 -6.18 +6.44 46. B1
2. <"Wned cultivable 
land
-6.14 8.41 +7.12 +9.25
3. Operated land -4.03 -10.83 * +4» 50 +12. 83
4. Effective land -8.88 -9.30 +5.60 +11.07
5. Hcmastead land +0.48 +10.72 +2.04 -22. 42
INDEX
1951 1972 1981 1951 ' 1972 1981
1. CWned land 100.00 77.31 49.32 100.00 118.50 137.46
2, Cwned cultivable 
land
100.00 74.91 40.56 100.00 120.99 148.27
3. Operated land 100.00 86.37 49.74 100.00 115.86 161.08
4. Effective land 100.00 80.34 46.83 100.00 117.84 153.22
5. Homestead land 100.00 102.05 148.04 100.00 104.95 51.24
TABIE 6.17
VILLAGE 2: RELATIVE SHARES OF DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF LAND BY
A) BOTTOM 603. AND B) TOP 10% OF THE HOUSEHOLDS: 
1951-1981
Share of bottom 601 
{In Percentages)
'~1
Share of tcp 10%
(In oercentaqes)
Land Categories:
1951 1972 1981 1951 1972 1981
1. CWned land 24.53 19.32 10.90 29.69 42.34 53.85
2. Owned cultivable 
land
24.77 18.29 10.57 29.31 43.54 54.03
3. Operated land 31.20 23.28 13.70 21.89 38.11 49.89
4. Effective land 27.95 20.86 13.03 25.46 40.76 51.04 j
5. Hcnestead land 22.17 31.59 13.21 33.47 26.20 52.60 | 
1.. i
PERCENTAGE CHANGES 1
1951-72 1972-81 1951-72 1972-81 J
1. Owned land -5.21 -8. 42 +12.65 +11
1
51
2. CWned .cultivable 
land
-6.48 -7.72 +14.23 +10.49
3. Operated land. -7.92 -9.58 +16.22 +11. 78
4. Effective land -7.09 -7. B3 +15.30 +10.20
5. Homestead land +9.42 -18. 38 - ,-7.27 +26 40
INDEX
1951 • 1972 1981 1951 1972 1981
1. Owned land 100.00 78.76 44.43 100.00 142.60 181.37
2. Owned Cultivable 
land
100.00 73.83 42.67 100.00 148.55 184.34
3. Operated land 100.00 74.61 43.91 100.00 174.09 227.91
4. Effective land 100.00 74.63 46.62 100.00 160.09 200.47
5. Hems stead land 100.00 142.49 59.58 100.00 78.28 157.15
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Tables 6.16 and 6.17 show the secular decline in the 
shares of the bottom 60^ of households and dramatic rise in 
the shares of the top 10^ of the households in both the villages.
Thus:
(i) "While the bottom 60^ of the households of village 1 
owned 2 4-35% of total land in 1951* their share has fallen to only 
12.0($ by 1981. Similarly in village 2, the bottom GCP/q of households 
owned 2 4*53% of land in 1951 and. the share has reduced to only 10.9Q% 
in 1981* The same thing is true for other categories of land, except 
in the case of homestead land. The rate of decline has been sharper 
in the 1970s- Within a short span of thirty years, the share of the 
bottom section of the peasantry reduced to half of what they had 
initially. The slight increase in the share of the homestead land 
by the poorer section may be due to the sheer increase in the 
number of households in this group. Most households would sell 
off their homestead land only at the very last moment. It is their 
last resort. Hence, as more households came down to the rank of the 
bottom 6C$> of the households, their share in the total homestead 
land also increased.
(ii) At the other end of the spectrum, the top 10^ of households 
have been gaining land consistently and the pace of the enlargement 
of their holdings has been greater in the 1970s in both the villages.
In village 1, while the top 10^ of households owned 34-81% 
of the total land in 1951 * the share increased to 47-8^ in 1981.
In village 2, the enange has been even more spectacular. The top 
10^ owned 2 9.69% of total land in 1951> and. their share has risen 
to 53.83^ in 1981.
(iii) But the greatest change can be noticed in the case of 
operated land. In both the villages, the richer, section of the 
peasantry has been enlarging its share of operated holdings over 
time. This section operated 31-32% in 1951 in village 1. It increased 
to 47-99% in 19S1 . Again in village 2, the corresponding shares 
were 2 5.46% ^ nd. 5 1-04%-
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It has been argued that richer peasants in North Bengal 
(in the region in which our village 2 lies) have been keen to 
rent out most of their land to tenants while they themselves would 
do very little cultivation as supervisory farmers (see Wood, 1977*5)* 
This was, no doubt, true in the 1950s and earlier (as testified 
by Mukherjee, 1957)* But the situation has began to change in the 
late 1960s as the drive for modernisation increased and the pressure 
on land also grew with the growth of family members.
The glaring contrast between the relative shares of two 
polar groups of the peasantry can be better demonstrated with the 
help of graphs. Grahps 6 (iii) and 6(iv) project the relative 
shares of these two groups in the total owned and operated land 
respectively. Graphs 6(v) and 6(vi) show the same for village 2.
The shaded part in the graph shows how fast the differences between 
the shares of top and bottom sections of the peasantry have been 
widening over time. The bulging shape of the graph on the right 
illustrates the greater Inequality in recent years.
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As can be seen-in the graphs, the inequality situation 
has worsened in the last three decades and it is more unequal for 
the operated land.
The shares of operated land for two groups reached a break­
even point in the early 1950s in village 1 and in the late 1950s 
in village 2. And after that, the gap began to widen. In the 
1970s, the gap became indeed very wide., confirming our suggestion 
that the richer households were enlarging the share in the 
operated land at the cost of the poorer peasantry.
So both the tests in turn (Gini Co-efficients and Relative 
Shares) lend support to our hypothesis that the concentration of 
land (all categories) has been on the increase and that the speed 
of that has been certainly greater in the 1970s.
CASE STUDIES:
We have looked into three households In depth to give a 
feel to how the processes of concentration and dispossession of land 
are working.
Case Study I reveals the changes in the landowner ship of 
Jamir TJddin (Household No G-88) from village 1. He was already 
rich when he became the household head and he increased his landholding 
size by more than double within the span of the last thirty years. 
Although the per capita land in his household declined significantly 
within this period, the figure is still very high compared to other 
households.
Case Study II presents a precarious condition of a middle 
peasant, Zahir TJddin Munshi. He became household head in 195& with 
3 acres of land. He has been trying very hard to hold on with that 
amount, even though his family members have more than trebled (as 
indicated by drastically reduced per capita landholding). But 
by 1981, he has already lost some land and as is clear from the 
turbulent time in his household, it is very unlikely that he 
will be able to remain a middle peasant. His family is indeed 
sliding down the social scale.
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Case Study III demonstrates the fast deterioration of the
j
landholding position of poor Hasen Ali. He became a household head
in 1961 with 1 .5 0 (per capita land .75 acre) acres of land
and has lost about half of that land in the face of increasing economic
pressure. He owned only .88 acres of land (per capita land as low
as .09 acre) in 1981. He is a pauperised household. All these
case studies are demonstrated through the charts attached.
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CONCLUSION; , '
The concentration of land in the hands of a few has increased 
in both villages. Simultaneously, we observed a fast increase in 
the ranks of the landless:
(i) Households owning less than half an acre of land 
(including the landless ones) comprised about 14% of total households 
in village 1 and 12% in village 2 in 1951* They increased to 41% 
in"both villages in 1981. They owned .38% of total land in 1951 
the figure rose to 3*06% in 1981 in the case of village 1. The 
corresponding figures for village 2 were -37% and. 1 -90%. Most of 
this was again homestead land.
(ii) Rich households owning more than 7»50 acres of land 
controlled most of the land, owned and operated. In village 1, 
these households comprised 16% of total households in 1951 ancl owned 
47% of total owned. "While the proportion of households shrank to 
7*5% in 1981, they still owned 40% of total land. In village 2, we 
observed a similar concentration.
(iii) Gini-co-efficients calculated from our data also indicated 
growing concentration in both villages.
(iv) Middle groups of the peasantry were observed to be under 
tremendous economic pressure and some of them have fallen off the 
social ladder.
CHAPTER V I I
DIFFERENCES IN THE) OWNERSHIP OF OTHER MATERIAL ELEMENTS OF PRODUCTION
Land, though the most important of all the means of production, 
cannot alone determine the material aspects of production in a Bangladesh 
village. It has to be complemented with other material elements, such 
as animals, especially draught animals, farming implements and inputs 
of production including capital and other assets. But no one can deny 
the basic importance of land in the over-all socio-economic structure 
of rural Bangladesh. In fact, as we shall see in this chapter, the nature 
of the distribution of all other material elements of production seems 
to be closely correlated to that of land.
1. Distribution of Draught Animals:
Our field investigation reveals that the total number of draught 
animals has been declining over time in both the study villages since 
1972. There were 288 draught animals in village-1 in 1972. This figure 
dropped to 263 by 1981. The corresponding numbers for village-2 were 
228 and 183. The per household figures for village-1 were 1.66 and 1.31 
in 1972 and 1981 respectively. Those for village-2 were 2.81 and 1.46.
This means that there has been a decline in the average number of draught 
animals per household in both both the villages. Falling average figure 
for the whole village should not, however, obscure the differential 
rates of dispossessionof draught animals in different groups of the 
peasantry. The greatest losers have been the middle and the small 
peasantry. The’rich peasants, in most cases, have improved their position 
as owners of draught animals in relative_terms. We get this trend 
from tables 7*1 and 7*2.
In table 7*1 we have distributed the households who had atleast 
one draught animal. In both the villages we notice an increase in the 
proportion of such households in the landowning group-1 in between
1972 and 1981. One explanation is that there has been an increase in the 
proportion of landless households. More households have been dispossed 
of their land. Even though they lost their last bit of land, they continued 
to possess some draught animals ( in most cases a single or a pair only). 
They had managed to operate some land ( in some cases cultivating their 
erstwhile owned land as tenants of the new owners). But there was tremendous 
economic pressure on them to sell these animals and many of our respondents 
were not sure at the time of interview as to how long they could withstand
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TABLE 7 .1
PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS OWNING ATLEAJ5T ONE DRAUGHT 
ANIMAL IN EACH OF THE LAN DOWNINGGROUPS : 1972-1981
LANDOWNING 
GROUPS (ACRES)
VILLAGE-1 VILLAGE-2
% of HH % of HH
1972 1981 1972 1981
1. 0 30.00 5 8 .3 3 18.18 27.58
2 . 0 - .5 0  ' 23.01 22.83 33.33 2 3 .80
3. .31-1-50 57.69 5 6 .7 3 A-6 . 15 53-33
k. 1.31-2-50 78.37 6 9 .69 76. h7 83.33
3. 2.31-5-50 88.13 66.66 9 0 .90 85.71
6. 3.51-5.00 100.00_ 9 2 .8 5 100.00_ 100 .00
7- 5-01-7-50 100.00 100.00 100.00 85.71
8. 7.51-10.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
9. 10.01 + 100.00 100.00 90.90 8 3 .3 3
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TABLE 7 .2
PERCENTAGE AND PER HOUSEHOLD DISTRIBUTION OF DRAUGHT 
ANIMALS AMONGST LANDOWNING GROUPS: 1972-1981
LAND
OWNING
GROUPS
VILLAGE - 1 VILLAGE 2
% OF TOTAL 
DRAUGHT 
ANIMALS 
OWNED
DRAUGHT 
ANIMALS OWNED 
PER HH
% OF TOTAL 
DRAUGHT 
ANIMALS 
OWNED
DRAUGHT 
ANIMALS OWNED 
PER HH
1972 1981 1972 1981 1972 1981 1972 1981.
1. 2.08 3.80 .75 .83
r-co 4.52 .18 . 27_
2. 3.12 4.40 .20 .42 .43 4.52 .33 .30
3. 8.33 7.10 .92 • 03 00 3.94 11.29 .69 1.00
4. 17.36 14.68 1.35 1.28. 14.91 14.86 2.00 1.44
5. 17.71 15.81 2.83 1.58 10.08 11.12 2.09 2.00
6. - 15.97 13.40 2.55 2.50 14.47 12.27 3.30 3.42
7. 9.29 13.56 3.00 3.00 10.52 11.52 3.00 3.42
8. 10.85 8.86 5.28 3.55 3.94 4.51 4.00 4.50
9. 15.27 18.38 6.28 4.33 21.92 25.38 6.33 5.83
ALL
GROUPS 99.98 99.99 1.66 1.31 99.99 99.99 2.81 1.46
BOTTOM 
60% OF 
HH
25.78 15.80 .76 .66 25.07 24.33 1.07 .76
TOP 10% 
OF HH 31.31 36.74 4.89 3.60 30.05 34.31 6.30 3.76
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the pressure. The extent of dispossession of draught animals amongst 
the poorer groups was higher in village-1. Many poor peasants have 
sold off their only draught animal and joined the full-time profession 
of agricultural wage labourers. In village-2, the opportunity of wage 
employment being limited, they still continued to possess their draught 
animals and remained share-croppers, even on disadvantageous terms.
In most cases the rich peasants in village-1 managed to maintain their 
original position. There were , however, some exceptions in village-2.
Table 7-2 reveals a diverse picture.The poorer households 
have been losing their share in the ownership of draught animals and 
the richer ones have been improving their share in percentage terms.
In per household terms, though the amount has been decreasing for both 
groups, the inequality remains,
i) The bottom 60# of households in village-1 owned one quarter of 
the total draught animals in 1972 and they owned on average 0.76 
draught animals per household. Their share dropped to 15.80# in 1981.
The per household figure, too, dropped to 0.66. A similar trend was 
also observed in village-2. The bottom 60# of households in village-2 
owned 25-07# of draught animals in 1972 and the proportion dropped 
to 2*f-33 # in 1981. The per household figures dropped from 1.07 in 
1972 to 0.76 in 1981.
ii)'By contrast, the top 10 # of households improved their position 
during the 1970s. While they owned 31-31# in 1972 in village-1, 
the proportion increased to 3^-7^ # in 1981. The per household 
figures were ^ .8 9 and 3-76 in 1972 and 1981. Although the per 
household figure for the top 10 # of households declined in 
1981 it still was atleast six times higher than that of the bottom 
60 # of households. In village-2, the top 10 # of households 
owned 30-05 of draught animals( 6 .3O per household) in 1972 and 
3^.31 # ( 3 -78 per household) in 1981. '
DIFFERENCES IN THE QUALITY OF DRAUGHT ANIMALS:
We noted not only differences in the number of draught animals 
between the land-poor and land-rich groups but also significant differences 
in the quality of the draught animals they possessed. And in a situation 
where there has been virtually no technological advance, the quality 
of the draught animals does matter. A pair of strong draught animals can 
plough land more deeply and more swiftly than a pair of weak draught
2 26
animals. We , therefore, asked about the general health of their draught 
animals. We also observed ourselves. Normally, villagers have their own 
way of classifying draught animals into 'good','average1 or 'bad' categories. 
The criteria used are usually the general look of the animals— whether 
skinny/ bony/ very weak to draw ploughs/ light weight/ dwarf siae^  growth 
of horns etc. Although they may sound arbitrary and subjective to outsiders, 
these categories, in fact, represent an ingenious way of rating them.We 
asked the respondents about the approximate value of their draught animals 
at current market prices. We also measured the height of each of the 
draught animals with the help of the scales which we carried with us.
A diverse but very intersting picture emerged from our qualitative 
investigations. The qualitative differences are presented in quantitative 
terms in table 7-3*
Table 7-3 indicates the following;
i) The average height and price of draught animals were relatively better in
village- 1 than in village-2.
ii) Most of the draught animals of better height and value belonged to
the richer groups of the peasantry in both villages.
iii) More than 85 % of the draught animals in richer groups ( say, groups
7 to 9 ) were either 'good'or'average'in health terms.By contrast, 
about ^0% of the draught animals of the poorer groups ( groups 1 to 3) 
were 'bad' healthwise. Less than 10 % of their animals could be 
termed as 'good', while about *f0 % of the animals of richer groups . 
belonged to this category. The above findings are more or less true 
for both villages.
Most poor households could not afford to buy healthy 
animals and they did not have enough money to buy fodder for their 
animals. The community grazing grounds for the draught animals have 
been virtually wiped out in both villages because of the increased 
pressure on land. By contrast, the richer groups had enough stock of 
fodder ( as exemplified by the enormous size of their kherer pala or 
pile of fodder ) and they had the means to buy it in case of any shortage. 
The mortality oT draught animals was also higher in the poorer groups.
So it was not surprising that we observed significant differnces in 
the qualitative aspects of draught animals among different groups of 
the peasantry.
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Lenin, however, used a different method for classification of 
the peasantry in the context of Russia. He used the number of draught 
animals owned as the basic reference group while classifying the peasant 
households (Lenin, 1977ai9*0- We have used Lenin's method, adding one 
or two elements to it, while classifying the peasant households in our 
study villages. Tables 7-4 and 7-5 show in detail the classification 
of the peasantry in both villages in terms of the ownership of draught 
animals.
Using ownership size of draught annimals as the basic differen­
tiating variable, we again find (as shown in tables 7-4 and 7.5) acute 
concentration of draught animals in the hands of a few well-to-do 
peasants and dispossession of poorer groups of the peasantry. For the 
sake of comparison, if we categorize households with none or ^  draught 
animal as poor peasants, with 2 to 3 draught animals as middle peasants 
and with 4 or more draught animals as well-to-do or rich peasants.
We observe a highly differentiated picture in both of our study villages. 
The extent of differentiation was sharper in village-1.
i) In village-1, the well-to-do peasantry, constituting only 12.00#of 
households (and 17-81# of total population in the village) , held 
40.32# of total area under crops in 1981. This group also owned 
a considerable proportion of total draught animals (43-34#) and 
total owned cultivable land (41.58#). At the opposite pole, 
we found the complete dispossession of the bottom group. The 
poor peasantry, comprising a little more than half of the total 
households (5**#) had only about 1/6 (17.80#) of the total area 
under crops. This group owned only 1/5 (20.20#) of the total 
owned cultivable land and only 1/26 (3.80#) of total draught 
animals.
ii) The differences were more marked in village-2. The rich peasantry 
comprising about 1/11 (16.31#) of total population, owned little 
less than half of total land under crops and also total owned 
cultivable land (42.74#) and 45-70# respectively). They also 
held about one third of the total draught animals. But, at the 
other end, the poor peasantry, comprising more than half (53-23#) 
of total households and 40.7‘1# of total population controlled 
only 1/11 (9.20#)of total land under crops and owned about 1/9
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(10.^9$) of)the total cultivable land. Their share in the 
ownership of total draught available was negligible, at 
only 2.83$.
So, we found a considerable concentration of the crop 
areas, owned cultivable land and draught animals in the 
hands of the well-to-do peasants in both villages, using 
ownership of draught animals as a differentiating variable.
2 i : Ownership Pattern of Other Animals :
Besides draught animals, a peasant household usually owns one or 
two calves, sometimes two or more goats and, of course, poultry (ducks 
and fowls) which yield extra income. Earlier, a milch cow also came 
under the category of other animals, but these days most of them are 
used as draught animals, with one or two exceptional cases. As regards 
poultry, only a few attempts were noted to organise it as a business 
concern, mostly with the help of the governmental technical advice and 
credit facilities. The distribution of these other animals was no less 
unequal in our study villages.
i) In village-1, well-to-do peasants, owning at least 7.50 acres 
of land and comprising only 7.50$ of the total households owned one 
quarter of total calves, 2*f$ of total goats and 22$ of total ducks and
fowls. They owned on an average 1.5 calves, 3*5 goats and 15 ducks and
fowls per household. In village-2, rich peasants (defined as above) 
comprising only 6.61$ of the total households owned 2Q$ of total calves, 
15$ of goats'and 19$ of ducks and fowls. The per household figures were 
1.25, 2.50 and 10 respectively in_198l.
. ii) By contrast, the poorest section of the peasantry in village-1
(owning no or less than0*51 acres of land) comprising ^1$ of total
households held only *f.65$ of total calves, 21$ of goats and 20$ of 
ducks and fowls. The per household figures were0.0^ , 0.68 and 2.^7 
respectively. Corresponding figures for village-2 were even less. Thus, 
this group comprising **1$ of total households held only 12$ of calves, 
15$ of goats and 10$ of ducks and fowls. The per household number were 
0*18, 1.12 and 3 respectively.
5 : Distribution of Farm Implements and Accessories
Implements and accessories used by the villagers for agricultural 
production were as yet very old fashioned.They still use the age-old
types of implements well known in the locality for generations. There 
has been little technological advance in the use of farming implements. 
Only recenlty, some of the villagers (the majority of them from the richer 
peasantry) have been using power pumps for irrigation. The use of Deep 
Tube Wells and Shallow Tube Wells for watering the HYV crops is more 
frequent in village-1 than in village-2. In fact,none of the households 
in village-2 had owned any of such mechanical devices for irrigation.
But theyat times manage to get water from neighbouring villages. We 
noticed a number of them in village-1 .Except for these pumps and some 
spraying machines for killing insects, the villagers have not seen any 
other improved variety of farming implements.
Of all the farming tools, the plough is, no doubt, of greatest 
importance. It is made of wood and furnish'ed with a pointed iron share 
(known as fala or fal locally). The share is placed on wooden platform 
called dophar.The sizes of these fala and dophar determine the quality 
of ploughing /see Sketch 7-1JJ • If they are not sufficiently long, the 
penetration will be less deep and the soil preparation will not be 
satisfactory. The beam which joins the plough and the yoke is usually 
made of wood, and so too, the yoke. But some poor peasants make it with 
bamboo as well. Besides the plough, peasants use a number of other 
ancilliary implements. A moi (or leveller) is used to level the earth 
just before and after sowing. It consists of a few pieces of bamboo 
tied to one another to form a narrow and small platform, which is tied 
to the yoke by two strong ropes. The cultivator stands on the leveller 
while it is drawn by two draught animals. Cultivators use. a small spade 
called Khurpi for weeding the extra grasses from the crop field. Kastey 
(sickle ) is used to cut the crop plants. Besides these, they also have 
an axe (kural) , a chopper (dao), a water scoop (do rig a/ho ssa), a spade 
(kodal) and a harrow (nangla).
Only a handful of the households in our study villages had bullock 
or buffalo-drawn carts and most others used slings carrying baskets (bhar) 
for the purpose of transportation. Similar types of implements were also 
noted by Mukherjee in the early 19^ 0s (Mukherjee, 1957a: 98-102). This 
indicates that there has been no change in the technology of farming in 
these willages.
IRo n ( s h a r £
°r f a l )
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Our findings suggest that the well-to-do pesantry in both 
villages were far better supplied with implements (ploughs, levellers, 
sickles, weeders and power pumps) than the poor and even the middle 
peasantry. Table 7.6 and 7-7 give us the details for' village-1 and 
vilage-2.
As can be seen in these tables, the richer section of the 
peasantry held the major portion of these implements. They monopolised 
the ownership of modern implements (pumps in this case). The average 
number per household for them was also higher than that owned by poorer 
groups.
i) In village-1, the top two groups of households (well-to-do 
peasantry) comprising about i (7-50$) of total households owned about 
one quarter (23-3*$) °f fke total number of ploughs, nearly 1/6 (17.48$) 
of the levellers, a little more than 1/10 (10.23$) of sickles, 1/6 
(17.62$) of the weeders and more than half (55-55$) of the power pumps.
In village-2, this group comprising only about 1/15 (6.46$) of 
total households owned more than 1/3 (22.83$) of total ploughs a little 
more than one quarter of total levellers (26.04$), more than 1/3 (21.83$) 
of total sickles and about 1/5 (20.03$) of total weeders. There was no 
power pump in this village.
ii) On the other hand, the poorest section (bottom two groups) 
comprising about 41$ of total household in village-1 held only a little 
more than 1/12 (7*89$) of ploughs,about 1/11 (9.24$) of levellers, 
i (23.12$) of sickles, J (25-38$) of weeders and only 1 /1 8 (5*55$) of 
total improved implements. - * _
In village-2, this section of the peasantry comprising the same 
proportion of households as in- village-1 (41$) possessed a little less 
than 1/12 (8.69$) of ploughs, 1/8 (12.34$) of levellers, less than i 
(28.44$) of sickles and about (24.99$). of weeders.
The slightly greater shares of sicklqs and weeders by the poorest 
groups may be due to the fact that most of the working males of these 
households worked as wage labourers and they invariably had their own 
implements, particularly sickles and weeders.
The per capita figures also varied markedly between the top and 
bottom groups in both the villages.
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The foregoing suggests that the inequality situation was quite 
significant with respect to the possession of agricultural implements 
in both villages in 1981. As for the middle groups, they were resisting 
the pressure imposed on them fiercely in the face of decline in their 
shares. Their per household shares were also lower than the overall 
average for the village as a whole and significantly lower than those of 
the richer groups. Thus the well-to-do peasantry in both villages were 
seen to be far better endowed with agricultural implements than the poor 
and even the middle peasantry.
The differences were not only quantitative but also qualitative. 
The quality of the implements owned by rich groups was superior to that 
of the poorer groups. To demonstrate this point, we singled out the 
plough, the most important of all agricultural implements, for investi­
gation.
As mentioned earlier, the quality of a plough actually depends 
on two of the most important accessories - i) the iron share (fala or fal) 
and the wooden platform (dophar) on which this share is fixed. Normally, 
rich peasants change both of these accessories long before they became 
diminished by constant use so that they remain sufficiently long to 
penetrate deep into the soil. Thus, rich peasants are in an advantageous 
position as they are in possession of well-built ploughs with sharp and 
long shares drawn by strong and healthy draught animals. Therefore, the 
soils of rich peasants are better ploughed than the landpoor peasantry
Table 7*8 shows us the difference in lengths of the shares (falas) 
and wooden platforms (dophars) used by different groups of the peasant 
households.
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Table 7*8 indicates significant differences in the quality of 
the accessories of ploughs. This inferior technology puts the poor 
peasants into a considerably disadvantageous position as regards soil 
preparation. But they try to compensate for these disadvantages through 
heavy labour inputs - their only abundent resource. However, they can 
not compensate for these disadvantages through this process of putting 
extra labour for ever. There comes a stage when new technology (in the 
form of modern irrigation, fertilizer, seeds etc) enters into the 
village and strengthens the productivity per acre of rich peasants.
As we see later in this chaper, it is at this stage that the traditional 
inverse relationship between farm size and yield per acre breaks down.
k : FARMING TECHNIQUE :
Concomitant with the differences in the quality and quantity of 
farming implements, the well-to-do peasantry were seen to be in an advanta­
geous position as regards the nature of farming techniques. They were 
seen to do their sowing faster and more intensively, they made better 
use of favourable weather, sowed the seed in more humid and well ploughed 
soil, weeded and watered crop plants in time and in the right proportions, 
and reaped the harvest and threshed the grain in proper time.
Differences in these technical advantages are well reflected in 
table 7-9- We collected such information only from village-1. It is
clear from this table that there were significant differences in farming
techniques between the better and badly off peasants. Usually, a field 
in Bangladesh needs at least k ploughing before -it is finally ready for 
sowing or transplanting. The poor peasants in village - 1, because 
of the acute shortage of draught animals, could not always plough so 
many times. By contrast, the richer peasants ploughed more than five 
times on an average. Similarly while the bottom 3 groups weeded less 
than twice per cropping season on an average the last three groups 
performed well over twice on an average.
Also, more households in the landpoor groups found it extremely
difficult to perform many of the agricultural activities such as ploughing
sowing, weeding and watering in time. The situation was even worse for 
the poorer peasantry with respect to the use of modern inputs, such as 
irrigation and fertilizer. Only about one quarter of households in
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j
this section of the peasantry could water their land in time and apply 
fertilizer adequately. But almost all of the richer households could 
perform these activities at the right time and in the right proportion. 
All of the forfegoing favoured them with a better harvest and thus con­
tributed to the tendency which normally causes a breakdown in the 
inverse relationship.
Before we turn to various aspects of the inverse relationship, 
especially the circumstances in which it breaks down, let us examine 
the pattern of distribution of modern inputs.
5* Distribution of Modern Inputs :
The inflow of modern inputs was considerably higher in 
village-1, and the distribution of these inputs was concentrated- in 
the richer groups of the peasantry.
Table 7.10 and 7*11 give us the detail.
As we can see from table 7*10, the poorest 59*50% of total 
households (owning less than 1.51 acres of land) in village-1 used 
only 15.56% of total fertilizer and 20.21% of total insecticides in 
1981. They obtained only 9*60% of total.institutional credit distri­
buted through different government and voluntary agencies. As against 
this, the top 11% of households (owning more than 7*50 acres of land) 
used *l6.62% of total fertilizer, 53-06% of toal insecticides and 
obtained 5^*26% of total insecticides and obtained 5*1*26% of toal 
institutional credit disbursed in this village . The per household 
averages were also significantly different. The land-rich peasantry 
used much higher amounts of fertilizer, insecticides and institutional 
credit than the poorer groups.
We get a similar picture in village-2 from table 7*11* She 
bottom 53*72% of households (owning less 1.51 acres of land) used 
1*f.68% of the fertilizer, 3*12% of. insecticides and *f.70% of institu­
tional credit. By contrast, the top 6.61% of households (owning more 
that 7*50 acres of land) used 39*57% of fertilizer, 1*f.06% of insectici 
des and 57% of total institutional credit that flowed into this village 
The Per household figures, though smaller compared to those of village-1 
varied widely in different groups.
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Differences in the supplies of farming implements and the 
nature of.farming techniques plus the skewed distribution of modern 
inputs amoijgst different groups of households led to differential 
impacts on cropping intensities and the level of production - two 
important elements of inverse relationship.
8 .6: BREAKING DOWN OP THE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP
It is more or less established in the literature that poor 
peasants cultivate more ins tens ively than the rich peasants as they 
employ their own family labour (up to the period at which its marginal 
productivity falls to'o' ) intenssively on the samll patch of land 
(Sen, 19^ 2, 196*+; Rao, 1967; Patnaik, 1972; Rudra, 1968 etc). However 
as Roy argues :
Once traditional patterns of farming are distributed 
by introduction of new technology, the impact on the 
the relation between farm size and productivity is not 
clear on apriori basis ( Roy, 1981:212).
Roy, himself, using disaggregated data at the district level for the 
Punjab in India demonstrates the disappearance of the inverse relation 
ship in the relatively advanced region but its persistence in backward 
regions (Roy, 1981).
We, too, got an almost similar result when we made an attempt 
to test the hypothesis concerning an inverse relationship. In village-1 
where we noted significant inflow of new technology, the rich peasants 
were seen to cultivate their land more intensively. So we found higher 
level of cropping intensities in these groups than in the poorer groups
But by contrastjin village-2, where the inflow of modern 
inputs has been minimal, the poorer groups cultivated more intensively. 
So their cropping intensities were higher than those of larger farmers.
Table 7-12 indicates these difference.
24 5
TABLE 7.12 
CROPPING INTENSITIES (IN PERCENTAGES)
LANDOWNING CROPPING INTENSITIES (IN %)
GROUPS
(ACRES)
VILLAGE - 1 VILLAGE - 2
1. 0 169.90 109.81
2. .01-.50 161.56 225.82
3. .51-1,50 165.19 109.07
4. 1.51-2.50 138.49 141.40
5. 2.51-3.50 195.53 141.94
6. 3.51—5.00 137.02 156.89
7. 5.01-7.50 162.02 142.05
8. 7.51-10.00 212.84 115.13
9. 10.01+ 179.48 97.52
All groups 170.75 124.75
NOTE: Cropping Intensity represents the ratio
between the gross cropped area and the 
net sown area.
hide*
2 4 7
Table 7.1£ exhibits an inverse relationship for village-2 
but a positive relationship for village-1. In village-1, the cropping 
intensity increases consistently in the richer land groups. But in 
village-2, the poorer groups were seen to cultivate their small patch 
of land more carefully and intensively as they had little opportunity 
to sell their labour to others. The rich peasants on the other hand, 
in the absence of higher yielding technology, were not very intensive 
in their farming (see also Graph 7(1))-
The pattern of cropping intensities which we have noticed in 
the two villages is also supported by the productivity data. We found 
a inverse relationship still existing between farm size and yield per 
acre (Gross) in village-2 and this relation just disappearing in 
village-1. Table 7-13 shows us this relationship.We have taken only 
the paddy for total agricultural production in table 7.131 because of 
its overwhelming importance in the production figures. In 1981, it 
accounted for 90# of total land under crops in village-1 and in 
village-2. Jute, wheat, potatoes and other vegetables accounted for 
the rest. In that sense, the proprotion of land under traditional cash 
crops, like, jute, was very insignificant in our study villages. For 
that reason we chose to concentrate upon the paddy production.
While calculating yield per acre, we have taken gross acreage 
and not net acreage. The reason for taking gross acreage was to . neutra­
lize the cropping intensity effect from the output figures. If we were 
to take net acreage, the productivity per acre in village-1 would have 
looked highly exaggerated from that of village-2, nay the national 
average. Paddy is produced three times in village-1 and most of it is 
HYV. Unless we took a gross acreage, the per acre production would have 
been more than double of the national average (which is near to that of 
village- 2).
As can be seen, richer groups produced more paddy per acre than 
the poor ones in village-1. The yield*per acre in the poorest two groups 
together was recorded to be 25 maunds or less. On the other hand, the 
richest two groups had yields higher than 28 maunds per acre.
When we considered HYV alone, the differences were even more 
prominent. The poorer groups had an average of 52 maunds per acre while 
the richer groups had an average yield of 38 maunds per acre.
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In villager2 , however, HYV production was minimal. Only 3#
of the cropped land was under irrigation. The inverse relationship
a
still existed in this village-2 the poor and middle groups of the 
peasantry as a whole had higher yield per acre than the. richest two 
groups (though the yield per acre for the poorest two groups was 
still very poor). They had a yield of 20 maunds per acre as against
•^■5 JS^ utl.d .^ Per acre Tor the richest two groups. ( See also graph 7 ii)
The reason for the breakdown of the inverse relationship
in village-1 was the inflow of modern farming inputs including eighteen 
mechanical pumps (17 Shallow Tubewells andlDeep Tube Well) for irrigation. 
Irrigation has made farming a profitable concern in this village. As 
such the richer section of the peasantry were seen to take a keen 
interest in agricultural activities. They were found to cultivate the 
land more intensively with the help of the wage labourers. Moreover, 
as the cost of production went up following the partial withdrawal of 
government subsidies from fertilizer, insecticides,power pumps and 
petroleum, and also the rise in the international prices of these 
inputs, only the richer section of the peasantry had the means to 
organise their agricultural production system more efficiently. They 
are the people who can apply more hired labour, and use superior 
technology in the form of higher doses of water, fertilizer and insec­
ticides at the right time. So it was very likely that the cropping 
intensities and the output per acre were higher in the richer groups.
By contrast, village-2, still a traditional village, demonstrated the 
normal inverse relationship between productivity and farm size.
Table 7 .13 also shows us the differntial pattern of production 
of paddy. We noted mainly three varieties of paddy - Boro, Aman and 
Aush in both the village. HYVs were noticed in both Boro and Aman. As 
expected, the proportion of HYV cultivation was significantly higher in 
village-1 compared to village-2. About 30# °f its total cropped bud 
was under modern irrigation in 1981.
A
The co-efficient of regression was estimated to be -.033 
(significant at 3#) but while that for village-1 was positive,
+ .30 (significant at 5#)* The estimated equation (y = a + bx) 
was linear.
2 51
The distribution of paddy output among different landowning 
groups was also found to be unequal. Thus households owning less than 
1.31 acres of land (constituting 37*3# of total households) accounted 
for only 13-63# of paddy production in 1981 in village-1. By contrast, 
the top two groups (constituting 7-3# of total households) had ^3-61# 
of total production.
The distribution looks even more asymmetrical when we
compare the figures of HYV. Thus the bottom 3 groups accounted for only 
1^*77 of total HYV production, while the top two groups accounted for 
46.^3#*of the share.
7 : DIFFERENTIAL STAYING POWER :
Not only did the richer households share the major part of 
total production, but they also took advantage of their better staying 
power and sold their produce when the price was higher. Poor peasants, 
most of them in perpetual debt and in need of cash, sold off their 
produce immediately after the harvest at a lower price. This -is clear 
from table 7-1 -^- It shows the differential market participation by 
different groups of the peasantry.
2 52
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Table 7.1^ clearly speaks of the advantageous position of 
the richer groups in market participation. Most of the bottom groups 
participated within 15-30 days of the harvest and they could not 
withhold their sale upto the lean period, when the prices recorded 
high. On the contrary, richer households could abstain from selling 
immediately after the harvest when most of the poorer and middle 
peasantry were selling and glutting the market. The land-rich groups 
usually sold their products during scarcity period when the price 
was higher.
• While the average selling price for the bottom three groups 
was recorded roughly around tk. 100^dn village-1 and tk. ySj-ln village-2 
the corresponding figures for the top two groups wereivl2Cjf-and tk. 115^“ - 
respectively during our study period. Thus, the richer peasantry were 
in an advantageous position was also confirmed by the pattern of their 
incomes (both agricultural and non-agricultural). We turn to this in 
following section.
8: DIFFERENCES IN INCOME ;
. '' We observed enormous differences in 'incomes amongst different
groups of the peasantry in both the villages, although the precise 
degree of these differences varied from village to village.We examined 
these differences from different angles using different methods of 
investigation. Firstly, we investigated the differences amongst the 
landownership groups; and secondly, we grouped the households according
to different ranges of income. Table 8.15 gives the distribution of 
income according to landownership groups.
Table 7.15 shows an asymmetrical pattern of income distribution. 
In village—1, the bottom two groups (the poorest section of the peasantry) 
constituting of the total households shared only 1^.9# of the total 
income in 1981. But the top two groups, constituting only 7 *5# of the 
total households (less than 1/5 of the poorest section) shared 
of the total income (which was more than double the share of the poorest
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section). The per ^ household and per capita income figures were also 
highly unequal. The per household income of the top group (group 9) 
was at least 10 times higher than that of the bottom group (group 1).
In per capita terms, the difference was not that large. It was : 1.
Similarly in village-2 ,the bottom two groups (41.32$ of the 
total households) held 22.99$ of the total income and the top two 
groups (6.61$ of the total households) held 32.56$ the total income.
The per household incomes of the two extreme groups (i.e. groups 1 and 9) 
tk. 3900 tk. 38082 (the ratio being 1 : 10) respectively. In per 
capita terms, the two figures were tk. 958 and tk. . 3218. (the ratio 
being 2 : 7) respectively. This means that the differences of income in 
various groups of the peasantry was higher in village-1 compared to that 
in village-2.
Another interesting trend emerges from this table. Both per 
capita and perhousehold incomes of group 2 (owning less than .51 acre: 
of land) were less than the corresponding figures for groups (owning no 
land and mostly earning as wage labourers). This indicates the appalling 
condition of the poorest section of the peasantry. A majority of these 
households have already chosen their occupations as agricultural wage 
labourers, but a significant proportion of them still cling to their tiny 
patches of land, while some of them rent in land under highly disadvan­
tageous rental conditions. These were the partially dispossessed peasantry. 
By contrast the fully dispossessed peasantry were earning relatively more 
than the potential landless group* The per capita incomes of the the poor 
peasantry owning same land_, say upto 2.50 acres of land were less than - 
the landless group (group-1). This underlines one clear fact : that the 
position of the marginal peasants was truly vulnerable.
Also intersting is the pattern of income that derived from outside 
farming as such. As we can see from table 7-15 > the proportion of income 
coming from agriculture in groups 1, 2 in village-,1 and groups 1, 2 and 3 
in village-2 are really very low. The proportions in the middle groups 
are very high , but again starts falling in the last two groups.
256
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A mjor part of the income which we will call non-agricultural 
came from agricultural wages. The rest came from rent, small business, 
raising poultry and livestock. The agricultural wage income accounted 
for 79-^3^1 69.18$ and 31*23$ of the total income of groups 1, 2 and 3 
respectively in village-1. The extent of wage income was quite insigni­
ficant in village-2 as the employment opportunities were few in this 
village (around 40$ of the toal income of groups 1, 2 and 3 as on the 
whole cases from agricultural wages). The middle groups earned only 
about 12$ - 15$ of their income from non-agricultural persuits (most 
of it coming from business and remittance from their families living 
in town or abroad) . The proportions were less than 10$ for the middle 
groups in village-2.
The top-most group had higher proportions of its income ear­
marked as non-agricultural (17$ in village-1 and 1*f$ in village-2).
That means that the percentage of non-agricultural income (most of 
which being cash) increased from the middle groups to the extreme ones.
Both these extreme groups sold more of their commodities in the market 
(for the bottom groups, labour-power itself being the single most 
important commodity). A higher proportion of non-agricultural income in 
the top most group indicates the ability of the land rich group to reap 
the benefits of developmental work, because of their advantageous 
position in. the rural power structure (see^also liahman, 1981; Vylder ,1982).
Now, let us look at the second method of income distribution.
We have used here the range of money incomes as the differentiating - 
variable. We have used 12 income ranges for this purpose.
"Lenin never considered agricultural wage as agricultural income.
He always categorised it as a sort of Industry' . Agricultural 
wage involves purchase and sale of labour power and because of 
its 'commercial' nature of transanction- Lenin would categorised 
this form of income as income deriving form 'personalised industries' 
(Lenin, 1977a; 13*0 *
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Table 7*16 also shows an enormous inequality of income in 
both the villages we studied. Thus, we found 38# of total households 
in village-1 who had per household income of Tk,5000/-. But they held 
only 10.6# of total income of this village in 1981. In village-2, 
there were V ? . o f  households belowlj£>000/- - per household income 
range. They accounted for only 13*7**# °f ^e total income of the village 
By contrast, there were only *f.5# of households who had an 
average income exceeding Tk. 50^000/- per annum in village-1. But 
they held one-quarter of the total income. Again, there were 13-7**# of 
households in village—2 whose income per household exceeded this range. 
They accounted for 2.68# of the total income of the village. '
The above findings, definitely indicate a high level of income 
equality in rural Bangladesh. But unfortunately, we do not have 
exactly similar information for these villages for the early periods.
We have, however, made an estimate from Mukherjee's distribution of 
income (Mukherjee, 1957a, table 3.1:135) for Six Villages of Bengal 
in 19*f1-**2 (which also included our village-2) by inflating
3his data with the help of an estimator reflecting the changes 
in the cost of living indexes, we found that only b% of the
households had an income per household less than Tk.50,000/— (at 
1980-81 prices). That means that a considerable number of households 
fell from their earlier income ranges and swelled the ranks of the 
dispossessed. At the other extreme, the proportion of households with 
average income of more than Tk. 50,000/- (at 1980-81 prices) remained 
more or less stable over these years, while their share in total income 
increased over time.
9. DIFFERENCES IN THE STANDARD Off LIVING :
The standard of living depends to a large extent on the 
material elements of production. So differences in the standard of 
living in a way reflect the extent of differences^in the material 
condition of production. While investigating differences in standard 
of living amongst different groups of households we examined * the
3After adjusting the price changes and weights in the 
cost of living indexes, we found that a Tk.fn 19**1-*f2 
was equivalent to Tk. 65 in 1980-81.
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ownership pattern of houses, other assets like radios, torches, cycles, 
motorcycles etc. and the pattern of expenditure with a special emphasis 
on the quantity and quality of their food intake.
A : HOUSING !
We noticed, primarily, two types of housing structure in our 
study villages : a)tin-roofed and b) the straw-thatched huts. The former 
is an indication of a richer household and the latter a sign of an 
impo verished household. But a few of the poor households continued to 
live in tin-roofed huts which they inherited from their parents, 
despite their economic hardship. These were the people who were 
highly conscious of their past family status and still referred to 
themselves as people of *Uchu bangsa1 (high family status). We found 
considerable differences amongst the tin-roofed huts as well. Only a 
minority of the tin-roofed huts had pucca or brick-laid foundation 
(less than 10#). Also, not all of the tin-roofed houses had walls _ 
made of tin. Most of the tin-roofed huts in village-2 had earth walls. 
But in village-1, we found that most of these huts had walls made of 
tin and wood. Normally there is one bedroom in a hut. But sometimes 
we found a big hut partitioned to make two living rooms.
In general, a hut is, in fact, a bedroom. The value of an 
average tin-roofed hut is certainly ten to twelve times the value of 
a straw-thatched one and the life of the former is not at all comparable 
with the latter. The poor pesantry, living mostly in straw-thatched huts 
need to repair their huts almost every two years and this takes a 
sizeable sum from their already depleted yearly budget. Hence, their 
investment in agriculture is diminished. The rich peasantry, on the 
contrary, heed to spend very little on their well-built tin-roofed 
houses.
From our field investigstion we found that the number of 
huts per household varied quite significantly from group to group.
Also, the number of people living per bedroom always tended to be 
higher in the poorer land groups - a clear indication of the appalling 
standard of living of the poor peasantry. Table 7-17 shows the housing 
conditions for different groups of the peasantry in both villages. The 
number of huts as presented in this table includes both huts used as 
bedrooms and huts used as kitchen and drawing rooms (Baithak Khana)•
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As can be seen in table 7-17» the land rich—groups had a 
higher number of huts per households. In village-1, the top-most 
group had six huts on an average compared to only 2.09 in group 1,
Group 2 had even less, with only 1.^ 8 per household. In village-2, 
the differences' -were slightly less marked but not insignificant, in 
anyway. Each household of the top-most group in village-2 had four 
units of huts per household on an average, while the bottom-most group 
had only 1.31 units per household.
The number of persons living per bedroom also varied in both 
the villages. In village-1, 5-^0 persons lived in a bedroom on an 
average in groups 1 and 2 together - the poorest section of the peasan­
try. On the other hand, there were 2.21 persons per bedroom in group 
8 and 2.09 in group 9- Again, the village-2, the first two groups 
together housed per person per bedroom on an average and the 
corresponding figures for groups 8 and 9 were 3-20 and 2 .0 9 respectively
The quality of the houses also varied significantly. In 
village-1, none of the households of group-1, 1.^ 296 of group 2 and 
16.21% of group 3 had. atleast 1 unit of their houses tin-roofed. By 
contrast, 10Q% in groups 8 and 9 bad atleast one tin-roofed unit. In 
village-2, we got a similar picture. 100% in group 9 and 90% in group 8 
had atleast one unit of their house tin roofed. But none in group 1, 
1.21% in group 2 and 1.32% in group 3 had atleast one unit. The rest 
of them had ordinary houses built with straw, bamboo and mud.
Thus we observed a clear differentiation in conditions between 
the top and bottom groups, both in terms of numbers and the nature of 
the huts.
B. OWNERSHIP PATTERNS OF OTHER ASSETS :
Not only did the housing structure differ, but so, too, did 
the ownership pattern of other assets. Of these assets, we specifically 
enquired about radios. The radio not only helped the rich peasants with 
greater knowledge and information about new technology but was also 
seen as a status symbol. Besides radios, we collected information on
Tin-roofed houses are costly and symbols of higher status 
in rural Bangladesh.
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bicycles, torches, motorcycles and trees, to see the tangible indices 
of differences between the rich and the poor peasantry.
Table 7*18 shows us the differential figures on the average 
number of these items owned by each group in these villages.
As evidenced from table 7-18 the top group held far more of 
the assets like radios, cycles, torches and trees than the bottom 
groups. The rich groups held the major share. This was true for both 
the villages.
Differences were also observed in the extent and the nature of 
expenditure which these groups of the peasantry made.
C. DIFFERENCES IN EXPENDITURE :
That the standard of living varied from group to group (of 
the peasantry) and village to village was reflected in the differences 
in the extent arid the composition of expenditures incurred by these 
groups of the peasantry. Table 7*19 illustrates how the expenditures of 
different groups varied.
As indicated in table 719 ,in village-1 the bottom two groups, 
although constituing almost half of the total households, (**1#) shared 
only 17.^# of the total expenditure. The top two groups, comprising 
only 7 -50# of total households, had almost $ of the total budget 
(30.86#). In per household terms, the expenditure of the top most group 
was nearly 9 times higher than the bottom group. What is more striking 
is that the per household expenditure of group 2 (the poorest of the 
peasantry) was found to be less than that of group 1 (composed of mostly 
wage-earning landless households).
Similarly, in village-2, the bottom two groups constituting 
M . 32# of the total households held 23.63# of the total expenditure in 
1981. At the other extreme, the top two groups, constituting only 6.61# 
of the total households, shared 21.^5$ of the total expenditure.
In terms of per household expenditure, the figure of the top 
group was at least three and a half times higher than that of the botttom 
group. The absolute figures of different groups were, however, lower in 
village-2 than the corresponding figures in village-Jl^  indicating a 
lower development of productive forces in village-2 and hence a lower
DI
FF
ER
EN
CE
S 
IN 
EX
PE
ND
IT
UR
E:
 
19
81
2 6 4
LA
ND
OW
NI
NG
 
GR
OU
PS
 
(A
CR
ES
)
Ifl
H  O 
H  H<  o 10
0.
00
 
' 
IC
O.
0
0
12
63
0.
61
99
.9
9 
LO
O.
CO
50
02
.2
8
1
0
.
0
1
+
(9
) 3.
0
0
 
14
.6
6
6
1
6
7
2
.
5C
4.
96
1
8
.1
7
1
2
6
5
2
.
6
6
7
.
5
1
-
1
0
.
0
0
(8
)
4.
50
1
6
,2
0
45
48
1.
44
1.
65
3
.2
8
9
6
2
4
.
C
O
5
.
0
1
-
7
.
5
0
(7
)
3
.
5
0
8
.7
0
3
1
4
0
9
.
1
4
5.
7
8
7
.1
8
6
4
1
1
.
7
1
3
.
5
1
-
5
.
0
0
(6
)
7
.
0
0
1
3
.
8
0
2
4
8
9
4
.
6
4
7.
44
9.
42
1
6
53
8
.
2
2
2
.
5
1
-
3
.
5
0
(5
)
6
.
0
0
10
.6
8
2
2
4
9
5
.
1
2
11
.
57
11
.4
2
5
0
9
5
.
0
0
o
m
n! ^  
in
rH
1
6.
50
13
.2
8
10
16
9.
6
6
14
.
87
 
13
.2
1 
•
4
58
4
.
6
1
.
5
1
-
1
.
5
0
(3
)
1
8
.
5
0
5.
24
3
57
3
.
8
0
12
.
40
 
10
.7
5
4
49
5
.
2
0
r ??
o 3
5.
00
1
4
,
1
0
50
89
.3
9
i
17
.3
5
1
2
.8
8
t
38
31
.2
8
o  5
6
.
0
0
3.
34
7
0
2
8
.
1
2
2
3
.
9
7
1
0
.
7
5
3
6
0
8
.
5
8
1
I
T
E
M
S
rH
I
1
5 1.
 
% 
of
 
to
ta
l 
H
H
2.
 
% 
sh
ar
e 
in 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
3.
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
/
K
H
 
(t
ak
a)
VI
LL
AG
E 
- 
2
1.
 
% 
of
 
to
ta
l 
H
H
2.
 
% 
sh
ar
e 
in 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
3.
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
ex
pe
nd
i 
t
u
r
e
/
H
H
 
(t
ak
a)
265
standard of living., Moreover, the expenditures of the landless 
groups was also .lower../than the other groups - as a result of the 
acute unemployment situation and the' lower agricultural wage in 
this village.
D. Composition of Expenditures :
Not only did ’the shares of different groups in total expendi- % 
ture differ but also the composition of the expenditure varied markedly 
amongst groups. We divided per household expenditure for each group 
into eight sub-sections : e.g. on food, gifts, festivals, remaining 
personal consumption (including clothing, medicine, education, housing 
etc), taxes and dues, uniform (mainly for buying and maintaining imple- 
menents, draught animals and agricultural implements.& inputs), litigation 
and 'others'.
Tables 7-20A and 7-20B present the per centage distribution of 
expenditure under the above heads.
A number of points emerge from tables 7-20A and
7.20B :
i) Considerable differences in the percentage expenditure 
on food were observed among different groups of the 
peasantry in both villages. The percentage figures for 
group 9 was nearly double that of group 1. A big pecentage 
of expenditure on food is generally taken to be evidence 
- of a low standard of living as there is little left for 
other comsumptions. In that sense, the poorest group of 
households . in village-2 had a lower standard of living 
than the corresponding group in village-1. The richer 
groups, by contrast, had smaller percentages of their 
expenditure earmarked for food (top group in village-1 
(spent 27.5*$ and that in village-2 spent 32.57% of their 
total budget for this purpose),
ii) The percentage of expenditure on farm increased gradually 
with the increase in the size of land ownership in boch 
villages,
iii) Expenditure on non-productive heads like gifts, festivals, 
litigation, increased proportionately from smaller to the 
larger groups in each village.
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iv) the percentage of expenditure on remaining personal 
consumption increased from the smaller to the larger 
land ownershipgroups indicating a relatively higher 
standard of living for the land-rich groups of the 
households.
E. THE PATTERN OF FOOD INTAKE :
The richer groups, though they spent less (in percentage 
terms but not in absolute, amount) than the poorer groups on food, 
were much better off when we considered the extent and quality of 
food intake.
Tabbies 7.21A. and 7-21B show the differences.
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We see from tables 8.21A and 8.21B that the differences in 
v food consumption varied markedly in both the villages. We can summarize 
the findings as follows ;
i) Most households in the poorer groups could not afford 
to t&ke three meals a day. Only 16.66% of group-1 and 
10.00% of group«2 in village- 1 had three meals a day in th 
the year 1980-81. The corresponding figures for the other 
village were 2^. 6^% and 30.50%.
ii) 100% of the households in groups 8 and 9 in b°th the 
villages could afford three full meals per day.
iii) ?5% of households in group 1 and 87.1 %^ of group 2 in 
village-1 reported that they missed atleast one meal 
regularly during the year preceding our period of inves­
tigation. The corresponding figures for village-2 were 
37.93 and 38.09%.
iv) A sizeable section of households in the land-rich groups 
of both villages reported that they were half-fed during 
the year preceding the date of interview,
v) The types of food taken often indicates the nutritional 
content of the food. Thus, milk, meat, chicken are usually 
considered as the most nutritional food in Bangladesh 
villages. Our field investigations showed that only a small 
proportion of the households from the bottom groups could 
afford to take these foods. On the other end, most rich 
peasants consumed them almost regularly, 
vi) Eating baked course flour (Vooti') is still looked down as 
poor man's activity, irrespective of its calorie value.
More than half of the poorer households (Groups 1-3) 
took 'rooti' instead of rice (the staple food in Bangladesh). 
None of the rich peasantry took rooti as such.
Thus the level and the quality of food consumption 
clearly differed from group to group in both villages.
These differences had far-reaching consequences for the 
general health and the standard of living of the house­
holds in different land onwership groups. From our
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participant observation for about a year in these villages, 
we could clearly identify the well-fed richer peasantry and 
the undernourished poorer peasantry. The richer ones were 
generally fair looking, had softer and oily skin and rounded 
limbs - a reflection of more assured and contended living.
The poorer peasantry on the contrary were bent looking, 
short, skeletal and sunburned - a reflection of their hard and 
insecure economic position. Most of them had diseases like 
night blindness, tuberculosis, gastric ulcers, diarroea - 
the diseases mostly associated with malnutrition . These 
differential implications for the development of productive 
forces in these villages.
CONCLUSION i
Thus," from the above findings on the material elements of
production, the following clear inferences may be drawn :
i) There is a strong correlation between land ownership and ownership 
of all other elements of production,
ii) Ownership of these material elements of production are
concentrated in the hands of a few.
iii) More and more households are becoming impoverished,
iv) The differences between the poorer groups and the middle 
groups have been narrowing over time and the indices of 
economic strength in the top groups show an increase,
v) The standard of living varied markedly between poor and rich 
groups.
vi) That is, a distinct process of differentiation of the rural 
households into propertied and propertyless, into better 
off and worse off, had set in in our study villages.
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CHAPTER V IX I
WHY DIPEERENTIATION: THE SOCIAL RELATIONS
OF PRODUCTION A3H) EXCHANGE
While examining the quantitative and qualitative aspects 
of the material elements of production possessed "by different 
groups of the peasantry in both of our study villages, we noticed 
enormous differences between them (see Chapter VI and VII).
In fact, we noticed that a clear process of differentiation of the 
rural households into owners and non-owners had already set in.
But measuring these differences alone, though quite significant 
in itself, does not lead us far enough, and needs to be combined 
with an attempt at explanation of the observed phenomena. In 
other words, we must be concerned with the processes which cause, 
intensify, and often retard these differences.
In an attempt to explain these processes, we have taken 
the social relations of production and exchange (i.e. the specific 
relations people enter into with one another in the course of 
production, distribution and exchange) as the crucial explanatory 
variables. As part of that attempt we have already delineated the 
pattern of distribution of the means of production and other related 
assets in the previous two chapters. In addition to these, we need 
to look into two other related aspects - (a) appropriation of surplus
*j
value and (b) utilization of surplus value . In more concrete terms, 
it is this surplus value which is generated when people enter into 
economic and social relations, and causes social stratification into 
various classes, with distinct and usually contradictory interests.
Surplus has been taken here as the difference between current 
output and necessary product (Marx, 1967» Vol. I, 171)• The 
necessary product is equivalent to the amount required for 
reproduction of labour power, keeping in mind the existing 
social norms.
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In this chapter, we will consider, primarily, the social 
relations of production and exchange governing the principal 
object of production - the land-in the context of our study 
villages. This is to reveal the nature of surplus appropriation 
and utilisation. More precisely, we will examine the following 
aspects:
(i) The occupational pattern of rural households.
(ii) Changes in the tenancy situation over time: focussing 
primarily on the share cropping system of cultivation,
(iii) The mortgaging system and money-lending.
(iv) The process of commoditization, including the purchase 
and sale of land and other products. The nature of the sale of 
labour power (an important commodity) will be discussed in Chapter
IX.
(v) The pattern of utilisation of surplus: productive versus 
non-productive use of it.
While discussing the above issues, we will always try to
concentrate on the relations between different groups of the
peasantry. In particular, relations between the poorer and the
richer groups will be analysed to discover what has been happening
2
to their indices of economic strength .
1. Occupational Pattern:
In 1980-81, most of the households we studied lived on 
agriculture either as cultivators or as agricultural wage labourers.
More precisely we will see if the changes in the indices of economic 
strength have been positive (manifested through enlargement of 
holdings,repossession of operational land from tenants, increase in 
the ownership of assets etc.) or negative (reflected through squeezing 
of holdings, dispossession of assets, leasing out of land, selling , 
of labour etc.).
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Thus in village 1, 57% of the households reported that their 
principal occupation was agriculture and 55% of the households 
had agricultural wage earning as the principal occupation.
Combining these two, we find that 9^% of the total households were 
primarily involved in agricultural activities, either as fanners or 
as wage labourers. In village 2, similarly, 5^ % of the households 
had cultivation as the principal occupation and 21% of the households 
had agricultural wage earning as the principal occupation. This 
means that 78% of the households were primarily involved in the 
agricultural sector. And if we add to this, the secondary occupations 
of some of the other households, the involvement of households 
in agriculture in percentage terms would go up by more than 98%.
Within this dominance of agriculture, households with larger 
landholdings controlled more than half of the total land in both
3
villages and appropriated the lion's share of the surplus generated 
in agriculture. Further, the richer households held the commanding 
positions and thereby controlled most of the surplus created in 
the trading and other non-agricultural activities^.
3
 ^ By larger landholdings we generally refer here to those holdings 
which are more than 7*5 acres. As we have seen in Chapter VI 
(tables 6*2A & 6-2B), 11% of total households in village 1 and 
12.59% in village 2 owned more than 7*5 acres of land and held 
50.49% and- 58*50% of owned land respectively in 1981 .
 ^ Vylder also noted similar trends of surplus appropriation.
He noted a greater fusion of rural and urban interests:
Thus what is significant is not so much the expected 
fact that the class origins of the political elite in 
Bangladesh are mainly in the rural and urban elites, 
but the economic and political fusion of rural and 
urban interests. More and more sons of big farmers 
tend to engage in business and in urban professional
and political activities in general..............
(Vylder, 1982: 27).
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2 . Tenancy Relations:
It is very difficult to get accurate information about 
tenancy. The landlords tend to underreport the amount of land 
rented out to others declaring some of the rented land as land 
under their own cultivation while tenants sometimes claim 
rented-in land as their own. The reasons for such underreporting 
may derive from the fear that the rich have of tenancy rights.
Rich peasants are apprehensive that the government may confer on 
tenants the permanent right of cultivation of their rented-out 
land. Tenants, for their part, do not want to arouse suspicion 
in the minds of the landlords and do not like to reveal the truth.
As such, there are some discrepancies between the findings of 
government sponsored studies and independent village studies 
organised by 'autonomous® research organisations. We were aware 
of these problems and tried to minimise the under/over 
estimation as much as possible through various cross-checking 
methods. We think the information on tenancy which we collected 
for this period may be more reliable than that of the past, since 
respondents had to depend on memory in order to reconstruct the 
past.
2(a) Types of Tenancy:
Our field investigation reveals four types of tenancy 
arrangement which have been commonly in practice for the last 
three or four decades in our study villages: (i) share-cropping - 
under which actual produce and, in some cases, certain inputs 
are shared by the landlord and tenaht at fixed proportions;
(ii) fixed-rent tenancy - under which the tenant pays the land 
owner a fixed amount of rent in cash or in kind at the beginning 
of the season or after harvest irrespective of the output he produces
on the land; (iii) khai-khalashi - which is more of a mortgage than
a tenancy. Under this arrangement the tenant pays rent to the 
landlower in advance and enjoys rights of cultivation on the land 
for a specified number of years after which the land has to be 
returned to the owner; (iv) dai-sudi - under which the tenant 
gives a loan to the landowner against a mortgage of land which 
he can cultivate until the loan is repaid. The net income from
the land is thus the interest on the loan. In many cases, the
landowner does not hand over the land to the creditors but instead
works as a share-cropper on his own land. In this credit
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arrangement, the mortgagee -value does not reduce and the mortgage 
can regain possession only by repaying the entire amount, 
sometimes with interest.
Fixed-rent tenancy has been declared illegal by the 1950 
Tenancy Act but is still found in many areas of Bangladesh. It 
has been a common practice of absentee landlords in the past 
but these days, with the growth of commercialization and 
modernisation in agriculture many richer peasants are trying to 
lease in some land from others, particularly from the poorer 
peasantry under a fixed rent system. However, as we shall see, 
share-cropping is still the single most important tenancy 
arrangement in the country, though the proportion of fixed-renting 
is on the increase.
2(b) Extent of Tenancy:
The proportion of agricultural land under tenancy (all 
four types mentioned above) has been declining over the last two 
decades with the advent of the !green revolution1. Before the 
1950s, tenancy relations, especially the share-cropping system, 
were the predominant production relations in rural Bangladesh. 
Mukherjee*s study of Six Villages of Bengal in the early 1940s 
(including one of our study villages) reveals that a major 
proportion of the cultivators were share-croppers. According 
to Mukherjee:
In 1942 it was found that in the interior village, 92 
out of 146 cultivators (or 63 per cent of the total) 
were share-croppers, and 120 acres out of the total 
cultivated holdings of 640 acres (or 18.8 per cent) 
were share-cropped. At Silimpur, in the same year 
41 out of 63 cultivators (or 65.1 per cent) were 
share-croppers, and 75 acres out of 250 acres of 
cultivated holdings (or JO.O per cent) were share- 
cropped. Thus taking the six villages together it 
is seen that 63.6 per cent of the total number of 
cultivators were share-croppers and 21.9 per cent of 
the total cultivated area was share-cropped 
(Mukherjee, 195?ai 86).
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But immediately after the partition of India in 1947> there 
was great confusion in the land system on both sides of the border. 
Many landlords emigrated from out? study areas, and those who 
decided to stay behind ejected their former tenants, at least 
temporarily, to evade clauses of the 1950 Tenancy Act. Hence we 
find a smaller proportion of land under tenancy in the early 1950s. 
As things stabilized, rich landowners went back to the tenancy 
arrangements. But again, as more modern inputs (mostly subsidised) 
began to flow into the rural areas from the mid-sixties onwards, 
richer landowners began taking back rented out land from their 
tenants. These, at least, were the trends which we observed in 
our study villages. Table 8.1 shows us the proportions of 
agricultural and operated land rented in at different periods.
TABLE 8.1
EXTENT OF TENANCY (RENTED IN) : 1951-1981
Items 1951 1972 1981
1. Total land rented in as 96 age of 
Total owned cultivable land:
i) Village - 1 14.80 15.22 13.00
ii) Village - 2 5-84 17.20 12.78
2. Total land rented in as % age of 
Total operated land:
i) Village - 1 14.04 14.55 12.40
ii) Village - 2 5.23 15.46 12.13
Thus, from Table 8.1 we find that the proportion of land rented 
in (expressed as a percentage of total owned cultivable land and 
total operated land) declined after 1972 in both the villages and the 
rate of this decline has been highest in village 1.
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These proportions have "been calculated on the "basis of 
the amount of land rented in. This does not, however, give the 
whole picture. We need to look at the other side of the coin 
as well - that is, what happened to the proportion of land rented 
out. This will give us the rentiers' point of view. Table 8.2 
shows us this view of tenancy.
TABLE 8.2
EXTENT OF TENANCY (RENTED OUT) i, 1951-1981
Items 1951 1972 1981
1. Total land rented out as % age of
Total owned cultivable land:
i) Village - 1 19*76 9 .60 8.03
ii) Village - 2 15.29 10.81 5.95
2. Total land rented out as 96 age of
Total operated land:
i) Village - 1 21 .69 9.18 7.66
ii) Village - 2 17.21 11 .16 5.67
Thus from the rentiers' point of view, we find that the 
total land rented out, as a percentage, of the total owned 
cultivable land and operated land, has been on the decline 
consistently over time, indicating the resumption of operated land 
by the former landlords of the total rented in land, the major 
part was reported to be under a share cropping arrangement.
2 8 0
TABLE 8 .5
DISTRIBUTION OF RENTED IN LAND: 1951-1981
Items 1951 1972 1981
1. Percentage of total rented in land
51.24 83.10 81 .65
under share crowing system: 
i) Village - 1
ii) Village - 2 69.72 67.45 72.73
2. Percentage of total rented in land
0 9.92 17.86
under fixed rent system: 
i) Village — 1
ii) Village » 2 2.10 4.90 7-38
3. Percentage of total rented in land
48.76 6.97 .48
under other tenancy systems: 
i) Village ~ 1
ii) Village - 2 28.18 27.66 19.89
Table 8.3 shows that of the total rented in land cultivated 
by the residents of village 1 in 1981, 81.63% was cultivated under 
share-cropping arrangements. The corresponding figure in village 2
R
was 72.73% • These figures are slightly less than 1972 figures for
5 The Land Occupancy Survey. 1977 found 92% of the rented in land 
in the whole country under share cropping arrangements. This seems 
somewhat inflated compared to our findings anc* those of other micro studies 
A 1980 study of three villages (see CSS Report, 1980), in the 
southern district of Bangladesh noted the figure as 83*7% and in 
yet another study of Comilla village, the figure was 76. (Hossain,
1981: 31).
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village - 1. In village - 2, the 1981 figure is more than that 
in 1972. Figures of 1951 for both the villages were less than 
those of 1981, This is because more land was under mortgage in the 
past since usurious capital played a more significant role at 
that time. The predominance of this type of tenancy arrangement 
has dropped significantly in village 1 over the last 30 years, 
particularly during the last decade, but it still persists in 
village 2.
However, the proportion of land under the fixed rent system 
increased in both villages, the extent of increase being higher 
in village 1. In village 1, land under fixed rent accounted 
for 9 -92% in 1972 and the figure had almost doubled by 1981 
(17-86%). Compared to village 1, the proportions under fixed 
rent tenancy for both 1972 and 1981 were significantly less in 
village 2. The higher proportions of land under fixed-rent tenancy 
in village 1 are directly related to the fact that a number of 
irrigation pumps have been sunk in this village. With a higher 
extent of modern irrigation and commercialisation, the proportion of 
sharecroppers fall^on the one hand and on the other a number of poor 
peasants with less than acre of land and few agricultural implements, 
consider it better to rent out the land to the middle and rich 
peasantry and Resort to hiring themselves out as wage labourers. 
Moreover, many of land owners prefer to go for a short term cash 
tenancy arrangement rather than share-cropping as there is a threat 
that the government might give occupancy rights to sharecroppers.
The area under tenancy, as indicated in previous paragraphs, does 
not always correspond to the proportion of households dependent on 
tenancy. An analysis of categories of farm makes this clearer.
Table 8 .4 shows four categories of farmers engaged in farming.
Groups 1 and 2 together form the owner categories and groups 3 and 4 
constitute the tenant categories.
6 . „ 
See also Jansen, 1979* 76—77
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TABLE 8.4 
CATEGORIES OF FARMS : 1951-1981
FARM CATEGORIES
PERCENTAGES OE FARMS
1951 1972 1981
VILLAGE - 1 
1. Rentier-Owner 28.45 24.15 24.69
2. Pure Owner 24.4O 33.92 35.44
3. Tenant Owner 47-15 40.00 33-54
4. Pure Tenants 0 1.93 6.33
VILLAGE - 2 
1. Rentier-Owner 32.84 21.45 10.31
2. Pure Owner 34.00 31 .42 57.73
3. Tenant Owner 30.04 45.71 24.74
4 . Pure Tenants 2.12 1 .42 7.22
Bote: (1) A, rentier-owner may rent out all or part of his land
to others.
(2) A pure owner does not rent in/or out any land from 
others.
(5) A tenant owner owns some land and rents in some more 
land to make his farm economically viable.
(4) A pure tenant does not own any land and all of his 
operated land is rented in from others.
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As can be seen in table 8 .4* the proportion of owner
categories has been on the increase over time and that of the
tenant categories (taken together) has been on the decline.
But, the proportion of pure tenants has been on the increase, and
especially during the last decade or so, the increase has been
very significant. Thus in both the villages, the proportion of
the total number of farms which were pure tenants has almost
trebled since 1972. Compared to other categories, however, the
proportion of pure tenants was still very small. Simultaneously, the
proportion of owner-cum-tenants has been declining. An increase
in the proportion of pure tenants combined with a consistent
decline in the proportion of owner-tenants and an increase in the
number of pure owners, indicates that land has been alienated from
7
the land-poor groups to land-rich groups of the peasantry.
Since land is not normally rented out to non-cultivating 
households, the increase in the proportion of pure tenants can 
only imply that some of the small owners and owner-cum-tenants 
sold off their land to become pure tenants and agricultural 
labourers. It may also be true that some of them have leased in 
part or in full the land they had sold off. The decline in the 
proportion of owner-cum-tenants may also be due to the fact that 
land-rich groups have reclaimed some of their rented-out land.
This has then been cultivated under their own supervision
with the help of the wage labourers. The increase in the volume of 
operated land belonging to the top 10  ^of households (see table 
in chapter Vi) during the last decade only confirms the above 
hypothesis.
One more fact needs to be recognised. Ve have observed in 
village 1 that as many as 29 near landless households (owning less 
than 1 .50 acres of land) rented out their small piece of land to 
the richer households and hired themselves out as wage labourers, 
This means that in recent times, following the inflow of. modern 
inputs into the villages, medium and larger farmers have begun to 
rent in a large proportion of land. Their aim in so doing has been 
to realize commercial profit.
Many macro studies also support these trends (see Chapter IV 
for detail).
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TABLE 8.5 
RENTING BI/OUT OF LAND : 1972-1981
. . .  , 
Landownership Groups
% of hh (Group 
-wise) renting in 
some land
% of hh (gcoupwise) 
renting out some 
land
1972 1981 1972 1981
VILLAGE - 1
1. Less than 2.50 acres 16.38 16.44 6.03 10.52
2. 2.51 - 5*00 acres 25*00 38.46 19.23 15.38
3. 5-01-7*50 acres 0 0 42.85 14*28
4 . 7-51 a*id above 7*14 13.33 60.00 36.66
VILLAGE - 2
1. Less than 2.50 acres 13*81 51 .21 9-09 10.34
2. 2.51 - 5*00 acres 33*33 39-13 28.57 23.80
3. 5-01-7*50 acres 0 0 57-14 14-28
4- 7-51 and above 0 12.50 100.00 62.50
,
Table 8.5 reveals that although a sizeable proportion of the 
poorer households continue to rent in land from others, the richer 
households are increasingly doing the same. Thus 13*33% 
households of the top two groups (owning more than 7*50 acres) in 
village 1, 12.50% in village 2 rented in some land in 1981* These 
proportions are much higher than those of 1972. Similarly, the 
proportions of households renting out land in the poorer groups 
(owning less than 2 .50 acres) increased in both the villages over 
the period 1972-81. The proportion of households renting out some 
land in the top two groups declined in villages 1 and 2.
It is not only the poorer households which have been facing 
stiffer competition in the land rental market from the richer 
households. For tenants in general,the terms of the share cropping 
system have also been deteriorating. Since share croppers constitute
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the major portion of tenants, the following sections concentrates
on the background of the share croppers, and the terms of share cropping.
3* Ihe Share-Croppers : Family History and Tenency Relations
After identifying the share cropper households (pure 
tenants and tenant-owner), we investigated their family history.
In village 1, we collected information on 53 share croppers. 19 
of them (39%) reported that they had become share croppers only 
within the last year. Of these 19» 14 came from the lowest three 
land groups. 7 of these 14 said that they were share cropping land 
which had belonged to them the previous year but had been sold to 
richer households due to economic pressure. Two of the households 
with more than five acres of land had become share croppers over 
the last year purely because of their profit motive. Six of the 
share-croppers reported that they had been share-cropping for more 
than ten years and none of them belonged to richer groups.
This means the richer groups have joined the rental market 
only recently. 53-96% of the share-croppers in village 1 reported 
that their fathers had been share-croppers and only 9*43% of them 
said that their grandfathers had been share-croppers. All of these 
three generation share croppers were from the poorer groups. 6 9.81% 
of them reported that they rented in land from the richer households, 
22.64% from the middle groups and only 7*59% from the poorer groups.
Only the richer and middle households rented in land from the 
poorer groups.
In village 2, we interviewed 25 share-croppers and found that 
most of the share-croppers had quite a long history of sharecropping. 
Only 12% reported that they became share-croppers during the year 
before the time of interview and, as expected, all of them belonged 
to the bottom three groups. 28% had been involved in share- 
cropping for more than ten years and 56% of them had been share­
croppers for at least five years. The fathers of 52% and the 
grandfathers of 8% of the share-croppers had also been share-croppers.
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There was only one share-cropper whose landownership 
exceeded five acres. This suggests that share-cropping has not 
yet "become a commercial venture in this village as it has hardly 
experienced any developmental efforts in terms of modernisation 
of agriculture. 64% of the share croppers reported that they 
rented in land from the richer groups and only 12.34% of them reported 
having got land from the poor peasants.
Thus in "both villages we found that land-poor households 
were generally share-croppers and mostly cultivated land rented 
in form the richer households. Very recently some medium and 
larger farmes have "been entering the land rental market. A few 
of the poorer households have been renting out their small piece 
of land and moving into the labour market. However, the class 
background of the share-croppers varied between villages depending 
on the level of development of the productive forces.
4* Terms of Share-Cropping;
We found no written contract for share-cropping in any of 
our study villages. We also observed that terms of share- 
cropping are becoming harsher day by day as more and more households, 
including some of the richer ones are turning to this form of 
tenancy. In particular, the return from HJV cultivation being 
higher than the ordinary kind, more rentier households are being 
induced to recover their erstwhile rented-out land. In recent 
times therefore, many tenants have been evicted. In other words, 
competition for share-cropping has become more severe over the 
last few years. As a result, the terms of share-cropping have 
also deteriorated over time. Even in the early seventies, almost 
all landowners would at least share the inputs half and half with 
share-croppers and in the fifties and early sixties most landowners 
supplied at least all of the seeds to the tenants. Even at present, 
some landowners continue to supply the seeds in full but the 
proportion is very small. Nevertheless, they dictate the pattern 
of cultivation (which variety to produce, when to harvest etc) 
to share-croppers.
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In village 1, only 9*43% of the share croppers reported 
that the landowners paid in full the cost of seed, fertilizer, 
water and insecticides and shared the product and by-products equally. 
The corresponding figure for village 2 was 14-81%. 30* 19% of the
share-croppers in village 1 and 44*44% in village 2 reported that 
they shared the inputs and outputs half and half with the landowners. 
60.38% of the share croppers in village 1 and 4 0*74% in village 2 
claimed that they had to bear the full cost of the inputs but the 
produce and the by-products were equally divided between land­
owner and share-cropper. In at least 3 cases in village 2, share­
croppers reported that they received 40% of the share instead of 
half. This is because of the overcrowding of the share-croppers.
The majority of share-croppers with smaller areas of land were 
forced to accept worse terms than their counterparts with greater 
areas. Thus, of the share croppers who had to bear the full cost 
of cultivation, more than 70% belonged to those poorer groups who 
owned less than 2.50 acres. Land-rich share-croppers got better 
terms such as full/half payment of the cost of inputs.
Besides sharing the cost of inputs, there were many other 
conditions which appeared to be disadvantageous for the share­
croppers who’ were small landowners. Almost all share-croppers 
still shared the actual produce except in one or two cases where 
they had to pay the value of the share in cash to the landowners.
In village 1, only 47 • 13% of the share-croppers thought that 
the land they rented in was fertile. Only 50% of share-croppers 
from the bottom three groups (owning less than 2.5 acres or no 
land) said that they rented in fertile land, while all of the 
share-croppers from richer groups (owning 5*00 acres of land or 
more) said that they rented in fertile land. About 21% of share 
croppers from the poorer groups complained that their rented-in 
land was less productive and needed more labour for cultivation.
But the richer share-croppers made no such complaint.
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In village 2, 70.83% of all share-croppers thought that 
they were operating fertile land. However, only about 50% of 
those who came from the poorer groups thought they rented in 
fertile land and 27% of them thought they were given less 
productive land by the landowners. This land needed more labour 
than usual for cultivation. This was further confirmed when 79% 
of the share-croppers in village 1 and 60% in village 2 reported 
that they were chosen as share croppers because they were 
physically stronger and could put in more labour in the land than 
others. Only 13% of the share-croppers in village 1 and 27% in 
village 2 thought that they were chosen as share-croppers because 
they happened to be near relatives of the landowners. 11 .7% in
village 1 and 12.9% in village 2 thought that they were chosen as 
share-croppers because they never defied the instructions of the 
landowners. These instructions were related to techniques of 
production, the terms of share and also factional and political 
support.
Even a decade ago, in most cases the produce was divided 
in the field and the share croppers did not have to carry the 
landonwer's share to his house. But at present the share­
cropper has ’to transport the landowner's share from the field to 
the latter's house. In village 1 only one share-cropper reported 
that the produce was divided in the field and he did not transport 
the landonwer's share to his house. Similarly, only 2 share­
croppers in village 2 reported that the produce was divided in the 
field and they did not transport the landonwer's shares to their 
house.
In addition to these terms, the desperate share-croppers 
from the poorer landowning groups had to offer some cash advance 
or labour advance (non-refundable) to some landowners to book 
the rented-in land. As and when required, the share-croppers from 
the land-poor groups and their family members including women were 
expected to give free services to the landowners and be loyal to
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them in their local and factional politics. Many share-croppers 
hesitated to answer queries on free services and loyalty fearing 
an eviction by the landowners if they found out. When reassured, 
at least 52.66% of share-croppers in village 1 and 56*57% in 
village 2, admitted that they had to follow the landowners at 
the time of local elections and that they had to support them in 
any dispute arising out of their corrupt activities. At least 
25.50% of share-croppers in village 1 and 35*60% in village 2 
reported that they or any of their family members, including wives, 
had to render some sort of free services to please the rentier 
landowners. These extra-economic compulsions were noticed to be 
greater in the cases of unequals - (i.e. share-croppers from 
poorer landowning groups and the landowner from richer landowning 
groups). But when the share cropping was among equals/near 
equals, this did not apply.
Almost all the share-croppers interviewed thought that the 
terms of share-cropping had either deteriorated or had not changed 
over the previous thirty years. None of them thought that these 
had improved from their standpoint.
Although terms and conditions have deteriorated over the 
last three decades, share-cropping still persists. This is 
because of the acute pressure on land. Since employment 
opportunities outside agriculture are still very limited, poorer 
households with abundant labour supplies try hard to find 
agricultural land for share-cropping. There are also social 
pressures to remain in cultivation rather than become wage labourers 
in rural Bangladesh. The situation is, however, changing fast where 
modern inputs have made some inroads. Where this is so, more and 
more people are resorting to cultivation under their own supervision
Q
rather than renting out land.
o
Jansen noted in the context of rural Bangladesh:
It is regarded as more beneficial to organise production 
on irrigated land with wage labour, even if the share­
croppers would be willing to accept as little as 25% 
instead of the normal 75% of the crop (jansen,l979: 76 ) .
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In the case of local variety cultivation, landowners 
could still gain "by offering land under the share-cropping 
system. In village 2, where the irrigation system was the 
least developed, the richer households still depended to a larger 
extent on share-cropping. The share-croppers, though getting no 
positive returns from cultivation after deducting the cost of 
their labour?, still hang on to the system as they consider it 
at least better than being unemployed; while, also, they derive 
some psychological satisfaction from being krishaks (farmers).
In any case, share-cropping as a method of surplus 
extraction was quite significant in areas where the level of 
productive forces was still very low and the landowners could 
get 5&/o or more of the produce without taking any risk or 
responsibility for. cultivation. The share-croppers on the other 
hand continued to submit to this exploitation as they did not 
have alternative job opportunities. But in areas where modern 
inputs have made sufficient inroads landowners have recovered their 
operated land from the share-croppers in order to cultivate the 
profit yielding BYV crops themselves with the help of wage labourers. 
The share-croppers, in turn, have been abandoning the age-old 
profession of share-cropping and joining the ranks of wage 
labourers. But the productive forces have not been developing fast 
enough to absorb all the surplus labourers in the rural areas.
The land/man ratio is very unfavourable and many households wanted 
to cultivate some land as share-croppers. The landowners also 
offered small pieces of land to a number of share-croppers in order 
to realise other long-term objectives. Landowners engaged some 
of these households to give them support in factional politics 
and supply them with virtually free services in the lean period 
and paid services(at a lower wage rate) during the peak period.
The support of these share-croppers was then utilized to 
strenghten their political position and they were thus able to 
acquire access to the various governmental inputs supplied through 
the local power structure.
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5- Usufructuary Land Mortgage:
Usufructuary Land Mortgage, though diminished in scale, 
especially in the areas where modern inputs have poured in, 
is still an important process contributing to the alienation of 
land from the poorer landowning groups. Mortgaging of land, 
coupled with money lending, contributes substantially to the 
transferring of assets from a larger section of the peasantry to 
a small number of usurers. In recent times, the nature of usury 
has changed and in most cases rich peasants themselves have been 
advancing loans in order to acquire land from the poorer peasantry.
In most cases,land, once transferred, did not return to the 
original owners because the rate of interest and further loans 
accumulated.
In our study villages, mortgaging of land was found to be 
more prevalent in village 2 (in Northern Bengal) where the level 
of productive forces was less developed, than in village 1 
(Eastern Bengal).
Thus in 1981, only -4^ of the total rented-in land in village-1 
was found under usufructuary mortgage. But the proportion in 
village 2 was 19*89%* Only 2% of the farms in village 1 were 
involved in mortgaging relations. But as many as 17* 52% of the 
farms were so engaged in village 2.
If we analyse the landownership pattern of those households 
which mortgage out land in both of our study villages, we find 
that 9C$> of them came from the poorer landowning groups. On the 
other hand, the majority of those who mortgaged in were either 
medium of rich farmers. There were one or two exceptions from 
the lower land-owning groups (but they had trading as a 
secondary profession). The proportion of farms mortgaging in and 
out was higher in 1972 and, of course, much higher in 1951* Thus, 
in village 2, the proportion was 22.8% of all farms in 1972 and 
28.27% of all farms in 1951* In village 2, 27% of the mortgaging 
debtors reported that they had had to transfer the title of the 
land to the mortgagee at some time during the period of three 
years before the date of interview.
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A number of other studies confirm this process of land 
alienation through mortgaging of land (Wood, 1976; Majumder,
1976; Jannuzi and Peach, 19775 Jabbar, 1978;
Rahman 1979)*
Apart from mortgaging out land, farms were found to borrow 
from other sources, mostly from the richer households, giving.. 
different kinds of securities. In our survey we found at least 
60% of the mortgagor farms to be indebted to various sources 
compared to ^8% and 55^ in case of mortgagee and non-mortgaging 
farms respectively. In most cases tenants borrowed from their 
landlords.^
A sizeable proportion of these farms borrowed money 
from people who were as good as professional money lenders. We 
identified at least 8 money lenders from village 1 and 11 from 
village 2. 5 ^  of the money lenders in village 1 and 22.2^ in
village 2 took land as collateral against these loans and 
appropriated it because the mortgagors could never repay the loans.
A correlation between tenancy and credit markets has also 
been found by*a number of micro level village studies (Hossain,
1977; Rahman, 1979)* Hossain pointed out that it was a common 
practice for landlords in the Thakurgaon area of Dina,inore 
district to advance loans in kind/cash to the tenant. These 
were recovered at the time of sharing the produce, with 
an interest rate of 50 or more percent for the season. Rahman found 
that in two areas of Mymensingh and Comilla districts (both 
in the Eastern part of the country) 46% of tenants obtained loans 
from their landlords in 1974—75 * The rate of interest was about 
50% in the case of production loans and nearly 10C% in the case 
of consumption loans. Thus, over and above the tenancy share, 
landlords (in the role of money-lenders) were able to extract 
further surplus from tenants through the payment of interest on 
loans. The non-institutional credit market thus operates basically 
to supplement the tenancy market and thereby increases the 
possibilities of extraction of surplus from small peasants by 
large landowners.
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-MONEY 1ENDERS :
Money-lenders interviewed by us came from various land-owning 
groups but most of them obviously came from the land-rich groups.
6C% of the money-lenders reported that they provided loans for 
consumption purposes and one or two of them also advanced loans 
for trade and commerce.
The most common period of advancing loans in both cash and 
kind was immediately before the harvest when the price of food 
was normally very high. These loans had to be repaid immediately 
after the harvest. The rate of interest varied from village to 
village but in any case was never below 100% in any of the 
villages. The rate of interest was as high as 200% in one case 
in village 2.
Thom our field observation, we found that usufructuary mortgage 
coupled with money lending which forced people into distress sale 
did in fact play an important role in the process of increasing 
landlessness in Bangladesh. Mortgagors, already in the poorer 
landowning groups, fell down the landowning ladder after transferring 
a part of their land to the mortgagee. This reduced their economic 
strength and they had to go back to the mortgagee for further 
loans at an exhorbitant rate of interest. Mortgaging out land not 
only reduced the repayment capacity of the household concerned 
but also made it less creditworthy to other landowners. Once 
bonded with some landowner, the mortgagor was trapped in a vicious 
cycle which ended with all his land being mortgaged out. He 
could hardly repossess that land and would be obliged to sell 
off land mortgaged bit by bit as the economic pressure on him 
increased in magnitude. Conversely, the income of mortgagees 
further increased while they remained creditors to the mortgagors.
Thus, mortgagors entered into a process which forced them 
gradually to reduce their landholding and ultimately become 
landless. Based on a survey in a village in Comilla, Wood 
1976(b) also indicated the persistence of this process of land 
alienation. He pointed out that through mortgage arrangements and 
credit relations small peasants land was gradually expropriated.
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As a result of this expropriation by the large landowners, the 
smaller farmer was gradually transformed into a share cropper 
on his own legal holding, a dependent labourer, an insecure 
itinerant trader, or a migrant agricultural labourer.
6. Relations of Exchange;
Relations of exchange involving different groups of the 
peasantry also play a vital role in the appropriation of the 
surplus by the land-rich groups from the land-poor groups.
And growing market relations are, in fact, the driving force 
behind such appropriation of the surplus. In more concrete terms, 
the nature and level of commoditisation determine the extent of 
surplus appropriation in the exchange sector. Such an 
appropriation can take place, because one group of participants 
in this process of commoditisation is in a much more advantageous 
position than others.
From our field investigation, we found that villages have 
become more market-oriented than they were say, thirty years ago, 
and money has increasingly become the medium of exchange relations 
in recent times. This increase in commoditisation and monetisation 
though limited, played an inportant role in differentiating the 
peasantry in terms of their assets and production in our study 
yillages.
We will examine the extent and nature of market relations 
involving the following:
(i) Land
(ii) Food and other household necessities
(iii) Labour power.
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7. Commoditisation of Land:
Due to growing economic pressure in recent times, 
increasing population and a squeeze on the renting of land, the 
value of land has increased over recent years thereby covering 
land into a commodity. This increased commoditisation has quickly 
enriched a few and ruined many others. This has resulted in a 
sharp process of land alienation through sales of land by small 
holders to large land-owners and to speculators. The increase 
in the value of land has been sharpest in village 1 where a 
land-rich peasantry has taken advantage of the inflow of modem 
inputs, especially power pumps, and amassed greater surplus during 
the last decade than ever before. The value of land also rose in 
village 2 .
The price of land has been steadily increasing in both 
villages we studied. In village 1, the price of an acre of crop 
land has increased by about 6 times in a decade. In village 2, 
the increase was also similar . Following table gives us the 
trend in the price of land.
TABLE 8.6 
PRICE OF CROP W D  : 1970- 81
Year
Price of crop land per acre 
(in taka)
Village - 1 Village - 2
1970 5,769 2,000
1971 E.A. N.A.
1972 9,615 5,750
1975 9,616 5,750
1974 28,846 8,500
1975 52,692 9,000
1976 54,615 10,000
1977 58,461 12,000
1978 48,075 14,560
1979 55,000 14,000
1980 55,000 14,500
1981 55,000 14,257
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The price of land shot up immediately after the war of 
liberation (1971) as terms of trade began to move in favour 
of agriculture (Rahman, 1979) - The price of rice began to rise 
and reached an all time high in 1974 when the country experienced 
a traumatic famine. The price continued to rise as the inflow 
of modern inputs into the rural areas increased. The price of 
land has stabilized during the last two or three years as did the 
price of rice, but that too was at a level much higher than in 
1970 (see graph Q^r i).
Land is still an important prestige symbol and the crucial 
means of production in the villages. Hence the higher values of 
land. The rising trend in the price of land is well illustrated 
in the graph attached. As the price of land, rose it went out of 
reach of the land-poor peasantry and made the landrich groups 
enormously rich. This has accelerated the processes of land sale 
and purchase and thus , exacerbated the process of alienation of 
land from the poorer to the richer groups.
8. Sale and Purohese of land:
There was an enormous increase in the number of transactions
in land over the last decade in both of our study villages and the
frequency of these transactions reached a peak in 1974> famine
year. In all these transactions the poor and middle peasants
appeared mostly as sellers and the rich land-owners as buyers
10of land. Many other studies support this. In our study, we found
survey of 14 districts of Bangladesh organised by the 
Ministry of Agriculture shows that small holders sold 53% °f their 
owned land in 1969/70 60% their land in 1972/75 (Osmani
and Rahman, 1981s 27-28). However, the large landowners sold 
only 4 percent of their owned land in both the years (i.e.
1969/70 and 1972/73) (Khan, 1977: 159).
In another study, it was found that the top 12% of households 
bought about two-thirds of all their land transferred during the 
period 1968-78, while nearly 50% of the land came from households 
in the poorest landowning groups (owning less than one acre)
cont'd
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61 households who sold their land during the period 1972—81 
in village 1. By comparison we found only 18 households who 
sold their land between 1960-1970* Even if we include a few more 
households to balance the cases of underestimation, the figure 
was still below JO, or less than half the later figure. Similarly, 
in village;2 we found 57 households selling land during 1972-81 
while the figure for 1960-70 was only 15* We got a similar 
picture when we approached the problem from the other side (i.e. 
looking at purchase transactions amongst the villagers). We 
found a similar rise in the level of transactions during the 
seventies, especially after the famine in 1974*
We investigated the land ownership pattern of the 
households who sold their land during the period 1972-81. The 
following table gives the group figures.
footnote contfd.
(Hossain, 1981:24). In yet another survey of eight villages 
in 1974 (the famine year) it was found that sales of land 
increased significantly in that year compared to other years.
The survey also showed that the majority of land sales during 
1972-74 were from farmers owning 2 acres or less and most the 
purchasers were farmers with more than 2 acres of land (Alamgir,
1977, tables 22-29).-
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TABLE 8.7
Sellers of land by landowning groups: 1972-81
Landowning Village 1 Village 2
Groups
(acres)
No. of 
Sellers
% age of 
Sellers
No. of 
Sellers
% age of 
Sellers
1. 0 6 9.8^ 8 1^ .03
2 . 0 1 -.5 0 if 6.55 20 39-09
.91-1-90 19 31.13 9 15.79
4. 1.91-2.90 17 27.87 - -
5. 2.51-3.90 if 6.35 if 7.02
6 . 3.91-3.00 3 8.19 k 7.02
7. 5.01-7.30 - - 7 12.28
8. 7.5 1.10.00 6 9.8*f k 7.02
9- 10.01 and above - - 1 1.75
All Groups 61 99.99 37 100.00
3 0 0
Table 8.7 shows that three-quarters (75-41%) of the 
sellers of land in village 1 and 64.91% in village 2 belonged 
to the poorer landowning groups owning less than 2 .50 acres 
of land. On the other hand, the corresponding figures for those
who belonged to larger landowner groups (with more than 7*50
acres) were respectively 9-84% and 8.77% in villages 1 and 2.
Not all of these sellers sold their land to the households
belonging to our study villages. In village\ 89-14% of
sellers in the poorer groups (owning less than 2 .50 acres of land) 
reported that they sold their land to the larger landowning 
groups, owning more than 5-00 acres of land. 10096 of the sellers 
in larger landowning groups said that they sold their land to 
households who owned either equal or more land than they did.
In village 2 the trend was similar. 6(%> of the sellers from 
poorer groups said that they sold to the rich and upper-middle 
peasants, while 8O96 of the richer sellers said that they sold 
their land only to the rich peasantry.
We found that the rich bought from the poor peasantry 
but the poor were rarely in a position to buy any land from the 
rich. Ther'e was always a bias against the poorer peasantry in 
the land market. This is also confirmed by our findings on the 
landownership pattern of all the purchasers of land during the 
1970s (whether or not they bought from sellers in their own 
village) in our study villages.
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Table 8.8 shows that in village 1 only 27*2% of the 
buyers belonged to the poorer groups who owned less than 2.50  
acres of land. On the other hand, the rich and middle peasantry 
constituted the bulk of land buyers in this village. 4"1 -9% of 
the buyers belonged to upper landowning groups (owning more than 
5.00 acres of land). In village 2, 21.42% of the buyers belonged 
to the bottom four groups while 52.74% of them belonged to the 
top three groups. The middle peasantry constituted qui_te a 
substantial portion of land buyers in this village.
In any case, the overall picture was differentiated.
Buyers generally came from the land-rich groups and they normally 
bought land from the land-poor groups. Thus the process of land 
transfer was found to be biased in favour of the land-rich 
groups of the peasantry in both villages.
As a rule, poorer households clung to their small pieces 
of land with the utmost tenacity and sold them only when they had 
been pushed into a desperate economic situation.
9. Causes of Land Sale:
The majority of them reported that they sold their land to
buy food. On the other hand the richer groups sold their land
in order to invest money either in business or in politics. Rich
farmers sometimes sold a part of their land when involved in
litigation. Spending money in litigation is also a kind of
investment for the rich peasantry. In most cases, as we observed,
11rich peasants became involved in land disputes with their
11
In order to start a land dispute normally a reason is 
needed. Agricultureal land has different'degrees of security1 - 
a legacy of the way the land tenure system has been evolved in
Bangladesh. The most secure land is inherited land with a
registration document in one's own or one's father's name. The 
land should also have the proper tax clearence papers and the land 
record certificates in one's own name. Less secure land is
sister's or aunt's inherited land, land on which tax has not been
paid for long periods, char land, and land belonging to
cont'd........
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poorer relations or neighbours and by manipulating local and 
Government judicial institutions they grabbed the land of the 
poor peasantry. Substantial bribes were reported to have been 
given by rich peasants of our study villages to the local 
Tahsilders, C.O. (Bbv) and magistrates to get a favourable 
verdict in land disputes. Late Osman Chairman, Montaz Ali and 
Jamiruddin (both TJ.P. members) and Bais Uddin Mondal and TJpeswar 
Mondal in village 2 were a few amongst the rural rich who were 
frequently involved in such land disputes and finally grabbed 
the land. Bich people know that if they have no chance of 
winning a land dispute they would by bribing the officials, at least 
cause the case to linger. As the cases drag on a man who legally 
owns the land gets impoverished and finally is forced to sell 
the land to the rich farmers (often in the guise of *amicable 
settlement1).
According to our investigation, in village 1, 51% of 
the total sellers reported that they sold land to buy food and 
other consumer goods, The figure for village 2 on this account 
was 52.65%. 15% of the sellers in village 1 and 17*54% in
village 2 said that they had to sell land in order to repay debt. 
12.72% of the sellers in village 1 and 5*56% in village 2 
reported that they sold land to buy draught animals. 11% of the 
sellers in village 1, and 5»70% in village 2, reported that they 
had to sell land to meet medical expenses for their family members. 
The remainder sold land for various * unproductive® pruposes 
including weddings, social formalities connected with death 
(Sradh, Chehlum), litigation, gambling etc. Wedding of daughters 3
footnote cont’d.
Hindus who have left for India. Bich and influencial peasants 
with better connections with the officials and lawyers and with 
money always look for any of these legal loopholes and start 
legal disputes themselves or encourage others to start the same 
At the end of the day, they become the owners of such disputed 
land.
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sisters accounted for most of those 'unproductive' expenses 
because of the important role still played by dowries in 
match-making in rural Bangladesh.
Those who reported that they had to sell land to buy 
food and consumer goods mostly belonged to the poorer groups of 
the peasantry. 82.60% and 95*25% °f them belonged to poorer 
groups owning less than 2.50 acres in villages 1 and 2 respectively.
Similarly, of the sellers reporting sale of land for debt 
repayment, 50% belonged to poorer groups in village 1 and 60% 
in village 2. In both these villages, almost all of those who 
reported having sold land to buy draught animals belonged to the 
group owning between 1.51 and 2.50 acres. Most of those who 
sold land for unproductive purposes belonged to middle and upper 
groups, with a few exceptions in the case of litigation. Most 
of the poorer got involved in litigation (primarily about land 
disputes), as we have indicated earlier, following active 
encouragement from local factional leaders who were invariably 
rich landowners. In the process they sold their land to the 
richer peasantry in order to meet the leagal expenses.
Thus we have seen that the poorer peasantry, responded 
to economic pressure by selling land to the richer peasantry 
and further worsened the situation of inequality. The land 
market has therefore been aiding the richer groups because their 
higher purchasing power has enabled them to alienate the poor 
groups from the. land they once owned.
10. Sale and Purchase of Other Commodities:
Not only has the commoditization of land been Increasing 
over the last decade or so. Other products, including food, were 
found to have been marketed to a greater extent in recent times. 
More households have been drawn into market circuits over the last 
few years and they now depend on markets more than ever before.
305
A 1965-64 survey estimated that about 10 percent of the 
paddy produced was sold in the market (GEOP, 1963-64). This 
proportion has gone up since then. Particularly after 1971 > 
the proportion of paddy sold in the market increased enormously.
Pi?om our field investigation we found that 53*2% of the total 
paddy produced in village 1 was sold in the market during 1980-81.
In village 2, although the proportion was lower than that in 
village 1, at 42.58% it was nevertheless much higher than the 
figure for 1963-6 4*
The proportion of paddy sold has increased dramatically 
during the last two decades. In addition to the market participation 
of the richer peasantry, as more and more peasants became 
impoverished and indebted, they entered into the market with an 
increased proportion of their produce. The poorer households, 
as we have observed, reduced some of their consumption (for example, 
on clothing, medicine, draught animals, taxes etc.) and went to 
the market with their produce immediately after the harvest.
They also became indebted during the slack period and had to sell 
a sizeable proportion of their produce immediately after harvest 
to repay these debts. The rich peasantry on the other hand had 
the staying power to keep away from the market immediately after 
the harvest and sold the produce when the poorer groups began 
to buy back. We have presented data on the timing of this sale
by different groups in table 7-14
In the following table we can see the amount of produce
sold by different groups of the peasantry.
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TABLE 8.9
PADDY SOLD AS PERCENTAGE OP PADDY PRODUCED 
BY LANDOWNING GROUPS: 1980-81
Landowning
Amount of paddy sold as % of total paddy 
produced in:
Groups (acres)
Village 1 Village 2
1 . 0 38.20 14.09
2. .01 - .50 16.20 28.77
3* *51 - 1*50 28.30 26.15
4* 1*51 - 2.50 57*60 20.77
5* 2.51 - 3*50 30.70 34.48
6 . 3.51 - 5*00 42.10 34-74
—
j b —X 1 ■—-
3
• vj
n O 40.70 32.84
8. 7*51 - 10.00 56.50 50.96
9 . 10.01 + 50.90 51.27
ALL GROUPS 53.20 42.58
Table 8.9 clearly shows a greater commoditisation amongst 
all groups of the peasantry. It is true that a sizeable portion 
of these figures in the poorer groups of the peasantry was due 
to distress sale, but even then one can argue that market 
relations have expanded during recent times. This is especially 
true for the richer peasantry. Back in 1969/70* households owning 
more than 7*5 acres of land used to market 34*6% of their output 
(PLDE> 1969/70 ln Hossain, 1977)* This figure increased to 
36.8% in 1973/74 (BIDS, 1973/74). But as we can see, by 1980-81, 
the figure has sur-passed 50% in both of our study villages.
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Table 8.10 gives a comparative picture of the extent 
of commoditisation of paddy which is the principal produce of 
Bangladesh.
TABLE 8.10
PERCENTAGES Off FARMS SELLING DIFFERENT PROPORTIONS 0E
PADDY PRODUCE: 1973-74 - 1980-81
Items
% of all farms
1973-74 1980-81
Bangladesh Village 1 Village 2
1. Percentage of farms selling over
25% of total paddy produced 26.6 16.45 26.8
2. Percentage of farms selling over
40% of total paddy produced 6 .5 6 .9 8.5
3. Percentage of farms selling over 50%
of total paddy produced 1 .0 9.5 12.5
Source: 1973/74? kIDS, Survey on Agrarian Markets and Structure of Income. 
1980-81, Survey by Author (See Rahman et al 1982).
The above table indicates that the proportion of farms selling 
at least 50% of their paddy has gone up significantly over last few 
years. Whereas a survey in 1973/74 found only 1% of farms who sold at 
least 5($> of the paddy they produced, we found in 1980-81 as many as 9-9% 
such farms in village 1 and 12.9% in village 2.
Not only was a greater proportion of the produce of the richer 
peasantry seen to have been entering into the market; the richer groups 
were also found to be better able to manipulate the market and sold their
308
produce at a comparatively higher price. The following table 
gives the different prices for different groups of the peasantry.
TABLE 8.11 
PADDY PRICES : 1980-81
Landowning Groups 
(acres owned)
Average price per maund of paddy sold (takas)
Village 1 Village 2
1. 0 92.00 85-00
2. .01 - .50 92.50 89.40
5. -51 - 1 .50 95.00 93.71
4- 1.51 - 2.50 96.00 93.00
5. 2.51 - 3.50 100.00 95.00
6 . 3.51 - 5.00 105.00 98.00
7. 5.01 - 7.50 105.50 100.00
8. 7-51 - 10.00 105.00 101.00
9. 10.01 + • 107.50 101.75
Thus table 8.11 reveals that the poorer groups had to sell 
their paddy at a cheaper price (immediately after harvest, as indicated 
in table 7.14)* Since all of the poor households needed cash for 
various purposes, they pushed the price to a lower level by 
increasing the supplies. The richer groups sold at a time when 
most of these poor households started buying back and so raised 
the level of demand. Because of this, the price of paddy sold by 
the richer groups was found to be higher. The poorer peasantry then 
suffered both ways - as sellers and as buyers. On the other hand, 
richer groups sold at a higher price and got a higher return from the
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produce. 'The great majority of the richer households were also 
involved in speculative trade. They bought paddy when the price 
remained very low and hoarded it only to sell at a higher price
when it became scarce. Besides, most of these households also
involved themselves in regular grain trade as they could take 
advantage of their high staying power and monopoly over the limited 
storage facilities available to them. Both villages 1 and 2 were 
flanked by market places - Sonatia Bazar in the case of village 1 and 
Hatshahar in the case of village 2. Sonatia Bazar is one of the 
biggest market places in the region and has accelerated the 
processes of exchange in village 1 . In recent times, this 
market place has become particularly famous for sale of paddy and 
rice and dozens of trucks are seen carrying paddy almost every day 
during the period immediately after the harvest. Even by the 
early seventies villages had not seen a single truck in this market 
place but now big traders, in alliance with local traders /rich 
peasants are buying thousands of maunds of paddy every season. 
Hatshahar Bazar in village 2, though still not that big, has 
facilitated to a great extent the growth of exchange relations in 
and around the village. More than 50^  of the households of village 
2 reported that they sold their items to small Beparis, Farias who
would in turn sell them to big traders. While purchasing also, a
sizeable portion of the respondents reported that they bought 
their items from petty traders, who in turn were linked up with 
big traders. Thus we noticed a growing traders1 exchange circuit in 
the villages we studied.
L
Rich peasants in both villages 1 and 2 were observed to have
taken advantage of their economic strength. Dictating the terms of
toll collections in the market,”*"They enjoyed a greater share of the
surplus transferred through various exchange relationships with
the poorer producers. The rich peasants, being in the Bazar Committee
13
or having their sons in the Youth Complex, extorted a huge amound 
of surplus from the petty traders and producers.
Their representatives were dominating the Bazar Management 
Committees.
!3
Youth complex, mainly managed by youths from richer households 
was in charge of collection of tolls from sel lers and buyers t
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Though market relations have been expanding continuously, 
money did not play a very long-term role in exchange transactions. 
About 80^ of the exchanges undertaken by the villagers conformed 
to C-HCi.e. Commodities were sold to obtain money to buy, 
almost immediately, the various necessities of life. Moreover, we 
hardly noticed any itinerant trader visiting the villages for 
courtyard purchases as most people now prefer to go to the market 
place. Also we found that barter exchanges had almost died out 
and most people now look upon the market place as the ultimate 
source of their day to day necessities. Even in the late sixties 
one could come across the following types of barter exchange
in rural areas of Bangladesh in general, and the villages we studied
in particular:
(i) Exchange of meal/rice for services (e.g. agricultural 
wage labour, haircutting, carpeting, small repairing 
jobs etc.).
(ii) Exchanges in petty shopping (e.g. between rice and
betelnuts/betel leaf; between rice/paddy and utensils).
(iii) Exchange of oil and oil seeds.
But all* these exchanges have been diminishing over the last
decade and most people were found to depend on the market place 
for these commodities. The barbers, instead of going to the 
houses at a regular interval and collecting rice/paddy during the 
harvesting season, were seen to sit in the market place and cut
hair in exchange for money. People were also seen to visit the
barber1 s house and pay him in money.
Barter exchanges, though not yet wiped out, were less
prominent in village 1 . In village 2, we noticed some such
exchanges. The extent of barter exchanges depended on the level 
of development of productive forces and the expansion of market 
relations.
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That market relations have pervaded the villages of 
Bangladesh became clear when we asked the household heads how many 
of them had gone to the market place, how much they spent and on 
what items in the preceding week. More than 80% of the respondents 
replied that they had gone to the market place and bought/sold some 
items with cash. The items bought were mostly food and other 
daily necessities. Food was the most common item for the poorer 
groups. Let us see how much cash they spent on an average in 
one week. This would give a rough estimate of the extent of 
their market participation. These questions were asked during 
June/July, a comparatively hard period for the poorer groups.
Table 8.12 gives us the details.
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Items bought/sold in these transactions included rice, 
vegetables, meat, fish, milk, cooking oil, fuel, cloth etc.
As we can see from table 8.12 quite a substantial amount of
money has been spent by individual households even in the lean
periods. The money spent per household is higher in village 1
than in village 2. This, again, reflects the higher level of productive
forces in village 1 and hence the higher average purchasing power.
Whereas an average household could spend Taka 27*76 in village 1,
the corresponding figure for village 2 was Taka 19-45* We can
also see substantial differences amongst different groups as
regards the level of spending. The top landowning groups spent at
least twice the amount of the poorer groups. One aspect is worth
noting. In both villages 1 and 2, the households in group 1,
mostly landless agricultural labourers, spent on average more
than the poorer groups with some land. This again is evidence for
the fact that the average agricultural wage earner is slightly
better off than the marginal farmer who still clings to tiny
patches of land. However, the condition of agricultural labourers
also varied between the two villages. Village 2 in North Bengal,
with no irrigation facilities within its boundaries was much '
worse off than village 1 in East Bengal which had seventeen power
pumps within its boundaries and hence better employment
opportunities.
If we look at the marketing situation from the sellers’ 
point of view, we get an equally monetized picture. In village 1 
villagers managed to take a total cash income of Taka 8,208 
during one week by selling different items, mostly paddy/rice.
Rich peasantry, owning more than 7*50 acres of land, accounted 
for more than 50% of this income. Peasants from the bottom groups 
also sold quite a substantial amount, but 80^ of their cash came 
from selling labour. In village 2, the amount of cash earned 
through selling different commodities, including labour, though 
quite small compared to village 1, was around Taka 2,500.00. Once 
again, the top two richer groups accounted for about 4®% of this 
money income.
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12. Commoditisation of Labour:
In recent times both villages witnessed a phenomenal 
growth in the extent of the sale of labour power (as indicated 
in Chapter IX). Eve. expanding labour sale has become an 
important form of exchange and a mechanism of transfer of surplus. 
We will discuss this aspect in more detail in the next chapter. 
Besides these economic relations of exchange, many extra-economic 
relations, particularly those involving the state, have been 
playing an important role in transferring surplus from the 
poorer to the richer groups of the peasantry (see Chapter X ).
SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS
Differences in the material elements of production 
amongst land-poor and land-rich groups of the peasantry can be 
explained in terms of relations of production and exchange. We 
found that richer peasants had stronger command over the surplus 
generated in the rural economy. They extract this surplus by 
virtue of their advantageous position in the production relations:
(i) Most households in rural Bangladesh still live on 
agriculture either as cultivators or as agricultural wage labourers.
(ii) There has been a shift in the nature of tenancy from share 
tenancy to fixed-rent tenancy. Share tenancy, too, has been 
shrinking and turning into a commercial venture, especially, in the 
areas where modem agricultural inputs have made some inroads.
(iii) Though poor peasants still overcrowd the share/tenancy 
markets, some of them are leaving to become wage labourers and some 
rich peasants are taking in rented land. Rich peasants are also 
resuming part of their rented out land to cultivate it under their 
own supervision with the help of the wage labourers. This is 
particularly true in the relatively developed village.
(iv) The terms of share-cropping have also deteriorated over 
the last decade. Tenants coming from the poorer land groups are 
the victims of harsher terms. They are also obliged to give 
extra services to the landowners and remain loyal to them.
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(v) Small peasants* land has been gradually expropriated by 
the rich peasants through mortgage arrangements and credit relations.
(vi) Extent of commoditisation of all items, including land, 
has expanded over the last decade. Growing market forces and 
increased market participation by all groups of the peasantry have 
accentuated the processes of differentiation. The rich peasants who 
are better endowed with resources and staying power are the 
beneficiaries of these processes. Landsellers are mostly the poor 
and lower middle peasants and buyers are the rich peasants. Land 
price has gone up dramatically. This has helped rich peasantry in 
alienating land from the poor peasants. Poor peasants, always 
in debt and with a greater need of cash for buying food and other 
necessities, sell land whenever in crisis and thus end up as landless.
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CHAPTER IX
RURAL PROLETARIANISATION
Differentiation of the peasantry and rural proletarianisation 
go hand in hand (Lenin, 1977aJl80). Generally, growth in hired 
labourers, deprived of the means of production and reduced to 
dependence on sale of labour power is taken as a necessary (but 
not sufficient) condition of proletarianisation (Parthasarathy, 
1978s 121). Lenin, however, qualifies a little further to 
include all types of poor peasantry - allotment-holding farm 
labourer, unskilled labourer, day labourer, building worker, 
owner of a tiny patch of land etc. while categorising rural 
proletariats. The criteria for including poor peasants into 
this category are insignificant importance of agriculture 
("a subsidiary occupation") in their occupational matrices and 
their extreme vulnerability:
Insignificant farming on a patch of land, with the 
farm in a state of utter ruin (particularly evidenced 
by the leasing out of land), inability to exist without 
the sale of labour-power (= "industries" of the indigent 
peasants), an extremely low standard of living( probably 
lower even than that of the worker without an allotment- 
—  such are the distinguishing features of this type 
( Lenin, 1977: 180) .
Although the Russian 'allotment-holding farm labourer' 
category does not exactly fit in the context of Third World 
peasantries, most of the other elements of Lenin's categorisation 
of rural proletariats appear to hold good. Our field experience 
suggests this.
The growth in the number of hired labourers or the sheer 
vulnerability of the poor peasants do not guarantee rural 
proletarianisation. It involves some qualitative aspects as 
well; most importantly the nature of the movement from 'bonded' 
to 'free8 labour (i.e. how far the labour is free to sell his 
labour and is not tied to a particular employer by bondage of usury 
of other traditional attachments in the form of patron-client 
relationship). The purification of wage
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relations and the extent of 'class consciousness1 
(i.e. how far a labourer has transcended the traditional barriers 
of caste, kinship, religion etc. and what is the stage of his 
perception of his common interests with the fellow labourers 
and his class behaviour). Byres describes the latter in terms 
of 'class-for-itself1 (Byres, 1981s 407). If these sufficient 
conditions are not fully met scholars tend to call this a, 
case of fpartial proletarianisation1 (Byres, 1981• 432).
We shall examine these aspects of rural proletarianisation 
empirically in the context of rural Bangladesh in what follows.
We start our analysis with the necessary condition of 
proletarianisation i.e. the growth of hired labourers.
1 GROWTH OF HIRED LABOURERS:
We witnessed a rising proportion of wage labour in our 
study villages. Indeed, the necessary condition of 
proletarianisation appeared to be fulfilled in these villages.
The proportion of agricultural labourer households^ (henceforth 
ALH) has increased significantly during the last decade. The rate 
of increase has been higher in village 1, the advanced village.
Our fieldwork findings were:
■j
'Purification’ of wage relations signifies the emerging relations 
in which the non-monetary elements of renumeration are progressively 
suppressed and more of wage labourers get cash payment as 
determined by the market forces (Goodman and Redclift, 1981: 176-177)-
Rastyannikov , a Soviet scholar, uses the term 'agrarian 
proto-proletariat' to characterise the incomplete manifestation of 
proletarianisation in the context of Indian agriculture 
(Rastyannikov, 1976: 67-81).
3.
Households with at least one male member involved in 
agricultural wage labour.
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TABLE 9.1
VILLAGES-1 AND 2: INCIDENCE OF HIKED LABOUR: 1972-81
Cut-off Hired labour-days as % total labour-days
period and 
villages for group (a) owning 7.50-10.00 acres
for group (b) owning 
more than 10.00 acres
1972
1) Village - 1 *f8.6o 51.00
2) Village - 2 ^0 .50 2^.25
1?81
1) Village - 1 70.50 76.60
2) Village - 2 52.50 55.50
PERCENTAGE CHANGE '
(1972-81)
1) Village - 1 +21.90 +25-60
2) Village - 2 +12.00 +15-25
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(i) 40% of households in village 1 and 29% in village 2
were ALH during our study period (i.e. 1981)* Of them, 55% 
of total households in village 1 and 21% in village 2 had 
agricultural wage earning as the principal occupation. Total 
number of working male members involved in seasonal/round the year 
agricultural wage earning was as high as 148 in village 1 
(out of total working males of 371, i.e. 40%) and 52 in village 2 
(nut of total working males of 173 i.e. 30%).
(ii) Back in 1972, there were 23% of the households who 
could be termed as ALH in village 1 (18% of the total households 
had agricultural wage earning as the principal occupation).
The corresponding figures for village 2 were 21.50% and 17*50%.
Thus we noticed a significant growth in the proportion of 
ALH in both of our study villages. The pace of growth was 
faster in village 1 than in village 2, especially after the 
installation of seventeen power pumps and the subsequent 
introduction of new HYV technology. Village 2 had no modern 
irrigation facilities.
That there was a rise in the proportion of wage labour 
was also’ confirmed by the figures from the demand side. We 
found that the owners of larger landholdings (owning more than 
7*50 acres of land) have increased their share of hired labour 
vis-a-vis total labour employed over the last decade (1972-1981). 
And the growth has been higher in village 1. While presenting 
the comparative data, we divided rich peasants into two groups:
(a) those owning 7*50 - 10.00 acres of land and
(b) those owning more than 10.00 acres of land.
As is obvious from table 9.1, the richer landowners, 
greatly increased the proportion of hired labour^in both villages.
^ Khan made an estimate of growth of landless labourers as a
percentage of the total labour force for rural Bangladesh. This
macro study demonstrates for Bangladesh as a whole the growth of
landless hired labourers. The following table gives Khan's
contd...
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WORKER NOVICES;5
That landlessness was growing faster, swelling the 
ranks of the rural proletariat in rural Bangladesh was also 
confirmed by the rapid growth in the number of 1 Worker Novices*.
Our examination of the family history of the AWLs revealed 
that a significant proportion of them were new comers to the 
labour market and an important proportion of them reported that 
they became wage labourers only in their generation (their 
fathers and grandfathers were either owner or tenant farmers 
or both). As is clear from table 9.2, quite a sizeable 
number of the labourers have joined the labour market very 
recently:
(i) As many as 1/2(20.25% in village 1 and more than 
(22.85%) in village 2 of AWLs were 'Worker Novices'. More than 
3* of them in both the villages entered the labour market after 
1972. The rest said that they were AWLs even before | 97 2
(ii) Nearly half of the AWL (47*27%) in village 1 and 
(34-28%) of them took this occupation during their time.
52.73% in village 1 and 6 5.72% in village 2 said that their 
fathers were also AWLs. 3*1 *85% in the former and 25-11% in the 
latter disclosed that their grandfathers were also AWLs.
Thus we observed that significant section of AWLs were of 
recent origin and that they have entered the labour market 
as 'Novices', compelled by economic pressure. These figures 
enable us to judge how rapid is the process that creates bodies 
of permanent agricultural labourers in rural Bangladesh.
...footnote contd.
estimate (Khan ,1 9 7 9*4 1 7)
YEAR ^ Landless labourers 
as % of total farming 
labour force
Number of landless 
agricultural labourers 
in millions |
1991 14.3 1.51
1961 17.5 2.47
1963/64 17.8 2.71
1964/65 17.5 2.73
1967/68 19.8 3.40
1977 26.1 4.54
 ^Those seeking employment for the first time /Lenin t1977( fifth
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We have, so fax, been focussing on the direct manifestation 
of the growth of a rural proletariat. But there are also some 
indirect measures. These include extent of dispossession of 
the poor peasants by the rich ones manifested through the 
changes in the structure of landholdings, owned and operated, 
and changes in the structure of occupations.
Let us now turn to them:
EXTENT OF DISPOSSESSION:
The increase in the relative share of the land holding, 
owned and operated, of the rich peasants in a land scarce 
economy indicates dispossession on the other side of the 
specturm. Byres (1981:428) identifies the following mechanisms/ 
measures of dispossession of the poor peasantry:
(i) Rich peasants resuming their leased out land 
for cultivation.
(ii) Rich peasants becoming tenants by acquiring a rising 
share of the tenated area at the expence of the poor peasants.
(iii) Rich peasants becoming owners of more land by buying 
land from poor peasants who have been forced into distress sales.
If rich peasants were successful on any or all of these 
fronts we would, indeed, be witnessing proletarianisation, 
or depeasantisation, with poor peasants separated from 
the means of production and rendered landless (Byres,
1981: 428).
..footnote contd: 
printing) :246J  . We used this empirical category to indicate
the agricultural wage labourer ( AWL) who has joined the labour
market very recently, say, in the last 1-3 years.
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Our findings also lend support to most of the above 
hypotheses on labour processes. As we have in table 6.4 
and 6-7, the rich and influencial peasantry have enlarged the 
size of their operated holdings at the cost of the smaller 
peasantry. These data indicate that the size of the operated 
holding of the poor groups has been shrinking over the last 
decade or so.
To make the point clearer, we present data on operated 
land (see table 9*3) for two polar groups of the peasantry:
(i) The poor peasants (owning less than 2.50 acres)
(ii) The rich peasants (owning more than 7*50 acres).
Table 9-3 reveals that although the proportion of poor 
peasant households increased significantly over the 1970s, the 
amount of operated land under their command has not increased 
at the same pace. In fact, the amount declined by 1 .89^  in 
village 1. By contrast, while the proportion of households 
belonging to the richer groups declined, the command over the 
operated land did in fact increase during the period 1972-1981• 
Again the extent of enlargement of the holdings for the top 
groups was -higher in village 1.
Thus we can argue that a trend of enlargement on the one 
hand and the dispossession on the other has clearly set in in both 
villages. The trend is slightly sharper in relatively more 
developed village 1.
This trend has been effected through all the three 
mechanisms cited by Byres (as we have witnessed in Chapter VIII 
see especially tables 8-4 and 8.5)* A sharp increase in the 
population has only further accentuated the trend. With rise 
of the population, the pace of fragmentation of land following 
the split in the households has increased and made many households 
marginalised and impoverished.
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In such a situation, the choices open to poor peasants are 
reduced and they are left with fewer potential roles ( most 
predominantly as wage labourers ) . Hence the growth of wage 
labourers in rural areas is almost concomitant with the foregoing 
tendencies.
The fewer the roles to which they ultimately adjust, the more 
they tend to be clearly class-based and more specific.
Griffin visualizes this in these words:
Occupation will become more specific, social relations 
will become more distinct and the customary terms on whicch 
services are exchanged will tend to give way to formal co
contracts The numerous people who formerly were excersizing
  oft u small scale will find that they have less control
over their lives ( Griffin, 197 :^ 7k).
Let us now examine the occupation structure (both present 
and past) of the AWLs to see if these trends were at work or not.
THE CHANGING OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE:
We observed more specific occupational roles for most 
of the households in both the villages especially in the poorer 
groups. P^reviously many households were part owner-part 
tenant, part wage labourer-part owner, part carpenterpart 
owner. But today more people were forced to take a single 
occupation. This was particularly true in village 1. In 
this village, more households now solely depend on the occupation 
of wage labourer.
We observed a sizeable proportion of AWLs had 
cultivation (either as self-operated small farms or share­
croppers or both) as the main occupation before entering into 
the labour market - yet another indication of the process of 
dispossession.
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(i) At least 18.99% of AWLs in village 1 and 13.63 
in village 2, revealed that their principal occupation had 
"been share cropping and that they had to surrender their 
erstwhile rented in land to the rich land owners.
(ii) 17.72% in village 1 and 20.00% in village 2 said 
that they were previously small peasants, hut could not withstand 
the economic pressures imposed on them in recent years and had 
to either sell or mortgage all or part of their land. And they 
finally ended up as AWLs. Most of this category of AWLs have 
joined the labour market after 1972. But it may not only be the 
fully or partly dispossessed households which became ALHs; a 
significant proportion of households with some land (even up to 
2.50 acres of owned land) also entered the labour market. Most 
of those who had some land were seasonal wage labourers.
An examination of the land ownership pattern of ALHs also testifies 
to this trend.
We observed a higher incidence of AWLs in the poorer groups 
of the peasantry. Thus:
(i) 7!i% of the absolutely landless households in village 1
and 6 5.51% 'in village 2 had agricultural wage earning as the 
principal occupation. The rest of them were mainly destitutes 
and had no fixed occupations.
Households with a small amount of cultivated land mostly 
have surplus family labour. So they can always send one or 
two family members to earn some wages during the peak season 
of cultivation, when the demand for hired labour is usually 
highest.
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(ii) 78.57% of the households of the second group 
(owning .0 1 -.5 0 acres) in village 1 and 4 7.61% in village 2 
were ALHs. The rest of them were either share croppers or 
petty traders and part-time artisans.
(iii) 55.15% of households from third group (owning .51-1*50 
acres) in village 1 and 35*55% of households in village 2 
engaged at least one of their male members as AWLs.
(iv) 9 *09% and 5*5!^ % of households in group 4 (owning 
1.51-2.50 acres) were ALHs.
These figures suggest that more and more members of poor 
groups of the peasantry have been getting involved in 
agricultural wage earning.
There also emerged a trend from the land distribution tables 
(for example tables 6*9> 6.10, 6.12 and 6 .13) that the poor 
peasants with a very small amount of owned land had better left 
their traditional profession of 'cultivation and joined the ranks 
of the AWLs. The discrepancy between non-owning and non-operating 
households suggests such a trend. Thus, we found twelve households 
as non-owning and fifty one as non-operating in village 1 in 
1981• This indicates that at least 39 households (i.e. 19-5% 
of the total households) from other groups had abandoned their 
tiny patches of land and opted to become ALHs. By contrast, there 
were only 5 such households (4 *13% of total households) in village 
2. Unlike village 1, there was an acute shortage of employment 
opportunities in village 2 and quite naturally most of the poor 
households clung to their small patches of land. This, as we shall 
see, has a wider implication on the extent and nature of rural 
proletarianisation.
That a greater number of AWLs were coming from poor groups 
of the peasantry (with some land) was also indicated by the 
distribution of the sources of income. As we have seen in 
Chapter VIM percentages of income deriving from agricultural wages 
in groups 1, 2 and 3 of village 1 were 79-45%> 69.18% and 31*23% 
respectively. The corresponding figures in village 2 were 67.78%* 
4 1.00% and 6 .71% respectively.
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The higher pace of growth in the proportion of AWLs 
in village 1 than in village 2 may be explained as follows:
(i) Village 1 has a greater inequality of the material 
elements of production (as demonstrated in Chapter VI and VII ). 
This means that more households from land poor groups have 
been dispossessed by the richer groups in village 1.
(ii) With the installation of seventeen modern irrigation 
pumps and the inflow of increased amount of modern agricultural 
inputs e.g. fertilizer, pesticides, credit etc, the'cropping 
intensity has greatly increased in village 1. This has led to 
higher employment opportunities round the year. Not only 
in village, but in many other villages in the locality Deep Tube 
Wells (DTWs) have been installed. Consequently, the production 
of HYV has gone up. Simultaneously, the employment opportunities
7 .
for hired labourers have also gone up in village 1. A sizeable 
proportion of households in this village have, therefore, become 
AWHs despite the fact that they owned some agricultural land 
(though very small in amount). The opportunities for share 
cropping have also shrunk (see Chapter VIll). However, 
circumstances differed in village 2. This village, located in 
the interior part of the relatively underdeveloped Northern 
Bengal, had experienced very little modernisation in agriculture. 
Not a single power pump has yet been set up in this village.
Only a neglible proportion of agricultural land is under 
irrigation. The adjoining villages are also not advanced in this 
respect. So employment opportunities were very limited and most 
people had to be happy with small patches of land in addition to 
some rented-in land from the rich peasants.
tt
7. Vylder finds that in general, however, employment rises 
with the introduction of the HIV technology and the
concomitant switch to a new crop rotation----------- ■
(Vylder, 1982: 90).
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(iii) The growth of wage labourers in village 1 was 
further facilitated by the presence of SONATIA BAZAR, the 
largest paddy market place in the region, in its vicinity.
Purchase and sale of paddy in bulk require a number of 
helping hands as a result, a good team of Koolees have made their 
employment secure in this market place. Most of these Koolees 
are from village 1. We found that many as 12 Koolees, including 
their Sardar, were almost permanently employed here from 
village 1. The very presence of these Koolees in these villages 
has a different kind of influence on the nature of the rural 
proletarianisation in this village. A number of trucks come from 
Dhaka, the capital, to pick up paddy/rice from this market place
and this has increased the flow of information —  political
and otherwise.
But village 2, though flanked by a small market place, 
Hatshahar, cannot claim such employment benefit from it.
Only one household was found to be employed as sweeper and a 
few others were working as Cobblers/barbers during our study 
period.
The level of employment and the amount of real wage indicates 
the extent'of vulnerability and the standard of living of the 
ALHs. Our findings indicate a very low standard of living 
amongst the AWLs in both the village (the condition was more 
precarious in village 2). However, the average income of the 
ALHs was at least better than marginalised peasants who still 
clung to the land (see Chapter VII ). Anyway, discussion on 
rural proletarianisation is bound to be incomplete, without an 
examination of the nature and level of employment and wages.
So, let us turn to that.
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES:
The nature and the level of employment and wages vary 
between these two villages. The threat of unemployment is much 
more pronounced in village 2 than in village 1. The level
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TABLE 9 >3 
NO. OF BAYS EMPLOYED
Months
Days employed in a month
FA1 SM1 pm2 ms2 mf2
BAISAKH 25 20 10 10 12
JAISTHA 25 25 12 12 15
ASHARH 28 27 26 26 26
SHRABAN 30 30 24 26 28
BHADRA 30 28 22 26 25
ASWIN 12 13 8 5 10
KARTIK 10 11 9 10 5
AGRAHAYAN 19 20 24 24 24
POUSH 28 25 24 28 30
MAGH 28 26 20 20 20
FALGUN 20 25 15 20 8
GHAITRA 15 20 9 15 10
FA, SM, PM, MS and MF indicates abbreviations of the names of 
household heads.
Suffix 1 indicates village 1
Suffix 2 indicates village 2
332
of employment varied seasonally in both villages. But the 
extent of variation was much lower in village 1 than in village 2. 
In village 1, the months of Aswin and Kartic appeared to he
Q
the leanest. In other months, wage labourers get regular 
employment in the farms of rich peasants of this village or 
other adjoining villages. Since, three crops (paddy) were 
produced in this village, the employment opportunities were quite 
evenly spread. The nearby market place also offered some job 
opportunities for the wage labourers, mostly on a contract basis. 
But, even then there was unemployment and one could not claim 
that all members of the poorer groups had a job throughout 
the year. On an average, 30^ of the labour days of the hired 
labourers remained unemployed and in the leanest months, this 
figure jumped out to as high as 60 to "JCP/o. Bor some it was 
as high as Poush, Magh, Asharh and Sraban appeared to be
the best months from the employment point of view.
Compared to village 1, village 2 experiences very wide 
variations in the level of employment. Since modern inputs did not 
enter in sufficient quantities in village 2, the cropping 
intensity was lower and so was the level of employment. It was 
found that in the months of Baisakh and Jaistha only and 10^
of the total labour days of AWL could be employed. Farmers of 
this village still cultivated mostly the traditional varieties 
and the cycle of employment followed the seasonal peaks and 
troughs in the demand for labour
8. Bengali months roughtly coincide with the English months 
in the following manner:
Baisakh ----------— —  April - May
Jaistha — -— *--------  —  May - June
Asharh------------------- June - July
Shraban------------- - --- July - August
Bhadra------------------- August - September
Aswin --------------------  September - October
Kartic------- ----------- October - November
Agrahayan ----------------  November - Beeember
Poush-------------------- Bee ember - January
Magh------- -- ---------- January - February
Falgun---------------- - - February - March
Chaitra ----- ------------- March - April
By Baisakh. the removal of weeds from traditional 
paddy and jute fields is almost completed and by Jaistha there 
is even more drastic reduction in the demand for hired labour. 
Only 10^ of the total labour force can manage some trifling 
agricultural work, mostly out of the fields. The level of 
employment starts increasing in the month of Asharh and reaches 
its highest (9CP/0) in the month of Shraban. This is the busiest 
month of the year in this region.
Cutting and washing of jute plants and fibres, 
transplantation of aman plants, drying of jute fibre and 
harvesting of aus paddy - all these activities coincide in this 
month. The level of employment begins to fall sharply in the 
month of Bhadra and falls to the bottom of in the month of 
Kartic. The graph gives a better picture of the average 
variation in the levels of employment in village 1 and 2.
Before the installation of power pumps in village 1, the pattern 
of employment of the agricultural workers was almost similar 
to that of village 2. Now the situation is better in village 1.
The average variations have been drawn from a sample 
of 20 AWL, 10 from each village.
AWL, when unemployed in the farms, resort to various 
subsidiary professions such as petty trading, dealing in 
vegetables, biri, kerosene oil, salt and also small artisan 
jobs such as carpenter, barber, potter etc, A higher proportion 
of ALHs in village 2 were found to resort to these secondary 
off farm activities.
To obtain some feel for the level of employment, we 
conducted case studies in both villages and we found different 
levels of employment in different months. We present the 
employment situation of a number of AWL. We present case studies 
of four of them in the following table.
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The employment pattern, in a way, dictates the level 
of wages in rural Bangladesh. As the level of employment 
rises in the months of Asharh, Sraban, Poush and Magh, the 
level of wage also rises. The wage rate varied more sharply 
in village 2 as employment opportunities were scarce in this 
village. At the peak season, the average wage (with food) 
reached taka 10/- in village 2 and taka 16/- in village 1.
The average wage rate in village 1 hovered around taka 10.00 in 
most of the months (excepting in Aswin/Kartic when it came down 
to as low as taka 5*00). But in village 2, the wage rate was 
very unstable and varied between taka 3*00 to taka 8.00 in most 
of the months. The average wage in village 1 was something around 
taka 10.00 where as in village 2 it was around taka 6.00.
Monthly variations in the wage levels are given in the graph.
\
The graph on wages clearly indicates the seasonal 
variations in both villages, and that the overall situation is 
mush worse in village 2.
The situation is made even worse by the upward movement 
in the price of rice. The price of rice, as we have seen in 
our study villages As lowest in the month of Sraban, Poush and Magh 
the harvesting seasons for paddy. But around these months, both 
employment and wages are at a relatively higher level. In the 
months of Aswin, Kartic and Chaitra, the level of employment and 
wages are very low but the price of rice is very high as most 
farmers turn to the market for food during this time of the 
year. As a result, the real wage of AWL is reduced and makes his 
life very difficult.
In an inter-temporal sense also, the real wage of an 
average AWL has been reduced. But the decline has been higher 
in village 2. If we compare the rice equivalent of wages in our 
study villages with other studies, we get a clear trend of 
downward movement in the real wage of an average worker.
Siddiqui (1980(b): 188) calculated taka . 50 and taka 
4.50 as the average wage per day in rural Bangladesh in 1951 and. 
1977 respectively. He also converted these monetary figures 
into rice equivalent and found that an average wage labourer 
received wage equivalent to 2.60 lbs of rice but this has reduced 
to 1.80 lbs by 1977- When we converted our findings, we found 
that an average AWL received 1 .60 lbs in village 1 and 1.20 lbs 
in village 2 as daily wage. There was a clear downward movement in 
the real wage of the AGLs. Khan (1979* 408) in a separate study 
also found such a declining trend.
MODE OP PAYMENT:
Mode of payment of the wage for the AWLs has, however, 
changed drastically. Even in the late sixties, village elders 
recalled that a part of the wage (especially of the permanent 
labourers) used to be paid in kind (mostly paddy, rice, clothes 
etc). But during our fieldstudy we noticed no payment in 
kind in either of the villages. Wages were usually paid in cash 
on the market days. Normally, a hirer would sell the paddy in the 
market and pay the wages in cash. One can say that wage 
relations have become monetized and hence purified.
EROM 1 BONDED' TO ’EREE’ LABOUR:
As we have noted earlier, even while wage labour is 
growing, one cannot conclusively say that proletarianisation is 
proceeding apace. An important additional criterion for 
proletarianisation is the shift from 1 bonded'toffree‘labour.
We observed that semi-patriarchal and semi- bonded 
forms of hired labour were on the decline in rural Bangladesh.
AWLs in Bangladesh have as a whole experienced some changes 
in the nature of their ’captivity1 . Although still bounded by 
moneylending, factional ties to some extent, there has been 
some movement towards a freer kind of relationship, away from 
the age old ’bonded’ ones. The emerging relationship is 
between hirers and the hired, a commercial transaction for the 
purchase and sale of labour power. This is especially
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true in those areas where there has been some development 
of productive forces, say for example, our village 1. From 
our own field experience we found that labourers in village 1 
are in a much freer and flexible position that those in 
village 2.
One of the reasons for such a situation was the relatively 
better employment opportunities in village 1 arising out of 
HYV technology and the presence of Sonatia Bazar nearby where 
a number of landless labourers work as Koolees. Also a number 
of marginal farmers work as petty traders on the market days.
In the lean seasons, the AWLs bring firewood from nearby 
Madhupur jungle and sell it in the market. The labourers of 
village 1 are relatively better off economically compared to 
those in village 2.
The employment situation in village 2 is indeed worse.
It has been tradionally a backward village with little 
development of the productive forces. Most of the poor peasants 
are dependent on the richer households for tenancy, credit, 
mortgage etc. The adjoining villages are also not developed 
enough to attract surplus labourers from this village. In 
addition, twenty more destitute families came from another 
district in 1971 ‘to swell the ranks of the landless. , In the 
face of acute unemployment and economic insecurity, it is obvious 
that most of the landless and land-poor peasant households 
have accepted their 'captive' position as inevitable. As a 
result the rich peasants were seen to dictate wage rates and the 
terms and conditions of employment to their advantage in this 
village.
That the dependent relationships of the AWLs in village 2 
were more tight was also manifested by the incidence of extra- 
economic pressures imposed on them by the rich. We interviewed 
a small sample of 29 AWLs in village 2 and out of them 18 
(i.e. 62,06/o admitted having done one or more of the followings:
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(i) Having given free services to the landowners;
(ii) Having allowed their women and children to perform 
free services for the landowners (e.g. rice husking, looking 
after the cows, helping in the kitchen etc.);
(iii) Having supported the rich landowners in factional 
politics, especially in Salish (village court).
(iv) Having voted in the elections according to the dictates 
of the rich landowners;
(v) Having given false witnesses on behalf of the rich 
peasants in suits involving land or any other local disputes;
(vi) Having been employed by the same landowner for a 
long period.
But we found AWLs of village 1 more confident and 
defiant. Out of a small sample of 35 AWLs we could identify 
only 8 (i.e. 22.8^) who had done one or more of the above.
In fact, we noticed a few other trends of disintegration of 
traditional values such as unquestionable loyalty to the 
village elders and respect for the extended family in village 1 . 
Many elder heads of the households complained to us that the 
traditional family bonds were crumbling and more and more 
young people were beginning to face life more independently 
then before. The subservient attitude usually common in the 
poor, even a decade ago, was gradually disappearing in 
village 1. As a mark of defiance, the landless hired labourers, 
were always seen to behave quite arrogantly in the Salish bench 
and did not always agree to what the Matbars thought right.
Some of the AWLs have bought radios and they would take them 
in the field to show off their newly acquired assets to 
others, particularly the rich. This was also a mark of 
defiance to richer households. They were also found to say 
'no' to a landowner when offered a job if they did not like him.
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PEREGRINATION:
The extent of their 'captivity' was further accentuated 
by the lack of mobility in village 2 by comparison with 
village 1. However, mobility in village 1 should not be 
over exaggerated. Only a handful of the AWLs have actually 
gone out of their village to seek employment during our study 
period. Some have gone all the way to Dhaka to seek employment. 
But a higher proportion of them showed an attitude which could 
be taken as readiness to move out if an employment opportunity 
was assured.
When asked those 35 AWLs in village 1, if they were ready
to go out of their village if offered a better job in some
other areas, leaving behind their families and small patches of
land, 27 of them replied yes. Only 4 of1 them said*no.’ The rest
were indifferent. Compared to village 1, when we asked the
same question to 29 AWLs of village 2, only 7 of them replied
•yes'. This was again a reflection of the attitude towards 
9
'captivity' . The AWLs in village 2 were skeptical about job 
opportunities and had very little idea about the outside world.
In a remote village like this, with little job opportunities 
around, it was quite natural that the relations between landowners 
and the agricultural labourers were viewed in more traditional 
terms reinforcing the principle of community 'interdependence' 
and 'solidarity' for servival. And in most cases such 
relationships were advantageous to the employers.
9
Lenin calls this tendency 'peregrination' and says 
"It destroys bonded forms of hire and labour service" 
(Lenin, 1977a: 252).
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DECLINING PERMANENT LABOUR;
Yet another manifestation of the ’bonded1 nature of 
employment was the 'permanent employment' policy. Unlike casual 
labourers, the permanently employed labourers, though assured 
of job for a certain specified period, could not be called 'free' 
in any real sense of the term. As a rule they had to be more 
obedient to the employers and had. to participate in many activities 
which they might not like by themselves, not to speak of unlimited 
hours of work. If employed in the house of local level leaders, 
they had to be even more loyal to them as they had the powers to 
'command respect'. Even a decade back, the permanent labourers 
were almost semi-serf. They could not change their employers 
whenever they liked. Mostly tied by some kind of credit 
relations, they had to work year after year without any 
increase in wages. The rural power structure as a whole would 
defend the exploitative landowners in this policy. There were 
many instances in which although a permanent labourer found 
employment at a higher wage rate in another village he was 
forced to leave that job and join the former employer. But the 
situation appeared to have improved as regards this employment 
of permanent labourers. Now permanent labourers were being 
contracted for shorter periods (say on a monthly or a quarterly 
basis rather than yearly) and they were free to choose their 
employers. This trend is greater in village 1 than in 
village 2. The proportion of permanently employed labour days 
compared to the casual labour days has been declining in both 
the villages we studied. At the moment, the proportion is 
higher in village 2 than in village 1.
In village 1, the proportion of permanently employed 
labour days to the total labour days employed (family + hired) 
was about one quarter. The proportion was higher in village 2 
(abour one third).
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On the whole we found that the extent of 'bonded1 
labour was declining in our two Bangladesh villages and the 
rate of this decline was higher in the villages which was 
more exposed to modernisation and commercialization in 
comparison to the backward interior village.
So far we have concentrated on the structural or 
class-in-itself changes which we have observed in our study 
villages. But an analysis of rural proletarianisation cannot 
be complete unless we look into the class-for-itself changes.
Data on class consciousness and class-action are extremely 
difficult to obtain. Moreover, there was no significant 
national or political movement during out study period which 
could have unfolded many of the class-for-itself attitudes 
amongst both rich and poor peasantry. Even then we have noted 
a number of day to day incidents and social confrontations 
which pointed out certain kind of class behaviour. But as is 
always the case, one cannot be absolutely conclusive about such 
trends. We have tried to gather as much information on this 
aspect of the proletarianisation, but we think our stay was 
not long enough to form a concrete opinion about the class- 
for-itself changes. By saying this, we do not want to minimise 
the significance of this aspect. We are aware of its 
significance. To get a feel of what we observed in the study 
villages, one may turn to the Appendix G, where we have presented 
some evidence of class consciousness of the rural proletariats.
PARTIAL PROLETARIANISATION;
The emerging proletariats which we have observed are in 
fact not fully proletarianised. The dependent relationship 
arising out of the land tenure system, lack of employment 
opportunities, the age-old community ideologies etc. was 
still very active in keeping them as yet old 'proto ' or 
'partial' proletariat. The extent of proletarianisation was 
observed to be higher in villages where the productive forces 
developed to a certain level (see Partha Sarathy, 1978>
Byres, 1981).
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CHAPTER X
THE STATE AND THE PEASANTRY
So far, in exploring the differentiation of the 
peasantry, we have been pre-occupied with the material elements 
of production and the socio-economic relationships that 
bind them. But our treatment would be incomplete without some 
consideration of the role of the state with respect to 
differentiation.
In the specific context of Bangladesh, Siddiqui (1980 i>) 
has made an elaborate investigation of the role of various non­
economic factors vis-a-vis rural poverty (see especially his 
Chapter VII on Superstructure and Poverty). We are not, 
however, taking up all aspects of the superstructure in this 
chapter. We will only focus on the role of the state (which 
has been touched upon by Siddiqui (198O b) but not elaborated) 
in perpetuating ever increasing differences amongst various 
groups/classes of the rural households of Bangladesh. This has 
become essential for the simple fact that the state (both in 
terms of its policy making role and also the functions it 
executes through its apparatus) has been more pervasive and 
active in the day-to-day life of rural households in recent times. 
The state is not a neutral and benovolent arbiter, promoting 
the national interest in economic growth and maximising the 
whole-scale social welfare. It has firmly established itself 
as "an endogeneous element in the economy, an institution which 
reflects the underlying social forces and structure of production" 
(Griffin and Khan, 1978:302) .
While doing that we are able only to raise certain crucial 
issues, without investigating them in detail. A study of the 
nature and the role of the state, in this context, will 
constitute a full-scale thesis in its own right. But these 
issues are so important that they cannot be ignored in any 
treatment of differentiation of the peasantry.
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It is in this context that
we have taken the state as a protector of the interests
of the dominant social forces, which are rooted in the
2
structure of production. In the Third World context, the state 
has become increasingly involved in the direct control and 
management of the economy (see Sobhan and Ahmed, 1980;
Hatching, 1980; Westergard, 1980; Vylder, 1982; Harris, 1982). 
This has, as we shall see, strengthened the hand of the dominant 
classes, as they now manipulate state power and the state 
apparatus to perpetuate their economic and social domination 
over the rest of society.
2 .
We note that:
State encompasses more than government: it includes the 
executive, bureaucratic, legislative, judicial, coercive, 
and publicly controlled educational, media, trade unions, 
and party apparatus designed to protect national^ security, 
foster the conditions for capital accumulation, and 
maintain social control (Sandbrook, 1982: 77)*
Marx and Engels, though, did not offer any conclusive definition 
of the state, chey deal with the subject on a number of 
occasions and their notion of the state includes many of the 
above elements. In fact, they did not take up the issue of the 
state seriously until they had written the German Ideology (1845-46). 
In the German Ideology, Marx and Engels note that the state is 
the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their 
common interests (Marx and Engels, 1845-1846: 90; Jessop, op.cit.
12). In the same treatise they identify the emergence of the 
state with the rise of private property and refer to its control 
of the means of coercion and M often employ os tensive difinitions 
which offer a more or less complete list of institutions that 
comprise the state" (Jessop, op.cit.: 21). Thus, in 
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx identifies the 
Erench state as"(this) executive power, with its enormous 
bureaucratic and military organisation" (Marx, 1852: 185).
Similarly Engels finds it as an organisation on a territorial basis, 
specialised coercive apparatus or force, taxation, administrative 
staff, and, as rule, political rights graded on the basis of property
(Engels, 1884s 155-156; Jessop, op.cit. 21).
In that sense the state still persists as 'an instrument
for the exploitation of the oppressed1 as
3 4perceived by Enrols and later elaborated by Lenin .
However, there is always a danger of being mechanistic and 
ending up with a one-sided formulation of the role of the state.
3 . Engels sees the state as a product of society at a certain 
stage of development. In his view, society is entangled in an 
insoluble contradiction with itself —  facing irreconcilable 
antagonisms which it cannot dispel. Buts
In order that these antagonisms, these classes with 
conflicting economic interests might not consume 
themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it 
became necessary to have a power, seemingly standing 
above society, that would alleviate the conflict and 
keep it within the bounds of 'order'; and this power, 
arising out of society but placing itself above it, 
and alienating itself more and more from it, is the 
state (Engels, 1884: 326-327)*
And in the Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels argue:
The executive of modern state is but a committee for 
managing the common affaris of the bourgeoisie (Marx and 
Engels, 1848i 486).
This committee does not sit idle but legalises and 
perpetuates the oppression of one class by another in the name 
of maintenance of 'order' and thereby moderating conflict. This 
aspect of social cohesion is not necessarily class reconciliation.
4* Lenin stresses that 'order' involves oppression of one class 
by another and the systematic denial of means of struggle to 
the oppressed class. And the state plays a vital role in this 
game. To quote Lenin:
The monstrous oppression of the working people by the 
state, which is merging more and more with all-powerful 
capitalist associations, is becoming increasingly 
monstrous (Lenin, 1977b: 7)*
Lenin emphasises in the same article that haditbeen 
possible to reconcile classes, the state would never have arisen 
nor been able to maintain itself.
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Jessop is right in raising caution against falling into 
such a theoretical trap. Marx and Engels, as Jessop 
argues, "do not offer a systematic and coherent theory of 
the state "based on any given casual principle or major 
theme" (jessop, op.cit: 30) . They adopted different 
approaches and arguments and did not themselves attempt any 
systematic analysis of it. They were concerned with the issue 
of the state when they were generally concerned with political 
class struggle and focussed on control of the state apparatus 
and its use in the repression of the dominated classes and/or 
the consolidation of the dominating classes (Jessop, op.cit: 25).
So in that sens, each state demands treatment in its own terns, 
one must guard against treating all states in identical terms.
In recent times a number of scholars have given attention 
to the role of the state in the social formations of 
Third World countries (see for example, Alavi, 1973? Saul 1974?
Leys, 1976: Ziemann and Lanzendorfer, 1977; Westergard, 1981; etc.). 
Much of the works in question is highly theoretical in nature 
and very few empirical analyses have been undertaken. Moreover, 
it is usually couched in general terms and does not specifically 
relate to the peasant question. These theoretical approaches 
have focussed the Third World specificities either in terms 
of post-colonial states —  pointing out their previous status 
as colonies (the principal advocate here being Alavi) or as 
peripheral states —  emphasising their complementary and 
subsidiary attachment to the world economy, or more precisely, 
world capitalism (Ziemann and Lanzendorf er being the principal 
protagonists in this side of the debate).
All these theoretical niceties however do not lead us far.
We are seeking empirical evidence to explain the processes of
5
differentiation of the peasantry . One way to evaluate the role 
of the state in these processes is to find:
 ^ Goodman and Redclift (1981) have made an attempt to understand 
the effects of state intervention in the peasantry of Mexico 
and Brazil. But the Bangladesh peasantry is not in the same setting 
as the Latin-American peasantry. The situations differ historically, 
internationally and internally. The level of development also 
differs widely in the two cases.
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(i) who are the beneficiaries of the state policies, in
g
particular its development policies I
(ii) how the state negotiates the processes of subsumption 
of labour to different forms of capital, including international 
finance capitalI
Hi?om our field observation, we found that over the last 
decade, certainly state involvement has increased in all 
sectors of the Bangladesh economy. The peasantry, too, has 
experienced the involvement of the .state at different degrees in 
different areas. The inflow of foreign assistance, under the 
active guidance of the World Bank (McNamara, 1982: Sobhan, 1981) 
in Bangladesh has only intensified that state intervention.
In this chapter we attempt to assess the magnitude of 
this state involvement in the name of development policies 
and indicate who have been its beneficiaries.
In Bangladesh, most modem inputs are procured and supplied 
by the state agencies. The private sector, though becoming 
prominent recently, has to follow the broad indications of 
state policy. In the context of the peasantry, we can, therefore, 
consider the expansion of the use of these modem inputs as 
indications of greater state involvement. The following table 
indicates the broad trend of the use of modem inputs.
By development policies we mean the general orientation of 
a regime with respect to accumulation. In more concrete terms, 
these indicate how the agencies of the state seek to assign a 
balance between private and public property, market versus 
planning mechanism, centralized versus decentralized economic 
decisions making, coercion versus popular participation in 
the promotion of development goals - eg. agricultural development, 
industrialization, dependency, export, import, price control etc.
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TABLE 10.1
USE OF MODERN INPUTS IN BANGLADESH AGRICULTURE: 
1958-59 to 1978-79
ITEMS 1958/59 196V65 1969/70 1972/75 1978/79
1 . Use of chemical
fertilizers 8 .*t ^5-0 129-5 178.7 550.1
(000 nutrient tons)
2. Area irrigated
by different ^2 § 
modern irrigation
151 A 816. A 1557-9 198.0
methods(000 acres)
5. Percentage of
cropped acreage Q 2 
under irrigation
0.5 2.5 ^.9 12.0
by mechanical
means
Cropped area sown 
with improved ^  
seeds(000 acres)
657 2175 n.a. 70A8
5. Institutional
credit( million 50 .6 97.9 195.6 522.5 1701.9
Taka)
Sources: Hossain, 1977a:27; SFYP,1981:I-II; BBS, 1979;2l8-20;
Ministry of Finance: Bangladesh Economic Survey, 1980-81.
' Table 10.1 gives us the broad trend in the increased use 
of modern inputs over the last two decades. In recent years the 
inflow of these inputs has increased further as the Bangladesh 
government put emphasis on rural development policies to increase 
food production ( SFYP, 1980; World Bank, 19S1 ). We may now 
pursue a detailed examination of these recent trends item by item.
1) IRRIGATION:
The increase in modern irrigation facilities has been 
significant in recent years, although somewhat uneven. The 
following table shows the trend:
TABLE 10.2 
RECENT TRENDS IN IRRIGATION: 1977— 1980
?YPE OF IRRIGATION UNIT FY 77 FY78 FY79 FY80
1. Deep tube wells 000 wells ^-5 7.^ 9 .5 9 .8
2. Shallow tube v/e 11s 000 wells
. 1 
5.^ ! 12.0 18.0 21.0
3 . Low lift pumps 000 pumps
I
zSA | 36 .7  
I
35.9 38.6
k. Land irrigated by 
minor irrigation
in million 
acres 1.5 1.7 1.8 2.0
facilities 
3. Area irrigated
by major facilities
in million 
acres
.09 0.1*f 0.16 0.2*f
Sources: BADC, BWDB Annual Reports, 1977-78 to 1980-81; Statistical 
Pocket Book, 1979; World Bank, 1980.
Note: EY =  Financial Year.
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2. FERTILIZER;
Fertilizer consumption has grown rapidly in recent 
years, more than doubling since financial year (FY) 1973*
The off-takes for FY 77 > 78, 79 and 80 were respectively 
516, 715» 734 and. 842 thousand tons (sources; as table 
10.2; see also Yylder,op. oit; 20).
5. IMPROVED SEEDS;
Where as RADC distributed only 152 thousand pounds 
of improved seeds in 1978-79} the figure jumped to 541 thousand 
pounds in 1979-80 and to 1263 thousand pounds in 1980-81. 
(Source; as above).
4 . INSTITUTIONAL RURAL CREDIT;
The Bangladesh government has been giving special 
emphasis to the rural credit programmes. Besides specialised 
Banks, most of the commercial banks have been recently involved 
in rural credit distribution.
Table 10.5 gives the trend.
TABLE 10.5
RECENT TREND IN INSTITUTIONAL RURAL CREDIT IN BANGLADESH
YEARS Total rural credit by all 
institutions( in million Taka)
1973-74 341.8
1974-75 366.9
1973-76 462.9
1976-77 886.4
1977-78 1068.4
1978-79 1707.3
1979-80 2683.9
1980-81 3522.8
Source; Bangladesh Bank Annual Reports: 1973”74 to'19SO-8l.
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5. FACTORS:
In 1970, there were 2072 tractors of about 85 horse power 
on an average; 1657 in the private sector and 415 in the 
government sector (Bangladesh Agriculture in Statistics,
1973* 62). The Agricultural Census, 1977 reports the number 
of tractors as 5j454* and. the number of power illers as 1,738.
The figures given above show a marked improvement in the
quantity of modem inputs flowing into the agricultural sector.
The major portion of these inputs are distributed by sepcific
agencies. Although involvement of the private sector has
7
increased in recent years the involvement of the state remains 
significantly high.
To play its part, the state has reoriented its executive 
branches and a sizeable part of its administrative structure 
is now directly involved in *rural development1 activities.
A major vehicle of dissemination of modern inputs has 
been the banking system. In recent years branches of state 
controlled commercial and development banks have expanded 
significantly and a sizeable number of them have been opened 
in the rural areas. In addition, the Central Bank has sponsored 
rural banking projects in different districts on experimental 
basis.
The following table gives an indication of the speed 
of expansion of bank branches:
7
See, for example,Box 5*6 entitled TPrivate Compliments Public: 
The Bangladesh experiment1 in The World Development Report (fifth) 
World Bank, 1982.
TABLE 10.4
RANK BRANCHES IN OPERATION: 1976/77 - 1979/80
Division/District 1976/77 1977/78 j 1978/79 1979/80
Rajshahi 431 632 731 853
'
Dinaj pur 64 93 112 127
Rongpur 104 134 163 195
Bogra 74 112 130 .145
Rajshahi 118 181 198 230
Pabna 71 112 128 156
Khulna 396 493 604 677— — ---
Kusht i : 63 76 95 107
Jessore 74 107 145 167
Kliulnu 114 146 179 196
Barisal 80 120 138 155
Pafcukhali 35 44 47 52
Dhaka 640 812 991 1,116. — —
Jamalpur* - - - 58
Mymensingh 119 156 „ 195 138
Tanga i1 30 41 ’ 64 81
Dink a 413 518 616 693
Farid}i ur 78 97 116 144
Chittagong 638 820 932 1,039
Sylhet 171 222 258 284
Ccmilla 136 182 218 248
Noakhal i 102 127 139 157
Giittagong 205 260 281 305
Chittagong Hill 
Tracts
24 29 36 45
TOTAL 2,065 2.757 3,258 3.685
NOTE: Table includes all brandies of scheduled cxtntercinl bankr,
and specialized financial institutions.
* Jtinvilpur was part of Mymensingh district up to 1978/1979.
SOURCE:Bangladesh Bank and Ministry of Finance, GOBD, Bangladesh 
Economic Survey, 1980-83, World Bank (1981a).
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As the use of modern inputs has increased, so the 
involvement of the state in agricultural development has also 
increased. This is indicated by the many—fold increase in 
the cost of development administration. The state apparatus 
has not only expanded its traditional major bureaucratic appendices 
(for example, police, government employees for filing work, 
military etc.), but it has also created many new departments 
like Integrated Rural Development (XRDP), the Rural 
Electrification Board, Handloom Board, Rural Development Board 
etc. Departments like the Bangladesh Agricultural Development 
Boards (BWB), the Power Development Boards (PDB) and many other 
regional development authorities have also expanded their 
activities. Several new rural institutions, inclduing the short 
lived Gram Sarkers. Youth Complex, various forms of co-operatives 
have also been created in recent years. All these have caused 
a phenomenal growth in the level of expenditure incurred on 
administration (See table 10.5).
TABLE 10.3
GROWTH IN THE EXPENDITURE ON ADMINISTRATION i 
1972-73 to 1980-81
YEARS Expenditure( at 1972/73 
factor cost) in million Taka
Increase in 
index: numbers 
(1972-73=100)
% of 
GDP
1972-73 1321 100.00 2.61
197^-75 2*l62 186.37 86
1976-77 3033 229.59 3.37
1977-78 3361 25*f.*f3 5.^7
1978-79 3663 277.29 5 .7 8
1979-80 39*-i-3 298. *f8 6 .0 2
1980-81 (Estimated) 321.35 6 .0 2
Source: Bangladesh Economic Survey, 1980-81:3*
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The inflow of state resources into the rural sector 
in recent years has brought with it,as we shall see, more 
tensions and inequalities amongst the peasantry. The rich 
peasants dominate the various institutions/committees/ 
organisations through which government assistance is channelled. 
And they are in a position to appropriate most of the resources 
in connivance with the bureaucrats and the ruling elites. The 
ruling elites depend on the rich peasants for mobilizing the 
peasantry for their political ends. The rural rich can 
exercise political power in the villages because of their 
economic domination and the relations of dependency which 
they have enforced on the rural poor over the years.
In return:
The rich peasants depend upon the state to provide 
modernising inputs to enable them to make their 
holdings more productive. They also seek to intermediate 
the flow of these inputs to smaller farmers so that 
surplus can be extracted from this class. State 
resources are thus used as instruments of dependency 
which keep the rural poor in bondage to the rich peasants. 
Within this category, one may include traders who may 
be rich peasants, or if not, who have a basic identity 
of interest with the rich peasant.
The rich peasant sees an expanding state sector as 
beneficial to himself in that it increases the volume 
of resources and instruments of control over the poor, 
available to him. He, in .turn, depends on the state 
bureaucracy to protect him from the consequencies 
of his exploitation.
At the same time he cultivates the local state 
agents of development to retain his monopoly over 
inputs and to use their extension services to increase 
his productive potential (Sohhan and Ahmed 1980:9-10).
In other words the rural rich acquire political power 
relations from therr prior, advantageous economic relations and use 
these political power relations "not only to maintain existing 
economic relations but also to acquire further economic 
resources originating from the urban sector/beyond the national
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boundaries®* (Siddiqui, 1980: 214-215) •
In our study villages, when we examined the distribution 
of modern inputs we found that rich peasants had grabbed the 
major share (see table 7.10). This was possible because of 
their domination of most of the rural institutions through 
which these inputs were distributed.
We shall consider this interaction of political power 
relations and economic advancement of the rural rich by 
looking at the following aspects of the Bangladesh state 
with particular reference to our study villages:
I* EFFECTS OF THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENT POLICIES ON THE PEASANTRY:
We shall examine the following major 
development policies:
(i) Land reform programmes .
O
By "beyond the national boundary" Siddiqui must have 
meant the resources coming in the form of foreign aid. Foreign 
aid constituted 1J.C^ of GBP and 79*4% of the development budget 
in 1979-80 and has a pervasive impact on the nature of 
development processes in Bangladesh with all their after effects. 
In Sobhan1s words:
"Aid is no longer an instrument which only touches 
the lives of a narrow class of the bourgeoisie.
A new aid - enriched class drawn from the ranks of 
the bourgeoisie and rich farmers may be its immediate 
and most successful beneficiaries and may well use aid to 
build themselves up as a class within the polity.
But the tentacles of aid now run deep into the 
society with a wider spectrum of the population, many 
of whom have considerable political muscle, now 
acquiring a vested interest in the continuation 
of the aid regime." (Sobhan, 1981: 39; see also 
Sobhan ,1982 )
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(ii) Integrated rural development programmes (lEDP) 
and policies related to other rural institutions, 
e.g.. Union Pari shad, Co-operatives etc.
(iii) Agricultural taxation policy.
(iv) Pood procurement policy.
(v) Manpower export and education policy.
2 . EVALUATION OP THE BIPLEMMTING MACHINAHY:
We will specifically look into the operation of 
the "bureaucracy - and law enforcing agency (police) - and 
their impact on the processes of differentiation of the 
peasantry.
1 . EFFECTS OP THE DEVELOPMENT POLICIES;
Ostensibely, the central theme of most development 
policies announced by the Bangladesh government has always 
been addressed to the reduction of poverty and inequality 
especially in rural areas (see FFYP, 1973-78J TIP, 1978-80; 
SEYP 1980-85). But, as we shall see, in the end ,
all these policies have further accentuated the state of 
inequality and more people have been thrown off the land to 
join the ranks of the rural poor. Let us consider a few 
of these major policies to substantiate this claim.
(i) LAND REFORM PKOGBAMMES:
Prom the macro point of view, we have already examined 
the major land reform programmes - their conception and 
implementation in chapter IV. The pronounced "egalitarian" 
objectives of these land reform acts fell short of the 
requirements and the effect could not be but ephemeral as it 
did not attack the problem of inequality at source. Even the 
minimum potential embodied in these programmes could not be 
realised because of the weakness of the implementation 
processes. After investigating a number of villages Siddiqui 
(1980c) came to the conclusion that 11 the scope of
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past land reforms legislations was extremely limited so 
that there was very little to be implemented. For example, 
the 53*3 acres/ family ceiling was disproportionately higher than 
the man-land ratio whether in 1950 or in 1972, and hence, 
land for redistribution from such ceiling limit was bound 
to be extremely meagre. However, even the little that was 
to be implemented went, by and large, unimplemented 
(Siddiqui, 1980c; 71)".
In our study villages as well we did not notice any 
attempt to implement the existing land reform programmes.
The target group of these much publicised programmes, the 
landless peasants, had a very low opinion of the sincerity of 
the government as regards their implementation.
The post-liberation land reform programmes envisage the 
distribution of Khas (owned by government)land amongst the 
landless and near landless peasants. But our investigation 
revealed that Khas land in both the villages was still under 
illegal occupation of rich peasants, especially those who 
were well connected with the local revenue officials.
In village 1, for example, the names of the landless 
peasants were listed twice over the past ten years. They 
were given the false hope that Khas land and excess 
(over the maximum ceiling) land would be distributed amongst 
them. But in re.ality that hope never materialised.
Their names were first listed in 1975~76« They had to 
pay taka 5/- each to the local Union Parishad (U.P.) member to 
get the forms. They paid another taka 10/- each to the said 
member for getting their forms attested by the Circle Officer 
(Revenue)^. Each of the applicants paid taka 25/- to the C.O. (Rev)
 ^ Ghana level revenue official (normally knows as C.O.(Rev).
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when he came to the nearby Tahsil Office (Revenue Office)
to investigate their cases. The same U.P. member collected
the money. This time with the calim that the C.O. (Rev)
10demanded Salami from them. Later the local Tahsilder 
charged taka 50/“ from each of the applicants for preparing 
documents. After a few months a magistrate come to the 
locality. The landless peasants were asked to assemble again 
in front of the Tahsil office, only to hear nice words of 
hope.
The II.P. member in question charged another taka 24/- 
from each of them as Nazrana of the Magistrate. Subsequently, 
they were' given notice to be present on a certain day in the 
Tahsil office when another high official visited them. This 
time they were asked to pay taka 100. The landless and near 
landless households sold their last resources (for example, 
chickens, goats, untensils etc.) and paid the money to the U.P. 
member and local officials in the hope that they would get some 
land. But that hope never materialised. The Khas land 
remained with the rich peasants, this time made legal in the 
name of their relations (fictitious landless).
There was another attempt to list the names of the 
landless households again in June 1981 . This time Cram Sarkar 
Prodhan was asked to do the unpleasant job. He being aware 
of what happened last time, declined to do this. The U.P. 
chairman intervened and told him to collect taka 2/- initially 
for each form rather than taka 5/-* Even then, most of the 
landless households did not show enough interest in this so- 
called distribution of Khas land. The Cram Sarkar Prodhan 
tried hard to get these households involved in the programmes 
but failed. The landless households no longer believed that 
government was serious about a land reform programme in rural 
Bangladesh.
10 The Union level revenue official (usually known as 
Nayeb Sahib).
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In the absence of any meaningful and deliberate 
attempts at land reform, as we have seen, the process of 
land concentration has been going on unabated in rural 
Bangladesh.
(ii) INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 'iRDP) AND 
OTHER RURAL INSTITUTIONS:
The Integrated Rural Development programme (iRDP) is 
a credit programme run by village co-operatives. The essential 
structure of this programme consists of:
(1) The primary co-operatives (KSS) located within the 
villages and organised by the farmers themselves.
(2) The primary co-operatives which are federated 
at the thana level (TCCA). TCCA not only co-ordinates the 
credit procurement from apex and distribution amongst the 
village co-operatives but also trains farmers to acquire productive 
and managerial skills.
The programme puts special emphasis at least in paper, 
on the small and medium farmers who are given credit tied to 
productive activity through supply of inputs. This model of 
co-operatives was first developed by Pakistan Academy for 
Rural Development in Comilla (hence the name Comilla model) in 
the 1960s. By the 1970s, the government of Bangladesh planned 
to replicate the experiences of the Comilla Model throughout 
the country. By 1980, there were 39610 primary co-operatives 
spread over 267 thanas. The following tables show the 
trend in growth of IRDP TCCAs and KSSs between 1972 and 1980.
Since 1974* IRDP co-operatives were also directed to 
include landless members. By 1980, ther percentage of 
landless members remained as low as 8 .14% (iRDP 1980).
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TABLE 10.6
TREND OF GROWTH OF IRDP CO-OPERATIV ES : 1972 - 1980
YEAR No. of TCCAs Total No. of KSSs KSS per TCCA
1972 33 5630 172
1973 87 10171 117
197^ 152 1^690 97
1975 161 17691 110
1976 162 18975 117
1977 200 2187^ 109
1978 250 275^8 110
1979 250 33511 13**
1980 . 267 39610 1^8
Source 
Note :
: Siddiqui, 1980d: 20 
Total number of Thanas = ^73.
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According to Siddiqui (l980d)this figure was 
inflated and the actual percentage of the landless members 
was not more than 3^ in any case. Mere numerical 
representation does not, however, mean anything. Effectively, 
the landless and landpoor members can exert very little 
influence on the way the co-operatives are run. Many 
evaluations of this programme have reached the conclusion that 
large farmers have taken over IRDP (Jones, 1979? SIDA/lLO 
Report, 1974? Khan, 1979? Blair, 1978; Abdullah et al, 1974? 
Hamid and Rahman, 1977 &nd many B.A.R.D. Research Reports).
Steve Jones, evaluating the IRDP co-operatives in
a southern district, notes:
Large farmers obtain a disproportionate amount 
of credit (more than can be explained by their 
larger land holdings), contribute the smallest 
percentage of savings mobilised by the co-operatives, 
and are the biggest defaulters on loans. Such 
defaulting can effect the credit worthiness of 
the entire KSS and, therefore, can stop the 
smaller farmers who repay credit more punctually 
from receiving further credit (S-fceve Jones,
1979: 67).
Rich farmers had the power to infiltrate the co-operatives 
and finally turned them into "closed clubs of kulaks". In 
the assessment of the planning commission, "the entire 
structure of the co-operatives seem to have become dominated 
by rural elite .... in conspiracy with the urban rich",
(GOBD 1974s 11 and 4)- The second five year plan document 
(1980-85) also notes, "the Comilla type of co-operatives (KSS), 
implemented by IRDP has benefited its members who are relatively 
rich farmers. It could not adequately serve the marginal 
and landless farmers", (GOBD, 1980: XII - 95)*
Hamid and Rahman, in their evaluation of two IRDP 
projects - one in Hat ore and the other in Gaibandha, both 
in North Bengal, came to the conclusion that the benefits 
of these co-operatives, if there be any, have largely 
gone into the pockets of the big farmers!
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The study demonstrates that, while in Natore and 
Gaibandha about 30% of co-operative farmers fall 
under the category of big farmers( having more than 
five acres of cultivable land of their own), almost 
all the executive committee members are surplus 
farmers ... ( Haraid and Rahman, '19775 2).
Abdullah et al (1974s 15) made a bench mark survey 
of four villages and found that, members of the IRDP 
co-operatives owned an average of 4-2 acres of land (the 
non-member households of these villages owned 2 .8 acres) 
and the functionaries (chairman, managers and model farmers) 
owned 6.16 acres as an average. In another paper, Abdullah 
et al (1976) claimed that 72 percent of all land belonging 
to the co-operative farmers was owned by the large farmers. 
Thana level co-operatives (TCCAs) were even more biased 
towards rich farmers (See table 10.7*
TABLE 10.7
AGRICULTURAL LANDOWNERSHIP PATTERN AMONG 
TCCA MANAGING COMMITTEE FUNCTIONARIES, 1980
LANDSIZE CLASS NUMBER PERCENTAGE
0 0 0
0 - 0 .5 0 5 1.70
0 .51-2 .00 38 12.92
' 2 .01-5 .0 0 112 38.10
5-01 and above 139 47.28
ALL SIZE CLASS 29^ 100.00
Source: Siddiqui, K, 1980d:26. The study was based on a survey 
of 25 selected TCCAs by IRDP officials in October, 1980.
363
Table 10.7 shows that farmers with more than 
5-00 acres of agricultural land constitute about half of 
the land of managing committee members (although they 
constitute only about 8^ of the agricultural households of 
the entire country). Since the assessment was made by the 
TCCA members themselves, it will not be unrealistic to 
assume that the figure was a gross underestimation.
In any case, IRDP, one of the major rural development 
programmes, as we have seen, has only strenghtened the 
hands of the rich peasants.
We did not notice much of IRDP activity in our study 
villages. However, in village 1, we observed that a co­
operative has been formed in and around a deep tube well 
supplied by the Bangladesh Agricultural Development 
Corporation. The co-operative had a number of similarities 
with an IRDP co-operative.
A few rich and middle farmers pioneered this
co-operative in 1975* They also included token members
from the small farmers group. Total number of households
involved were about 60 initially. They showed that they
would water about 200 acres of land. Arfan Sarkar became
the founder manager f this deep tube well co-operative.
In the first year they cultivated 150 acres with the help of
this deep tube well. The installation of the deep tube well
was heavily subsidised by the government and they were
charged a token price of only taka 65,000. The annual charge
for hiring the DTW was only taka 1200/-. But the committee,
"1 "1mainly the manager, charged taka 450/- per annum per acre 
for irrigation. The manager did not show any accounts to the 
general members. A section of the committee members protested 
against this. But the others supported the manager and the 
rebels had to leave the committee. A new set of more docile 
members have now been inducted into the committee.
In 1980, this was raised to taka 500/- per acre.
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Since the majority of the commitee members were 
rich farmers and also related to the manager, they did not 
protest against the manager's way of handling the irrigation 
scheme. It was decided that the surplus generated out of 
the contributions after deducting the cost would be 
deposited in the bank. The money deposited would eventually 
be paid to the BADG to pay the price of the well.
Apparently, no-one knows what has been happening to
the money collected so far. The manager himself gave us 
the following estimates of the income and cost involved in
the scheme for the Boro Season of 1980.
INCOME
Total contribution @ 450/- per acre for watering 
80 acres of land: 80 x 500 - Taka 40000.00.
EXPENBITI3HE:
Hiring charge of Deep Tube Well - TK 1200.00 
Fuel (diesel) - 12 drums @ TK 1200 = TK 14400,00
Mobil - 16 gallons @ TK 9 6.00 = 1536.00
Lubricating oil - TK 1200.00
Salary of manager (per season TK 800.00) = TK 800 
Drivers (2): 2 x 600 = TK 1200.00
TOTAL: = 20566.00
Surplus: TK 40,000.00 ~ TK 20366 = TK 19.664.
This amount was supposed to go to BADC as part payment of
the well. But nothing has gone there. General members 
complained that the manager and his committee members have 
been sharing this surplus since the DTW has been installed. 
In addition they need not pay any money for watering their 
own land. It is not surprising that Arfan Sarkar has been 
increasing his size of land ownership almost every year.
On the other hand, most small farmers found it extremely 
difficult to manage such a high amount of money for 
Irrigating their small plots. They have been deprived
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of the benefits of modern technology subsidised by the
government. The officials of BADC were supposed to look
into these malpractices. They, too, have been bribed and
12they did not bother to see who got the water.
Thus efforts like IRDP and irrigation programmes of 
BADC have further strenthened the already advantageous 
economic position of the rural rich in the villages which 
we studied.
UNION PARISHAP;
The Union Parishad is the last tier of the administrative 
set up in Bangladesh. This is an elected body and co-ordinates 
the local level developmental and other activities (Rahman, 
1981: 21-26), With the emphasis upon developing the rural 
institutions (FPYP and SFYP), the Union Parishads have in 
fact gained further importance. Although, with the brief 
intorduction of Gram Sarkers (willage government) the 
importance of Union Parishad was somewhat under threat; it 
has regained its structure as the Gram Sarkers have been 
abolished by the military government of General Ershad.
Union Parishads have traditionally been under the 
domination of the rural rich and almost all of those connected 
with this institution have gained economically and socially. 
Union Parishad leaders not only manage to appropriate a 
substantial portion of government resources (eg rural works 
programme, food for works programme, relief, rural credit, 
rural rationing system) that pass through them but also make 
some extra income by offering themselves as intermediaries
12 Similar collaboration between rich farmers and government 
officials was also observed by another researcher, Jansen, who 
spent quite a long time in the rural areas of Bangladesh 
in the late 1970Ts:
cont'd...
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to the villagers. They, being a part of the rural 
power structure, can easily reach the urban power 
structure and hence become contact men for police, revenue 
officials and all sorts of government officials involved 
in different developmental activities.
U.P. leaders get a good commission from the villagers 
for their roles as intermediaries and thus, inflate their socio­
economic position.
In a failry widespread survey of 132 U.P. leaders in 
sixty unions of ten districts in 197©> we found that the majority 
of the U.P, leaders came from a rich farmer background and that 
most of them enhanced their landownership size during their 
tenure as U.P. leaders. The following table gives the details:
footnote cont1d..
A condition for getting a deep tube well in an 
area is that a co-operative has to be formed, 
and the co-operative has to apply to government 
for a deep tube well... The key
persons in a co-operative are the chairman, the 
managers and the owner of the land where the 
deep tube well is sunk. In many cases one person 
can combine two or three of these positions. 
Generally, these are the biggest landowners in 
the area to be irrigated... Normally
there is a great demand for deep tube wells in 
an area. The people in government at central 
and local levels are well aware of this situation, 
and exploit it to their advantage. It is not unusual 
that a large amount of bribes will have to be paid 
to them by the rich people who start the co-operative 
... One important consequence of this way of
acquiring a deep tube well is that linkages between 
urban and rural elites are strenthtened...
The rich farmers who have had the expenses for the 
bribes inform the members of the co-operative 
of this, and demand compensation for providing 
water to others. A normal way to collect payment 
from the members is to demand 150 to 300 taka for 
irrigating one bigha of land or to ask for a 
certain percentage of the crops; 23% is common.
In this way, the rich farmer(s) can more than 
recover their expenses and the water from the deep 
tube well becomes a major source of income...
(Jansen, 1979: 73-74)*
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The matrix above shows that about 6C% of the 
U.P. leaders interviewed had more than 7*50 acres of 
land. Only 10% of the leaders came from a small farmer 
background. But all of these rich leaders were not 
originally rich farmers. At least 50% owned less than 
7 .50 acres of land when theybecame heads of households.
Again, of those who gained land, 49*20% were elected for 
either two or more terms. Thus we found a direct correlation 
between the holding of the U.P. office and gaining land.
In our study village 1, we found ample proof of this 
trend. During president Ayub’s regime, the late Osman 
Sarkar of this village was the chairman of the Union 
Council for two terms. When he first became chairman, he had 
virtually no standing as a landowner in this village as he 
was a government employee and did not stay in this village. 
But within a span of ten years he became one of the richest 
man in the village owning more than 12.5 acres of land and a 
double storied tin shed house. He acquired land from poor 
neighbours by dubious means and no-one could challenge him 
as he was at the apex of the local power structure. During 
his tenure as chairman he made many enemies and he was 
killed subsequently. But his family is still considered to 
be one of the richest in the village. His close association 
with the state apparatus made him rich.
When we examined the past and present land holding 
positions of two current U.P. members of village 1, we 
noticed a similar trend.
CASE 1; JAMIR UDDCT, U.P. MEMBER:
Jamir Uddin became a U.P. member in 197& and in the 
last five years he has emerged as a rich and powerful rural 
leader. Besides his role as a U.P. member, he is also a 
seasonal trader involved in rice and jute trading. He gets
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his capital from the local commercial hank as he is 
very friendly with the local bank manager. He is now a 
busy man. He supervises the rural works programme and 
distributes relief to the rural destitutes. And 
invariably, he gets a share of it. During our stay in the 
village, we found him organising the rural works programme 
just immediately before the beginning of the rainy season.
Since the bulk of the rural works involves earth work, the 
rain helped him to hide the exact amount of earth that has 
been put on the road . The workers who worked in this 
project thought that at least 50^ of the fund allocated for 
this project went straight into his pocket. He is also an 
influencial member of the managing committee that runs the 
local DTW (irrigation) scheme. He need not pay the normal 
price for watering his land under this scheme as he always 
defends the corrupt scheme manager. He, too, gets some share 
of the surplus emanating from the scheme .
He is very often called to the Salish to dispense justice 
in the event of any local dispute. As a Salish judge he 
takes bribes from both parties to the disputes.
About three years ago the sons of late Sobhan Mondal 
started a dispute over their father's land. This land was 
near the land of Jamir TJddin. There was a small fight amongst 
the brothers over that land. Jamir Uddin councelled one of 
brothers to launch a legal suit against his brothers.
Jamir Uddin offered him money (of course in lieu of mortgaged 
land) and went to town to help him making the suit. The case 
dragged on for the two years after 1979* In 'the meantime, 
the sons of Sobhan Mondal sold about 2 acres of land to 
Jamir Uddin at a lower rate than the market price.
Jamir Uddin had 11 acres of land when he became 
the head of the household .about ten years ago. Now he 
owns about 25 acres of land. And $0% of this excess land 
was acquired after he became the member of the Union Parishad,
i.e. during the priod 1976-1981*
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CASE 2: MODTAZ MEMBER:
Montaz, like Jamir Uddin has been a member of the 
Union Parishad for the last five years. Montaz was a 
small farmer in the 1960s. He used to steal wood from the 
nearby Madhupur jungle and supplied it to the Beparis of 
Jagnathgon.i Ghat, in 1964 he suddenly brought home 100 
bundles of c.i. sheets . People are still puzzled about 
this incident. He did not have sufficient money to buy 
the c.i. sheets . People suspect that he must either
have stolen or hijacked it from some other people. He used 
a part of it to build his own house and sold the rest to buy 
land. After that he began to lend money to needy farmers 
at an exorbitant rate of interest with their land as 
collateral. The poor farmers could never repay that loan 
and, ultimately handed over the mortgaged lands to Montaz.
By 1975, he had become a rich farmer and owned about 8 acres 
of land. His newly acquired land made him a powerful 
man in the village.
Many of his associates advised him to contest the 
1976 Union Parishad election. He became a member. During 
five years of tenure as a U.P. member, a huge amount of 
government resources have poured into this village. And 
as expected, most of them went to Montaz and his close 
associates . By 1980, Montaz had already become the owner 
of 18 acres of land. And in village 1, 18 acres of 
agricultural land is indeed a lot of land, where the 
average land per household is only about half an acre.
When interviewed, he felt his association with the state 
machine helped him gain land and power.
Besides IRDP and Union Parishad, all other smaller 
organisations like the school committee,, the mosque 
committee, the jute Oo-operatives and the like, were found 
to be dominated by the large farmers. The poor were hardly 
involved with those organisations that could attract some 
governmental resources to the village.
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Not only did the rich farmers dominate the rural 
organisations, hut they also had access to outside 
organisations, such as the Krishi Bank, the Police Station, 
the regional offices of the ruling party etc.located 
in the nearby towns. The rich farmers had also urban relations 
and they always used these connections to enhance their 
economic and social positions. We can present two case 
studies (both from village 1) which involved such connections.
CASE 5; DANESH SHUDKHOR1 ^ :
Danesh was lucky to have an uncle-in-law working in the 
local Krishi Bank (agricultural bank) in the nearby town. With 
his help, Deneshi borrowed taka 5?000 at an official interest 
rate of in 19^7* He invested taka 2000 in land and bought 
2-jy acres of land. He gave the rest i.e. taka 5000 as loans 
to the needy villagers at the usurious rate of 10C^.
By the end of the year he received taka 6000 from his debtors. 
Next year he borrowed more money from the bank. This time 
he changed the system of money lending.
He bought paddy with that money. He loaned paddy 
instead of cash to the debtors. The debtors had to return 
two Maunds of rice if he took 1 Maund at the end of the 
cropping season, (i.e. after about 4 months). He could 
lend three times a year and get at least 5 rate of 
interest.
Danesh had virtually no land when he started this 
money lending with the support of the state sponsored 
credit. Now he owns about 10 acres of agricultural land.
13.
Shud Khor means one who lives on money lending .
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CASE 4: AZIM UDDIN:
Azimuddin was a store keeper at a local BADC godown.
He was in charge of the insecticides and diesel. At the 
beginning of 1974 be managed to steal 3 drums of insecticides 
(about 15 maunds). He told his superiors that there were 
holes in the drums and the insecticide leaked out of them.
There was a real crisis of insecticide in the later part 
of this year. And he sold this insecticide in the black 
market at about tk 40,000/-. He bought paddy with that 
money. Village 1 witnessed the worst famine in 1974*
Azimuddin started giving loans to the needy fanners at an 
approximate rate of interest of 10C^ per cropping season.
He took land as the collateral. Many of the poor farmers 
repaid the money with interest. But others defaulted. And 
Azimuddin gave even more loans to the defaulters and thus 
forced the debtors to hand over their entire land. Azimuddin 
had only 3*5 acres of land in the mid sixties. By 1980, his 
sons had 15 acres of land (Azimuddin died in early 1980). His 
sons continued as money-lenders.
We could multiply such examples. The essential point 
is that an association with the state apparatus is always 
helpful in enhancing the economic position.
(iii) AGRICULTURAL TAXATION POLICY:
That the government is heavily dependent on the rich 
farmers is also clear from the failure of successive governments 
to introduce a progressive taxation system in the agricultural 
sector. Hossain et al (1978) and Siddiqui (l980b:424“427) 
have clearly demonstrated that despite an increase in the 
resource flow into the rural areas, there has been a fall in 
the real vaiue of rural tax revenue. Table 10*9 gives an 
indication of the general tax structure prevailing in the 
1970s in rural Bangladesh:
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As we can see from table 10.9 5 the net tax 
burden on the rural sector has fallen overtime 
The figures have been arrived at after adjusting the concealed 
taxes with the total tax burden figures. In the last two 
or three years the subsidy and price support have been 
partially withdrawn. To this extent, the net burden of 
taxes must have increased a little recently. But compared 
to the increase in the agricultural income of rural 
households, due to the spread of the new technology, the 
burden is still either negative or minimal. As we have 
seen in Chapters VIII and IX, the beneficiaries of the new 
technology have been the large farmers. But they pay the 
least in terms of taxes (as evidenced in the" ratios of 
direct tax to total agricultural income, as shown in the 
table. Neither the benefit principle nor the ability 
principle appears to be operating in the context of 
Bangladesh (see Hossain et ad for an elaborate examination of 
this aspect of agricultural taxation in Bangladesh). Land 
taxes are still paid as fixed amount and in that way the rich 
peasantry gain. Compared to the direct taxes, we notice a 
greater increase in indirect taxes. Normally the burden of 
indirect tax is more on the poorer section of the population 
(SeeHo£sainetal,1978 for an estimation). Also the amount of U.P. 
taxes has increased at a higher rate in the recent years. 
Whereas collection of taxes, rates, fees and tolls by U.P. 
was 79*66 million taka in 1973~74> 'ttie amount increased to 
182-40 million take in 1977~78* The
increase in percentage terms was 129 over the base period.
And as we shall see, the major share of these enhanced indirect 
taxes was borne by the poorer sections of the peasantry as 
they had little say in the decision making processes of the 
rural power structure. In addition to this, the procurement 
price of food has been set at a higher price than the market 
price and thus cancelling some of the concealed taxes which 
used to be imposed on the rich peasantry.
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In our study villages, we found that the U.P. 
leaders had always been lenient to their fellow rich farmers 
and harsher on the poorer ones while deciding how much to 
charge as local government taxes. The poor peasants also 
complained that they had to pay more than the usual land 
tax to the local revenue officials as they would always 
charge some unexplained ’extras1. On a number of occasions, 
said one of our informants, in village 1, poor peasants had 
to pay taka 10/~ although the revenue office gave them the 
receipts of taka 1 /-. The richer groups, being more
powerful, can always challenge the revenue officials in such 
cases.
The rich farmers form the power bases of the ruling 
class. They not only form the ’votebank1 for the ruling 
elites they can equally be stubborn in the face of any plea 
for paying higher amount of taxes. During our discussions 
with the rich farmers, we often pointed out to them that 
the government was supplying them subsidised inputs and now 
that their income has increased they should pay a higher 
amount of agricultural tax. But the rich farmers responded 
that any government was .obliged to give such concession 
to them for its survival and they need not pay anything. ’The 
state needed them’ - they said.
The policy makers are aware of this attitude of the rich 
farmers and they have been very careful in formulating any 
policy with regard to imposing higher agricultural taxes on the 
rich peasantry. This had always been a very sensitive issue 
and all governments hesitated to take any step in that 
direction. There were some attempts to pass a law in this 
regard, but the MPs of all parties had always opposed such a 
move unanimously.
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An explanation of such an attitude amongst the 
policy makers has been given by Siddiqui (1980b: 440) and 
Jahan, 1976). Siddiqui has suggested that the majority of 
the MPs have rural interests despite their urban connection.
Most of them were absentee landlords and depended on the 
rural rich to mobilise votes fnr them at election time.
According to Siddiqui1 s calculation, 70.9% of the MPs 
in 1979 bad at least 10.00 acres of agricultural land under 
their ownership. 1 6.^% of them reported their principal
occupation as agriculture (according to a government 
statistic^ the figure was 21.7%). The data suggest that the 
majority of them were abentee landowners and in most 
cases sharecropped out their land. It is quite natural that 
they would oppose any kind of direct taxation of the rural 
rich. The bureaucrats, too, especially at the lower echelons, 
are well connected with agriculture through extended family 
relationships and, at times, as absentee owners of land, and 
as such become natural allies of the rural rich (See Yylder,
1982: 15 for his emphasis on this point).
(iv) FOOD PR(XDREMMT POLICY:
The government has been making attempts to procure 
food internally during the harvesting season, at a price 
higher than the market price. Besides using the 
bureaucratic machinery, government has also been trying to 
use local government leaders (U.P. leaders/Gram Sarker 
leaders) to procure paddy and wheat. Government has also started 
establishing rural food storage to stock the procured 
rice. According to government policy, this would stabilize 
the prices of food and give farmers an incentive to produce 
more. But, as we have seen in our study villages and 
elsewhere, this programme has only benefited the rich 
farmers, in particular the trader-cum-leaders of the rural 
rich (see Rahman et al, 1982, for an exposition and evaluation 
of government policy with regard to procurement of paddy and wheat).
14
See BBS, 1979: 34- 
*Now defunct.
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Poor peasants were unable to break the bureaucratic 
barrier and get near to the procurement centres.
In most of study tours we were told that local
leaders were misusing government resources given to them
15to procure food in connivance with the bureaucracy . In 
other words, the food procurement policy of government has 
become an extra bonus to the richer section of the 
peasantry.
(v) MANPOWER EXPORT POLICY;
Since the mid 1970s, labour migration from Bangladesh 
to the Middle East has been increasing rapidly (See World 
Bank, 1981: Staff Working Paper No. 454)* Though the 
rate of migration is highest from three districts (i.e. 
Chittagong, Dhaka and Sylhet) most of the other districts 
are also not far behind. The increase in manpower export 
from Bangladesh (a predominant portion of them being from 
rural areas) is shown in the following table:
15J According to a newspaper report, a sum of taka 601.9 
million was distributed amont 43520 members of U.P. and 
Gram Sarker in August 1980 under an official order of late 
President Ziaur Rahman. Each of the members were told to 
buy at least 500 maunds of paddy. A government circular 
was given to these member to furnish information about the 
exact amount of rice they procured. They gave written 
statements to the Thana administration. But by October 1981, 
it became clear that not even half of that sum has been 
utilized for procurement of paddy. They all furnished 
fictitious in formation. Govternment . could not do much to 
regain this money. (See Ittefaq » 23rd March, 1982).
TABLE 10.10 
SHARE OF REMITTANCE 'BJ EXPORT AND
FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS:1975-76 to 1979-80
( In million Taka)
ITEMS 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80
1. Remittance from 
Bangladeshis 
working abroad
732.0
(11.65)
1910.5
(18.46)
2194.6
(23.41)
2678.7
(21.76)
3785.0
(28.25)
2. Export Earnings 5551.7 6670.1 7178.2 9637.0 9611.9
(88.35) (81.54) (76.59) (78.24) (71.75)
3- Total Foreign 
Exchange 6283.6 8180.6 9372.8 12315.7 13396.9
Earnings ( 100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
(100.00) (100.00)
Source: Mahmood, R.AO981), 1 Immigrants1 remittance as a source
of foreign exchange—  the Bangladesh 
Experiences', IDS, Sussex.
Note: / Figures in parentheses represent column percentages
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As we can see from table 10.10, the share of 
remittances in total foreign exchange earnings has 
been increasing quite rapidly over the last few years.
The impact of these remit.ances on the process of 
differentiation of the peasantry can be enormous. We did not 
come across any household in our study villages which has a 
migrant member abroad. But we observed a few households in 
adjoining villages who had some of their members in the 
Middle East. The huge amount of money sent by these migrant 
members created serious imbalances in the land market of the 
villages. Normally, only a rich farmer can afford to sent 
his son abroad. It cost a lot of money (not less than 
Tk. 30>000)* So a middle or poor farmer cannot think of sending 
some-one abroad. Moreover, it needs good urban connections 
to strike a deal with the manpower recruiting agent.
The additional money pouring into the hands of the
already landrich families in rural Bangladesh from abroad
16has further strengthened the rich families. And they, 
in the absence of any other suitable avenues of investment, 
prefer fo buy land from the poorer families. The land price 
in the areas from which a large number of migrant workers 
have gone to the Middle East has suddenly shot up and it has 
further accentuated the processes of land transfer from the 
poor to the rich households. It is felt by most villagers that 
the manpower export will have a significant depeasantising 
impact in the villages when more people go abroad for in 
the future.
Osmani and Mahmud call them 1 super rich* :
The inflow of remit ;ance has thus led to the 
emergence of a new class of ’super rich* and 
has grossly exacerbated the existing problem of 
income inequality. The conclusion is fortified 
by the finding that the typical migrant does not 
belong to the poorest class of the society. 
(Osmani and Mahmud, 1980: 26)
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(vi) EDUCATION POLICY;
Education is, in fact, a resource. Unless educated, 
once cannot think of making links with the outside world.
The rich farmers in both of our study villages have sent 
their children to the educational institutions and some of 
the rich farmers have already enhanced their economic positions 
with the help of the money and power of their members 
residing in urban centres. From our findings, the level of 
education was found to be concentrated in the landrich 
groups. The poorer households cannot afford to send their 
sons and daughters to the educational institutions. They 
prefer to send their children to work at a very low age under 
tremendous economic pressure. In village 1, QCP/o of those who 
were educated at more than the secondary level came from 
households owning more than 5*00 acres of land. A similar 
trend was noticed in village 2. On the other hand, the 
majority of the ’dropouts* were from the poorer groups 
(see Saleh et al, 1979)*
Thus the state resources flowing into the educational 
sector strengthened the position of both the urban and 
rural rich.
Erom our investigation of the public policies so far, 
we have seen that they are biased towards the rural rich and 
create further inequalities amongst the already unequal 
rural households.
In addition to the inherent bias against the poorer groups, 
in these policies, the implementing machinery gives a further 
boost to the whole processes of making society more 
unequal. In order to try and understand the differentiating 
mechanism, we talked to three government officials who had 
direct interaction with the peasantry. Normally they would
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not communicate openly. But given the assurances of 
their anonymity and the objective of our research, they 
at last gave us frank confessions about their own wealth 
and activities. The three officials were 
(1) An officer in charge of a police station (OC), who 
originates from our village 1; (2) A circle officer in charge 
of the co-ordination of the development activities of a 
Thana (CO Dev) operating near our village 2; and (5) A 
Bank Manager, placed at the market place adjacent to our 
village 1. Their testimonies shed light upon the role of 
the state as an element accentuating differentiation of the 
peasantry.
We have chosen a Police Officer, because the police
represent the protectors of law and order and work as the
principal instrument of violence, mostly used by the ruling
17class on the others . They are the most visible 
representatives of a coercive state. We chose a Circle 
Officer (Dev) because most of the developmental resources 
pass through him and he is the main contact point of the 
state. As we have noted, nationalised banks have expanded 
their branches into the rural areas and banks are playing 
an important role in distributing institional credit in the 
rural areas. So we selected a Bank Manager to give his 
version of banking activities.
(A) COMMISSION OP A POLICE OFFICER (OC):
"I am a very new officer and was given the charge of 
the police station only 6 months back. Before I was working 
as a second officer in another police station. My father used 
to work as a clerk in a semi-government office in Dhaka.
He died about two years ago and I became the head of the 
household. My father left about 1.3 acres of land.
17 The police, as an organised force has traditionally been 
an ally of the rural rich and has always acted as their 
protector (see Shaterji, 1981» for the historical perspective).
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During the last two years of service, I have doubled 
that amount and we have at the moment 2.6 acres of 
agricultural land. In addition to that I am supporting 
the educational and other expenses of the family. I have 
already given abouttk33,000 in cash for that. In all, I 
have given my family tk. 1,13*000 up till now. I have some 
savings and recently I got married. You can say I have 
earned about tk two lakh during the last two years. Now 
that I am an 0C, I hope to earn more. I am very well placed 
now and my minimum income per month is taka25,000. Some 
0C s earn even more than that.
There are different channels through which we get 
money. Since I am in charge of Feri ghat, I get straight 
tk.12,000 a month from the ghat alone. The rest of the 
money comes from different cases. To be honest, we police 
are friends of the rich. We cannot survive without 
middlemen. Normally Union Parishad Chairman/member, 
ex-members/Chairmen, businessmen etc. are our contact men.
They are the people who bring cases and money for us.
They too get the share. We also give certain percentages 
of our'income to our superiors.
We are heavily biased against the poor. The poor 
can hardly come near to us. But influential rich farmers 
are smart enough to walk into our office and say hello 
(of course, with a packet of foreign cigarettes). They keep 
us up to date about the developments in their areas. Normally, 
we do not want to accept a case, however genuine that may 
look like. We simply will not entertain a case unless the 
petitioner pays us a lump sum. The contact men usually 
pay that money. We than proceed to catch the 'culprits’.
We normally apprehend a number of possible 'criminals'. 
Many a time we take extra money to catch extra men. Some 
people give us money to harass their factional opponents.
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Then we take money from both parties. We take money 
from the petitioner promising a very strong final charge 
sheet against their opponent and we take money from the 
other party promising exactly the opposite. In the final 
analysis, we count money and weigh our comments accordingly. 
I understand many innocent people are victim of our 
power game and many of them lose wealth, land, prestige, 
everything. Let me give you an example of how a self- 
sufficient peasant became landless in about six months 
because of police intervention.
A owned 3 acres of land and B owned 4 acres of land.
They were neighbours. One day A !s cow trespassed B's land
and spoiled his crops. B complained against A to the
local Matbars (TJ. P. members). They did not solve the
dispute. Next time B's cow went to A's field. He gave
18the cow to government Khoar and B had to pay some fine 
to get his cow back. Next time when A's cow went to 
B's field both of them began to qurrel and at one point 
B hurt A with a piece of wood. The Matbars advised A to 
file a case against B. A came to me along with the local 
U.P. mamber (my contact man) and gave me tk 10,000 to 
accept thfe case. He (U.P. member) also requested me to 
apprehend a number of people who were relatives of B. I 
issued warrant against at least six of them and apprehended 
four. This time another headman who I knew very well came 
and offered me tk 700 so that my sepoys don't beat them.
I accepted it. Then I was offered another tk 1000/- for 
not chasing the other two accused.
Animal's jail, where animals who trespass others 
crop fields are detained and released after a fine.
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A was pressing for a favourable final charge sheet 
against B and his associates. I demanded tk 3000*00 
for that. He sold a part of his land to my contact man 
(U.P, mamber) and gave me tk 25*00. I gave charge sheet 
against the 3 accused and let the. others go (of course, 
after getting tk 3000). B has also sold a part of his 
land to the said headman.
The case is now in the magistrate's court. The 
lawyers, Chaprasis, Magistrates, U.P. members, Headmen - 
.all of them are squeezing money from both parties. I 
would not be surprised if I find both of them either landless 
or very near to that position by next year. That is how 
we the law enforcing agency people can force some self- 
sufficient peasants to be paupers. This has been the 
practice of the police department traditionally and I am 
not an exception.
(B) CONFESSION OP A GO:
"I am 44 years old and I have been working as CO (Dev) 
for the last ten years. I am an MA and I am a bit more 
polite than many of my colleagues. That is my crime. I do 
not get promotion. I cannot make my superiors happy 
as I cannot take money from my clients in sufficient amount 
and pass a good share to my superiors. Even then I cannot 
keep my eyes closed. Money comes - may not be in bulk 
(as many of my colleagues boast of). I am a relatively 
poor CO. I have only constructed a two storied building 
in a district town and I am the owner of only 15 acres 
of land. My wife has 20 ounces of gold ornaments 
(an ounce costs about tk10000). My monthly salary is about 
tk 1250 and my monthly expenditure exceeds tk 5000. If 
I count the bribe, my monthly income is on an average of 
tk 10,000. It is not very difficult to get money.
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My signature is very important. Nothing will get passed 
unless I put my signature. These days the Thana has become 
the focus of administration and I am the chief executive of 
thana, I co-ordinate the activities of at least 20 different 
departments and every department has to get my consent before 
they finally get a project passed. Normally I get the 
maximum money from the rural works programme and food for 
works programme. The plan submitted by the chairman of 
U.P. has to be forwarded by me. And once a project has been 
passed by the relevant ministry it has to be implemented 
under my supervision. So I am the keyman. The chairman gets 
the budget alright, but always leaves a certain percentage 
for me and the SDO (my superior officer). The very nature of 
the works programme is such that I can always raise an 
objection. So the chairman always keeps me happy. Ve 
don't give cash to the chairman. We always give in 
kind- wheat. The godown-man always gives the chairman 
%  less than what we allot. The chairman has to accept it.
He keeps certain percentage for himself. He has to give 
a share to the Thana project implementation officer, the 
project supervisor, my office clerk. Then he has to 
keep the mouths of local influentials shut. At the end of 
the day, T reckon not even 30^ of the total budget reaches 
the village. The rural landless labourers sign the master 
rolls for say ten seers a day but get actually 2.5 seers.
The chairman adjusts the account by that means. We all 
know this. But what can we do?
At the beginning of my career I used to be slightly 
embarrassed to take money directly from the chairmen. We 
used to get the money through our clerks. But nowadays 
we don't trust them either. We get it straight from the 
chairmen. Last year alone, I took about 85,000 tk cash 
from five chairmen„
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The Chairmen know our weakness and they are, 
therefore, not afraid of bungling the government resources.
The U.P. chairmen share this money with other influent ials.
You can say that the richer peasantry is the net beneficiary 
of the state sponsored development works,r.
(C) CONFESSION OP A BANK MANAGER:
"I have been here for the last three years. We 
started very modestly. Initially we had very little 
deposits. But many farmers are opening accounts. Medium 
and small farmers too are depositing quite a lot of money.
But they do not get the credit. In most cases, the rich 
farmer cum trader gets overdraft facilities. I give short 
term loans to the local traders as well. They give me a part 
of the profit. I have given an overdra t amounting to 
half a million tk to an aratdar, even though he cannot get 
it if I strictly follow the banking principle. Why should I?
I get a part of the profit as well.
Let me give an example of how agricultural credit is 
being misdirected. We have a special agricultural credit 
programme for the small farmers. A U.P. member took tk 2000 
as credit in the name of a small farmer without even informing 
him. When a notice was given to that small farmer, he was 
simply shocked. He came straight to the bank. We understood 
what went wrong. We advised him to contact the local 
U.P. mamber. The U.P. member, himself being the culprit, 
charged another taka 100 from that poor fellow to settle 
the matter. And I knew very well what was happening".
When we closely examine these 'confessions', we 
can find how corrupt and unjust is the whole state apparatus 
of Bangladesh. Bribing an official for any job is now-a-days 
an accepted practice in Bangladesh. From our field investigation 
we noticed that out of 54 households who actually received 
institutional agricultural credit in village 1 from the local
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banks, at least 17 of them (i.e. about one third) told 
us that they had to bribe the bank officials to draw the 
loans. Households with lower income and owned land had to 
pay more propritionately than their rich counterparts to 
get this loan.
About 6C% of the households in village 1 complained 
that they had to bribe the land settlement officials who 
came to survey their land and finalize records of ownership 
of the land. The settlement officials took about 60,000 
taka from village 1 alone in 1981 as bribe. The major 
part of this amount went from the poorer peasantry who 
always feel insecure and vulnerable in front of the 
government officials unlike the rich peasants. A few of the 
rich farmers became agents of the officials and earned a good 
amount during the settlement programmes. We saw poor peasants 
selling their last resources? like the only cow/goat and 
arranging cash to settle 'disputes1. In many cases the 
illiterate poor farmers were unnecessarily harassed for minor 
irregularities in tax payment. In others the rich and 
influential farmers influenced the settlement officials 
to put extra pressure on the poor peasant so that they could 
buy their land. And in most cases the poor peasants 
succumbed to such pressures.
In fine, we found most government officials directly 
connected with the villagers minting money in the name of 
providing services and resources to them. Generally they 
collected this extra money through their contacts (invariably 
rich and influential villagers). All these have made the 
already unequal asset ownership situation in the villages that 
we have studied even more unequal.
Most people in the villages are well aware of this close 
connection between the government officials and the rural rich. 
When we discussed this with the poor and the landless farmers 
on their own, they said unuqtvoca bly that the police and other
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government officials were looking after the interests 
of the rich. Again when we sat down with the rich separately 
and asked their opinion they were much more diplomatic 
in their answer. They said the government officials looked 
after the interests of all villagers.
Poor household have no confidence in government
offices and unless pushed to, they do not want to get involved
17with the administration. The SIDA/BIDS survey, on landless, 
conducted in 1978 in ten different villages of Bangladesh, 
more than 71% of the respondents (215 out of 310 landless 
agricultural labourers) thought that the U.P. leaders mainly 
represented the rich and 79% of them (238 out of 310) said 
that the Thana officials represented the interests of either 
the rich or the government. We noticed similar apathy in the 
poor about the government in our study villages.
CONCLUSION:
So our field experience does not support the hypothesis 
that the state is neutral, as is often aserted. As we have 
seen in the foregoing, the structural effects of state 
intervention with respect to the peasantry in Bangladesh have 
only facilitated the continuation and consolidation of the 
domination of the poor by the rich. Indeed, the state has 
created new classes dependent on it for access to all kinds of 
subsidised inputs and 'developmental* allocations. The ruling 
c I o l s s  draws its main support from these classes for its 
survival. Even though some of the poor farmers may have 
genuinely benefited from the improvement in technology, poor 
peasants as class actually now hold less power vis-a-vis 
rich farmers (see flow chart 10i for a diagrametic expositon 
of the interdependence of the state and the rich peasantry).
So on the whole we may argue that state intervention has 
actually helped enhance the accumulative power of the rich 
peasantry and the bureaucrats and extended their areas of 
exploitation. One can, therefore, conclude that the state in 
Bangladesh is negotiating the subsumption of labour to capital
17' See Yylder, op.cit: 65. I was also co-researcher on this project.
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and, in doing so, is actually stimulating increased 
social differentiation within rural households.
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CHAPTER XI 
SUMMARY'AND CONCLUSION
We cam summarise the results of our investigation into the 
peasantry of Bangladesh as follows :
1. i) It is argued that the incidence of poverty and landless­
ness has increased amongst the vast majority of the rural population 
in Bangladesh during the last few decades. Simultaneously a handful of 
rich peasants have increased their wealth and power.
ii) There have been basically two points of view concerning 
the causes of such inequality. One group of scholars think that the 
demographic variables are the most crucial factors and consider the 
phenonmenon as temporary. If population growth can be halted, the pro­
cesses which cause these differences will be of little significance. By 
asserting the primacy of demographic factors, this group rejects the 
presence of conflicting classes in rural Bangladesh. The other group, 
though they do not underestimate the importance of demographic factors, 
attempt to explain this inequality and poverty in terms of socio-economic 
relations.
iii) These contrasting views on agrarian changes in Bangladesh 
strikingly resemble the famous debate on differentiation of the peasantry 
in Russia in the late 19th and early 20th century.
2. The debate has deep historical roots. The populist and the 
latter day Neo-populist views on the peasantry were fiercely opposed by 
the Marxists. The two leading figures in the debate were Chayanov who was 
an advocate of demographic differentiation and Lenin, who emphasised 
social differentiation. The former believed that the differences within 
the Russian peasant economy were a purely temporary phenomenon and 
could be explained in terms of the growth and disintegration of family 
size. According to Chayanov , the peasantry was a homogeneous entity and 
showed extreme strength of survival. But the Marxists, and especially 
Lenin, viewed the Russian peasantry as highly differentiated and frag­
mented into conflicting classes arising out of the development of commo­
dity production and the exploitation of labour. The debate went on well 
in the 1920s until it was suddenly halted by Stalin.
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3. Both schools of thought introduced interesting methodological 
devices to prove their ideas empirically, They took the help of the 
Zemstvo Statistics available in Russia and.also carried out their own 
empirical research. While Chayanov himself led the Production-Organisation 
School in rural research to test his ideas on demographic differentiation, 
Kritsman led the Agrarian Marxists of the time to test the primacy of 
class differentiation. The methodological developments witnessed in 
Russia while the debate wets taking place can be of immense value to 
present day researchers attempting to understand the agrarian problems 
of Third World countries. The applicability of the debate can be tested 
by drawing the relevant hypotheses from it and then putting them to the 
test.
k* The attempt may be made at two levels : the macro and the 
micro. In this study v/e have first looked into the changes in the agra­
rian structure of Bangladesh from macro point of view. The macro view 
from the 19^0s to 1980s reveals that the agrarian structure has been 
becoming increasingly unequal ; resulting in a higher level of landless- 
ness and pauperisation, while a few became more wealthy and powerful.
The macro investigation is followed by micro level findings from two 
villages of Bangladesh. Village-1 is from more fertile East Bengal, 
which has already witnessed 'the drive for modernisation'. Village-2 is 
in North Bengal.‘It is a typical, backward village with no access to 
modern agricultural inputs.
5. Our data from both the villages did not lend support to the
Chayanovian notion of a homogeneous peasantry. We did not get any 
consistent correlation between family size and landholding size as 
expected by the Chayanovian view. Nor did we get any positive relation­
ship between the consumer-worker ratio and the level of income.
The modern version of Chayanovian ideas has been formulated by 
Shanin in the sahpe of his social mobility schema. We constructed 
mobility matrices with the help of the past and present landownership 
information. We did not note a fluid .situation as suggested by Shanin.
In fact, we found that the majority of today! rich households also origi­
nated from rich households of the past. The rich households have 
persisted long enough to emerge as a class in our study villages.
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6. On the contrary, we observed a striking inequality amongst 
the rural households with regard to the ownership/control of land. The 
concentration of land in the hands of a few households in both the 
villages was indeed very significant. The top 10% of the households in 
village-rl owned 33*91$ of total agricultural land, in 195*1 and they 
increased their share of the same to 50.28% in 1981, They operated 28.37% 
of the total land in 1951 and the figure rose to ^5-70% in 1981. At the 
other end of the spectrum, the bottom 60% of households have been consis­
tently losing their shares. Thus they owned 2 h * k % %  of agricultural land 
and operated 29.57$ of total operated land in 1951* These figures dropped 
to.9.93$ and 1^.71% respectively in 1981. We observed a similar trend of 
concentration and d.fspossession in other village- too.
7. We observed acute differences between different groups of 
peasant households in both villages with respect to :
i) Ownership of draught animals,
ii) Farming implements e.g. plough, yoke, spade, 
pumps etc.
iii) Techniques of production,
iv) Ownership of other assets e.g. houses, radio, 
trees and different household assets, 
v) Pattern of income and expenditure.
Vi) Market participation, 
vii) Food intake and standard of living.
We observed a clear trend of differentiation between owners and 
non-owners of the above material elements of production. The extent of 
differentiation varied from village to village.
8. We have seen from our field work findings that these differ­
ences can be explained in terms of the relations of production and 
exchange. We found that the rich peasants have a stronger command over 
the surplus generated in the rural economy. They extract this surplus 
by virtue of their advantageous positions in tenural arrangements, 
money lending, mortgage and market participation.
9. The rich peasants are also exploiters of others labour. It 
is because of their increased exploitation that the poorer groups of 
peasants are being dispossessed and ultimately proletarianised. That
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the poor peasantry has been dispossessed and proletarianised became 
clear from the following :
i) The repossession.of operated land by the rich farmers from 
their tenants.
ii) Growth of wage labour, especially the 'worker novices* (workers 
for the first time),
iii) Movement from 'bonded' to 'free' labour,
iv) 'Purification' of the wage payment - from kind to cash 
payment.
The extent of proletarianisation differed from village to village. 
Landless agricultural workers and marginalised peasants in village-1 
appeared to us more proletarianised than in village-2. We noted this by 
observing the followings i
i) The extent of ' class-in-itself' to 1class-for-itself1 
changes.
ii) The disintegration of kinship relations and development 
of class struggle (th. ough partial).
10. We have also examined the role and the nature of the state in 
differentiating the peasantry. We have seen that the Bangladesh state, 
through its policy and apparatus, has been aiding the rich peasants in 
consolidating their economic position. This has strengthened their hand 
and made the distribution of income and power more unequal amongst 
different groups of the peasantry.
So our macro evidence and, more important, our micro-level field 
work findings indicate that the peasantry in Bangladesh conforms more to 
class differentiation than to the demographic differentiation paradigm.
We observed rapid expansion in the forces of production and this, in 
turn, has intensified the processes of polarisation of the differentiated 
peasantry. In other words, we witnessed a historically crumbling peasantry.
A conclusion of this nature automatically leads us to the question 
of transition, in particular to the problematic of the development of 
capitalism in agriculture. Although this is very important in its own 
right, an examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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A P P E N D I X  A  
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
1. SCOPE AND LIMITATION :
A meaningful social enquiry normally proceeds in three stages of 
research process - reflexive, developmental and experimental 
(Phillips, 19?6 : 3-17). A social scientist or for that matter any 
scientist reviews relevant literature to unearth some fundamental 
assumptions or paradigms (reflexive), defines a problem for 
investigation (developmental) and proceeds to set up a research 
situation bearing on the problem (experimental). Again each of 
those phases is not really neatly compartmentalized. For example, 
reviewing the literature emphasizes the element of perception, 
but it is also oriented to certain goals and it is an activity 
or experiment. Again the definition of a problem is not merely 
developmental or oriented towards goals : it must also incorporate 
ideas and it is a kind of action. Also, setting up of a research 
situation does not preclude ideas and goals. A researcher actually 
goes through these phases quite often and redefines his strategy 
of enquiry.
Fi g ure A  — I
Experiment
or
F i e l d  w o r k
D e f i n i n g
or
Reflex ive  Element; P r o b l e m
S C I E N T I F I C  E N Q U I R Y  AS A N
I N T E R L I N K I N G  p r o c f s s
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In more concrete terms, a social enquiry should incorporate 
atleast the following elements (Lin, 1976 : 1-12 ; Keral, 1976 :1-20 ; 
Peil 1982 :3-25 : Joshi, 1981) :
I.Identification of the research problem and its relation with 
the broader theoretical paradigms.
II.Specification of its terms and nature.
III.Operationalization of variables and formulation of hypotheses 
to be tested with the help of empirical evidence.
IV.Methods of data collection.
V.Analysis of the data and defining their theoretical contribution.
In otherwords, methodological aspects of social research 
include both the process of theory construction and the use of 
empirical evidence to test the hypotheses emerging out of the 
theoretical discourse. It includes all aspects of problem formulation, 
not simply the technology of data collection. This is because :
In the absence of a broader perspective of a macro theory 
of social change, fieldwork (yields) only a bewildering mass 
of facts and information but no meaningful insights.(Joshi,
1981 : 435)
We have already looked into first three aspects of the above
elements in our discussion so far. "he present study, as we have
indicated, makes an attempt to understand the acute poverty 
prevailing among the majority and the affluence enjoyed by a few 
in rural Bangladesh and the evergrowing magnitude of this problem 
of inequality, with the help of the conceptual tool called 
differentiation of the peasantry. We have elaborated the theoretical 
developments of this conceptual apparatus from an historical 
perspective in chapter - II. We have made an attempt to operationalize 
the conceptual tools in order to apply them in the context of a third 
World peasantry in chapter- III. We have also brought out some 
specific hypotheses for testing them with the help of empirical 
information collected through fieldwork.
Since we have already dealt quite extensively with the theoretical 
aspects, especially the problem formulation part of it, we will
concentrate more in this appendix on the Fieldwork Experience. But
before getting involved with the problems of fieldwork, we should 
note some of the limitations of this study.
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Our study has a number of limitations :
j
I. We have taken into c ons id era t ion only the relevant part of t.ne exciting 
debate on the differentiation of the peasantry in Russia in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries. As a result, we have
deliberately left out a number of works by prominent scholars of
the time who made valuable contributions to the debate.
II. A detailed discussion of the historical evolution of the mode
of production (especially the extent of development of capitalism 
in the agricultural sector of Bangladesh) would have certainly 
added strength to our analysis. Although we have covered many 
empirical indices of that developmental, process, We could 
not get involved in more detailed discussion of its theoretical 
formulation. We have tried to avoid the danger of operating on 
too many fronts without doing justice to our main concern - the 
issue of differentiation of the peasantry. Given the limited 
space of the thesis, it is nrc possible to examine all issues
bearing on the theme of differentiation of the peasantry.
Several issues, which are very important in themselves, have been 
deliberately left out because of their rather peripheral connection 
with the context of this thesis.
III. Reality is indeed much more ceaplex than many of our empirical 
findings would propose. One cannot be perfectly precise while 
trying to apply any theoretical concept in the empirically 
selected groups of the peasantry. But we have tried our best 
to incorporate as many indices as possible to secure correspondence 
between the theoretical and empirical categories. The lack of 
congruence, if there be any, has to be treated in this light.
So one has to take a1cautious* approach analysing the complex 
issue of differentiation of the peasantry.
IV.We have primarily depended on the empirical information collected 
from two villages of Bangladesh. We realise that we could be 
more confident in our interpretation of the findings if we 
could broaden our fieldwork to include a few more villages 
in different regions of Bangladesh. But we were constrained by 
time and resources. Nevertheless, insights derived from this 
limited fieldwork were profound and we could always broaden our 
horizon by conducting similar fieldwork elsewhere at a later date.
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V. There are no "tricks of the trade" of data collection and if
i
someone seeks to look for such an easy option, he will 
inevitably distort what scientific investigation is all about.
We had to discover and rediscover th« problems and solutions, 
over and over through our individual research skill and at times 
using many innovative techniques. So,much of our field 
experiences was highly personalized and self-rewarding. If someone 
looks for a Universal "Crash Method" of data collection, I am 
afraid he will be disappointed. Many others may not be totally 
in agreement with our findings and may questition the quantitative 
precision of our data ( Say for example, the percentage of 
share croppers, which may be estimated in one survey as 20.75 as 
opposed to 22.50 ). But to us, it was not only the quantitative 
findings of the study that were fascinating but the day-to-day 
difficulties of data collection were equally educative . The 
observation of intricate social relations, the hard struggle for 
survival amongst the rural households made our fieldwork more 
rewarding than the traditional,impersonalised mass production 
of quantitative information on the peasantry. We too collected 
hardcore data but only to support the broad social trends 
which we observed.
2. PHASES OF FIELDWORK :
A methodologically sound social enquiry demands keeping each 
of the elements we mentioned earlier in phase and in harmony with 
each other. We tried our best to keep our research process as 
comprehensive as possible. Our field investigation included the 
following phases :
a* Phase-I : The very first phase was obviously the stage of
formulating my problem of enquiry. The topic of differentiation 
of the peasantry was suggested to me by my supervisor,
Mr. T.J.Byres. Although aware of the problem, I had never 
thought of taking this dificult and intricate topic for my 
thesis. But once plunged into the issue, especially the 
Russian debate on differentiation, I began to find interest 
and stimulus.
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I spent the first nine months of 1980 in a general study 
of relevant literature and evolving a theoretical basis of my 
research topic. A thorough look into two wellknown classics 
( Lenin, 1977a ; Chayanov, 1966 ) made it easier to pose the issue 
theoretically. Subsequent review of the literature, especially 
some of the recent empirical studies conducted in Bangladesh and 
India, made me aware of the problems of hypothesising the 
theoretical concepts that X was dealing with and finding out- 
appropriate methods of data collection in order to test those 
hypotheses.
I came out with a broad outline of the possible aspects of 
the issue which I planned to investigate empirically and showed it 
to my supervisor. We had . prolonged discussions on the 
conceptual and empirical problems that would be faced in the field. 
We finally agreed to prepare the detailed questionnaires once I 
was familiar with the villages. So I left London for Bangladesh 
at the end of September, 1980 to conduro the fieldwork.
- b.Phase- II : Phase-II of our fieldwork included the selection of the 
study villages. I started this phase ' work sometime in 
November, 1980. It took about three morohs to finally decide 
which villages to study.
With about 85,650 villages t HE3,198la : 212 ) and a
total population of approximately 90 ~ l.11 ion ( B.B.S, 1981 ) 
Bangladesh presents a varied picture r. socio-economic conditions. 
Some villages are peri-urban in nature, some have significantly 
well developed technology, a few of thsr are very well served by 
modern transport, where as others are not easily accessible by 
any means. Some have highly fertile soil and adequate rainfall, 
others have less fertility and little rainfall. Some are sparsely 
populated, others are very densely populated. Some have experienced
1. Wood (1978) has broadly indicated the nature of these v 
variations from a historical perspective. See also BARG (1978) 
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a high level of Rural Development activities ( e.g., the Corailla 
region with advanced co-operatives and irrigation facilities) 
and others are simply out of touch with much of development 
administration ( say for example, parts of Rangpur and Dinajpur 
districts of northern Bengal); while villages in the 
southern part of the country ( e.g. Barisal and Khulna districts) 
have their peculiar ecological and sociological features 
because of their coastal location. Char areas have again 
distinct socio-economic characteristics of their own. It is 
necessary to pursue field study in each of these regions if 
one wants to grasp the differing nature of rural change. We 
have, however, concentrated upon two parts of this variegated 
whole.
One has to keep in mind this diversity while making 
the selection of villages for investigation. And this I did 
before finally selecting my study villages.Before making my 
final selection, I first studied the district gazeteers 
( both past and present ), relevant government documents, the 
geographical details available in a variety of books 
( e.g., Ahmed, 1967 *, various BBS publications etc. ), the 
latest account of each district compiled by Dainik Desh 
( Special number, 1980 ), Bichitra (Special Number, 197911980), 
available micro studies ( Sources : BIDS, University of Dhaka, 
University of Chittagong, University Grants Commission, Bureau 
of Statistics etc). I also had extensive field trips, 
interviews and discussions throughout the country during this 
initial phase. Finally I decided to study two villages :
Gopinathpur ( henceforth village-I ) in the district of 
Jamalpur in Eastern Bengal and Hatshahar ( henceforth village-2) 
in the district of Bogra in Northern Bengal ( See map at page )
I deliberately left out the Comilla region because a number 
of studies have already been conducted on it and we are more or 
less aware of the situation prevailing there ( Blair, 1978 ;
Wood , 1976 ; Stevens, 197& i Rahman , 1979 ; Khan ,1979 )•
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Criteria of i village selection :
Village-I was selected for the fact that it manifests 
typical features of the Eastern Bangladesh villages. Situated 
at a distance of 12 miles from the district headquarters, the 
village is about two miles off the Dhaka-Jamalpur Highway.
One can reach the village either on foot or by rickshaw / 
bicycle from the Highway. It is located in No. i k Digpait 
union of Jamalpur District. On the north and east, it is 
bounded by the village of Sonatia; on the South by Chandpur 
Matarpara ; on the west by Rashidpur. The educational 
attainment, land-man ratio, landlessness, income-expenditure 
pattern, productivity etc. in this villa e are almost similar 
to other villages of Eastern Bengal. The soil is fertile, and 
more than 50 %  o f  the land is triple cropped. The famine of 
19?A hit this area very hard and caused a gcr ; deal of land- 
transfers and pauperisation. 17 irrigation purrps (one Deep 
Tube well and the rest Shallow Tube wells) hE - already been 
setup in this village. The extent of utiliza~. — n of credit", 
fertilizer, insecticides is also similar to ;_r7 other 
Eastern Bengal village. There is a market p e (Sonatia Bazar) 
adjacent to the village. The marketplace hr., significant 
impact on the volume of exchange and commodio.nation of the 
village products.
Village-II was selected mainly to enable a comparison 
with the data collected on it by Mukherjee (Tr~7a) in the 
early 19^0*s.This was one of his five interior villages.
Detailed information on the socio-economic structure of these 
villages was published by him. Mukherjee noted two small 
scale Zamindars in this village and that their ancestors
had played the pioneering role in forming this village.
In the words of Mukherjee :
(Their (Zamindars) ancestors migrated to this area 
where they had found a potential site for the 
profession of priesthoad among the semi-Hinduised
Rajbanshis who along with the Muslims are living
in this locality for a long time. To establish village 
properly, the Brahmin landlords also brought a few 
families of their castes with them, and settled them 
on land here to form a self-sufficient unit. A periodical
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market^ hat, was also arranged to be held twice a 
week. The village thus gained its importance in the 
locality. ( Mukherjee, 1957a ).
The market is still there but the Zamindars have all 
been forced to abolish their Zamindaris by the Act of 1950 
(EBSATA) and there have been tremendous changes in land ownership 
patterns since then.
Although it is very difficult to make a point to 
point comparison between Mukherjee's findings and our ones 
(as the objectives of the two studies did not always coincide 
and categorizations of the households were often different), We 
gathered enough information to make this worthwhile.
Hatshahar is , indeed, one of the backward villages 
of the region. Till recently, there was no direct road to this 
village, which lies about 30 miles north of Bogra town. It is 
located in No. 2 Boro tara ifnion of Khetlal thana in Bogra 
district. It is about 9 miles east of Joypurhat, the subdivisional 
headquarters1 The village is bounded to the north by Noupara, 
east by Hatiour, to the south by Khushalpur and Noupara and 
to the west by village Borotara. In the past, one had to 
reach Khetlal, the thana headquarter first and then reach the 
village either on foot or by rickshaw. But now a pacca bus road 
passes by.the village. However, the village is still backward 
with few or no modern input, reaching it. This, in a way, 
represents the typical characteristics of an underdeveloped 
North Bengal village. Another reason for selecting this village 
was that the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) 
has been conducting an intensive rural study since 1977 by placing 
permanent investigators In the village. I thought I might make 
best use of this knowledge and compare my findings with those 
of the BIDS study.
Moreover, both the villages had the following features 
which make them representative in somesenses :
I. They are not recently inhabited villages. Thak survey and
revenue maps show that they were in existence well before 1856.
II. The villages had proportionate numbers of house holds from all
classes as evidenced by the land holding groups.
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III. None of the -villages was mountainous,coastal,tribal or char 
in nature.
IV. A number of non-agricultural occupations co-existed with 
agriculture in both the villages.
V. Village-I was typical in nature of any East Bengal village 
and village-2 represented the north Bengal villages.
G* Phase-Ill : Phase III was essentially a preparatory phase for
the actual hardcore data collection. This took about two 
months. I paid several visit to the villages and familiarised ' 
myself with most of the household heads. During these reconnaisance 
tours, I made arrengements for accomodation and other logistic 
facilities for my investigators. I have known village-I 
since my childhood as I was born nearby. Although I left my 
village long ago, I have maintained a close link with th~ 
area and visited it quite often. So it was not very diffi-r-lt 
for me to form an initial general idea about the socio- anomic 
setting of this village. As for village -2, the BIDS inv-^. —-igators 
placed in the village guided me in forming a general no- zn 
about the village. The findings of the BIDS study and di/ ssions 
with the BIDS investigators were of special help in s . ing 
my ideas about the village.
I also appointed two local investigators in 
village -I and one in village-2 during these priliminarp tours. 
These local investigators were educated upto intermediate levels 
and were virtually unemployed. They were residing in the 
villages. One of the local investigators in village-2 ,
Dilip Chakravarti was a primary school teacher . He was 
well aware of the techniques of data collection as he had been 
very close to the BIDS study team.
After a few visits, I sat down to formulate the 
questionnaires and general guidelines for the data collection.
It took me a few weeks to prepare the draft questionnaires.
Once the draft questionnaires was ready, I circulated it to 
many of my colleagues at the BIDS who had practical fieldwork 
experience. I myself had earlier been involved in more than 
one fieldstudy. We then discussed the practicability of the 
administration of the questionnaires»
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Next we selected two principal investigators for each 
of the villages from amongst the fresh University Graduates 
(Economics). The criteria of their selection included some 
experience of data collection, they were born in rural areas 
and kept in touch with their villages afterwords. Initially 
they had to undergo a regorous training at the Institute 
under my own guidence. This was the preparatory training for 
fieldwork. They soon became familiar with the conceptual and 
empirical tools which we were to use in our data collection 
techniques. After about six weeks training, we took them with 
us to our study villages to introduce them to the villages. 
Siraultaniously, we also carried out pre-testing of the 
questionnaires. During this per-testing, we collectively 
administered the questionnaires taking three households from 
nine different land-owning groups of the peasantry (categorized 
according to landholding sizes). The pre-testing helped us to 
realise the feasibility and efficiency of all operating procedures 
proposed to be used in our field investigation. This prompted us 
to remove many unnecessary and doubtful clauses from the 
questionnaires and thus to improve on instruments of data 
collection. It allowed us to take a hard look at the variables, 
hypotheses and theories formulated and used. The pre-testing 
provided information and insights in regards to the viability 
and usefulness of these variables, hypotheses and theories.
We were thus provided with an opportunity to make a final selection 
of variables and to consider reformulation or refinement of 
hypotheses and theories. Ofcourse, these processes of reformulation 
and refinement continued through out the fieldwork period.
Once back from the field after pre-testing, I sat 
down with my field notes and restructured the questionnaires 
and field guidelines incorporating the field responses during 
pre-testing. We then discussed each item of the questionnaires 
including possible problems which might crop up when we meet the 
respondents. After through debate and discussions, we finalized 
the draft questionnaires. The questionnaires was then printed .
The whole exercise took about four weeks. We were ready to start 
our actual data collection by March, 1981.
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d. Phase IVi This phase included the the collection of a mass of
concrete data. continued for about nine months. I was living with 
each team of investigators alternately. I was also collecting information 
along with the investigators and observing the households. But the 
stimulating part of the field tours were the evening sessions with 
the investigators. After the day's hard work, we would return to our 
field centre and sit down to discuss the problems we faced while filling 
up the questionnaires. Each of us had unique experiences and we would 
exchange our solutions to these problems. Through these discussions 
we came to a certain consensus about many innovative methods of data 
collection. I will call these unconventional methods, the guerilla 
methods of data collection. These methods had no set pattern.
This phase-of the fieldwork provided me with exciting 
stimulas for reconstructing and retailoring my theoretical framework. 
This reconstruction of theoretical ideas again stimulated me to go 
for deeper investigation. In a way this was a two-way and mutually 
reinforcing exercise . In this phase, I became aware of the complexity 
of social reality and was helped to shed many of the hardline approache_ 
which I had learned from text books. Reality taught m e  t0 unlearn m a n y  
of these unrealistic and dogmatic ideas. This also helped me widen my 
theoretical vision and again convinced me that there was no short-cut 
in fieldwork.
e.Phase V: In this phase, we processed our data. We first edited each
of the questionnaires and organised the data in groups according to 
landowning sizes. These became our basic reference groups and we then 
coded our data according to these groups.Whenever possible, we also 
made other groupings e.g. groups according to operated land, tenural 
arrangements, income and expenditure patterns etc and compared our 
results with those of the basic reference groups. The preliminary 
grouping of the data helped us identify the weakness of our data and 
accordingly we went back to our villages to collect the missing data. 
This was our final trip to the study villages. So we checked and 
cross-checked as much information as possible with our local 
investigators, selected informants and the household concerned.Once 
we were back from the field and the quantitative data coded,they 
were ready for tabulation. This involved counting the numbers of 
individual items in various categories of households and putting 
the results into tables.These tables would serve us as the basis
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of our analysis that was to follow.The tabulation,in fact, continued 
throughout the phasie of analysis and interpretation of our fieldwork 
findings.The calculation was done with the help of simple calculating 
machines.I was always involved in the data processing exercises.This 
helped me form an overall idea about the state and the quality of my 
empirical information.The tabulations ranged from simple two variables 
exercises to complex multi-variable cross-tables.
The whole exercise of data processing was extremely 
illuminating and X myself could realize the worth of an extensive 
fieldwork only at this stage of our research process.
Phase VI: This phase included the writing of the thesis and putting
data int use.This was the mosteexciting of all the phases.While writing 
the first draft,I became aware of the diversities from village to village, 
the relationship of the households with land and nature, their ageold 
dependence on the community at large, the gradual breaking of that 
dependence, the emerging patterns of differential classes, the growing 
interference of the state and the da^-to-day struggles of the peasantry.
I was aware of these aspects in the rases of individual households,but 
later the factors could be seen to arply to groups as well— a prelude 
to the identification of class behe~our.lt is at this stage that the 
processes of differentiation began emerge more forcefully and clearly.
The first draft gave me = first impression of the issues I 
was looking at.After finishing the first draft,I went back to my theoretical 
construct and discussed many of the problems with my supervisor .After 
receiving his comments I began to realize many of my own limitations as 
an investigator.
All these limitations and rethinking have been reflected 
in my final draft.This phase of the study covered well over a year 
and allowed me enough time to reflect upon many of my earlier overenthusiastic 
notions on the research problem.
3. METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF DATA COLLECTION:
i) SAMPT.TTjG: Our study village-I was too big to be subjected to an overall
census.There were more than four hundred households in this village.
Although they all belonged to a single village geographically( Mouza), 
mainly designed for administrative purpose, only about two hundreds of 
them belonged to a cohesive social village.By social village we meant
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the area in which we noticed a homogeneity of social interactions and 
closer kinship relations.Before demarcating such a social villageCwhich 
is our village-I) we collected general information related to land,labour, 
education,population and other community indices for the whole village.
Our social village was found to tally with almost all the general 
characteristics of the whole village.So sampling did not obscure many 
of the peculiarities of this village.The 200 households which we identified 
as those belonging to village-I hardly go beyond its boundary for any 
social activityCe.g. salish,marriage,akika,faita/sradh etcO.
In the case of village-2, however, we took the full census.
✓
There were only 121 households and we collected all categories of 
information for each of these households.
ii) IN'l'KKV IEWING: Interviewing the respondents with a set of questionnaire
was the most common method of collecting quantitative data.There were 
one-spot surveys on some aspects of the information(say, for example, 
family size, age, landownership,assetowr=rship etc.) and also Cost-jRoute 
methods of regular and frequent visits tr the same sample households for 
collecting information on aspects like raying and selling of products, 
production patterns, use of hired labour etc. The questinnaires were 
arranged accordingly.
iii) THT^  OBSERVATION: Besides notin- rown the quantitative information
through the usual interviewing methods. ®e made use of the observation 
p
methods . We were keeping an eye on sor^ selected households and witnessing 
the changes experienced by them during our study period. The selected 
informants and the local investigators were of great help in this method 
of data collection. We were also witnessing the important events in the 
villages and their effects on individual households. This method of 
observation has allowed us to test the qualitative hypotheses that we 
have drawn from our quantitative information.
2
Observation is a method of data collection in which the researcher or 
his collaborators record information as they witness events during the 
s study period ( Lin, 1976.'205).
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v) THE NATURE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRES: As the nature of the research
problem demanded, we had indeed very lengthy questionnaires.But we 
made no attempt to fill the questionnaires at any time. To facilitate the 
flexibility in the data collection, we divided the questionnaires into a 
number of sub-divisions. We started with the questions on general demographic 
information—  the name of the household, sex and age of the family members, 
their occupations etc. We then went for more specific information e.g. 
ownership and use of land and its associated features— tenural arrangements,
mortgage, buying and selling of land; other resources housing, farm
implements, draught animals, water bodies; nature of technology;production; 
income/expenditure patterns; utilization of surplus: indebtedness and _ 
money lending; market participation; introduction cf modern inputs; 
intervention of the state in the rural development activities; the local 
power structure and institutional framework; use of wage labour; the^ 
emergence of class consciousness and the extent of proletarianisation 
amongst the impoverished peasantry etc. ( Please’see the synopsis of the 
questionnaires in Appendix B. The original questionnaires was in Bengali).
Our first attempt was to collect as t_:: information as 
possible on land-ownership and land-utilization fret rach of the of the 
households. We then formed nine groups of households t dividing them 
according to different landsize) and collected-other information keeping 
in mind these basic reference groups. We attached sc. ruch importance to 
the land-ownership pattern because of the fact that given the present 
state of agricultural development and agrarian relations, the size of 
landholding was still considered a rough proxy of class status 
(Byres,1977! 265-8) in the context of rural Bangladesh. However,whenever 
our theoretical construct demanded,we formed other reference groups and 
collected information accordingly. Thus we formed separate reference groups 
based on such factors as number of draught animals owned, the number and 
nature of housing, the tenural arrangements, the wage earning capacity, 
the levels of income, occupations etc. Thus when we wanted to see the 
extent of the exploitation of labour, we went straight to see the utilization 
of labour and concentrated on groups like wage labourers, share-croppers, 
the rentier-farmers etc.
We noticed considerable diversity even within such special 
groups. Thus, a wage labourer with no land in his possession exhibited 
quite different attitude from another wage labourer who owned some land.
A share-cropper with better agricultural implements behaved quite differently 
from another share-cropper who was poorly endowed with such implements.
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We never tried to fill in any of the questionnaires in 
one sitting. We took each of the sub-sections part by part and allowed 
sufficient time in between. The respondent's timing and place were 
considered final.
Most of the information revealed by the respondents was 
not written down infront of them, particularly on sensitive subjects, 
like the land. This was put in the questionnaire concerned immediately 
after returning to the field centre. The investigators were instructed 
to put their comments in the margin of the sheets about the reliability 
and typicality of their data.
Some of the questions were deliberately framed in a way 
so that they enabled the investigators to ask the right question at the 
right moment. For example, the question on total land owned by a household 
was immediately followed by the question on utilization of land—  how 
much of it the respondent cultivated himself and how much of it was 
rented out, when did he buy this land or how did he acquire it. Questions 
related to the production of crops on individual Z _ a r,d  plots were asked 
simultaneously. All these allowed us to estimate uue approximate size 
his landholding.If he gave us wrong information e~ one stage, the 
discrepancy would surely be identified at a later stage and was corrected. 
Again, for example, the question on income accrui— r to a household was 
broken down into several parts;
i) Income from agriculture including the value cf output of each crop 
produced, poultry and livestock items,
ii) Income from renting out of land, farm equipments,draught animals, 
houses, boats etc. - -
iii) Income from money lending, mortgaging our, forward sales etc.
iv) Income from other occupations e.g. hiring out as wage labourers,
trading, fishing, priesthood, services etc.
v) Incomes from other peripheral activities such as salish, dalali, 
writing application and documents for others, dowry, helping others in
bribing government officials, holding positions in the rural works
programme committees, local bazar committees etc.
We first collected data on the last week's income of the household
and then gradually extended the information for the whole month. Ques 
Question on income in lumpsum for some special acivities was also asked 
specifically.We collected similarly the corresponding information on 
the expenditure pattern of all the households.
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While collecting information on items like land, assets, 
farm implements etcJ. we always kept in mind the dynamic nature (flow) of 
these aspects of rural economy.
In each case, we probed quite deeply to get the accurate 
information. Thus, whenever we found the information incomplete, vague, 
irrelevant, inconsistent or inadequate, we went back again and again 
and helped the respondents recollect their information. This probing 
also helped us establish better communication with the respondents. But 
we had to be very tactful in this method of probing. We asked anybody 
we thought relevant to correct our information. In many cases, we solicited 
information from the past/present servants of some households whose heads 
deliberately avoided giving the correct information.
In some circumstances, many household heads would not simply 
admit their ignorance of the particular subject we were talking about.
They would give us wrong answers. In such cases, we had to invent certain 
plausible answers and give a lead to follow up these answers. A 
supplementary question, asking for elaboration often helped many 
respondents come back to the point quickly.
We faced a number of problems while collecting information, 
to which we had to find instant solutions. The problem that hurt us most 
was our resource constaint. A study of this magnitude, spread over so
long a time, usually demands huge resources both monetary and manpower.
We had a limited amount of money and a limited number of investigators.
I, therefore, relied heavily on the local investigators residing in and 
around our study villages.They demanded less money and collected excellent 
information. The only problem with them was that LtHey were not trained But 
once thoroughly trained, they were our best sources of information.
Familiarity with the villages also helped us a great 
deal. I was more or less known to every member of village-I. Everyone 
co-operated wholeheartedly. Moreover, mine was the first such research 
project conducted in this village. So we received the best possible 
co-operation. The problem was not very severe in Village-2 either. We 
had two local advantages here. The village had been under similar study 
by the BIDS for quite some years and each of the households appreciated 
the objectives of such research. And our local investigator Dilip Chakravarti, 
was highly skilled and tactful in collecting information. Excepting one 
or two households, all villagers knew Dilip and we could easily penetrate
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into almost all of the households. We, however, faced some kind of 
non-cooperation from one or two rich households, mainly because of 
their distaste for some of the earlier activities of the BIDS investigators. 
A few,overenthusiastic BIDS investigators had tried to organise the 
landless peasants to press for higher wages and rental shares from the 
rich peasants. This had made the landowners slightly worried. We ,however, 
could collect our information through the help of our local informants and 
investigator. The BIDS records collected earlier also helped.
In both the villages, we made it absolutely clear to the 
villagers that our sole aim was to collect objective information and not 
to get mixed up in local conflicts. We kept urselves neutral in the face 
of any factional quarrel and showed respect for their local socio-cultural 
milieu.
If any misunderstanding arose between any of our investigators 
and a local villager, we quickly settled it. We generally showed a low 
profile and did nothing to offend the villagers. We never became involved 
in any financial transaction with our respondents. We communicated with 
the rural rich only to get information and never took food in any of the 
households even after repeated insistence. The co-operation cf local 
government officials, Bank officials, Tahsildars (local revere- collector), 
was also sought from time to time to solve the problems of the village 
as a whole. All of this created confidence among the villagers about our 
trustworthiness.
From the very beginning, we made two things cln?ar. Firstly, 
we categorically explained to the villagers that we had nothing to do 
with government. Secondly, we did not come to-their village to distribute 
reliefs on behalf of any voluntary agency . We explained that we came to 
their village only for research purpose. My association with rhe country's 
premier research organisation,BIDS, helped me a great deal in overcoming 
some of the suspicions of our respondents and in convincing them on this 
point. This was necessary to ensure that no sections of the villagers 
either overstated or understated the facts which we were trying to gather. 
Even after all this we noticed some tendencies in the poorer sections 
to overstate their current miseries( perhaps for relief purpose), and 
understate their present resources while overstating their past resources.
For example, some of the richer peasants conceealed their resource 
position, especially the land information inferring, not unreasonably,
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that the Government may be seeking information (in disguise) for 
purposes of taxation, crop-levy or the imposition of a new lower 
ceiling on land. Question on tenural status might have led some 
share-croppers to the inference that Government may be interested 
in the issue of share-croppers right. But the landlors might have 
thought the Government was thinking to launch a programme of land 
reform which would affect them adversely. Moreover, the large scale 
emigration of Hindu landowners has left land in defacto control of 
many with doubtful title and they were particularly sensitive to 
any question on landholding.
We, however, tried our best to make them understand that 
information supplied by them would be kept secret and would only 
be used for research purposes. After some of these initial setbacks, 
we, ofcourse, could get back the confidence of the respondents.The 
more we became familiar with their way of living, the more access 
we got info their household information. If we were denied cooperation 
we went tack to them again and again. Our local investigators helped 
us a l o z  in breaking the communication barrier and thus made us 
familiar to the rural households.
at times offered our respondents some light refreshments - 
such a.~ rigarettes, biri, pan and biscuits to their children during 
our introductory sessions.
ifter collecting the general information we went to collect 
specialised 'information - as for example the nature of labour ex­
ploitation, the level of proletarianisation, the extent of kinship 
bondages etc. For this purpose, we formed a small and informal . 
group of households with similar socio-economic interests (e.g. 
the wage labourers, share-croppers, the rentier-farmers etc). We 
introduced topics of general interests to each of these groups and 
encourage them to become involved in discussing problems in which 
we were interested. We usually organised these group discussions late 
at night. While on their own, they usually opened up and talked about 
many issues with a high level of commonsense and understanding. It 
was after these group discussions that we realized how naive it would 
have been to assume that the peasants were a group of ignorant, un­
thinking people. They knew their own problems relating to land, food,
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cows, credit etc. uch better than many of the 'well acclaimed' 
rural experts. We also had an opportunity to cross-check some of 
the information collected earlier through these group discussions.
As for other ways of cross-checking, we relied on the inherent 
checks and balances set in the questionnaire itself. Take for exam­
ple, the land information. A household was supposed to give us land 
information on atleast three occassions. They first gave us the total 
land they owned and operated. Then they gave information of land crop 
by crop, season by season. Again they furnished land information while 
giving buying/selling, lease of land information. So, whenever, we 
noticed discripancy, we referred back to that particular questions 
and ascertained the correct data. Also information on a related 
aspect of certain variable helped us get a rough guide as to the 
reliability of our information. Thus an abnormal result on cropping 
intensity (say, more than three times higher than the average figure 
of the village) signalled us to go back to their land information for 
the household concerned for re-checking.
Similarly, any rough foodgrain balance encompassing the stock 
at the beginning of our study period and the movement of the stock 
through sale/purcahse/consumption determined any discrepancy in the 
food information and hence the acrerage information.
Again, a check of the large investment and other expenditure 
against the income , credit/loans during the study period helped us 
to remove any discrepancy in the cash balances. Inconsistent returns 
were reinvestigated. We finally allowed about 10# inconsistency 
errors. One way to improve the field investigation was to discuss 
the problems we faced while collecting information amongst ourselves 
during our night sessions of exchange of experience. A collective 
wisdom did certainly emerge to help solve some of the intricate field 
problems.
But the biggest problem we faced was during the collection of 
past information. Since we were working on the question of differentia­
tion of the peasantry we had to get some dynamic view of the situation.
We were.to locate the underlying changes of important economic indicators 
faced by individual households. But certainly, a household of 1981 was 
not always the household of 1951- Indeed, a household of 1951 would have 
split into three households by 1981. So how could we analyse the past?
We had to reconstruct the recent history of the village by recall method 
and get these information checked and cross-checked by the knowledgeable
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village elders with; a high sense of integrity and objectivity. The 
cross-examination at times was carried on with a single respondent, 
at other times in a group, depending on the type of information we 
are looking for. To secure past data, we first identified certain cut­
off periods —  certain years which were strongly imprinted in the 
minds of the elderly household heads because of local/national happenigs. 
In case of our study villages, we chose 19511 1972 and, of course, the 
year in which we conducted our study (1981). 1951 was chosen becuase a 
year before that, the East Bengal State Acquistion and Tenancy Act 
(EBSATA) was passed. This Act, the major one concerning the landholding 
and tenancy situation influenced most rural households. The Act made 
the nominal owners of land (raiyats) the real landowners (Maliks). 
Moreover, Pakistan was created only about two years before this 
enactment and the creation of Pakistan was followed by a big communal 
riot. All these historical events made people remember their conditions, 
especially their landownership position around that period. Even if the 
household head in question was comparatively young, he must have heard 
from his parents/other relatives about the actual land size of their 
ancestors. Again, 1972 was the year after the 1971 War of Liberation.
Most people could, somenow, reconstruct their socio-economic positions 
around that time.
We first asked a household head, the name of the household head 
in 1951. We then asked if he knew the landholding size of his father/ 
grand father Tor anyone who was household head of his ancestral house­
hold around that time) * We then checked the information with other 
elderly neighbours/relatives. We took similar information for each of 
the households. On each occasion we cross-checked the land informations 
from different sources available locally. We then collected together in 
one bundle the household sheets bearing similar names. That bundle then 
became household for 1951- We made similar compilation for 1972. Since 
we recorded names on each occasion, we could easily identify which of 
the household actually disintegrated or integrated or just disappeared 
during the period 1951 - 1981.
Once we had established the past household , we then investigated 
the key economic information for that year from eldest member of the 
household supported by others. We a.lso had this information rechecked 
with the help of elderly relatives/neighbours. To confirm some of this
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information, we investigated the possible land transaction records 
at the local Registry Office. But many times we ended up with confusing 
land information as the clever rich peasants had some of their land 
registered in benami (pseudonym) to avoid the land reform legislation. 
Anyway, we atleast got an approximate idea of the land situation pre­
vailing in the past. We checked our information with other historical 
studies (e.g. Mukherjee, 1957a, 1957b; Abdullah, 1976) to see if our 
data were at variance.
To itake concrete examples, Abbas Ali (Household No. G 200) 
reported that his father Sabed Ali was the head of their household in 
1951 and owned 3-5 acres of land. Sabed Ali was also the head of the 
household in 1972 and owned 5-7 acres of land. But by 1981,Sabed Ali 
had died and his old household had spilt into three separated house­
holds. Abbas Ali had 2.50 acres of land by 1981. His younger brother 
Nazrul Islam (Household No. G 9) now owning .78 acres of land also 
reported that his father was the head of the household and owned 3-5 
acres in 1951. Again, the nephew of the above two, Rafiqul Islam 
(Household No. G. 13) told us that his grand father was the head of 
the household in 1951* And he too said that his grand father owned 3*5 
acres of land. Rafiqul Islam owned .78 acres of land in 1981. Based on 
this information, we could safely say that G 200, G 9 and G 13 comprised 
one household in 1951* And that that household owned 3*5 acres of land.
Compiling this information supplied by three separate households 
we could identify the original household of Sabed Ali and its land v 
holding situation in 1951. Abbas Ali apparently had more land than 
other two hoseholds. He must have taken back some of the land from 
the other two. We can summarise the whole situation in diagrametic 
form as well (see figure A-2).
Similarly, Ibrahim Ali (Household No. GI63), Rustom Ali 
(Household No. G 20), Hazrat Ali (House No. G 28 and Taher. Ali 
(Household Number G193) revealed that they all belonged to the same 
household in 1951 headed by Sukur Mahmud and owned ^.52 acres of 
land. The past information collected in the above way helped us 
in testing many hyptheses regarding the changes in the social 
dynamics. We could thus construct a social mobility matrix to
4 16
F i g u r e  A  — 2
Abbas A l i
Son of Sabed A l i
H  H N o : G  -  20  0
Owned 2-F0 acres of
land in 1981
S A B E D  A L I
O W N E D  3 - 5 0  ACRES  
O F  L A N D  I N  1 9 5 1
N a z r u l  Islam 
Son o f  Sabed A l i  
H H  N o ; G - 9  
Owned *78 acres of
land in 1981
R a f i q u l  Islam 
Grand son of Sabed Ali  
H  H  N o :  G - 1 3  
Owned *78 acres Of 
land m 1981
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test the hypotheses of Shanin (1972) regarding the socalled social 
mobility trends amongst the peasantry (see chapter V).
New Terminology :
While considering the field study we felt the inadequacies 
of many conventional empirical terras and we therefore re formulated  
them to make them applicable in the context of our study villages.
i) Thus we felt that information on the ownership of land 
alone did not really give us the total picture. Even the operated 
land could not explain the income status of a household. So we 
formulated a new term —  the effective land size equivalent to net 
operated landholding as follows :
Effective land size = Owned cultivated land + -J (shared in -
shared out) land + (land leased in
under fixed Cent - land leased out
under fixed rent).
Effective landsize roughly corresponded with the agricultural 
income as it explained the net ccorand over operated land.
ii) We have seen in our study areas that a boy attaining the 
age of 10 begins participate in full time in agricultural activities. 
And an old man continues work full time till he dies. So, we have
taken (11 - 6*0 years) as the work?, ng age of rural people. This differs
from the international standards (see Census, 1981 and other BBs 
documents). *
iii) We have calculated consumer-worker (C/W) ratio as 
follows :
a. Consumers = All adult males and females (above 10 
years) J children (below 10 years) 
b) Workers = All working males (I1-6*t years)
- student.
C/W Ratio = i/ii.
iv) We also improvised many of the academic terras currently 
in use keeping in the conformity with the local situation and dialect 
Finally, I felt that ray fieldwork gave me the kind of 
insights about peasantry which could never be possible through any 
secondary literature survey. My understanding of the peasantry was 
never the same after my fieldwork. The excitements which I shared
4 1 8
with fellow investigators will influence ray 
years to come. The preceding chapters bring 
excitements and despair.
thought processes in 
into focus some of those
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APPENDIX B 
A SYNOPSIS OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES
1. Community Servey Questionnaire :
This was the first questionnaire to be administered. It was 
designed to collect data on the general setting of the village. The 
information collected included mostly the aggregate data ( e.g.,total 
number of household, total population, total amount of land, total 
number of pumps, ponds, khas land etc.) and also data of a general 
nature (e.g., the interlinkages of the village with the surrounding 
villages, nearby towns and market places, the nature of the power- 
structure and social events ). Information was collected with an 
historical perspective, so that the general nature of the changes 
in each of these variables could be understood. While collecting the 
community information, we normally sat with a large number of people, 
mostly ■alderly ones, so that the accuracy of the data could be 
immediately cross-examined.
2. Preliminary Household Questionnaire :
This was administered on the household heads ( or seniormost 
member of the household in the absence of the household head ). This 
questionnaire consisted of questions on family structure, family 
labour, wage labour, education level, ownership and use of land and 
other assets,occupations ( primary and secondary ), housing, asset- 
transactions, migration, share-cropping, mortgages, moneylending, 
indebtedness etc. In each case, we asked" for information on certain 
periods ( remembered for their historical importance due to local 
or national events, e.g., war of liberation in 197% Land Reform Act 
of 1950 and riots in and around early 1990s. ). We concentrated on 
the family history and land size in these cut-off periods. The 
preliminary questionnaire was followed by detailed questionnaires 
on important items like income-expenditure, land, sharecropping, 
production, wage labour, state involvement , etc.
3. Income-Expenditure Pattern :
Questionnaire on income was divided in four parts :
a. Agricultural income.
b. Rental income.
c. Income from other occupationes.
d. Others.
That on expenditure, likewise, contained as many as twenty items 
starting with food and other consumption needs to expenditure on 
litigation.
%  Land Information :
This part of the questionnaire may be summerised as follows :
PARTICULARS AREA (ACRES) IN CUT-OFF PERIODS
1951 1972 1981
1. Owned land
2.. Rented in land
3. Mortgaged in land
%  Total area (1 + 2 + 3  )
5. Rented out area
6. Mortgaged out area
7. Total ( 5 + 6 )
8. Operational land ( A - 7 )
9. Effective land ( 9 after 
rental adjustments )
10.Area sown more than once
11.Gross cropped area
12.Irrigated area
13.Gross irrigated area
.
The above was followed by land sale / purchase information, again from 
an historical perspective.
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Share-cropping :
Information on share-cropping included not only the amount of 
land involed but also terms and conditions of share-cropping, 
advantages and disadvantages of various types of share systems.
6. Production :
Production of crops was calculated seasonwise on different types 
of land e.g., own land and others'land, irrigated land, non-irrigaged 
land ,etc. The production figures were taken both in kind and money terms.
7. Mortgage and Money lending :
The general questionnaire on the extent of mortgage in and out 
of land was followed by a close look into individual cases through 
participant obsevation. Information on money lending was collected 
from both debtors and creditors.
8. Wage labour :
Questions on the growth in wage labour, the extent of wage variations 
the seasonality of the wage employment,mode of wage payment and the extent 
of'bondage'/ mobility amongst the wage labourers constituted this part of 
the quest ionnaiore.
9* Introduction of Modern Inputs and the Involvement of the State :
Questionnaire on modern inputs included the extent of use of 
fertilizer, insecticides, HYV seeds, modern irrigation pumps, institutional • 
credit, etc. Information was collected for 1981 and 1972. Questions on 
state included involvement of household with various institutions like 
police, judiciary, local government, co-operatives, banks, etc.,the 
benefits received from such institutions, "the extent of exploit a tion 
by the local leaders and agents^ of state machine and the nature of 
the implementation of various policies of the government.
10.Attitude of the People :
This part of the questionnaire included essentially the 
qualitative questions e.g., the nature of their perception about 
exploitation by dominant groups, the repression by the state, the extent 
of the development of class-consiousness and rural 'proletarianisation' etc.
The questionnaires,alongwith codes, ran into no less than 
150 pages. They were prepared in Bengali in order to make them easily 
perceptible to both investigators and respondents.
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APPENDIX C
CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AMONGST 
AGRICULTURAL WAGE LABOURERS
Class-consciousness amongst agricultural labourers is an 
important element of the phenomenon of rural-proletarianisation. This 
relates to agricultural wage labourers/poor pesants being able to 
comprehend their own economic interests as a class and relate the 
causes of their impoverishment to the overall structure of the society 
in which they live.
Throughout our field: study, we kept an eye on the agricultural 
wage labourer households to see whether they behave as a distinct class 
or not. While the level of consciousness amongst agricultural labourers 
varied from village to village and from group to group (according to 
the level of land ownership, control over operated land, level of 
indebtedness etc. ), we found that this consciousness as a whole was 
growing. The political turmoils which the villages ■ had to share since 
the war of liberation of '197*1 and greater intrusion of mass communication 
system in the form of radio, newspapers,television,etc.in the villages 
have created more awareness amongst the villagers as a whole. Whether 
that higher level of awakening has been precipitating into class- 
consciousness or not is very difficult to interpret.
It is certainly true that the level of general consciousness
was much less in village -2 than in village-I. Even than, the poorer
peasantry showed enough potentiality to rise as a class in the face
of acute class-exploitation by the dominant groups. Ofcourse, the level
of that consciousness was at times blurred by factionalism and kinship.
But whenever some one explained to them the exploitative relations in
which they were involved, they could easily comprehend that. There has
hardly been any organisational attempt to arouse the exploited
1peasantry for better wage and share of tenancy in village-2.
In villages ( in Rangpur District) not far from this, when the 
Kisan Sabha, an organisational wing of Indian Communist Party * tried to 
organise the share-cropping poorer peasantry to agitate for higher shares 
in the 19^0s, they rose to the occasion and made history. The revolt 
was called the Tebagha Movement. ( See Sen, S, 1972 ).
BIDS research investigators based in this village made an experimental 
attempt to organise the landless labourers of this village. They came 
very late in the night and discussed their plight with the research 
them. They formed a committee and began to press for higher wages and 
share rentals. But the village rich led by one RM became suspicious 
about the whole thing and began to intimidate those who were partici­
pating in the organisational activities.
As long as BIDS investigators were in that village, they success­
fully resisted such threats. But as soon as they left, or posed to be 
more neutral for the sake of research activities, the rural poor lost 
their confidence and began to be involved in factional politics again 
foregoing their class activities to save their skin. Those who still 
retained vigour were harassed by the richer peasantry in the name of 
theft and sexual corruptions. Ultimately, the organisation they started 
for themselves crumbled. Though nipped in the bud, that they got toge­
ther and formed an organisation was sufficient indication that if 
properly guided they could rise to the ocassion. Those who had no/or 
very little owned land were more sincerely involved in that short 
lived organisation than others.
But the situation was quite different in village-1. The agricultural 
labourers, especially with no or very little owned land (say, less than 
•50 acres) were more defiant and formed militant groups identifying 
themselves as completely different from other folk. They valued very 
little traditional family ties and became quite sceptical about the 
'community security1 system. V/hen asked to identify their social 
distinction from others we were told the following by them:
1. Most of the poorest agricultural labourers said that the richer 
households (even if they were related) did not bother to associate 
themselves with them in social gatherings like marriage, Sradh/Chehlum, 
etc. They were not invited on such ocassions.
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2. Most richer households did not distribute the Kurbani meat/beef 
to the poorer neighbours or relations these days. They confined them 
to richer relations or neighbours.
3. In Salish, the richer households were invariably against the 
poorer peasantry irrespective of the merit of the case.
*t. The local government leaders favoured their richer relations/ 
neighbours while distributing the government's development 
resources.
All of these and many other realizations amongst landless 
labourers point to consciousness amongst them. In village-I, we 
found landless wage labourers very often discussing amongst themselves 
possible wage rates for the ensuing seasons and coming to a broad 
agreement about the rates. Most of them tried to implement this 
unofficial consensus. If someone took a lower rate, he had to explain 
to others the circumstances in which he had to accept that.
They would never discuss these problems in the presence of a 
representative of rich landowners. They would better wait till 
3jate at night to thrash out these problems. We tested this differential 
attitude. In the day-time when asked about their own situation and the 
relationship with the landowners they gave us quite a compromising 
answer. But at the dead of the night, free from the fear of the rich 
peasants, they gave us a completely different picture.
We received complaints from the landowners of village 1 that these 
days agricultural labourers have become 'overlords'. They did not like 
to have panta (the watered rice left over of the night before) and 
demanded fresh rice. Some of them even took their newly acquired modern
Religious festival of Muslims during which they sacrifice cows/ 
goats etc in the name of Allah.
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wealth 'radios', to the fields to "show off" their 'defiance' and 
pride. In a nut shell, we found the agricultural labourers in village-1 
more independent and conscious. The growth in the demand for higher 
labour in the wake of a higher number of power pumps and greater 
cropping intensities and also the presence of a market place adjacent 
to the villages, facilitated the growth of such consciousness. The 
level of consciousness was certainly less in those who had a greater 
amount of land.
But one should not over-estimate the growth of this consciousness.
The consciousness though present at an individual level, did not as yet
lead to collective action. There was no indication of the formation of
a trade union for agricultural labourers in any of our study
3villages.
3
However in some villages, agricultural labourers have formed such 
trade unions with direct organisationa support from left wing 
political parties in a number of districts, say, Khulna, Jessore, 
Jamalpur, Mymensingh,Comilla, Noakhali etc. (Selim, 1980).
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APPENDIX D
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND LOCAL TERMS
ALH i Agricultural Labourer Household.
AWL : Agricultural Wage Labourer.
Aratdar : Stockist 
Abvab : Illegal exactions.
Aman : a) Broad Cast - deep water variety of Paddy, highly photo­
sensitive, sown from February to April on 
land usually flooded from 1 to 3 metres deep, 
harvested in October-Decemb er. 
b) Transplant : Transplanted on puddled land from July to 
September and harvested from November to 
early January (Major Aman variety).
Akika : Muslim equivalent of christening.
Aush : Early monsoon crop harvested in July and August. Either 
broadcast or transplanted.
Bargadar : Share-croppers 
Biri : Indig.eneous igarettes.
Boro : Transplanted from December to February and harvested from 
late March to end of June.
Bhar : Sling to carry buskets/weights.
BADC : Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation
BBS : Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
BWDB : Bangladesh Water Development Board *
BARC : Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council 
BARD : Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development 
BIDS : Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies 
Bichitra i Weekly Newspaper.
Bepari : Merchant.
Bazar i Daily Market.
Baithak Khana : Seating Room
Comilla Model : Co-operative model of rural development 
ioneered in the district of Comilla 
since 1960s.
CO (Dev) : Circle Officer (Development) - highest level executive
officer at Thana.
C.I. Sheet: Corrogated Iron Sheet( Generally known as 'Tin Sheet'in Bangladesh).
CO (Rev) : Circle Officer (Revenue) - ighest level evenue
fficer at Thana.
Char : Accreted land from river.
C/W Ratio : Consumer/Worker Ratio.
Chaprashi : Orderly/bearer.
CSS : Centre for Social Studies, University of Dhaka 
Chehlum : Commemorative feast to mark death (Muslim).
Dainik Desh : Daily Newspaper (Bengali)
Dalai : To work as a broker/intermediary 
Dhani Chashi/Dhani Grihastha : Rich farmer.
Dophar : Wooden platform attached to the plough.
Dao : Chopper
Donga/Hossa : Water Scoop
Daroga : Police Inspector
Debottar : Hindu religious endowment.
Daisudi : Credit arrangment under which the tenant gives a loan to 
the landowner against a mortgage of land which he can 
cultivate untill the loan is repaid.
District : Administrative unit above the subdivision
Division : Administrative unit above the district
DCR : Development of Capitalism in Russia (Lenin, 1977a)
DTW : Deep Tube Well
EBSATA ; East Bengal State Acquisition & Tenancy Act, 1950. 
E~Criterion : Exploitation Criterion.
EPW : Economic and Political Weekly.
Fala/Fal : Pointed iron sheet placed over the wooden platform (dophar)
of the plough.
FFYP : First Five Year Plan 
Faria : Itenerant trader.
FY : Financial Year
Feri Ghat : Launch/Steamer/Boat terminal at the river bank,
G = Prefix G indicates a household from study village-2 (Gopinathpur)
GOBD s Government of Bangladesh
GOB : Government of Bengal
GOEP : Government of East Pakistan
GOP : Government of Pakistan
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Gs/O : Grand Son of
Gram Sarker : Village government (literally).
Gram Sarker Prodhan : Chief of Village government.
Gomosta : Employee of Zamindars
Guerilla method of data collection : Unconventional method of data
collection.
H = Prefex H indicates household from study village-2 (Hats?hahar)
HDC : How to Differentiate Classes.
HYV : High Yielding Vareity.
HH : Household.
Haoladar/Gatnidar/Taluqdar : Quasi landlords 
IRDP : Integrated Rural Development Programme.
ILO : International labour office.
Jotedar : Stratum next to landlords and quasi landlords.
Kbailcalashi : Tenancy arrangement in which the tenant pays rent in 
advance to the landowner and enjoys the rights of 
cultivation of the land for certain specified years.
Koolee : Labour who carries weight
Krishak i Farmar
Krishi Bank : Agricultural Bank.
Kishan : Agricultural labourer
Kishan Sobha : 'Agricultural labourers Association’ - frontal 
organisation of Communist Party of India.
Khas land : Government land.
Kulaks : The rich Peasants.
Kherer Pala ; Pile of fodder.
Khurpi : Small spade used to weed grasses.
Kaste : Sickle.
Kural : Axe.
Kurbani : Muslim festival to sacrifice animals.
LLHII : Landless Households.
Md : Maund - Unit of weight = 1/27 of a Ton.
Matbar : Faction leader.
Moi : Leveller
Mir : Co-operatives - Council of elders who exercised the responsibilities
of Obshchina in Russia.
Malik : Landlowners.
MESW : Marx and Engels selected works.
MECW : Marx and Engels collected works.
MHH :.Middle Households (Middle Peasants).
Mouza : Demarcated territorial unit designated as a mouza having 
separate jurisdictions list number (JL No.) A mouza may 
include more than one village.
NEP i New Economic Policy.
Naib : Rent collector 
Nankar : 'Corvee1
Nazrana : Compulsory cash present demanded by landlords from peasants 
before renting out land to them. Also means 'bribe' to Govt, 
officials.
Nangla : Harrow
OC : Officer in Charge (Head of the Police Station)
Obshchina : Unit responsible to the landlord for peasant rent payments 
and/or for the organisations of peasant work on the land of 
landlord prior to abolition of serfdom in Russia).
Pan : Betel Ieaf.
PXDE : Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
PDT : Preliminary Draft Thesis.
Pucca : Brick laid.
Panta ; Watered rice, left over the night before.
Raiyat ; Tenant.
Rocti : Course flour (Baked)
SFYP i Second Five Year Plan.
Salami : Non-refundable lumpsum payable by a leasee before taking 
possession.
Sudkhor : One who lives on usury interest (literally) - Money lender. 
Salish : Dispute adjudication.
Sepoy : Ordinary Police.
S/o : Son of 
Sardar : Leader
Sradii : Commemorative feast to mark death (Hindu).
Tebhaga . : Three shares, literally.
Thana : Administrative unit above union
TCCA : Thana Central Cooperative Association.
Tahsil : Basic Revenue Collection Unit.
Tahsilder : Revenue Collector at Tahsil level.
Tk : Unit of currencies equivalent to 2.5 pence.
TYP : Two Year Plan.
UP : Union Parishad.
Uchu Langsha : High family status.
Union i Basic administrative unit.
Waqful Lillah : Muslim religious endowment devoted to public welfair. 
Zamindar : Landlord created by Permanent Settlement of 1795.
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